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NILDA VERGINESA-SUAREZ, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG AND COURT
STENOGRAPHER III CONCEPCION A. PASCUA, Respondents. ---------------------------------------------- OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG, Respondent. |
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014
A.M. NO.
06-07-415-RTC PRESENT: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,* CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, and PERALTA, JJ. PROMULGATED: March 4, 2009 |
EN
BANC
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
These
consolidated cases involve (a) the administrative charges of graft and
corruption against respondents Judge Renato J. Dilag (Judge Dilag) and Court
Stenographer III Concepcion A. Pascua (Pascua) of Branch 73 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales filed by Nilda Verginesa-Suarez
(Suarez), Court Stenographer III of the same court; and (b) the administrative
charges for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag
filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). These cases also include the counter-charges
of Judge Dilag and Pascua against Suarez for falsification, negligence in the
transcription of stenographic notes, and absence without official leave.
Administrative Matter No.
RTJ-06-2014 stemmed from the Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated P30,000.000 from litigants in consideration of favorable
judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez supported her accusation with a sworn
statement of a certain Belen Trapane who allegedly paid the amount of P30,000.00
to Pascua to obtain a favorable judgment in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage lodged before the court presided by Judge Dilag. She also attached an anonymous letter
addressed to former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which stated that
Judge Dilag charged the amount of P30,000.00 for a favorable judgment in
every annulment case. Suarez further
pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered by Judge Dilag in
the following cases:
1.
Civil Case No. 180-0-2001
entitled “Lanie Pancho v. Rolando Gopez” (Pancho
case) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage which was dismissed in a Decision dated March 14, 2005 but
granted in a Decision dated June 16,
2005;
2.
Civil Case No. 433-0-2003
entitled “Jeffrey Joseph T. Tomboc v. Ruth Tomboc” (Tomboc case) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage which was
dismissed in a Decision dated April
29, 2005 but granted in a Decision
dated May 20, 2005; and
3.
Special Proceeding No.
436-0-2002 entitled “Petition for Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and for the Separation of the Common Properties, Danilo
del Rosario and Rachelle del Rosario, Petitioners” (Del Rosario case) which was dismissed in a Decision dated July 27, 2004 but granted in a Decision dated September 7, 2004.
Judge
Dilag and Pascua filed their respective answers to the complaint in compliance
with the directive of the OCA. In his Answer[3]
dated February 21, 2006, Judge Dilag denied the allegation of graft and
corruption and he filed administrative countercharges against Suarez for
falsification or fabrication of the purported dismissed decisions; negligence
in the transcription of stenographic notes assigned to her, supported by
several manifestations and motions of lawyers; and absence without official
leave from November 22, 2005 to December 12, 2005.
In her Kontra-Salaysay[4]
dated
Suarez filed a Supplemental Affidavit[5] dated March 16, 2006 and alleged
therein that Judge Carmelita Fruelda of Branch 43 of the RTC of San Fernando,
Pampanga, attempted to persuade her to withdraw the administrative case she
filed against Judge Dilag and Pascua.
Suarez also filed separate replies to the comments of Judge Dilag and
Pascua. In her Reply to the Comment of Judge Renato Dilag[6]
dated May 10, 2006, Suarez contended that she had transcribed her pending
transcript of stenographic notes and denied that she went on absence without
official leave during the period adverted to by Judge Dilag. Suarez further pointed out that Judge Dilag
had been previously charged and sanctioned administratively in Ma. Teresa De Jesus v. Judge Renato J. Dilag,[7]
wherein Judge Dilag was fined P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law.
The
OCA observed that the controversies between the parties were replete with
substantial factual issues, and so it recommended a formal administrative
inquiry to be conducted by a designated Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals. In a Resolution[8]
dated August 2, 2006, this Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the OCA,
to: (1) treat the comment of Judge Dilag as a complaint against Suarez; (2)
redocket the instant matter as an administrative matter and refer the same to
an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation within ninety
(90) days from receipt of the record; and (3) require the Investigating Justice
to submit a report within thirty (30) days from termination of the
investigation.
Administrative Matter No. 06-07-415-RTC, on the other hand, arose from a series of anonymous
letters which reported the alleged graft and corrupt practices of Judge
Dilag. As early as P30,000.00 for a favorable judgment in cases of annulment of
marriage.[10] On
On
(a) In Lilibeth Agustin v. Angel B. Lopez, CV.
No. 242-0-2003, a petition dated May 4, 2003 was filed for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of a valid marriage license and
psychological incapacity of the respondent.
In a Decision dated
(b) There were two (2) conflicting decisions in
SP No. 436-0-2002, “Danilo del Rosario and Rachelle del Rosario, an action for
the Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and for the
Separation of the Common Properties.” To
the Monthly Report for the Month of July 2004, attached was a Decision dated
(c) In Lourdes
Sotto v. Cresencio Diwa, CV No. 221-0-2005, which involved a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, a decision (dated January 24, 2006) was
rendered before the expiration of the period for the parties to submit
memoranda (on January 26, 2006). Also,
an entry of judgment dated February 20, 2006 was issued despite lack of a
certificate from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that it had received
a copy of the decision.
(d) In Joyce
Moreno v. Alvin Moreno, CV No. 188-0-01, also a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, the petition was originally denied in a decision dated
(e) Two (2) petitions
entitled Eliodoro Q. Perez v. Adelita
Perez for declaration of nullity of
marriage were filed. The first petition
was filed on
(f)
In Aurea Rowena Cayabyab v. Carlo Cayabyab, CV No. 125-0-05, an action
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the petition was granted in a Decision
dated February 7, 2006, and a Certificate of Finality was issued on March 01,
2006 by Clerk of Court VI John V. Aquino of the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC) based on the registry return card with a stamped receipt by the OSG of
the subject decision. Subsequently, the
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion dated
(g)
In a petition for adoption filed by
the spouses Angelito D. Roldan and Yolanda Roldan, a similarly fake registry
return card purportedly showing receipt of the subject decision by the OSG was
found in the case records.
(h)
Entry of Judgment was made in the
following cases despite absence of proof that the OSG received copies of the
decisions:
i) CV
Case No. 321-0-03 (Edwin Santos v. Berlyn
Santos)
For:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
ii) CV Case No. 222-0-00 (Dinoso v. Corpuz)
For: Annulment of Marriage
iii) CV
Case No. 167-0-02 (Robles v. Robles)
For:
Annulment of Marriage
iv) CV Case No. 43-0-02 (Lazo v. Lazo)
For: Annulment of Marriage
v) CV
Case No. 384-0-04 (Lim v. Lim)
For:
Annulment of Marriage
vi) CV
Case No. 187-0-04 (Manchura v. Paje)
For:
Annulment of Marriage
vii) SP
No. 99-0-02 (Saldana v. Saldana)
For:
Annulment of Marriage
viii) CV
Case No. 433-0-03 (Tomboc v. Tomboc)
For: Annulment of Marriage
The
judicial audit team recommended to the OCA that the foregoing findings be
consolidated with Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2014 and referred to an
Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It was also recommended that the resolution of the issue of the
resignation of respondent Pascua be deferred and subjected to the outcome of
the investigation by the Investigating Justice.
The OCA adopted the recommendations of the judicial audit team. In a Resolution[15]
dated
These
cases were then assigned to Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
In
the course of the preliminary conference, the parties submitted their
respective proposed facts of the cases.
The Investigating Justice summarized the factual disputes and issues
raised by the parties in the Pre-Trial
Order[16] dated
PRE-TRIAL
ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
A. THE ISSUES
RELATIVE TO THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SUAREZ
1) Whether or
not respondent Judge rendered conflicting decisions in the three (3) civil
cases. [Civil Case No. 180-0-2001, Civil
Case No. 433-0-2003, and Civil Case No. 436-0-2002]
2) Whether or
not a certain Belen Trapane, paid in behalf of plaintiff Lanie Pancho, in Civil
Case No. 180-0-2001 for declaration of nullity of marriage, the amount of
P30,000.00 to respondents through respondent Pascua.
3) Whether or
not respondents, through respondent Pascua, are charging P30,000.00 to P40,000.00
for the grant of every petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage.
B. THE ISSUES
RELATIVE TO THE COUTNER-CHARGES OF RESPONDENTS JUDGE DILAG AND COURT
STENOGRAPHER III PASCUA
1) Whether or
not the three (3) Dismissed Decisions are falsified.
2) Whether or
not private complainant failed to transcribe the transcript of stenographic
notes of several cases . . . as enumerated in respondent Judge’s answer.
3) Whether or
not private complainant went on absence without official leave (AWOL) from
xxx xxx xxx
SUPPLEMENTAL
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
xxx xxx xxx
THE ISSUES:
Based on the . . . specific accusations of complainant OCA
against respondent Judge, the core issue involved herein is whether or not
respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct and/or gross negligence in the
handling of the above-mentioned cases as set forth [by the OCA].
Thereafter,
the parties presented their respective sets of evidence.
The
evidence for the complainants consisted of two folders of documentary exhibits[18]
and the testimonies of Admer Lumanog,[19]
Belen Trapane,[20] private
complainant Suarez,[21]
Atty. Teresita A. Tuazon,[22]
Marissa A. Pascual,[23]
Evelyn A. Tec,[24]
Luzviminda P. Lacaba,[25]
Aurea Rowena Quiamco Cayabyab,[26]
and Rizalina B. Tiongson.[27]
Private
complainant Suarez was a Court
Stenographer III and a colleague of Pascua.
They were both assigned to Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City,
Zambales, under the direct supervision of Judge Dilag during the time material
to these cases. Private complainant
testified that Judge Dilag and Pascua collected payments for favorable
judgments on cases assigned to their court, and that respondent Pascua acted as
the “bagman” of Judge Dilag. The
respondent judge would allegedly dismiss or deny first the case/incident and
then, after payment through Pascua, he would approve or grant said
case/incident. Suarez presented the sets
of dismissed and granted decisions in the Pancho,
Tomboc, and Del Rosario cases, and identified the signatures of Judge Dilag in
the said dismissed decisions.
In
connection with the countercharges against her, Suarez substantiated her claim
that she had accordingly transcribed her transcript of stenographic notes, [28]
and that she was not on absence without official leave from November 22, 2005
to December 12, 2005, as she had an application for leave therefor, which was
disapproved by Judge Dilag but duly approved by the Leave Division of the
Office of Administrative Services of the OCA.[29] Suarez contended that Judge Dilag filed these
countercharges against her in retaliation for her filing a complaint against
him.
Belen Trapane
testified that, on behalf of her friend who was the plaintiff in the Pancho case, she gave the amount of P30,000.00
to Pascua to obtain a favorable judgment.
Trapane narrated that, when she earlier inquired from Pascua about the
status of the said case, the latter told her that the same was dismissed but
the decision could be replaced with another one granting the petition upon
payment of P30,000.00, purportedly as required by Judge Dilag.
Admer Lumanog was
the Docket Clerk in charge of the monthly report on civil cases of the court
presided by Judge Dilag during the time material to these cases. He attested to the existence of the Decision dated
Marissa Pascual and Evelyn Tec were also court employees at
Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales, during the time material to
these cases. Both testified that they
became familiar with the customary signature of Judge Dilag in the course of
their official functions, and that the signature appearing in the decision of
dismissal of the Del Rosario case
belonged to Judge Dilag.
Luzviminda Lacaba was a
Utility Worker at Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales. She testified that, from the period of 2003
to 2005, Judge Dilag assigned and authorized her to take part in the releasing
of decisions of their court and that, in the course of such function, she
happened to read the decision of dismissal in the Del Rosario case.
Aurea Rowena Cayabyab was
the plaintiff in Cayabyab v. Cayabyab, an
annulment case lodged before Branch 73 of the RTC of Olongapo City,
Zambales. She stated under oath that she
also paid the amount of P30,000.00 to Pascua to facilitate the early
termination of her case; and that she even paid the additional amount of P1,000.00
for the service on the OSG of the decision rendered by Judge Dilag in the said
case. She, however, was disappointed to
learn later on that the “Registry Return Receipt” which purportedly showed
receipt of the said decision by the OSG was a fake document, as the OSG
manifested that there was no such service of the said decision and that it moved
to recall the certificate of finality of this decision.
Atty. Teresita A. Tuazon was
the Judicial Supervisor of the OCA who headed the judicial audit team which
conducted the investigation and physical inventory of the cases in the court
presided by Judge Dilag. She also
testified to the existence of the conflicting decisions in the Del Rosario case. She further substantiated and expounded on
the findings of the judicial audit team as to the irregularities in the
disposition of the petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage in Lilibeth Agustin v. Angel Lopez, Lourdes Sotto v. Cresencio Diwa, Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno, Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez and Aurea Rowena Cayabyab v. Carlo Cayabyab,
and the petition for adoption in Angelito
Roldan and Yolanda Roldan.
In
Lilibeth Agustin v. Angel Lopez, the
records allegedly revealed an evidentiary dearth of support for the decision
rendered therein. Judge Dilag initially
dismissed the petition for lack of proof that there was no valid marriage
license, without resolving the issue about the psychological incapacity of the
parties to contract marriage. However,
upon motion for reconsideration, the marriage was nullified on the ground of
psychological incapacity of one of the parties to the marriage.
In
Lourdes Sotto v. Cresencio Diwa, the
decision rendered by Judge Dilag was allegedly done with undue haste. Judge Dilag required the parties to file
their respective memoranda within a certain period, but he then decided the
case without waiting for those memoranda or even before the lapse of the period
to file said memoranda.
In
Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno, the
final ruling issued by Judge Dilag was allegedly based on a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, even if the said evidence was
not attached to the motion, in violation of Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the purported newly
discovered evidence consisted of a psychological report of a psychiatrist,
which should had been presented before or during the trial proceedings and not
after the case had been dismissed. In
any event, the entry of judgment of the final ruling was made without
furnishing the OSG a copy thereof.
In
Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez,
Judge Dilag was allegedly grossly ignorant of basic legal procedures,
particularly of Section 2 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, because, despite
the fact that the first petition filed had been “dismissed with prejudice” at
the instance of the plaintiff, the second petition filed was subsequently
granted. Moreover, the case was decided
even before the submission of a report on the existence of collusion between
the parties as required by Section 9 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
In
Cayabyab v. Cayabyab, a fake registry
return card showing receipt by the OSG of the decision rendered therein was
exposed; Pascua was allegedly responsible therefore and allegedly asked by
Judge Dilag to resign because of such incident.
In
the Angelito Roldan and Yolanda Roldan
adoption case, the records of this case and those of the OSG conflicted as to
the date of receipt by the latter of the decision rendered therein, which
resulted in a premature entry of judgment on the said decision.
Finally,
in Dinoso v. Corpuz, the decision
rendered by Judge Dilag showed receipt by the OSG and an entry of judgment that
had been made but the records of the OSG revealed that it had no records of the
case.
Rizalina Tiongson was
the Chief Administrative Officer of the Docket Division of the OSG. Contrary to the earlier findings of the
judicial audit team, she attested to the fact of receipt by the OSG of copies
of the decision rendered in the following cases:
1) Lourdes Sotto v. Cresencio Diwa
2) Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez
3) Edwin Santos v. Berlyn Santos
4) Robles v. Robles
5) Richel B. Lazo v. Lester Dean H. Cruz
6) Lim v. Lim
7) Manchura v. Paje
8) Saldana v. Saldana
9) Tomboc
v. Tomboc
However,
she also attested to the fact that the OSG had no copies of the decisions
rendered in Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno and Dinoso v. Corpuz, and that the records
of the OSG revealed a later date of receipt of the decision in the Angelito Roldan and Yolanda Roldan
adoption case.
On
the other hand, the evidence for the respondents consisted of two separate
folders of documentary exhibits[30]
and the testimonies of respondents Judge Dilag[31]
and Pascua,[32] Atty.
Ma. Soledad M. Santos,[33] Ester A. Asilo,[34] Bernardo Esteban,[35] Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda,[36] and Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios.[37]
Judge Dilag denied
that he collected fees from litigants in exchange for favorable decisions. He also denied that he rendered the three
dismissed decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc, and Del Rosario cases
and claimed that the signatures therein were not his. He further contended that he had no hand in
the preparation of the monthly report of cases submitted to this Court, to
which the dismissed decision in the Del
Rosario case was attached.
As
to the alleged irregularities in the disposition of cases raised by the
judicial audit team, Judge Dilag argued that the said cases were decided upon
due consideration of the evidence presented by the parties and pursuant to the
applicable laws and rules of procedure.
He further claimed that he exercised sound judicial discretion in the
disposition of the said cases. Judge
Dilag pointed out that the OSG did not even question the propriety or
correctness of the decisions he rendered.
Respondent
Pascua also denied that she
collected money for Judge Dilag in exchange for favorable decisions, and she
claimed that the accusations hurled by Suarez against her were merely
fabricated.
Atty. Ma. Soledad M. Santos was
the counsel on record of the plaintiff in the Tomboc case. She testified
that she had not seen or received any decision denying the petition filed in
the said case.
Ester A. Asilo was a
Court Stenographer and designated Officer-in-Charge of the court presided by
Judge Dilag. Upon examination of the
records of the said cases under the instruction of Judge Dilag, she attested
that the alleged decisions of dismissal in the Pancho, Tomboc and Del Rosario cases were not part of the
aforesaid records. She further testified
that Suarez failed to report for work from
Bernardo Esteban was
the Process Server of the court presided by Judge Dilag. He testified that Suarez was duly served with
a memorandum issued by Judge Dilag which pertained to the present
administrative countercharges against Suarez.
Judge Carmelita
Gutierrez-Fruelda denied the allegation that she attempted to
influence Suarez to withdraw the instant administrative case against Judge
Dilag.
Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios was
the counsel on record in the Del Rosario
case. She testified that the said case
was decided favorably by Judge Dilag, and that she was not aware of a purported
previous decision of dismissal therein.
During the course of the trial, Atty. De Dios also admitted that she was
ordered suspended for a period of six (6) months from the practice of law by
this Court in a Resolution dated
After
the trial, the parties filed their respective memoranda. The OCA filed its Memorandum[38]
dated
In
his Report and Recommendation,[41]
the Investigating Justice dismissed the administrative charges of graft and
corruption against Judge Dilag and the countercharges of falsification,
negligence in the transcription of stenographic notes, and absence without
official leave against Suarez for insufficiency of evidence.
However,
the Investigating Justice found Judge Dilag liable for: (1) “gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct” for signing
conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc, and Del Rosario cases; (2) “gross ignorance of the law and procedure”
in handling Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno and
Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez; and
(3) “gross negligence and inefficiency” for failing to administer proper
supervision over his staff when a fake registry return receipt was effected in Cayabyab v. Cayabyab and entries of
judgment were effected in Joyce Moreno v.
Alvin Moreno, Angelito and Yolanda
Roldan, and Dinoso v. Corpuz. The Investigating Justice also found Pascua
guilty of the administrative charges of graft and corruption.
The
Investigating Justice further recommended that the matter raised by the OCA
against Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios be referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for appropriate action.
The
exhaustive evaluation of evidence and findings of fact by the Investigating
Justice are quoted hereunder:
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014
A. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag
This Investigating Justice finds that there is no sufficient, clear and convincing
evidence to hold respondent Judge administratively liable for graft and
corruption. Jurisprudence dictates
that the ground for the removal of a judicial officer must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. The general
rules regarding the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply to
charges of misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence.
In the instant case, there is no clear and convincing
evidence that indeed respondent Judge received money from litigants to obtain
favorable decisions. The testimonies of
Belen Trapane and Aurea Rowena Cayabyab, stating to the effect that they each
paid P30,000.00 to respondents, through respondent Pascua, cannot be given due
weight against respondent Judge for being hearsay evidence. By the same token, the rumors relative to the
alleged acceptance of money in exchange for a favorable decision remain as such
and cannot be admitted as evidence, let alone given due evidentiary
weight. Corollary, private complainant
Suarez fell short of the required degree of proof needed in an administrative
charge of graft and corruption.
Respondent Judge, however, should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 2; Section 2 of Canon 3; and, Section 1 of Canon 4, of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide:
Canon
2. Integrity is essential not only to
the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor
of judges.
Section
1. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of
a reasonable observer.
Section
2. The behavior and conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also
be seen to be done.
Canon
3. Impartiality is essential to the
proper discharge of the judicial office.
It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by
which the decision to made.
Section
2. Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
the judiciary.
Canon
4. Propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section
1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety of a judge.
This finds support in the case of Kaw vs. Judge Osorio [A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1801, March 23, 2004], where the Supreme Court, though dismissing
the charges of extortion and graft and corruption against respondent judge
therein, nevertheless, held him administratively liable for violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
In the case at bench, the existence of the two (2) sets of
conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc and Del Rosario cases,
respectively, though speculative, absent clear evidence that respondent Judge
received monetary considerations, the same, however, from a reasonable point of
view, would seriously arouse the suspicion of a reasonable mind that something
is wrong. In other words, while not
conclusively and clearly proving the charge of graft and corruption, the same
casts a cloud of suspicion upon the integrity, impartiality and propriety of
which respondent Judge is expected to possess and manifest. These requirements are concepts of the mind
which can only be manifested through actuations of a magistrate. Thus, as explicitly worded in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must not merely possess these requirements but he
must be also be seen and perceived to be such.
The judiciary is the bastion of justice, fairness and equity. Certainly, it cannot afford to have erring
magistrates who will only tarnish its image rather than maintain and preserve
the same.
Contrary to respondent Judge’s protestation and vehement
denial, the evidence on record substantially proves that the three (3)
dismissed Decisions dated March 14, 2005, April 29, 2005, and July 27, 2005
are, indeed, genuine decisions bearing respondent Judge’s signature. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that:
Section 22. How
genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen the writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting of such person may also be given by a comparison,
made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge.
In the case at bench, a comparison of and closer look at the
several documents admittedly bearing the signature of respondent Judge
sufficiently show that indeed the signature in the three (3) dismissed
Decisions were his. Furthermore, three
(3) court personnel of respondent Judge, who are familiar with his signature,
testified that the signature in the dismissed Decision dated July 27, 2005 in
the Del Rosario case belongs to respondent Judge.
By the same token, respondent Judge cannot raise as an
excuse that the three (3) dismissed decisions were never promulgated, nor
received by the parties and their clients.
It is sufficient that it was proven to genuinely exist and that they
could create the suspicion of irregularity.
It also bears stressing that respondent Judge cannot wash his hands that
he had no participation in the preparation of the Monthly Report to which the
dismissed Decision dated July 27, 2004 in the Del Rosario case was
attached. Need it be pointed out that he
declared under oath the truth and correctness of the information in the
report. He cannot also put the blame for
the error in the Monthly Report to his staff.
He cannot use, as a shield, the negligence or malfeasance of court
employees for his failure to perform his duties. As an administrator of the court, respondent
Judge is directly responsible for the discharge of his official function and
the administrative management thereof.
He is called upon to supervise court personnel to ensure prompt and
efficient dispatch of the court’s business for a speedy administration of
justice. This may be gleaned from Rule
3.08 and 3.09, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:
Rule 3.08. A judge
should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of
the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09. A Judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure prompt and
efficient dispatch of business, and require at all time the observance of high
standards of public service and fidelity.
Worthy of stressing is the applicability by analogy of
People vs. Elpedes [1 SCRA 1344] to the case at bench. In the said case, the Supreme Court
ratiocinated that where the judge signed two (2) conflicting decisions on the
same day, one of conviction and another of acquittal, the losing party could
not be blamed for bringing an administrative action against the judge and that
the unpromulgated decision of conviction is relevant evidence against the
judge. The pertinent portions of the
decision read:
… [I]t is unheard of, verging on the suspicions, that on the
same day should sign two decisions, one of conviction and one of acquittal, and
on extremely irreconcilable terms. That
is what happened in the Elpedes incident.
Therefore, counsel for the losing party (Ańosa) could not be blamed for
implying something wrong and resorting to this Court against Judge Benitez, and
enclosing in support of his accusation, a copy of the unpromulgated decision.
xxx xxx xxx
The unpromulgated decision was relevant evidence against the
judge in the administrative case which the Supreme Court had given due course.
B. Court Stenographer III Concepcion A.
Pascua
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds respondent
Pascua guilty of graft and corruption.
Witnesses Belen Trapane and Aurea Rowena Cayabyab
categorically and straightforwardly testified that they each paid the amount of
P30,000.00 to respondent Pascua so as to facilitate a favorable outcome of
their cases. The bare and flat denial of
respondent Pascua cannot overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of
Belen Trapane. It is well-settled that
to find merit in denial, the same must be buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability. Likewise, the testimony
of Aurea Rowena Cayabyab remains uncontroverted despite the opportunity to
refute the same. It should be noted that
during the latter part of the investigation, respondent Pascua did not anymore
appear, nor can she be reached or contacted even by her own lawyers. Such disappearance is indicative of guilt.
C. Nilda Verginesa-Suarez
The counter-charges of respondent Judge against private
complainant Suarez must be dismissed for lack of merit.
The allegation of respondent Judge that private complainant
falsified the three (3) dismissed Decisions dated March 14, 2005, April 29,
2005, and July 27, 2004, respectively, must fail. There is absolutely no proof advanced by
respondent Judge that the three (3) dismissed Decisions were falsified. Respondent Judge should know that mere
allegation, absent any proof, is not evidence.
On the contrary, it was indubitably established by private complainant
that the three dismissed decisions do exist and that they genuinely bear the
signature of respondent judge.
The charge of failure to transcribe TSNs must also
fail. Respondent Judge had not shown any
clear proof that indeed private complainant failed to transcribe the TSNs of
the cases that were assigned to her. It
is elementary that he who alleges must prove the same. Be that as it may, private complainant has
sufficiently established that she has already transcribed the TSNs of the cases
that were assigned to her.
Finally, there is also no merit in the charge of AWOL from
November 22, 2005 to December 12, 2005.
Evidence on record shows that on November 21, 2005 and November 30,
2005, respectively, private complainant filed two (2) applications for leave
for November 22 to 25 and 29 to 30, 2005 and December 1, 2, 5 to 9, and 12 to
16, 2005. Though these applications were
initially disapproved by respondent Judge, the same, however, were already
inconsequential since the Supreme Court, through the OCA, had already acted
upon her applications for leave as four (4) days of vacation leave with pay
from December 13 to 16, 2005 and fourteen (14) days of vacation leave with pay
from November 22 to December 12, 2005, as evidenced by the Certification dated
May 24, 2006 signed by Hermogena F. Bayani, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer,
Leave Division.
A.M. No. 06-07-415
Anent the OCA’s charge
of gross negligence, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct and/or gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, this Investigating Justice finds respondent
Judge guilty thereof.
Respondent Judge exhibited acts amounting to gross ignorance of the law and procedure
in handling the cases cited in the Audit Report.
The grant of the Motion for New Trial in the Joyce Moreno
vs. Alvin Moreno case was not proper because the psychological report and the
affidavit of the psychiatrist who conducted the examination were not attached
to the motion pursuant to 2nd paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that a motion for new trial based
on newly-discovered evidence shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses by
whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated documents
which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. Likewise, the psychological report cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence shall be supported by affidavits of
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly
authenticated documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. Likewise, the psychological report cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence because it did not exist yet at the
time of the trial as the psychological examination was conducted only after the
case was initially dismissed. It is well-entrenched
that newly-discovered evidence refers to evidence already existing prior or
during the trial but which could not have been secured and presented during the
trial despite reasonable diligence on the part of the litigant offering it or
his counsel.
In the Eliodoro Perez vs. Adelita Perez case, respondent
Judge was grossly ignorant when he erroneously took cognizance of the second
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity filed by petitioner therein considering that he had already dismissed
with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties, issues and causes
of action with that of the first petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 17 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
the dismissal of the complaint upon the motion of plaintiff is without
prejudice unless otherwise specified in the order. Thus, the only instance when dismissal of an
action under the rule is with prejudice is when the order itself so states. In the instant case, the Order dated October
28, 2003 dismissing the petition stated that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Corollary, in accordance with
elementary legal procedure, a dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication on
the merits which would bar its refilling on the ground of res judicata. It must be stressed that respondent Judge’s
ignorance of the procedure was re-affirmed during this investigation when he
was asked the reason for the qualification of the dismissal with prejudice, to
which he answered that whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice, the
parties can still re-file the case.
In the same Perez case, respondent Judge also disregarded
basic law and procedure when he decided the case even before the submission of
the City Prosecutor relative to the investigation to determine collusion between
the parties as required under Section 9 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages.
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence to uphold and maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of
developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a
cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure.
Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good
faith, no administrative sanction is imposed.
Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable
judgment. It does not apply where the
issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and basic as
to be beyond possible margins of error.
In the case at bench, respondent Judge failed to follow basic legal
procedures which are not excusable but renders him liable to administrative
sanction for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
Respondent judge argued that the insinuations of the OCA
that malice and fraud attended the dispositions of these cases have not been
sufficiently proven. The argument
fails. In the case of Ora vs. Judge Almajar [A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1599, October 14, 2005], the Supreme Court, while finding that there was
no allegation that respondent judge therein was motivated by bad faith, malice
or corruption, nevertheless, held him administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. The pertinent
portions of the decision read:
Respondent judge is charged with gross ignorance of the
law. However, to warrant a finding of
gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce
an inference of bad faith. The acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but
were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders would be
intolerable.
In the case at bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that
respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he
issued the premature warrant of arrest.
Be that as it may, however, we hold him administratively liable for his
unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of preliminary investigations. We have always exhorted judges to be
conversant with basic legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and
procedural rules. They are expected to
follow developments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted position of a
judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who
depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in
the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and be the embodiment of
professional competence.
In his desperate bid to evade liability, respondent Judge
reasoned out that since the OSG did not appeal, the same indicates the
correctness of his decisions. The
argument, however, has no persuasive effect.
It bears stressing that in the instant case, no private rights are
involved. The Supreme Court, however, is
not proscribed from taking cognizance of the irregularities committed by judges
and justices. The Court, through the
OCA, has the power of judicial discipline over lower court justices, judges,
and court personnel pursuant to paragraph C (1) of the Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 30-91. The
findings, therefore, contained in the Audit Report and approved by the Supreme
Court to be included in this investigation is merely an exercise of such power.
Finally, respondent Judge was grossly negligent and inefficient in failing to administer proper
supervision over his staff when a fake registry return receipt was effected in
the Cayabyab case and Entries of Judgement were effected in the Joyce Moreno
vs. Alvin Moreno, Angelito and Yolanda Roldan and Dinoso vs. Corpuz cases
without copies of the decisions thereof being furnished to the OSG. He tried to evade liability by declaring that
these were no longer his tasks but those of his staff. This is a lame excuse which merits scant
consideration since it is well-settled that a judge cannot use as a shield the
malfeasance or negligence of his staff. [Emphasis supplied]
We
adopt the findings of fact and recommendations of the Investigating Justice
with respect to the administrative sanctions to be imposed upon respondent
Pascua, the dismissal of the counter-administrative charges against private
complainant Suarez, and the action to be taken on the charge for illegal
practice of law against Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios. However, we raise the administrative sanction
to be imposed upon respondent Judge Dilag to the maximum penalty.
Judge
Dilag is found guilty of serious charges falling under Section 8 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, namely, “gross misconduct constituting violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct” in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014 and “gross ignorance of the
law or procedure,” as well as “gross negligence or inefficiency” in A.M. No.
06-07-415-RTJ. Under Section 11(A) of
the said rules, the imposable penalties for the commission of a serious charge
are as follows:
SEC.
11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is
guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of
more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering
that Judge Dilag had already been administratively sanctioned in Ma. Teresa De Jesus v. Judge Renato J. Dilag[42]
wherein he was fined in the amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law, Judge Dilag’s already grave offenses are further aggravated. Therefore, this Court imposes upon Judge
Dilag the extreme administrative penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
On
the other hand, the administrative liability of Pascua for graft and corruption
is classified as a grave offense sanctioned by Paragraph A (9) of Section 52,
in relation with Section 58, Rule IV of Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 19-99 as follows:
Par.
A (9), Section 52. – Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift, or other
valuable thing in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when
such fee, gift or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded to
other persons, or committing acts punishable under the anti-graft laws. 1st Offense – Dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
Section
58. Administrative Disabilities Inherent
in Certain Penalties.
a. The penalty
of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.
Thus,
the Court imposes upon Pascua the penalty of dismissal from the service which
carries the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service. The Court further
agrees with the Investigating Justice that in view of the evidence on record,
Pascua should be investigated for possible criminal liability for the same
acts.
Finally,
the Court approves the recommendation to refer the charge of illegal practice
of law against Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios (raised by the OCA in its memorandum)
to the Office of the Bar Confidant.
WHEREFORE, in
view of all the foregoing, we hold as follows:
1. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag is
hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations, for gross misconduct,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and gross negligence and
inefficiency.
2. Respondent Court Stenographer III
Concepcion A. Pascua is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, which
carries the accessory penalties of cancellation of her eligibility, forfeiture
of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service, for graft and corruption under Paragraph A(9), Rule IV of
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, and this administrative
case against respondent Pascua is hereby REFERRED
to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
3. The counter-administrative charges of
falsification, negligence in the transcription of stenographic notes, and absence
without official leave against private complainant Nilda Verginesa-Suarez are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4. The manifestation of the counsel of the
Office of the Court Administrator in its Memorandum[43]
dated
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
(On
official leave)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
(On official
leave)
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice
|
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1921,
[8] Rollo, pp. 195-196.
[9] Records, Folder of Exhibits for the OCA, Exhibit “O-OCA.”
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 43.
[14]
[15]
[16] Records, pp. 245-249.
[17]
[18] Records, Folders of Exhibits for Private Complainant (Exhibits “A” to “RR” with submarkings) and the OCA (Exhibits “A-OCA” to “DDDD-OCA” with submarkings).
[19]
TSN dated
[20]
TSN dated
[21]
TSN dated
[22]
TSN dated
[23]
TSN dated
[24]
[25]
[26]
TSN dated
[27]
TSN dated
[28] Folder of Exhibits for Private Complainant, Exhibits “R” to “JJ.”
[29]
[30] Records, Folders of Exhibits for Respondent Judge (Exhibits “1-Dilag to 9-Dilag” with submarkings) and Respondent Pascua (Exhibits “1-Pascua” to “4-Pascua” with submarkings).
[31]
TSN dated
[32] TSN
dated
[33]
TSN dated
[34]
[35]
[36]
TSN dated
[37]
[38] Records, pp. 278-333.
[39]
[40] Id. at 334-369.
[41] Id., separate envelope.
[42] Supra at note 7.
[43] Supra at note 40.