THIRD DIVISION
|
SPOUSES DANILO T. SAMONTE
and ROSALINDA N. SAMONTE, Petitioners, - versus - CENTURY SAVINGS BANK, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 176413
Present:
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: November
25, 2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated September 27, 2006 and Resolution[2]
dated January 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86875. The assailed decision affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[3]
Decision[4]
dated
The
facts are as follows:
Petitioners Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda N.
Samonte obtained a loan amounting to P1,500,000.00 from respondent
Century Savings Bank secured by a Real Estate Mortgage[7]
over a property located at
Having
failed to redeem the property, petitioners entered into a Contract of Lease[9] with
respondent, wherein the former agreed to pay the latter a monthly rental of P10,000.00
for and in consideration of their continuing occupation of the subject property
from January 16, 2001-January 16, 2002. Petitioners further acknowledged
respondent’s valid and legal title to enter into the contract as absolute owner
of the property in question.[10]
On
March 28, 2001, respondent consolidated its ownership over the property, which
led to the cancellation of petitioners’ title and the issuance of a new one in
respondent’s name.[11]
Of
the agreed monthly rentals, petitioners only paid a total amount of P40,000.00. On April 4, 2002, respondent sent a letter[12]
to petitioners demanding that the latter pay their unpaid rentals and vacate
the leased premises. Petitioners, however, refused to heed the demand. Hence, the complaint for ejectment docketed
as Civil Case No. 79002.
In
their Answer,[13]
petitioners admitted having entered into the contract of lease but claimed that
it was void, since their consent was vitiated by mistake and they were made to
believe that it was a requirement for the loan-restructuring agreement with the
bank. To justify their failure to pay
the rents and to vacate the premises, petitioners insisted on the nullity of
the foreclosure proceedings.
Petitioners
had, in fact, commenced an action for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1564.[14]
On
May 6, 2004, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Century
Savings Bank Corporation. Defendants
spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda
N. Samonte and all persons
unlawfully withholding subject property located at
1. To immediately vacate subject property and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff;
2.
To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, P80,000.00
as monthly rental in arrears plus P10,000.00 per month as reasonable
compensation for their continued use and
occupancy of subject premises starting 16 January 2002 until they
actually vacate and surrender possession to it;
3.
To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, P10,000.00
as Attorney’s fees; and
4. To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the cost of suits.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MeTC decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 67,
SO
ORDERED.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA. They insisted
that the ejectment case should await the result of the separate action they
instituted for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. They likewise
contended that should the court declare respondent entitled to the possession
of the subject property, the same should be provisional and subject to the
court’s decision in the nullification case. Lastly, they questioned the award
of back rentals as they were allegedly awarded based on incorrect computation.[17]
On
Hence, the instant petition.
The only issue for determination is whether the instant
ejectment case should be suspended pending the resolution of the action for
nullity of foreclosure.
We answer in the negative.
As a general rule,
an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another
action raising ownership of the property as an issue.[18] The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in
the following precedents:
1. Injunction
suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal
trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate the latter; and
neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).
2. An
"accion publiciana" does
not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]).
3. A
"writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal
issue before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution
of the judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is
the material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.;
etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).
4. An
action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit
involving the same property (Quimpo v. de
la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).
5. Suits
for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to
compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito
v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales
v. CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander
Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]).
6. An
action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one
of sale with pacto de retro) does not
suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]).
7. An
action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits
regarding the same property (Del Rosario
v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963]; Salinas
v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz
v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon
v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching
v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine
Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604
[1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608
[1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al.,
[annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither
do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property
operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable
mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping
v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annulment of title],
170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison
[annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177
SCRA 288 [1989]).[19]
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the
outcome of a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,[20]
and Amagan v. Marayag,[21]
we ordered the suspension of the ejectment proceedings on considerations of
equity. We explained that the ejectment
of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create
confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and expense.[22]
Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and effort by proceeding to a
stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the result of
enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.[23]
In the present case, petitioners were the previous owners
of the subject property. However, they
lost their right over the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
wherein respondent emerged as the highest bidder. Petitioners, however, remained in possession
thereof as lessees in a contract of lease executed after the expiration of the
redemption period. For failure to pay the stipulated rents, respondent
commenced an action for ejectment.
Petitioners, in turn, instituted a case for the nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings involving the same property. When the ejectment case
reached the CA, petitioners sought the suspension of the proceedings solely by
reason of the pendency of the nullification case.
Given these factual antecedents, the instant case hardly
falls within the exception cited in Vda. de
Legaspi and Amagan as the
resolution of the ejectment suit will not result in the demolition of the
leased premises.[24]
Verily, petitioners failed to show “strong reasons of equity” to sustain the
suspension or dismissal of the ejectment case. Faced with the same scenario on
which the general rule is founded, and finding no reason to deviate therefrom,
the Court adheres to settled jurisprudence that suits involving ownership may
not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment.[25]
This rule is not without good reason. If
the rule were otherwise, ejectment cases could easily be frustrated through the
simple expedient of filing an action contesting the ownership over the property
subject of the controversy. This would
render nugatory the underlying philosophy of the summary remedy of ejectment
which is to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to
discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the
property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to
assert their claims.[26]
We are not unmindful of the afflictive consequences that
will be suffered by petitioners if the ejectment is ordered, only to be
reinstated later if they eventually win the nullification of the foreclosure
case. However, respondent will also
suffer an injustice if denied the remedy of ejectment, resort to which is not
only allowed but, in fact, encouraged by law.[27]
We would like to stress
that unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land
or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without
prejudice to the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of juridical
possession in appropriate proceedings.[28]
These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who
would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession.[29]
In these cases, the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of
ownership are provisional in nature.[30]
The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be
clothed with finality.[31]
In any case, we sustain
the finding that respondent has the better right to possess the subject
property. The Contract of Lease executed by petitioners and respondent remains
valid. It is undisputed that petitioners failed to comply with the terms
thereof by their failure to pay the stipulated rent. As lessor of the subject
property, respondent has the right to demand that petitioners pay their unpaid
obligations and, in case of their failure, that they vacate the premises. Considering that the lease contract has long
expired, with more reason should respondent be allowed to recover the subject
property.
There is also no doubt
that the plaintiff in the ejectment case (respondent herein) is entitled to
damages caused by the loss of the use and possession of the premises.[32]
We quote with approval the appellate court’s findings, viz.:
On the matter of whether the
court a quo erred in the computation
of the amounts awarded, representing back rentals and reasonable value for the use
and occupation of the premises, We rule in the negative.
The award of back rentals
amounting to Php80,000.00 and Php10,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the
continued use and occupation of the property is proper.
As stated in the decision of the court
a quo, to which We agree, the monthly
rentals in arrears amounted to Php80,000.00 as of
Inevitably, no error can be
imputed to the court a quo when it
ordered petitioners to pay respondent jointly and severally the amount of
Php80,000.00 as monthly rental in arrears plus Php10,000.00 per month as
reasonable compensation for the continued use and occupancy of the property
starting January 16, 2002 until they actually vacate and surrender possession
of the property to respondent.[33]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 226-238.
[2]
[3] Branch CXXXIX (139),
[4] Penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Pozon; rollo, pp. 132-139.
[5] Branch 67,
[6] Penned by Pairing Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua; rollo, pp. 127-131.
[7] Rollo, pp. 37-40.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] The case is now the subject of review by the Court in G.R. No. 176212.
[15] Rollo, p. 131.
[16]
[17] CA rollo, pp. 008-022.
[18] Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486, 489 (2000).
[19] Palattao v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil. 438, 447-448 (2002).
[20] G.R. No. L-40437, September 27, 1977, 79 SCRA 135.
[21] Supra note 18.
[22] Amagan v. Marayag, id., at 499.
[23]
[24] Palattao
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at 449.
[25]
[26] Feliciano v. CA, 350 Phil. 499, 507 (1998).
[27]
[28] Palattao v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19, at 446-447; Amagan v. Marayag, supra note 18, at 495.
[29] Palattao v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 447; Amagan v. Marayag, supra, at 495.
[30] Palattao v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 447; Amagan v. Marayag, supra, at 495.
[31] Samuel
Malabanan v. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., G.R. No. 163495,
[32]
[33] Rollo, p. 237.