EN BANC
Agenda of
Item No. 89
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2016 – CORAZON R TANJUATCO,
petitioner, versus JUDGE IRENEO
LEE GAKO, JR., respondent.
Promulgated
on:
March
23, 2010
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DISSENTING
OPINION
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion and
conclusion. I do not agree with the
unusual sympathy and consideration that the ponencia
has demonstrated towards the respondent judge who – by the measure of what he
did in this case, his record of past transgressions and past warnings from this
Court, and our governing precedents –
should be held liable for more than simple misconduct and be penalized
accordingly. I say this with emphasis as I fear that this en banc decision will set a dangerous precedent that will shield
members of the Judiciary who have soiled the judicial robe on many occasions
and who continue to commit violations that put the whole judiciary to
shame.
Two
essential facts must be appreciated at the outset in considering the case. The first,
a matter of record, is that the rescission complaint that gave rise to the
present administrative matter involved a contract between Vicente S and his
son, Pantaleon, on the one hand, and the City of
In the course of the rescission
case, the respondent Judge advised the petitioner that the complaint be amended
so that the verification shall be made by Vicente B instead of Pantaleon, and
that the purchase price paid by Cebu City and held in escrow shall, upon
rescission of the contract, be paid as rentals, not to the parties to the rescinded
contract, but to Vicente B, the direct petitioner.
The
ponencia points out that the suggestions made by respondent judge to
Vicente B., represented by Pantaleon, may be viewed as an attempt to comply
with the guidelines laid down in Administrative Matter 03-1-09-SC, otherwise
known as the Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks
of Court in the Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Discovery Deposition Measures (Guidelines); the purpose of the
Guidelines is to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of
cases, and decongest court dockets. The ponencia suggested that the respondent
might have noticed that the person who verified the complaint was Pantaleon
(the attorney-in-fact) and possibly concluded that the verification was
defective and should be addressed to prevent future complications, such as the
filing of a possible motion to dismiss; and that there was really no need for a
new verification because the attorney-in-fact is allowed to verify. The ponencia also points out that the
Investigating Justice erred when she concluded that the complaint should be
dismissed outright under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court (the rule on
certification against Forum Shopping), and when she faulted the respondent for
not impleading complainant Tanjuatco and Carlos del Rosario as
parties-plaintiffs.
I find the ponencia’s statements highly unusual. First,
the Guidelines were nowhere cited by the respondent Judge as basis for his
actions. The justification was provided
purely by the ponencia, not by the
respondent judge. Second, the respondent judge’s advice to Vicente B went beyond
matters of form that were legitimate for a court to bring up at the earliest
possible time in order to expedite proceedings and avoid unnecessary delay. A
closer look at the rescission case shows that the complaint, on its face,
raised a lot of questions on who the real party in interest from the plaintiff
side really was. The actionable document, attached to the rescission complaint,
was the contract between
A companion development in the
case that makes matters
“curiouser and curiouser” (as Alice in
Wonderland puts it) is that the respondent judge was not a stranger at all
to the del Rosario family; members of the family had appeared before the
respondent judge as heirs in the partition of the estate of their patriarch,
the late Vicente S. del Rosario. As
reflected in the Report of Investigating Justice, the
heirs/co-owners of the estate of Vicente S appeared at the pre-trial of the
partition of estate case before the respondent judge, although the latter was
subsequently compelled to withdraw from the case at the instance of the heirs
who, in the judge’s words, “misunderstood” him. As the Report puts it, “[t]he fact that he
conducted conferences among the heirs of the deceased [Vicente S] coupled by
the fact that the Partition Case was filed by one of the heirs in defiance to
the position of the other heirs respecting the settlement of a vast estate,
would sufficiently serve notice to him that there is a severe conflict of
interests among said heirs.”
Thus,
the respondent judge who presided over the rescission case knew, not only of
the partition case, but also of the conflicting claims by the heirs of Vicente
S who were then effectively co-owners pending partition of the estate. Yet, the respondent judge simply went ahead and
decided the rescission case, adjudicating the whole amount held in escrow to
Vicente B as rentals, without any acknowledgment in his decision of the
co-ownership status of part of the award to Vicente B. Significantly, one of the heirs (Carlos del
Rosario) moved to be allowed to intervene in the case although the motion was
filed after the issuance of the decision in the case but prior to its
finality. The respondent judge, in
defense, simply said that he did not act on the motion to intervene because it “skipped from the attention of the court”
– a most uncommon explanation indeed.
Knowledge
of the pending partition case (and necessarily of the co-ownership among the
heirs) should have alerted the respondent judge that the partition case would
impact on the rescission case as the part of the land, subject of the disputed
contract, and part of the amount held in escrow belonged to Vicente S and
therefore to his estate after his death and, pending partition, to his heirs in
co-ownership. Thus, the personality of the plaintiff and the nature of the
property in dispute should have been live issues in the rescission case. To be
sure, a co-owner may sue without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to
benefit his co-owners.
Adlawan v. Adlawan[1]
echoes this doctrinal rule. However,
where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone in disregard of his or
her co-owners, the action should be dismissed. Arturo M. Tolentino,[2]
explained the rule as follows:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity
of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone,
such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondent judge disregarded this
rule although in his mind Pantaleon, rather that Vicente B, was the real
plaintiff as reflected in his Comment dated
It should be borne in
mind that Pantaleon, Carlos del Rosario, and complainant, as compulsory heirs
of Vicente S, are co-owners of the subject lots. And a co-owner may bring an action in that capacity
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. When a suit is brought by one co-owner for
the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them but an adverse
decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be benefited by the
suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of Vicente B, as the two, as
co-owners, are entitled to their pro-rata share in the monetary award to be
adjudged to Vicente B. Thus, there was
really no prejudice suffered by complainant or her brother, when the respondent
denied the faulty-filed motion for intervention.
The ponencia
clearly overlooked that the rescission complaint was not filed by a co-owner in his capacity as a co-owner. More importantly, it was not even brought by a co-owner but by the son of a co-owner;
co-owner Pantaleon pointedly avoided being a direct party to the rescission
case, and even withdrew his verification at the instance of the respondent
judge. Thus, the award of the rentals
to Vicente B was not an award to a co-owner – a circumstance that will vastly
complicate the partition case if an attempt is made to bring in this award as
part of the estate. The ponencia, too, devoted a lengthy
discussion on the issue of joinder of parties, on both the plaintiff and the
defendant sides. It, however, forgot
that the respondent did not make any ruling on the intervention that Carlos del
Rosario – the brother of Pantaleon and a co-heir – sought; as already
mentioned, his motion for intervention, according to the respondent judge,
simply “skipped the attention of the court.”
Given
these observations, it may well now be asked for purposes of evaluating the
import of the suggestion of the respondent judge to Vicente B: why did
Pantaleon not bring the rescission case himself and even went to the extent of
withdrawing his verification at the direct suggestion of the respondent
judge? In fact, were the suggestions of
the respondent judge – on the matter of verification and on the amendment of
the complaint to reflect that the amount in escrow should be paid to Vicente B
as plaintiff – simply matters of procedure intended to expedite the
proceedings?
To recall the basic facts narrated above, the
parties in interest on the part of the del Rosarios in the contract with
Under
this view, the respondent judge directly paved the way in securing the
objective, firstly by the out-of-bounds suggestions described above. His help was also indispensable because he
overlooked in his decision Vicente B’s lack of interest and personality to
bring the rescission suit, while at the same time making sure that none of the
other heirs in Vicente S’ estate intervened.
The respondent judge further helped by granting the motion for execution
pending appeal despite live issues that would have alerted a fair and
conscientious judge that something was amiss.
From this perspective, the ponencia's
cited Guidelines loses relevance even if it had been invoked by the respondent
judge, while the other grounds the ponencia
raised are mere technical grounds that do not detract from the conclusion that
the respondent grossly violated his judicial duties and did not simply commit
simple misconduct. The way the
Investigating Justice put it is particularly apt: “what the respondent
committed in this case is not sheer ignorance of the law but a blatant
miscarriage of justice and betrayal of his sacred oath as a judge.”
It is interesting to note that while
the ponencia does not completely
exonerate the respondent judge, it did its utmost to lighten his
liability. This is particularly apparent
when it said:
While
there is no evidence tending to show that the respondent perverted his office
for some financial benefits or for consideration less than honest, respondent
to be sure did not conduct himself, in relation to [the rescission case], with
the exacting partiality required under the Code of Judicial Conduct. As the records show, respondent indeed
suggested to Vicente B.'s counsel that the amendment to his complaint should,
in relief portion, include a claim for rentals.
This to us is improper and at least constitutes simple misconduct.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This Dissent posits that under the
given facts, what the respondent judge did cannot be characterized as simple
misconduct. As an intervention, it was beyond being “improper” as it was
effectively the presiding judge lawyering for one of the parties. This is gross partiality and plain injustice
to those affected by the decision in the rescission case.
This
Court does not likewise need a finding of “financial benefits” or
“considerations less than honest” in order to conclude that what the respondent
judge did was gross misconduct in the performance of duties. Had these benefits
and considerations been found, they would have simply been grounds, not only
for the administrative charge of gross misconduct, but for a criminal charge
for bribery at the very least. What appears clear to this Dissent, again as the
Investigating Justice phrased it, is that the respondent judge had the
“deliberate intent to do injustice to the complainant and other heirs” that
brought the respondent judge in conflict with Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which read:
Canon 2
A
JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES
Canon 3
A
JUDGE SHOULD PERFROM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
As
stressed in the foregoing discussions, the respondent went beyond due bounds
and committed improprieties in the performance of his duties when he
maliciously intervened, through suggestions from the bench to a party, in order
to influence the outcome of the case before him. He was also manifestly unfair, using his
skewed reading of the law, in continuing to entertain the rescission complaint
despite its obvious defects, despite the pendency of the partition case, and
despite the prejudicial effects of his ruling on the other heirs of Vicente
S. To be sure, what he did in the case
were not mere isolated acts of improprieties but gross and unmistakable
violations that, following a pattern, were geared towards the objective of
favoring a chosen party.
Investigating
Justice Guevarra-Salonga recommended that the respondent, who then was still in
the service, be dismissed from the service for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and for grave misconduct in the performance of his duties. This Dissent fully agrees with this
recommendation and with its counterpart – the complete forfeiture of the respondent
judge’s benefit – now that the respondent judge has retired from the service.
The
Dissent is driven by two compelling reasons in taking this position. First
is the respondent judge’s record of
violations while in the service. He
is not a first-time offender and had
been repeatedly warned in the past that more severe penalties awaited him
should he commit the same or similar offenses.
He remained incorrigible, however, and showed a propensity to violate
his duties and the trust reposed in him as a judge. This is evident from the cases filed against
him, charging him with and finding him guilty of various offenses committed in
relation to his duties as a judge.
In Rallos v. Gako, Jr.,[3]
this Court found the respondent guilty of grave
abuse of authority, partiality and dishonesty when he made it appear that
the complainants, who were petitioners in an intestate estate proceedings
before his court, were present during a hearing of their petition when in fact
they had not attended because the respondent changed the date of hearing
without notifying them. We fined him P10,000.00 and warned
him that a commission of similar acts in the future would be dealt with more
severely.
In Zamora v. Gako, Jr.,[4]
then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora charged the respondent with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority for having ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of smuggled rice
to the claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings with the Bureau of Customs, the office with exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
We found him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and suspended him for three (3) months without pay, with
the stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future would be dealt
with more severely.
In Lagkao v. Gako, Jr.,[5]
we found the respondent guilty of grave
abuse of authority for issuing a temporary restraining order in defiance of
the decision of a higher court setting aside an injunctive writ he had
issued. We fined him P20,000 and sternly warned him.
In City of Cebu v. Gako, Jr.,[6]
we found the respondent guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision in a civil case. We imposed a fine of P40,000.00 and our usual warning.
In
Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gako, Jr.,[7]
the respondent and some of his court employees were found to have violated
pertinent circulars and orders on the procedure for raffling of cases. The respondent judge acted on 518 petitions
for voluntary confinement and rehabilitation of drug dependents filed from 1998
to 2006; these petitions had not been raffled as required and had instead been
brought directly to the respondent’s sala, in clear violation of Section 2,
Rule 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
We fined him P40,000 with the ever-present
warning that the next offense would merit a sterner penalty.
At this point, the respondent has
already mocked this Court by continuing his violations and his perverse ways,
and getting away with it. He will
continue to mock this Court when he reads that all that we can do is fine him another P100,000.00 that the majority found sufficient
and appropriate for his SIXTH
offense. Unfortunately for the Court,
this time we can no longer serve him a warning as he is now beyond such
warning.
A second
reason why this Dissent believes that the respondent merits the ultimate
administrative penalty is this Court’s record of dismissing other members of the judiciary for less than
the record of offenses that the respondent judge committed in his years of
service, as well as the message we are communicating to the public who will
surely learn of how the majority has been unusually lenient with the respondent
judge. We shall be disturbing existing
jurisprudence and starting a jurisprudential trend that may prove detrimental
to the administration of justice in the long run.
Given
the penalty the majority imposed on the respondent judge, the members of the
Judiciary who had earlier been dismissed as well as the public would cry “foul” when they learn of
the Gako record of surviving his sixth major offense. To name some, this Court since 1992 has
dismissed:
Judge Florante Madrono;[8]
Judge Angelito C. Teh;[9]
Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena;[10]
Judge Bienvenido M. Rebosura;[11]
Judge Walerico Butalid;[12]
Judge Estanislao S. Belan;[13]
Judge Rica H. Lacson;[14]
Judge Abelardo H. Santos;[15]
Judge Melchor E. Bonilla;[16]
Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa;[17]
Judge Salih Musa;[18]
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.;[19]
and Judge Fabian M. Bautista.[20] In recent memory, we dismissed no less than
three Justices of the Court of Appeals:
Justices Demetrio Demetria for violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA;[21]
Justice Elvi John Asuncion for gross ignorance of the law in A.M. No.
06-44-CA-J;[22]
and very recently, Justice Vicente Roxas for multiple violations of the canons
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA,[23]
his second offense.
Why
Judge Ireneo Gako has been differently treated will be a question that many
will ask. Many will even wonder why,
after finding the respondent judge liable and fining him P100,000.00, the
majority is even directing the Office of the Court Administrator to “facilitate
the processing of the retirement papers of [respondent judge] for the speedy
release of his retirement benefits.”
The
Dissent reiterates that respondent Judge Ireneo Gako should be found guilty of
gross misconduct for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross partiality,
and gross ignorance of the law. He
should be imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all benefits, except only for
already earned leave credits, and perpetually disqualified from appointment to
any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and –controlled corporations.
Only by such measures and by consistency in our penalties can we
effectively relay the message that we are serious and we mean business when we
say that we shall cleanse the courts, including
our own ranks, of hoodlums in robes and scalawags who bring the
administration of justice to disrepute.
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
[1] G.R.
No. 161916,
[2] Tolentino,
Civil Code of the
[3] A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1484 (A), March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.
[4] A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1484,
[5] A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1840,
[6] A.M.
No. RTJ-08-2207, promulgated on
[7] A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2074, promulgated on
[8] A.M.
No. MTJ-90-486,
[9] A.M.
No. RTJ-97-1375,
[10] A.M.
No. 95-9-98-MCTC,
[11] A.M.
No. MTJ-95-1069,
[12] A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC,
[13] A.M.
No. MTJ-95-1059,
[14] A.M.
No. MTJ-93-881,
[15] A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1197,
[16] A.M.
Nos. MTJ-94-923 and MTJ-95-11-125-MCTC,
[17] A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1446,
[18] A.M. No. SCC-00-5,
[19] A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448,
[20] A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1188,
[21] In Re:
Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio
Demetria with Interference On Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen,
[22] Padilla
vs. Associate Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion, Court of Appeals,
[23] Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 [Antonio
Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.],