THE
LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ A.M. No. CA-09-48-J
MIRANDA
ASEOCHE, represented [Formerly OCA-IPI No. 07-119-CAJ]
by its Founding Partner,
ATTY.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Present:
Complainant,
PUNO, C.J.*,
QUISUMBING,**
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
-
versus -
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
JUSTICE
ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
Chairman,
Nineteenth (19th) Division,
BRION, and
Court
of Appeals, based at
Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 13, 2009
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R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga, J.:
This
is an administrative complaint against Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, Chairman of
the 19th Division of the Court of Appeals based in
The
special civil action for certiorari stemmed from a complaint filed by Ma.
Krissyl Asparen with the
Immediately thereafter, complainant and Ma. Krissyl Asparen sought the inhibition of respondent from the case on the ground that the latter had previously represented various religious organizations and institutions during his practice of law and the petitioner school in the case is run by a religious organization while petitioner Sr. Bandalan is a nun belonging to said organization.[2]
In a Resolution dated 1 April 2005, respondent Justice admitted on record that he once served as counsel of religious organizations but denied that such circumstance affected his impartiality in the case. Respondent Justice, however, found it proper to voluntarily inhibit himself to disabuse the mind of the student and complainant of any suspicion as to his impartiality.[3]
Despite
his inhibition, respondent Justice allegedly participated again in the case
when his name appeared as one of the signatories of a Resolution dated
Complainant alleged that respondent Justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case—a blatant disregard of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[6]
For
his part, respondent Justice maintained that he never participated again in the
case after his inhibition therefrom on
Moreover,
records show that on
On
Clearly, respondent Justice asserted, the charges leveled against him are devoid of factual basis. Respondent Justice strongly contended, in fact, that complainant should be the one made to answer for the false accusations and insults he had made against the court.
The Court finds the instant administrative complaint devoid of merit and should accordingly be dismissed.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant. In fact, if the complainant upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.[7]
In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate his imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice. Aside from his naked allegations, conjecture and speculations, he failed to present any other evidence to prove his charges. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails. On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the case and his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake.
It also bears reiteration that a party’s remedy, if prejudiced by the orders of a magistrate lies with the proper reviewing court, not with the Office of the Court Administrator by means of an administrative complaint.[8] It is axiomatic that, where some other judicial means is available, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular.[9]
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Justice Isaias P. Dicdican is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
[1]CANON 2: A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01—A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
…
Rule 2.03—A judge shall not allow family,
social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
[8]Atty. Hilario v. Hon. Ocampo III, 422 Phil. 593, 606 (2001)citing Dionisio
v. Escano, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1400,