|
JUDGE
ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner, - versus - HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary, Office of the President; Former DOJ SECRETARY HERNANDO
B. PEREZ (now substituted by the Incumbent DOJ Secretary RAUL GONZALES);
Former PROV. PROS. AMANDO C. VICENTE
(now substituted by the
Incumbent PROV. PROS. ALFREDO L. GERONIMO); PROS. BENJAMIN R. CARAIG,
Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL T. VISTAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
165276 Present: CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: November
25, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review,[1]
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the February 13, 2004 Decision[2]
and September 16, 2004 Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019.
The facts of the case, as alleged by
petitioner and likewise adopted by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14) year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the care of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four.
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the latter letters.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family who were regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would frequently run to the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day subsistence to the medical and hospital expenses of his children.
In the evening of
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy
with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on
In the evening of that day,
On
Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
From
In the early morning of
Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously, selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-being and development.
Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
In a Resolution dated
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
On
Petitioner then filed a Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice on
In a Resolution dated
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[10]
The
CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine
of qualified political agency, to wit:
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt petitioner’s case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself.[11]
Moreover,
the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not
warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of
PD No. 1829.[12]
Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when it dismissed the complaint
for violation for RA No. 7610 as the
same was not attended by grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13]
which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution dated
Hence,
herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MICHAEL VISTAN.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF R.A. 7610 (CHILD
ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.[14]
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner's
arguments have no leg to stand on. They
are mere suppositions without any basis in law.
Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an
invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President
and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost
unfettered power.[15] This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority
to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well
within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been
established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”[16] The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any
error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum
Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
As
early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,[17]
this Court has recognized and adopted from American jurisprudence this
doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[18]
Memorandum
Circular No. 58,[19]
promulgated by the Office of the President on
In the interest of the speedy administration
of justice, the guidelines enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November
1983) on the review by the Office of the President of
resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning
preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and
clarified.
No
appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for
review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the Office of the
President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be
dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set
the limits of his power to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum
Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or
abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion[20] is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's
power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems
necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of
justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – his own
alter ego.
Nonetheless,
the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than the Constitution provides for
restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear:
x
x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible
under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative
acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by
him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3,
sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy
(par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[21]
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain
embodied in our fundamental law. There are certain presidential powers which
arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the
suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.[22] The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and
the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination
of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.[23]
The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional
import.[24]
In the case at bar, the power of the President to
review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the preliminary
investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same
exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not
fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an
appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of
reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of
Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the
other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every
decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s expertise in
said matter.
In Constantino, Jr. v.
Cuisia,[25]
this Court discussed the predicament of imposing upon the President duties
which ordinarily should be delegated to a cabinet member, to wit:
The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.
If, as petitioners
would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the
foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country
long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the
propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many
methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and
more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the
documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the
very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the
holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government.[26]
Based
on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s
position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the
President, notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are
not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the
Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the
government’s principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the
government’s prosecution arm and administers the government’s criminal justice
system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the
correctional system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise.[27] These are known
functions of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and,
thus, within the Chief Executive's power of control.
Petitioner’s contention that
Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter
1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control
over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No.
58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.[28] Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been
reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said
Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President.
Anent the second
ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit.
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a
violation of Section 1(e) of PD No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as
follows:
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by
obstructing the service of processes or court orders or disturbing proceedings
in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the courts. x x x
Specifically, petitioner
contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed the service of a
court process, particularly the warrant of arrest.[29]
This Court does not agree.
There is no
jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Notwithstanding
petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of the said
issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken by
petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on "obstruction of
justice,” in the wise:
x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a
member of the bench to argue that unserved warrants are tantamount to another
violation of the law re: "obstruction of justice." Petitioner is like
saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another offense of
“obstruction of justice” if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the
former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after
its life – and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction
of justice." What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again
unserved during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking
of petitioner, another or a second charge of "obstruction of justice"
should be filed against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued on
this second charge is not served, again, a third charge of "obstruction of
justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus,
petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for
"obstruction of justice" is counting and/or countless, unless and
until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily surrendered. We, therefore,
find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and spirit of
the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x[30]
As correctly
observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do not
warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of
PD No. 1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented
by petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the
person of the accused makes the latter a fugitive
from justice and is not equivalent to a commission of another offense of
obstruction of justice.[31]
Petitioner,
however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it is
applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself.[32]
Petitioner thus contends that where the
“law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”[33]
Again, this Court
does not agree.
Petitioner
conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction
that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.[34]
Courts must not bring cases
within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can
be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no
person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within
them.[35]
Any reasonable doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused.[36]
Indeed, if the law
is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the
offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In
any case, this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it
may be, is nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the case at bar.
Lastly, petitioner
argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610. Said Section
reads:
Any person
who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development,
including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
On this note, the
Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor
to file the information for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, of RA No.
7610, gave the following reasons:
APPROVED
for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The
recommendation to file an information for viol. of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M.
Vistan is hereby denied. The affidavit
of Ma. Mercedes Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found
happiness and peace of mind away from the complainant and in the company of her
relatives, including her brother, respondent Michael Vistan. How can her
joining the brother be prejudicial to her with such statement?[37]
Said finding was
affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation
and Shig Katamaya v. Hon. Hernando B. Perez et. al,[38]
where this Court emphasized the executive nature of preliminary investigations,
to wit:
x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of
an information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the
public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court considers it sound judicial policy to
refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations and to
leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy,
courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on
the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, petitioners will prevail only if they can show that the CA erred in not
holding that public respondent’s resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.[39]
Were the acts of
the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with grave abuse
of discretion?
By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act not at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[40]
Based on the
foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their conclusion of lack
of probable cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself. The
reasons for the cause of action were stated clearly and sufficiently. Was their
reliance on the victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion?
This Court does not think so.
While petitioner would argue that the victim was
"brainwashed" by respondent into executing the affidavit,[41]
this Court finds no conclusive proof thereof. Besides, even if their reliance
on the victim’s affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary that not every
erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of discretion.[42]
As such, this Court will not interfere with the said findings of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice absent a clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion. The determination of
probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to
the prosecutor and ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive
function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that this Court will
not pass upon absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Andres
B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado
[3] Rollo, p. 19.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] PENALIZING
OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS,
[8] AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
[9] Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Villena
v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 463
(1939).
[17]
[18] Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 464. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19] Reiterating and Clarifying the
Guidelines Set Forth in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (
[20] Rollo, p. 8.
[21] Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 462-463.
[22] Constantino,
Jr. v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Title III, Justice, Chapter
1, GENERAL PROVISIONS:
1.
Section 1. Declaration of
Policy. - It is the declared policy of the State to provide the government
with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel and
prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system;
implement the laws on the admission and stay of aliens, citizenship, land
titling system, and settlement of land problems involving small landowners and
members of indigenous cultural minorities; and provide free legal services to
indigent members of the society.
2.
Section 2. Mandate. - The
Department shall carry out the policy declared in the preceding section.
3.
Section 3. Powers and Functions.
- To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the following powers and
functions:
4.
(1) Act as
principal law agency of the government and as legal counsel and representative
thereof, whenever so required;
[28] Villena v. Secretary of Interior, supra note 16, at 463.
[29] Rollo, p. 11.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 208, citing People v. Subido, 66 SCRA 545 (1975). People v. Yu Jai, 99 Phil. 725 (1956); People v. Terrado, 125 SCRA 648 (1983), and other cases.
[35]
[36]
[37] Rollo, pp. 83-84. (Refer to handwritten annotation.)
[38] G.R.
No. 169026,
[39]
[40] Estrada v. Desierto, 487 Phil. 169, 182 (2004).
[41] Rollo, p. 13.
[42] Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 40, at 188.