SECOND DIVISION
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SPS. ISAGANI CASTRO and |
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G.R. No. 168940 |
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DIOSDADA CASTRO, |
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Petitioners, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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CARPIO,* J., |
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Chairperson, |
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ANGELINA DE LEON TAN, |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** |
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SPS. CONCEPCION T. CLEMENTE |
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BRION, |
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and ALEXANDER C. CLEMENTE, |
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SPS. ELIZABETH T. CARPIO and |
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ABAD, JJ. |
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ALVIN CARPIO, SPS. MARIE ROSE |
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T. SOLIMAN and ARVIN SOLIMAN |
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Promulgated: |
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and JULIUS AMIEL TAN, Respondents. |
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November 24, 2009 |
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D e c i s i o n
The imposition
of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and
voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust.
It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation
of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of
justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which
may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained
within the sphere of public or private morals.[1]
In this Petition
for Review on Certiorari,[2] petitioners
assail the October 29, 2004 Decision[3]
and July 18, 2005 Resolution[4]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76842, affirming the June 11,
2002 Decision[5] of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 79, which equitably reduced the stipulated
interest rate in an agreement entered into by the parties from 60% per annum (or
5% per month) to 12% per annum, with the modification that herein respondents
may redeem the mortgaged property notwithstanding the lapse of redemption period
on grounds of equity and substantial justice.
Factual antecedents
Respondent
Angelina de Leon Tan, and her husband Ruben Tan were the former registered
owners of a 240-square meter residential lot, situated at Barrio
Canalate, Malolos, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-8540. On P30,000.00
they obtained from the latter. Under the
Kasulatan, the spouses Tan undertook to pay the mortgage debt within six
months or until
When her husband
died on P30,000.00 plus a portion of the
interest but petitioners refused and instead demanded payment of the total
accumulated sum of P359,000.00.
On
Proceedings
before the Regional Trial Court
On P30,000.00 is unconscionable.[7]
On
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court cannot declare the
mortgage and foreclosure null and void but the x x x Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa x x x herebelow quoted:
2. Na ang nasabing
pagkakautang ay aming babayaran sa loob ng anim (6) na buwan simula sa petsa ng
kasulatang ito o dili kaya ay sa bago dumating ang Agosto 17, 1994 na may
pakinabang na 5% bawat buwan. Na ang
tubo ay aani pa rin ng tubong 5% bawat buwan.
Is
partially rescinded to only 12% interest per annum and additional one percent a
month penalty charges – as liquidated damages beginning February 17, 1994 up to
June 21, 2000 per Delivery of Possession x x x and/or for the defendants to
accept the offer of P200,000.00 by the plaintiffs to redeem or reacquire
the property in litis.
The
Court is not inclined to award moral damages since plaintiffs failed to buttress
her claim of moral damages and/or proof of moral damages. x x x
No
award of attorney’s fees because the general rule is that no [premium] should
be placed on the right to litigate. x x x
The
counterclaim of the defendants is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs
against the defendants.
SO
ORDERED.”[8]
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
Petitioners appealed
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
interest rate stipulated in the Kasulatan
is iniquitous or unconscionable and, thus, its equitable reduction to the
legal rate of 12% per annum is warranted.[9] At the same time, the appellate court declared
that respondents may redeem the mortgaged property notwithstanding the
expiration of the period of redemption, in the interest of substantial justice
and equity.[10] The dispositive portion of said Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that plaintiffs-appellees may redeem the
mortgaged property by paying the defendants-appellants spouses Isagani and
Diosdada Castro the amount of P30,000.00, with interest thereon at 12%
per annum from
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners’ Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Issues
Hence, the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE INTEREST RATE VOLUNTARILY
AGREED UPON BY THE PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS AND EXPRESSLY STIPULATED IN THE
CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THEM.
2.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN MAKING A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS
AND RESPONDENTS BY UNILATERALLY CHANGING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE
CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THEM.
3.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN EXTENDING THE PERIOD OF REDEMPTION IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS IN VIOLATION OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL PROVISIONS
OF ACT NO. 3135 PROVIDING A PERIOD OF ONLY ONE YEAR FOR THE REDEMPTION OF A
FORECLOSED REAL PROPERTY.[12]
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend
that with the removal by the Bangko Sentral of the ceiling on the rate
of interest that may be stipulated in a contract of loan,[13]
the lender and the borrower could validly agree on any interest rate on loans. Thus, the Court of Appeals gravely erred when
it declared the stipulated interest in the Kasulatan as null as if there
was no express stipulation on the compounded interest.[14]
Respondents’
Arguments
On the other
hand, respondents assert that the appellate court correctly struck down the said
stipulated interest for being excessive and contrary to morals, if not against
the law.[15] They also
point out that a contract has the force of law between the parties, but only
when the terms, clauses and conditions thereof are not contrary to law, morals,
public order or public policy.[16]
Our Ruling
The petition
lacks merit.
The Court of Appeals correctly
found that the 5% monthly interest, compounded monthly, is unconscionable and should
be equitably reduced to the legal rate of 12% per annum.
While we agree
with petitioners that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate
on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 which
suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, it is
also worth stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be
declared illegal. There is certainly nothing
in said circular which grants lenders carte
blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either
enslave their borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.[17]
In several
cases, we have ruled that stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable
interests are contrary to morals, if not against the law. In Medel
v. Court of Appeals,[18] we annulled a stipulated 5.5% per
month or 66% per annum interest on a P500,000.00 loan and a 6% per month
or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan, respectively, for being
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Ruiz
v. Court of Appeals,[19] we declared a 3% monthly
interest imposed on four separate loans to be excessive. In both cases, the interest rates were reduced
to 12% per annum.
In this case, the
5% monthly interest rate, or 60% per annum, compounded monthly, stipulated in
the Kasulatan is even higher than the
3% monthly interest rate imposed in the Ruiz
case. Thus, we similarly hold the 5%
monthly interest to be excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, contrary
to morals, and the law. It is therefore
void ab initio for being violative of Article 1306[20]
of the Civil Code. With this, and in
accord with the Medel and Ruiz cases, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed
the legal interest of 12% per annum in place of the excessive interest stipulated
in the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals did not unilaterally change the terms and
conditions of the Contract of Mortgage entered into between the petitioners and
the respondents.
Petitioners
allege that the Kasulatan was entered
into by the parties freely and voluntarily.[21] They maintain that there was already a meeting
of the minds between the parties as regards the principal amount of the loan, the
interest thereon and the property given as security for the payment of the
loan, which must be complied with in good faith.[22] Hence, they assert that the Court of Appeals should
have given due respect to the provisions of the Kasulatan.[23] They also stress that it is a settled
principle that the law will not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise,
foolish or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities
and with full awareness of what he was doing.[24]
Petitioners’
contentions deserve scant consideration.
In Abe v. Foster Wheeler
Corporation,[25] we
held that the freedom of contract is not absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
morals, safety and welfare. One such
legislative regulation is found in Article 1306 of the Civil Code which allows
the contracting parties to “establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.”
To reiterate, we
fully agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that the compounded interest
rate of 5% per month, is iniquitous and unconscionable. Being a void stipulation, it is deemed
inexistent from the beginning. The debt
is to be considered without the stipulation of the iniquitous and
unconscionable interest rate.
Accordingly, the legal interest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu
of the excessive interest stipulated in the agreement, in line with our ruling
in Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,[26]
thus:
The foregoing rates of interests and surcharges
are in accord with Medel vs. Court of
Appeals, Garcia vs. Court of Appeals,
Bautista vs. Pilar Development
Corporation, and the recent case of Spouses
Solangon vs. Salazar. This Court invalidated a stipulated 5.5% per month or
66% per annum interest on a P500,000.00 loan in Medel and a 6% per month or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00
loan in Solangon for being excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In both cases, we reduced the
interest rate to 12% per annum. We held that while the Usury Law has been
suspended by Central Bank Circular No. 905, s. 1982, effective on P142,326.43
loan, and in Garcia vs. Court of Appeals,
sustained the agreement of the parties to a 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00
loan. It is on the basis of these cases that we reduce the 36% per annum
interest to 12%. An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and
reasonable. While it is true that this Court invalidated a much higher interest
rate of 66% per annum in Medel and
72% in Solangon it has sustained the
validity of a much lower interest rate of 21% in Bautista and 24% in Garcia.
We still find the 36% per annum interest rate in the case at bar to be
substantially greater than those upheld by this Court in the two (2) aforecited
cases. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
From the
foregoing, it is clear that there is no unilateral alteration of the terms and
conditions of the Kasulatan entered
into by the parties. Surely, it is more
consonant with justice that the subject interest rate be equitably reduced and
the legal interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.[27]
The additional 1% per month penalty awarded as liquidated damages does
not have any legal basis.
In its June 11,
2002 Decision,[28]
the trial court granted an additional 1% per month penalty as liquidated
damages[29]
beginning February 17, 1994 up to June 21, 2000.[30] Since respondents did not file their
appellees’ brief despite notice, the appellate court declared this to be not in
issue.[31]
Although the issue
of the liquidated damages was not presented squarely in either Memorandum of
the parties, this does not prevent us from ruling on the matter. In the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction,
we are clothed with ample authority to review findings and rulings of lower
courts even if they are not assigned as errors.
This is especially so if we find that their consideration is necessary
in arriving at a just decision of the case.
We have consistently held that an unassigned error closely related to an
error properly assigned, or upon which a determination of the question raised
by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered notwithstanding
the failure to assign it as an error.[32]
On this premise, we deem it proper to
pass upon the matter of liquidated damages.
Article 2226 of
the Civil Code provides that “[L]iquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract,
to be paid in case of breach thereof.”
In the instant
case, a cursory reading of the Kasulatan would
show that it is devoid of any stipulation with respect to liquidated
damages. Neither did any of the parties allege
or prove the existence of any agreement on liquidated damages. Hence, for want of any stipulation on
liquidated damages in the Kasulatan entered
into by the parties, we hold that the liquidated damages awarded by the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals to be without legal basis and must be
deleted.
The foreclosure proceedings held on
The Court of
Appeals modified the judgment of the trial court by holding that respondents,
in the interest of substantial justice and equity, may redeem the mortgaged
property notwithstanding the lapse of the period of redemption.
Petitioners
argue that this cannot be done because the right of redemption had long expired
and same is no longer possible beyond the one-year period provided under Act
No. 3135.[33]
On the other
hand, respondents insist that to disallow them to redeem the property would
render meaningless the declaration that the stipulated interest is null and
void.
It is undisputed
that sometime after the maturity of the loan, respondent Tan attempted to pay
the mortgage debt of P30,000.00 as principal and some interest. Said offer was refused by petitioners because
they demanded payment of the total accumulated amount of P359,000.00.[34] Moreover, the trial court also mentioned an
offer by respondent Tan of the amount of P200,000.00 to petitioners in
order for her to redeem or re-acquire the property in litis.[35]
From these, it
is evident that despite considerable effort on her part, respondent Tan failed
to redeem the mortgaged property because she was unable to raise the total
amount of P359,000.00, an amount grossly inflated by the excessive
interest imposed. Thus, it is only
proper that respondents be given the opportunity to repay the real amount of
their indebtedness.
In the case of Heirs of Zoilo Espiritu v. Landrito,[36] which is on all
fours with the instant case, we held that:
Since
the Spouses Landrito, the debtors in this case, were not given an opportunity
to settle their debt, at the correct amount and without the iniquitous interest
imposed, no foreclosure proceedings may be instituted. A judgment
ordering a foreclosure sale is conditioned upon a finding on the correct amount
of the unpaid obligation and the failure of the debtor to pay the said
amount. In this case, it has not yet
been shown that the Spouses Landrito had already failed to pay the correct amount
of the debt and, therefore, a foreclosure sale cannot be conducted in order to
answer for the unpaid debt. The
foreclosure sale conducted upon their failure to pay P874,125.00 in 1990
should be nullified since the amount demanded as the outstanding loan was
overstated; consequently it has not been shown that the mortgagors – the
Spouses Landrito, have failed to pay their outstanding obligation. x x x
As a result, the subsequent registration of the
foreclosure sale cannot transfer any rights over the mortgaged property to the
Spouses Espiritu. The registration of
the foreclosure sale, herein declared invalid, cannot vest title over the
mortgaged property. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
On this basis, we
nullify the foreclosure proceedings held on
Anent the
allegation of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in extending the
period of redemption, same has been rendered moot in view of the nullification
of the foreclosure proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2004 as well as the Resolution dated
July 18, 2005 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award
of 1% liquidated damages per month be DELETED and that petitioners are ORDERED
to reconvey the subject property to respondents conditioned upon the payment of
the loan together with the rate of interest fixed herein.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO
C.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 775 dated
**
Additional member per Special Order
No. 776 dated
[1] See Ibarra v.
Aveyro, 37 Phil. 273, 282 (1917).
[2] Rollo,
pp. 9-21.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Id at 213.
[16] Id at 214.
[17] Cuaton v. Salud, G.R. No. 158382,
[18] 359
Phil. 820 (1998).
[19] 449
Phil. 419 (2003).
[20] Article 1306 of
the Civil Code provides:
The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
[21] Rollo,
p. 199.
[22]
[23] Id at 200.
[24] Id at 201.
[25] Nos.
L-14785 and L-14923, 110 Phil. 198, 203 (1960).
[26] Supra
note 19.
[27] Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, 412 Phil.
816, 823 (2001).
[28] Rollo, pp. 48-82.
[29]
[30] This is the
date the Sheriff delivered possession to the petitioners of the subject
property by virtue of a Writ of Possession.
[31] Rollo,
p. 11.
[32] Cuaton v. Salud, supra note 17, at 283.
[33] Rollo,
p. 201.
[34] Rollo, p. 146.
[35]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court cannot
declare the mortgage and foreclosure null and void but the documents [sic] Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa x x x
x x x x
Is
partially rescinded to only 12% interest per annum and additional one percent a
month penalty charges – as liquidated damage beginning P200,000.00 by the plaintiffs to redeem or
reacquire the property in litis. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
[36] G.R.
No. 169617,