SECOND DIVISION
LARRY
V. CAMINOS, JR., G.R.
No. 147437
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO
MORALES, J.*
Chairperson,
-
versus - TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR.,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,** and
BRION,
JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent.
May
8, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I
O N
Tinga, J.:
The right
of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other
motorists is mutual,
coordinate and reciprocal.[1] He is
bound to
anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway
are equal to his own.[2] Although he is not an insurer against injury
to persons or property,[3]
it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and
reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others[4]
as well as for his own.[5]
This
Petition for Review[6] seeks
the reversal of the Decision[7]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated
The case is
rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of
The force
exerted by petitioner’s car heaved
which, it
seems, was able to keep its momentum and general direction even upon impact—was
stalled along Ortigas
Avenue a few feet away from the
intersection and facing the direction of San Juan whereas Arnold’s car had
settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue with its rear facing the meeting
point of the median lines of the intersecting streets at a 45-degree angle.[19]
At the close of the investigation, a
traffic accident investigation report (TAIR)[20]
was forthwith issued by P/Cpl. Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District.
The report revealed that at the time of the collision,
Petitioner
was subsequently charged before the
property.[24]
He entered a negative plea on arraignment.[25]
At the
ensuing trial, Patrolman Santos admitted having executed the sketch which
depicts the post-collision positions of the two vehicles.[26]
Antonio
Litonjua (Antonio), the father of P73,962.00. The necessary works on the car, according to Antonio, had
not been performed by SKB Motors because the needed materials had not been
delivered.[31]
Meanwhile, SKB Motors allegedly ceased in its operation, so Antonio procured
another repair estimation this time from Fewkes Corporation.[32] The estimation report was dated P139,294.00.[33]
Ricardo Abrencia, resident manager of Fewkes Corporation, admitted that he
personally made and signed the said estimation report and that Antonio had
already delivered a check representing the payment for half of the total
assessment.[34]
Petitioner,
the lone defense witness, was a company driver in the employ of Fortune
Tobacco, Inc. assigned to drive for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who
was with him at the time of the incident. In an effort to exonerate himself
from liability, he imputed negligence to
In its P139,294.00 as well as a fine in
the same amount.
The
Court of Appeals agreed with the factual findings of the trial court. In its Decision dated
This
notwithstanding, petitioner was still unsatisfied with the ruling of the
appellate court. Seeking an acquittal, he filed the present petition for review
in which he maintains
The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment,[38]
argues that petitioner’s negligence is the proximate cause of the collision and
that Arnold Litonjua’s negligence was contributory to the accident which,
however, does not bar recovery of damages.
Additionally, it recommends the reduction of both the fine and the civil
indemnity as the same are beyond what the prosecution was able to prove at the
trial.
The
Court denies the petition.
Reckless imprudence generally defined
by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.[39]
Imprudence connotes a deficiency of
action. It implies a failure in
precaution or a failure to take the
necessary precaution once the danger or
peril becomes foreseen.[40] Thus, something more than mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of
reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.[41] Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the
safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held
to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another,
either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.[42]
Hence, in prosecutions for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers
of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies
in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle,[43]
and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an
act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is without malice; (d)
that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender.[44]
Among the elements constitutive of
the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the
conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act
without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which
supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere
negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.[45]
This, because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is
all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the
accused,[46] that
is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be
considered likewise at fault.
Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code,
however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing damage to property
may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal
prosecutions, the inquiry as to whether the accused could be held liable for
the offense is a question that must be addressed by the facts and circumstances
unique to a given case. Thus, if we must
determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious indifference to
the consequences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the
most fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from petitioner’s contention
that at the time the collision took place, he was carefully driving the car as he
in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed allegedly
was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which under normal conditions could be
considered so safe and manageable as to enable him to bring the car to a full
stop when necessary.
Aside from the entry in the TAIR,
however, which noted petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful, the
physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention.
The photographs taken of
Rate of speed, in connection with
other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining
whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,[47]
and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the
impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred.[48] While an adverse inference may be gathered
with respect to reckless driving[49]
from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances[50]—as
in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the
intersection in excess of lawful speed—such proof raises the presumption of
imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence,[51]
or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the
accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless
or imprudent manner.[52]
We find,
however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as
the physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare
assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well within what is
controllable. Indeed, the facts of this
case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the junction, was
traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his
testimony. Insofar as such facts are
consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.[53]
Speeding,
moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to
exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is
necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case
but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle
under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.[54] This standard of reasonableness is actually
contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.
It states:
SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
Even apart
from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with all the conditions encountered [55]
which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever
necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using
the highway. [56]
It is must
be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the
motorist is approaching an intersection.
Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an
intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when
driving elsewhere in a street or highway.[57] A driver approaching an intersection is
generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle
under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible notice,[58] that is, he must look for vehicles that might
be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.[59]
Since
compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has
exercised the level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with
more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the
intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. In other words, where the view at an
intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view
to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would
dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the
intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision,[60]
which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost caution until it is
determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible[61]
so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see
ahead.[62]
On this
score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own admission
that he had not seen
It can only
be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the
standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway
in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own safety
whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. Since he is chargeable with what he should
have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the
circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had
inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and
reasonable motorist.
In general,
the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in
exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of
all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the
dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result
from the use of the vehicle.[63]
In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution
and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road[64]
which are open to ordinary observation.[65] The ultimate test, in other words, is to be
found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care
is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually
foresee the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted
was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary
prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of
a general nature as that suffered was to materialize.[66] The evidence in this case is teeming with
suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision
that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially
considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the
structures on the road. In the same way,
he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking
on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that he was
running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the
physical facts of the case.
Yet,
petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal.
In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of
In traffic law parlance, the term
“right of way” is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful
manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of
direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless
one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other.[67]
Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of
statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision,[68]
it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter,
that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of
way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the
intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such
right without danger of collisions.[69]
In our setting, the right of way rule
is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136,[70] which materially provides:
Section 42. Right of Way.
(a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b) The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this Act. x x x.
The provision governs the situation
when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same direction and one of
them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule embodied in
the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States,
has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach
an intersection from directly opposite directions at approximately the same
time on the same street and one of them attempts to make a left-hand turn into
the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle
making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other.[71]
Nevertheless, the right of way
accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms. It is actually subject to and is affected by
the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection.[72] Thus, whether one of the drivers has the
right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the
highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach
the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if
either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to
occur.[73]
Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our
traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at
approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the
junction substantially in advance of the other.
Whether two vehicles are approaching
the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of the
vehicles enters the intersection first.
Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative
distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered.[74] It is said that two vehicles are approaching
the intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver
approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued
on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the
driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the right of
precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.[75]
Nevertheless, the rule requiring the
driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on
approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to
come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the intersection
with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a
vehicle within the danger zone on his right.[76] He is not bound to wait until there is no
other vehicle on his right in sight
before proceeding to the intersection but only
until it is reasonably safe to
proceed.[77] Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,[78] it was established that a motorist crossing a
thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the
person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on
the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street,
he is bound to give way to the former.
Moreover, in
a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person
who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the
accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense.[79] In fact, even where such driver is said to be
guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of
the accused.[80] In other words, proof that the offended party
was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little
weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused’s
culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent
in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the
intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s contention, will
nevertheless not support an acquittal.
At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules
governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the
purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of
the private offended party.
But it must
be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that
to keep a
proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In
fact, aside from petitioner’s bare and self-serving assertion that Arnold’s
fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his
allegation that it was actually Arnold’s car that came colliding with his car,
there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what
the physical evidence in this case has established. Clearly, it was petitioner’s negligence, as
pointed out by the OSG, that proximately caused the accident.
Finally, on
the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present countervailing
evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by
All told,
it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is such
care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate
with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely
to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate
with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the
particular case,[81]
the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those
circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which
would be open to ordinary observation.[82]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*Acting Chairperson as replacement of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave per Special Order No. 618.
**Additional member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 619.
[1]Richards v. Begenstos, 21 N.W.2d 23; Hodges v. Smith, 298 S.W. 1023; Lawson v. Fordyce, 12 N.W.2d 301.
[3]Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v.
[4]Burdick v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, 124 F.2d 694; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Lane, 116 F.2d 264; Shipley v. Komer, 154 F.2d 861.
[5]Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.
[6]Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 8-23.
[7]Penned
by then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo (now retired Associate Justice,
Supreme Court of the
[8]In
Criminal Case No. 76653. The trial court decision dated
[9]The Mitubishi Super Saloon with plate numbers PDU 403 was registered in the name of Antonio S. Gonzales.
[10]The Volkswagen Karmann Ghia bore plate numbers NTX 617. It was registered in the name of Antonio K. Litonjua, the father of the private offended party, Arnold Litonjua. See Records, Exhibit “E.”
[11]Records, Exhibits “1” and “D”; Rollo, p. 27.
[12]See the Traffic Accident Investigation Report. Records; see also rollo, p. 27.
[13]Rollo, p. 28.
[15]See Records, Exhibits “C”, “C-1”, “C-2”, “C-3” and “C-4.” These exhibits in the form of photographs depict the extent of the damage caused to Arnold Litonjua’s Volkswagen Karmann Ghia.
[16]Rollo, p. 28.
[17]TSN,
[18]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
That on or about the 21st
day of June 1988, in the municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the driver and/or person in charge of the Mitsubishi 4-door
sedan bearing Plate No. PDU 403, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a careless, reckless,
negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid
damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the
said vehicle to bump/collide with a Volkswagen bearing Plate No. NTX 617 being
then driven by one Arnold M. Litonjua and owned by one Antonio K. Litonjua,
thereby causing damage to the latter motor vehicle in the amount of P73,962.00,
to the damage and prejudice of its owner in the aforesaid amount of P73,962.00,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
[26]TSN,
[27]TSN,
[29]TSN,
[31]TSN,
[32]TSN,
[34]TSN,
[36]The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting [in] Damage to Property, and hereby sentences him
to pay a fine of One Hundred Thirty[-nine] Thousand Two Hundred Ninety[-four (P139,294.00)
Pesos which is [the] amount equal to the damage to property resulting from said
Reckless Imprudence.
On
the civil aspect, the accused is hereby ordered to indemnify Antonio Litonjua
the similar amount of One Hundred Thirty[-nine] Thousand Two Hundred
Ninety[-four] (P139,294.00) Pesos for the damages sustained by his motor
vehicle, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
[41]People v. Paarlberg, 612 N.E.2d 106
(1933); People v. Crawford, 467
N.W.2d 818 (1991); Wood v. City of
[42]Wofford v. State, 395 S.E.2d 630 (1990); Shorter v. State, 122 N.E.2d 847 (1954); White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).
[43]7A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 861-862.
[46]People v. Ackroyd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1989).
[48]Knuth v. Murphy, 54 N.W.2d 771. This case held
that evidence of the extent of personal injuries is competent to show the force
of the impact as a basis for an inference of the rate of speed of the vehicle.
[49]
[50]People v. Devoe, 159 N.E. 682; People v.
[52]People v. Herman, 20 N.Y.S.2d 149.
[53]See Woodson v. Germas, 104 S.E.2d 739.
[54]Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128474,
[56]Nunn v. Financial Indem.
[57]Roberts v. Leahy, 214 P.2d 673.
[60]Kane v. Locke, 12 N.W.2d 495;
[61]Matthews v. Patton, 123 A.2d 667.
[62]Henthorn v. M.G.C.Corp., 83 N.W.2d 759.
[65]Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142 S.W.2d 908.
[66]Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645.
[68]Betchkal v. Willis, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985).
[70]
Entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws
Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create a Land
Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes.” The law was approved on
[71]McCarthy v. Beckwith, 141 N.E. 126; Arvo v. Delta Hardware Co., 204 N.W. 134; Cohen v. Silverman, 190 N.W. 795; Webber v. Park Auto Transp. Co., 47 A.L.R. 590.
[72]Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A.2d 792.
[73]Reynolds v. Madison Bus Co., 26 N.W. 2d 653.
[75]
[76]
[78]G.R.
No. 125134,
[80]State v. Sullivan, 277 N.W. 230.