SECOND DIVISION
|
LORENA P.
ONG, Complainant,
- versus - JUDGE
OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Respondent. |
A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2052 Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,* and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: March
30, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present administrative case arose in
the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1632, “Lorena P. Ong, Plaintiff, v. Domingo Ong, Defendant” (the civil
case), an action for declaration of nullity of marriage or legal separation and
damages filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Koronadal City and raffled
to Branch 24 thereof, presided over by Judge Oscar E. Dinopol (respondent).
In the course of the trial of the
civil case, the therein plaintiff-herein complainant Lorena P. Ong filed on
April 1, 2005 a motion for the issuance of a “protection order”[1]
praying for the custody of her two children, Lorenzo Ruiz Ong[2]
and Maria Monica Loren Ong,[3]
then 10 and 4 years old, respectively, and support from her husband-therein
defendant Domingo Ong (Domingo).
By Order[4]
of
After the issuance of the
In the working area of the staff of RTC
Branch 24 and in their presence, the Presiding Judge past 10:00 a.m. of
September 15, 2005 conducted an unannounced interview of the children of the
parties for about 30 minutes and discovered that both children, in spite of
the encouragement of the Presiding Judge, refused to sleep with their mother,
plaintiff in this case, they apparently are well treated and cared of by their
father while they are forced to do things by their mother. It also appeared
from the manifestation in court by counsel for the plaintiff that the latter is
enrolled in a nursing school that required her to devote her quality time in school
and away from her children.
(Underscoring supplied)
By
said Order of
ACCORDINGLY, as the children are bound to be
in the custody of plaintiff for a minimal period each day, and considering the
paramount interest of the children who should not be further traumatized as
narrated by them, the previous order denying the motion for reconsideration is
hereby set aside. Meantime, let a status
quo ante before the filing of this case be maintained and custody of the
children remain temporarily with defendant until the hearing on 19 January 2006,
subject to the inherent right of plaintiff to be with her children, but not
forcing them to sleep with her. The parties are likewise encouraged to attend
to their Sunday obligations as a family.
(Underscoring supplied)
Complainant
filed a motion for reconsideration[7]
of this Order. In the meantime, respondent issued an Order[8]
dated
In her Social
Case Study Report,[9]
Soria recommended that: (1) both complainant and Domingo “must undergo
and submit themselves to a Neuro-Psychiatric Evaluation and Therapy and be
referred to Dra. Agnes Padilla, Department Head, Davao Medical Center,
Psychiatry Department, JP Laurel Avenue, Davao City,” and (2) both
children will remain under the custody of their father, Domingo, during
school days from Monday to Friday afternoon, and of their mother from
Friday evening to Sunday, the arrangement to be implemented on “a six months
(6) trial custody to prevent a traumatic turn-over of the minors,
considering that solidarity between father-son-daughter relationships is
visibly intact.” In the same Report, Soria manifested that she would submit
a progress report after six months to
determine who shall have permanent custody of the children.
By Order[10]
of
Respondent
thereupon issued an Order[12]
dated August 25, 2006 modifying the schedule of custody by giving 1) complainant
custody of the children from 8:00 o’clock in the morning of Saturday, beginning
August 26, 2006 and every Saturday thereafter, until 7:00 o’clock Monday
morning of August 28, 2006, and every Monday thereafter; and 2) Domingo custody
from
Significantly,
complainant did not file any motion for reconsideration of the August 25, 2006 Order.
Perceiving,
however, that respondent had become “patently partial in favor of [Domingo],” complainant
filed on
Respondent
set the hearing of the motion for inhibition, however, to
Before her motion
for inhibition could be heard, however, complainant filed on
October 31, 2006 the present verified letter-complaint[15]
dated October 25, 2006 against respondent charging him for: (1) gross violation of Sections 18,[16] 20[17] and
28[18] of
Republic Act No. 9262 (otherwise known as the
“Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004”); (2) gross violation of judicial ethics and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment relative to Civil Case No. 1632; and (3)
unduly and unreasonably delaying the
resolution of her motion to inhibit. She prayed that respondent “be
administratively investigated and sanctioned” and, “in the meantime, be
directed to inhibit himself from further hearing [the civil] case due to
obvious partiality.”
By 1st
Indorsement[19]
dated
In the
meantime, Domingo submitted in the civil case his comment[20]
on complainant’s motion for inhibition, disputing complainant’s charge of
partiality on the part of respondent towards him, contending that respondent’s orders
were properly issued in the exercise of his sound discretion.
By Order[21]
of
Back to the
administrative complaint, respondent, in compliance with the directive[24]
of the OCA, filed his Answer/Comment[25]
thereon dated
By Resolution
of
By his December
14, 2007 Investigation Report, Justice Camello recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint “for insufficiency of evidence,”[26]
Nevertheless, he went on to recommend that “respondent should be strongly
reminded to refrain from entertaining litigants outside the court premises to
avoid any suspicion of impropriety,”[27]
in light of respondent’s admission in his Affidavit proffered during the
hearing of the administrative complaint, viz: that “Domingo Ong visited [his] house one
evening complaining that he had been deceived by his counsel and Lorena Ong
because sometime in December 2006, while he and his wife Lorena were observing
the alternate shared custody of their minor children, his lawyer told him to
allow Lorena to take custody of Lorenz during the Christmas break, and assured him
that Lorena will return the child to him,” but that “since February 11, 2007, Lorena
did not anymore return Lorenz until [that day]”; and that again, “on September
4, 2007, Domingo Ong visited [his] house to complain that Lorena brainwashed
Lorenz against [him] because Lorenz suddenly turned against him and did not
anymore return to him.”[28]
Thus, the
Investigating Justice reported:
Parenthetically, the admission made by
respondent in his affidavit that one of the parties in Civil Case No. 1632-24,
Domingo, visited him twice in his residence during the pendency of the case
below should not be taken against him for purposes of the present
administrative charge. That matter was not even alleged in the complaint. It
was the respondent who volunteered the information in his affidavit
presented during the hearing in order to prove that he is hiding nothing and to
prove that he is impartial in the discharge of his duties as judge. x x x. Domingo’s
visits (sometime in March or April 2007 and on September 4, 2007) to the house
of respondent took place long after the happening of the following material
events to the case, i.e., issuance of
the assailed Order, the filing of the motion for inhibition, the denial of the
motion for inhibition and the filing of this administrative case before the
Office of the Court Administrator. Apparently, the purpose of Domingo’s
visit was to complain to the respondent about what Domingo perceived as
connivance between his lawyer and complainant Lorena, which resulted in the
refusal of minor Lorenzo Ruiz to be under his custody, a situation discordant
to the court-ordered shared custody over the feuding couple’s children for the
three-month trial period. The complainant presented no proof that the visits of
Domingo were upon the prodding of the respondent. The circumstances per se could hardly be equated with the
improper conduct of fraternizing with litigants. Still and all, the broad
injunction of Section 1, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that judges should
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities,
warrants a strong reminder to the respondent that he should in the future
refrain from entertaining any party to a case pending before his sala outside
the court premises most especially in his own residence, for
no matter how innocent such act might be in truth, the probability of its being
publicly perceived as malicious is not remote at all. x x x. Like Caesar’s
wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion (State Prosecutors v. Muro, A.M. No. RTJ-92-876,
The
recommendation is well-taken.
The established
rule is that in administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of
proving, in general by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.[30]
Such burden must overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge’s functions. The
presumption necessarily springs from a judge’s solemn oath of office to
administer justice according to the law and evidence, without respect to any
person and without fear or favor.[31]
Complainant failed to discharge the onus, however.
Under the first
ground of her complaint, complainant alleged that respondent “grossly
violated” R.A. No. 9262, specifically Sections 18 (requiring prompt
action for any application for protection order), 20 (treating an application
for a protection order a priority over all other cases) and 28 (granting to the mother automatic custody of “children below
seven years old or older but with mental or physical disabilities,” “unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise”).
Complainant
contradicted herself, however, when she stated in her complaint that upon
filing her motion for protection order, which mainly prayed that the custody of
her children be given to her, respondent acted properly, thus:
When I filed through my counsel a motion for
provisional remedies among others, the custody of my children especially Maria
Monica Loren who is still below seven years old, Judge Dinopol was initially on
the right tract (sic). He issued an order dated April 19,
2005 giving the defendant, my husband, five days from receipt of the order to
show cause why the custody of my children should not be given to me as provided
for in Article 213 of the Family Code x x x. On
Complainant
anchors the second ground of her complaint on respondent’s issuance of the
Order of
x x x. In the order dated
Refuting complainant’s
charge, respondent narrated the circumstances leading to the issuance of his
Order of
But, while the order (dated
COURT:
x x x x
And bring the children next hearing. [TSN,
x x x x
ATTY. IGNES:
We just want to be clarified. Who among the
parties will bring to Court the children?
COURT:
On August 3, the two (2) children should be
also in Court. The parties are directed to bring Lorenzo Ruiz and Monica Loren.
[Ibid., p. 42]
Unfortunately, further testimony of Lorena on
Q [to
herein complainant]
How is your relationship with Ma. Monica your
younger child?
A She
doesn’t want to go with me. She was so attached to the father because
everything was given to her, not in my case that I have to discipline her.
Q What
do you mean by everything is given to her by the father?
A She
is spoiled.
Q Did
you ever try to relate to your daughter?
A Yes,
but because most often I spent less time than the father, I am in Tacurong and
the father is always in Marbel same house, same work, so they are more close.
Q Was
there ever a time that you wanted to hug your daughter or take her into your
arms?
A Yes,
but she refused like lately she doesn’t want to sit with me any more then I
come to her and she will say, “Daddy, daddy nandiyan si Mommy.” I tried twice.
I went inside the room they saw me and they locked immediately the room.
Q You
wanted to get near them they hid inside the bathroom and locked it?
A Yes,
sir.
Q Did
they say anything to you?
A “Bawal
pumasok daw,” sir.
x x x x
Q How
does the child talk to you?
A Very
impolite, sir.
Q What
does she say to you?
A “Ayaw ko sa ‘yo.” She doesn’t even talk. She just ran away. She
would not even play with me unless the mother would insist (mother of Domingo).
x x x x [
COURT:
x x x x
Q The
Court is curious. I noted in your marriage contract that you are a Catholic. Do
you attend mass every Sunday with your children?
A Before
I used to go with them but later on after that incident I did not anymore
because there is no point going with them particularly to my husband.
Q But
in what year, if you could remember you stopped going to mass together with
your family?
A Two
(2) years after the birth of Monica, sir.
x x x x
Q Who
usually invites that the whole family will go to church on Sunday?
A The
respondent because after the mass I have to go back to work on Sunday. [
Given these declarations of complainant
Lorena in Court admitting the dislike of her children to sleep with her and
which her said children similarly expressed to herein respondent in his
presence after conducting an interview on
x x x x[34]
From a
consideration of complainant’s second ground of her complaint vis a vis respondent’s explanation
thereon, the Court finds that complainant is assailing the correctness
of respondent’s exercise of judicial discretion in issuing the
questioned Order of
As the
Court finds no appreciable presence of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad
faith, the acts of respondent rendered in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action, even if they are erroneous.[37]
That respondent had previously ruled in
favor of complainant in fact dispels complainant’s charge that he is biased.[38]
Complainant’s
charge that respondent knowingly rendered an unjust “judgment” is unsubstantiated. Suffice it to say that there is no
judgment or decision to speak of as the proceedings in the civil
case have, at the time the present complaint was filed, been on-going.
As for
complainant’s charge that respondent is “unreasonably delaying the
resolution of [her] motion to inhibit” by still “granting defendant [Domingo] fifteen
(15) days to comment [thereon] without the [latter] asking for it,”[39]
the same fails. She herself set her
motion for inhibition for hearing. It
was just fair for respondent to hear Domingo’s side.
WHEREFORE, the
complaint against respondent is DISMISSED. He is REMINDED and WARNED,
however, against entertaining litigants outside the court premises, failing
which he could be faulted.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No.
571 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 28-30. While the motion was so captioned, the prayer therein was limited only to the custody and support of the children.
[2] Born on
[3] Born
on
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
ACCORDINGLY,
the defendant is hereby directed to allow plaintiff to take custody of the
minor children starting not later than
Meantime, as
directed in paragraph No. 1 of the order, the parties are directed to undergo
the court sought Neuro Psychiatric Evaluation, within twenty [four] (24) hours
upon notice, by Dra. Agnes Padilla. The court, however, earnestly admonishes
the parties to comply with their Sunday (spiritual) obligations together.
SO ORDERED.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Section 18. Mandatory Period for Acting on Application for Protection Order. – Failure to act on an application for a protection order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section without justifiable cause shall render the official or judge administratively liable.
[17] Section 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex-parte and adversarial hearings to determine the basis of applications for a protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other proceedings. Barangay officials and the courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a protection order under this Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in order to hear applications for a protection order.
[18] Section 28. Custody of Children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of her grandchildren. Children below seven (7) years old or older but with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
[19] Rollo, p. 72.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
Investigation Report, p. 36.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Rollo, pp. 317-318.
[29] Investigation Report, pp. 33-34.
[30]
Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, A.M.
No. RTJ-01-1640,
[31] Datuin, Jr. v. Soriano, id., citing Soriano v. Angeles, 339 SCRA 366, 375 (2000); People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 290, citing Go v. CA, 221 SCRA 397 (1993).
[32] Rollo, p. 75.
[33]
[34]
[35] Dionisio
v. Escano, A.M. No. RTJ 98-1400,
[36] Claro
v. Efondo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585,
[37] Datuin,
Jr. v. Soriano, supra, citing Canson
v. Garchitorena, 311 SCRA 268, 287 (1999); Causin v. Demecilio, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1860, September 8, 2004, 437
SCRA 594, 606; Rondina v. Bello, Jr.,
A.M. No. CA-05-43,
[38] People v. Kho, supra at 298.
[39]
Rollo, p. 17.