ATTY. NORLINDA R. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2142
AMANTE-DESCALLAR, [OCA-IPI No. 08-2779-RTJ]
Complainant,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Tinga,*
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
JUDGE REINERIO ABRAHAM B.
RAMAS,
Regional Trial Court, Promulgated:
Branch 18,
Respondent. March 20, 2009
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar,
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 18, filed seven
administrative complaints against respondent Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas,
of the same court, for gross ignorance of the law, gross negligence, and
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Misc.
No. 2820, complainant
charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law in relation to Civil Case
No. 3412. She claimed that in the Order
dated August 18, 2006, respondent granted the motion for execution of the
prevailing party by counting the five year period provided in Section 6 of Rule
39 from the counsel’s receipt of the Entry of Judgment. Complainant averred that Rule 39 expressly provides
that the five year period is reckoned from the date of entry of judgment; and
not from the date of receipt by counsel; that jurisprudence is replete with
rulings that a final judgment ceases to be enforceable after that period, but
merely gives the prevailing party a right of action to have the same revived. Hence, respondent should be disciplined for
gross ignorance of the law and violation of Rule 3.02[1]
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[2]
In Misc.
No. 2821, complainant
charged respondent with gross ignorance of the law in relation to the conduct
of the plea bargaining in Criminal Case Nos. 5601-2000 and 5602-2000 both
entitled “People v. Cebedo.” On
pre-trial, the defense offered to enter into plea bargaining by offering to
plead guilty in Crim. Case No. 5602-2000 for possession of seven (7) decks of
shabu in exchange for the withdrawal of Crim. Case No. 5601-2000 for selling
one deck of shabu. The prosecution
agreed and respondent approved the agreement declaring Crim. Case No. 5601-2000
withdrawn[3]
and dismissed as a consequence of plea bargaining.[4]
Complainant
averred that respondent’s conduct was contrary to the provisions on plea
bargaining in Section 2 of Rule 116, Rules on Criminal Procedure[5] and
Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 8493,[6]
and Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98.[7] She argued that it was unclear whether the
offended party consented and whether the prosecutor has proper authority to
enter into such agreement; and that plea bargaining is limited to a plea to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged.[8]
In Misc.
No. 2824, complainant alleged that the validity and propriety of the
plea bargaining in Crim.
Case Nos. 5760-2K, 5761-2K, 5762-2K entitled “People v. Dumpit” and the
dismissal of one case as a consequence thereof are questionable. Respondent approved the plea bargaining
agreement entered into by the prosecution and the accused[9]
and dismissed Crim. Case No. 5760-2K and Crim. Case No. 5762-2K as a
consequence of plea bargaining. Upon
arraignment,[10] accused
pleaded guilty to the sale of shabu. Thereafter,
respondent issued a Decision[11]
finding the accused guilty of selling shabu in Crim. Case No. 5761-2K. The next day, the accused applied for
probation and was released on recognizance.[12]
Complainant also alleged that
respondent was grossly negligent relative to the issuance of Search Warrant No.
40-03[13]
against accused Dumpit which led to the filing of an Information for possession
of shabu docketed as Criminal Case No. 6899.[14] In a Motion to Quash the Information, the
accused challenged the jurisdiction of the court over his person and prayed for
the suppression of the evidence obtained[15] on
ground that Search Warrant No. 40-03 was intended for one Edmun Camello and not
Dometilo. In the Order[16]
dated May 3, 2004, respondent quashed Search Warrant No. 40-03, admitting that
there was indeed an error in the search warrant, particularly the name of the
person subject thereof which rendered it intrinsically void.
Complainant
argued that respondent’s failure to read carefully the contents of the search
warrant before affixing his signature constitutes gross negligence; that any
inadvertence on the part of the stenographer should not be construed to
exonerate the respondent who signed the search warrant without ascertaining the
correctness of its contents; that by such negligence, respondent exposed the
judicial system to ridicule by declaring null and void a search warrant which he
himself issued and likewise caused a blow on the morale of the police officers
who lost the case on a technicality.
In Misc.
No. 2825, complainant assailed the August 2, 2006 Order[17] issued by
respondent dismissing Criminal
Case No. 8149-2K6 entitled People v. Lopez for lack of probable cause. In said case, respondent gave the prosecution
ten days from receipt of the order to file a comment or opposition to the accused’s
Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause. However, on August 2, 2006, or only seven days
after the prosecution received its copy of the order, the respondent issued an
Order dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Complainant claimed that respondent
disregarded due process because the Order dismissing the case was rendered
before the expiration of the 10 day period given to the prosecution to file
comment.
Moreover, complainant alleged that
respondent should have treated the subject motion as a Motion to Quash. Thus, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 117, the
motion should be made before the accused enters a plea, and not after
arraignment, as in this case, and based on any of the grounds stated in Section
3, and failure to assert any ground before arraignment shall be deemed a waiver
thereof.
In Misc.
No. 2860, complainant alleged that on the strength of Search Warrant No. 87-04,[18]
the accused in Criminal Case No. 7235-2K4 was arrested after a search conducted
in his residence. After arraignment,
accused filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrant and Suppress Evidence. However, the prayer[19] in
said motion inadvertently asked for the quashal of another search warrant
issued in another case.
Complainant claimed that despite the
glaring error, respondent gave due course to the motion; worse, the dispositive
portion of the Resolution dated August 8, 2005 was a mere reproduction of the erroneous
prayer in the Motion. Complainant alleged that the same cannot be treated as a
mere typographical error; that respondent did not read the resolution before
affixing his signature; that respondent exhibited gross ignorance in issuing
Search Warrant 87-04 and thereafter invalidating the same for failing to comply
with the requisites of a Search Warrant; and that respondent issued several
search warrants beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his court which were
eventually invalidated thereby putting the efforts of the arresting officers to
naught.
In Misc.
No. 2861, complainant argued that respondent provisionally dismissed Criminal Case No. 6994-2K3 entitled People v. Fernandez, for failure of
the prosecution to present the laboratory technician on several occasions despite
having presented several other witnesses. Complainant claimed that the court cannot motu
proprio dismiss the case solely on that ground since the prosecution has
presented other witnesses whose testimonies respondent is duty bound to pass
upon before making a resolution of the case.
While Section 23 of Rule 119 allows the Court to dismiss the case for
insufficiency of evidence, it requires that the prosecution must first rest its
case and be given opportunity to be heard. The right of the accused to a speedy trial
does not mean the arbitrary dismissal of the case against him to the prejudice
of other parties in the case.
In Misc. No. 2887,
complainant averred that Raup Ibrahim
and Vivian Duerme who were the accused in three criminal cases[20] filed motions to
suppress evidence and quash information praying for the dismissal of the cases
against them. Respondent gave the
prosecution ten days to file a Comment on the said motions. However, in disregard of the period given to
the prosecution, respondent issued an Order dated July 31, 2006 dismissing the three
cases.
In his Comment, respondent judge argued
that complainant failed to show that his decisions were issued whimsically and
arbitrarily or that the parties in said cases were deprived of due process; that
hearings were conducted and the parties were given equal opportunity to be
heard, and the dispositions in question were served upon them; that assuming his
rulings to be erroneous, the rules provide remedies by which said rulings may
be contested, which the parties failed to avail of. Moreover, if complainant believed that the
dispositions were erroneous, she should have alerted the respondent as lawyer
and an officer of the court.
Moreover, respondent assailed the
standing of complainant to file the administrative complaint docketed as Misc. No. 2820 because she was not the
counsel of the parties nor was she a party to the case. He claimed that assuming the assailed order to
be erroneous, the proper party could still avail of proper remedies under the
rules; and that the present complaint only attempts to preempt whatever legal
action the parties may undertake which is tantamount to a usurpation of the
rights of the aggrieved party to a judicial process and an arrogation of
judicial discretion.
With
respect to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5601 as alleged in Misc. No.
2821, respondent averred
that the prosecution initiated its withdrawal on August 4, 2000; that the
assailed orders were properly served to the parties; however, neither contested
the disposition of the court hence, the orders became final and executory by
operation of law.
In Misc. No. 2824, respondent averred that the parties
in Criminal Cases No. 5760-2K, 5761-2K and 5762-2K actively participated in the
proceedings. None of them contested the
disposition of the court which are now final and executory.
Respondent
imputed ill motive on the part of complainant in filing the present charges. He claimed that he filed an administrative
complaint against complainant for irresponsibly disclosing wrong and malicious
information in Election Protest Case No 0001-2K4, to which complainant
retaliated by filing administrative charges against him for Absenteeism and Falsification
of Certificate of Service and for bringing home a piece of evidence, of which
respondent was found guilty. Thereafter,
respondent filed another administrative charge against complainant for Gross
Inefficiency, who in turn filed the instant administrative complaints.
In its
Report dated January 7, 2008,[21] the Office
of the Court Administrator found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the
law only in Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824, and recommended the dismissal of
the other complaints for being judicial in nature, thus:
EVALUATION: As
can be gleaned from the records, it is evident that the acts being complained
of relate to the propriety of the orders issued by respondent judge in
resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the counsel of the accused in Misc.
No. 2825; motion to suppress evidence filed by the counsel of the accused in
Misc. No. 2887. Thus, the same refers to
the exercise of respondent judge of his judicial discretion.
x x x x
Likewise, as to Misc. No.
2820 and Misc. No. 2860, even assuming that respondent judge made an erroneous decision
and/or interpretation of Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, still he
cannot be automatically held administratively liable.
x x x x
As to Misc. No. 2861, the act
complained of actually dwells on an issue evidently judicial in nature since it
involves the appreciation of evidence by the respondent judge. It bears without stressing that a trial
judge’s impression on the testimony of witnesses and his appreciation of
evidence presented before him are binding on the Court in the absence of a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or an obvious misapprehension of
facts. The fact that the respondent’s
appreciation of evidence differed from that of the complainant’s does not
warrant the conclusion that the respondent judge is ignorant of the law.
x x x x
Moreover, as to these charges
of ignorance of the law, complainant utterly failed to present substantial
proof to negate the presumptions of good faith and the regularity in the
performance of judicial functions. It is
true that “judges may be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of
the law when it is shown that—motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption—they ignored, contradicted or failed to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.”
x x x x
Finally, the present administrative
complaint does not even allege that respondent judge was motivated by bad
faith, malice, corruption or dishonesty when he issued the assailed
orders/decisions. Neither were there any
evidence presented tending to prove that respondent judge was motivated by such
motives in issuing said orders/decisions.
However,
as to Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824, the next issue to be resolved is:
whether or not the issuance of Orders dated September 4, 2000 and August 14,
2000, respectively, amounted to gross ignorance of the law which would justify
an administrative sanction against respondent judge.
To
justify his issuances of Orders dated September 4, 2000 and August 14, 2000 in
Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824, respectively, respondent judge insists that
neither the prosecution nor the accused contested the disposition of the Court,
thus, said orders are now final and executory.
One need not even go beyond
the four corners of RA 6425 (as amended by R.A. 7659 effective December 31,
1993) to see respondent judge’s palpable error in the application of the law. The assailed Orders are in connection with
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act, particularly, Sections 15 and 16 of R.A.
6425 (as amended) which cannot be a subject of plea bargaining as provided
under the plea-bargaining provision of the same law. Nevertheless, respondent judge in his Order
dated September 4, 2000 and August 14, 2000 approved and granted the release of
the accused by virtue of the plea-bargaining agreement entered by the
prosecution and the accused. The
pertinent provisions of R.A. 6425 (as amended) reads as thus:
Article III, RA 6425
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and
Distribution of Regulated Drugs.—The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug.
x x x x
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.— The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall possess or use any regulated drugs without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof.
Article IV, RA 6425
SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provision.—Any
person charged under any provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death shall not be allowed.
A plain reading of the
above-quoted law would readily show that violation of Section 15 and 16 of R.A.
No. 6425 (as amended) cannot be subject of plea bargaining since the imposable
penalty therein is reclusion perpetua to death. Had respondent judge been more prudent in
going over the pertinent provisions of R.A. 6425 (as amended), particularly
Section 15 and Section 16, he would certainly arrive at the same conclusion. It does not take an interpretation of the law
but just a plain and simple reading thereof.[22]
The Office
of the Court Administrator thus recommended:
1) That
this instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2) That respondent Judge Reinerio Abraham
B. Ramas, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 18, Pagadian City be found G
3) That
Misc. No. 2820, Misc. No. 2825, Misc. No. 2860, Misc. No. 2861 and Misc.
No. 2887 against respondent Judge
Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas de DISMISSED for being judicial in nature.[23]
The OCA
also noted that in another case docketed as RTJ-06-2015, involving the same
parties, respondent judge was found guilty of Simple Misconduct and was fined
P11,000.00 and sternly warned. The
charges of Absenteeism and Falsification of Certificate of Service against him
was referred for Investigation but no report has yet been submitted.[24]
The issue for resolution is whether
respondent judge is administratively liable for the alleged erroneous rulings
and issuances made by him in the exercise of his judicial functions.
It
is elementary that not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.[25] In Maquiran v. Grageda,[26]
the Court held that alleged error committed by judges in the exercise of their
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings
but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. Thus:
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Law and logic
decree that “administrative” or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on
the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be
recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for
acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if “there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of
malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the
judge in rendering said judgment or order” or under the stringent circumstances
set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Misc. No. 2820, the Court agrees with the OCA that the ruling of
the respondent as to the interpretation of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court does not automatically subject him to administrative liability for gross
ignorance of the law. First, there is no showing that parties to
the case have exhausted judicial remedies against the alleged erroneous
ruling. Neither was it refuted that, as
claimed by respondent, the subject civil case, unlike the other administrative
charges, is still pending and active, and should his ruling be erroneous, the
parties still have available remedies to contest said ruling. An administrative complaint is not an
appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion
for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the
assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order
to the higher court for review and correction.[27] Second, there was no showing and
neither was it alleged that the issuance of the ruling was attended with bad
faith, malice, or dishonesty.
As regards Misc. No. 2861, the
Court agrees that the charge of gross ignorance of the law against the
respondent judge should be dismissed. The
allegations of complainant and the proffered evidence do not prove the elements
of this administrative offense, to wit: that the subject order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence but more importantly must be attended by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.[28] The soundness of the provisional dismissal of
the criminal case subject of Misc. No. 2861 lies within the judicial discretion
of the respondent, erroneous exercise of which does not automatically render
him liable. In proper cases,
unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the right of the accused
to speedy trial, may even be a ground for the permanent dismissal of a criminal
case.[29] In the subject case, respondent deemed it
proper to order only the provisional dismissal of the case.
As regards Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887,
the Court finds that respondent violated the basic and fundamental
constitutional principle of due process when he granted the motions filed by
the accused in the criminal cases subject of these administrative complaints
without giving the prosecution its day in court. Worse, respondent disregarded the period he
gave for the prosecution to file comment on the motions. Such action cannot be characterized as mere
deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment but a blatant disregard of
established rules.
In Balagtas v. Sarmiento,[30]
the Court found respondent therein grossly ignorant of the law in granting the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad in violation of due process. Thus:
Considering the litigious nature of Peith’s motion and the fact that the criminal and civil aspects of the cases were simultaneously instituted, the public prosecutor and the private offended party should have been notified, failing which, the respondent judge should not have acted upon the motion.
The Rules of Court is explicit on this point. A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.
In granting Peith’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic and fundamental constitutional principle, due process. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
In the instant administrative cases,
the motions filed before respondent judge were likewise litigious in nature
which must be heard. Respondent judge
should not have acted on said motions filed by the accused without first giving
the prosecution the opportunity to present its side.
Though not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where
the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act
as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a
judge owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and
the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an utter lack of
familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient
in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice.[31]
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court classifies gross ignorance of the law and procedure as a serious charge punishable
by either dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months,
or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. In the instant
case, the penalty of suspension from office for six months without salary and
other benefits, is proper.
With respect to Misc. No. 2821 and
Misc. No. 2824, the Court
disagrees with the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator that the
issuance of the Orders dated September 4, 2000 and August 14, 2000,
respectively, amounted to gross ignorance of the law because it was made in
violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, prohibiting plea
bargaining.
At the
time the assailed rulings were issued, the prohibition on plea-bargaining
provided in Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is not absolute. It applies only when the person is charged
under R.A. No. 6425 where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Though Sections 15 and 16 of the
said law, under which the accused was charged, provide that the sale and
possession of these drugs is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,
these penalties may only be imposed if the same were of the quantities
enumerated in Section 20.[32]
If the quantity involved is less than
that stated, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending on the quantity.[33]
It is to
be noted that the decision to accept or reject a plea bargaining agreement is
within the sound discretion of the court subject to certain requirements of
statutes or rules.[34] In Daan v. Sandiganbayan,[35]
the Court defined plea bargaining as a process, in criminal cases, whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the
graver charge.[36]
In the instant
administrative cases, the determination of whether the agreement complied with
requirements set forth by the rules lies in the sound discretion of the
respondent judge. Whether the quantity
of shabu in the criminal cases subject of Misc. No. 2821 and Misc. No. 2824 is covered by the prohibitory provision of
Section 20-A is also within the competence of the trial court judge to pass
upon. Should there be an error in the
dismissal of the cases as a consequence of plea bargaining, parties to the cases
are not without judicial remedies.
The Court
notes, however, that respondent was also charged with gross negligence in Misc.
No. 2824 and Misc. No. 2860. Misc.
No. 2824 relates to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 40-03 where the name
of the accused in the caption differs from that mentioned in the body. On the other hand, Misc. No. 2860
relates to the Order quashing a Search Warrant in another criminal case and
reproducing the Prayer in the Motion to Quash filed as its dispositive
portion. The errors committed by
respondent judge in the mentioned cases could have been avoided had he
exercised diligence and prudence expected of him before affixing his signature.
As held by the Court in Padilla v.
Judge Silerio,[37]
in “the discharge of the functions of his office, a judge must strive to act in
a manner that puts him and his conduct above reproach and beyond
suspicion. He must act with extreme care for his office indeed is laden
with a heavy burden of responsibility. Certainly, a judge is enjoined, his
heavy caseload notwithstanding, to pore over all documents whereon he affixes
his signature and gives his official imprimatur.” In Judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
Confiscated Cash, Surety and Property Bonds at the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City, Branches 63, 64 and 65,[38] the
Court found respondent judge therein negligent for failure to exercise the
necessary diligence in the performance of his duties and was imposed a fine of
P5,000.00.
Respondent judge cannot take refuge
behind the mistakes and inefficiency of his court personnel. He is charged with the administrative
responsibility of organizing and supervising them to secure the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, requiring at all times the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity. Indeed, he is ultimately responsible for
ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are
promptly notified of his orders and decisions.[39] In Co v. Judge Plata,[40]
the Court found respondent judge therein liable for negligence for his failure
to scrutinize the documents he had signed and to follow the proper procedure
for fixing the amount of bail.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, this Court finds respondent Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas of the
1) of gross ignorance of the
law in Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, for which he is suspended from office
for six (6) months without salary and other benefits;
2) of negligence in Misc.
No. 2860 and Misc. No. 2824, for which he is meted a FINE of P5,000.00.
Respondent
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The
charges in Misc. No. 2820, Misc. No. 2821, and Misc. No. 2861 against respondent
Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 590 dated March 17, 2009.
[1] Rule 3.02. — In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
[2] Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[3]
[4]
[5] Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. —At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.
[6] Rep. Act. No. 8493. Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
[7] Sec. 3. MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES. — In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 4. PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENT. — All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 3 hereof are subject to the approval of the court; Provided, That the agreement on the please of the accused should be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.
[8] Rollo, p. 46.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
PRAYER
“WHEREFORE, it is prayed that, after due hearing of this incident, Search Warrant No. 01-PMG-SM 2004 dated August 24, 2004, be ordered quashed, all evidences obtained or emanating from it be ordered suppressed and declared as inadmissible in evidence, this case be ordered DISMISSED and the accused be ordered released.”
[20] People v. Raup Ibrahim y Cua, Criminal Case No. 8284-2K6; People v. Raup Ibrahim y Cua and Vivian Duerme y Cajutor, Criminal Case No. 8283-2K6; and People v. Vivian Duerme y Cajutor, Criminal Case No. 8285.
[21] Rollo, pp. 1-13.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
v. Hon. Romulo A. Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1848, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA
76, 99.
[26] A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 15, 43-44.
[27] Claro v. Judge Efondo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585, March 31, 2005, 454 S
[28] Go v. Judge Abrogar, 446 Phil. 227, 242 (2003).
[29]
See Condrada v. People of the
[30] A.M. No. MTJ-01-1377, June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 343, 349-350.
[31] Lim v. Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1556, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 196, 201-203.
[33] 2nd paragraph of Section 20, R.A. No. 6425.
[34] 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 648, 638.
[35] G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 233.
[36] Id. at 240; citing People v. Villarama, Jr., G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 246, 251-252.
[37] 387 Phil. 538 (2000).
[38] OCA-IPI No. 04-7-358-RTC, 464 SCRA 21, 29-30 (2005).
[39] Visbal v. Judge Buban, 481 Phil. 111, 117 (2004).
[40] 453 Phil. 326, 332 (2005).