EN BANC
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant,
- versus - ATTY. GODWIN R. Respondent.
|
A.C. No. 7902 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: March 31, 2009 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
At bar is a Motion for Reconsideration,[1]
dated, October 21, 2008 filed by respondent Godwin R. Valdez (
We have
previously decided in Torben B.
Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez,[3]
that respondent
The
complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of respondent P900,000.00 as stipulated in
a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform any of his obligations
under their contract for legal services, ignored the complainant’s request for
a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care, and rejected the
complainant’s demands for the return of the money paid to him.
Complainant
Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against
On
September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED to
immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of
extra-judicial demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of
six percent (6%), shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation
of this decision until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to
immediately return all papers and documents received from the complainant.[4]
x x x x
Hence, this Motion for
Reconsideration filed on October 21, 2008, by respondent
I.
RESPONDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE THAT
COMPLAINANT HAD FILED CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE WERE DISBARMENT
PROCEEDINGS AND AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
II.
HAD HE BEEN GIVEN AN
We deny the Motion for
Reconsideration.
On the first issue, the respondent
argues that the IBP has no jurisdiction over him since proof of service of the
initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional requirement.[6] He states
in his Motion for Reconsideration that “he had no inkling whatsoever of the
existence of the disbarment case filed by the complainant.”[7]
He asserts that, in
September 2006, he “abruptly abandoned his office at Suite 402 Pacific Irvine
Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at Makati City following persistent and serious
threats to his physical safety and security x x x.” [8] On the advice of his close friends and clients
to “lie low” and “make himself ‘scarce,’”[9] he
stayed for a few days in his residence at Imus,
He claims that because he “abruptly
abandoned”[11] his
Complainant
Overgaard filed an “Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration”[14]
on December 9, 2008. He counters that respondent Valdez was duly notified of
the charge against him and of all the proceedings at the IBP,[15]
since all notices were sent to “Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., No. 2746
Zenaida St., Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,”[16]
which is the respondent’s office address indicated in his letterhead and made
known to the complainant and to the public. He sent the respondent a letter
dated November 27, 2006, demanding that the latter return the documents and the
P900,000.00 paid to him in relation to the case. The demand letter was sent to the same
address and was received by one whose signature was “RRJ,” as noted in the
Registry Return Receipt.[17]
Complainant
Overgaard argues that respondent cannot claim ignorance of the disbarment case
against him, since this is a natural offshoot of a wrongful act.[18]
Complainant Overgaard points out that when respondent
We hold that respondent was given
reasonable notice of the complaint for disbarment against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as
the Order[22] to answer the Complaint was sent by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to the respondent’s
Respondent
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of
his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to
be heard by himself or counsel. But if
upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court
may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
The
respondent’s feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his
This brings us to the second issue:
whether or not respondent committed multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and thus his disbarment should be sustained.
The respondent argues that he did not
abandon his client. He denies that he refused to perform any of his obligations
under the contract for legal services between himself and the complainant. He
claims that he gave the complainant legal advice, and that he searched for and
interviewed witnesses in relation to the cases he was handling for the
complainant.[26] He also denies that he ignored the
complainant’s requests for a report of the cases entrusted to his care. He
claims that he gave periodic status reports on the result of his work, that he
returned the documents in connection with the case, and that he rendered an
accounting of the money that he actually received.
We find that respondent’s disbarment
should be upheld. From the facts of the case, and based on his own admissions,
it is evident that he has committed multiple violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In
abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without
making sure that the cases he was handling for his client were properly
attended to during his absence, and without making arrangements whereby he
would receive important mail, the respondent is clearly guilty of gross
negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and then
rely on the convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety. Even
assuming that there were serious threats to his person, this did not give him
the permission to desert his client and leave the cases entrusted to his care
hanging. He should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases he was handling were
attended to and that his client’s interest was safeguarded. If it was not
possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care, he should have
informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed to
withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of another
counsel who could properly represent him.[27]
Deplorably, the respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot
about the cases entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and
prejudice.
The respondent denies that he did not
do anything in connection with the cases included in the Retainer Agreement. He
asserts that he reviewed the documents in relation to the case and gave the
complainant important advice. He claims that he travelled to Bato, Camarines
Norte to negotiate for an amicable settlement with the members of the family of
the adverse party in one of the cases filed against the complainant.[28] He
also went to
The respondent’s disbarment is not
anchored on his failure to do anything in relation the cases entrusted to his
care, but on his abandonment of his client. He will not be absolved from
liability on the basis alone of these inconsequential acts which he claims to
have accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he has failed to
perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts and to society.
As the complainant’s lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client
with competence and diligence.[30] This
includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care and giving the
complainant sound legal advice, but also properly representing his client in
court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing and filing required pleadings,
prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care with reasonable dispatch, and
urging their termination without waiting for his client or the court to prod
him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his client in a
state of uncertainty.
The respondent’s acts and omissions
were not just a case of inaction, but they amount to deceitful conduct and are
contrary to good morals. After assuring the complainant that he would protect
the latter’s interest and attend to the cases included in the Retainer
Agreement, he abandoned his client. It was only after the complainant’s own
inquiry that he discovered that the respondent never appeared in court to
represent the complainant in the cases filed against him, so much so that he
had no knowledge that warrants of arrest were already issued against him. The
respondent also failed to enter his appearance in the civil case for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. After receiving the complete
amount of legal fees, giving the complainant initial legal advice, and
interviewing some witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the
complainant never heard from him despite his continued efforts to contact the
respondent.
The complainant put his trust in the
respondent with full faith that the latter would exert his best effort and
ability in the prosecution and defense of his client’s cause. But instead of
devotion to his client’s cause, the respondent grossly neglected his duties to
his client. After all the representations he made to the complainant and after
receipt of the full amount of the legal fees, he absconded from his
responsibilities and betrayed his client’s trust. There is no excuse for this,
and his gross negligence and appalling indifference is unforgiveable.
On the Court’s finding that the
respondent refused to return the money he received from the complainant despite
written and verbal demands and was not able to give a single report regarding
the status of the cases, the respondent claims that he returned the documents
to the complainant’s representative in the middle of July 2006,[31] and
that he also gave an accounting of the money he received sometime immediately
after it was demanded from him on July 25 or 26, 2006. The respondent counters
that although he initially received the amount of P900,000.00, he gave P300,000.00
to two intelligence operatives for locating witnesses in favor of the complainant
in P600,000.00 was actually received by him, and from this
amount he drew all expenses in connection with the complainant’s cases. The
respondent further avers that he made an accounting of the P600,000.00
received by him and offered to return P250,000.00, but it was the
complainant’s business partner who refused to accept the P250,000.00 and
insisted on the payment of the whole amount.[33]
The complainant declared that he did
not receive the documents being demanded from the respondent, nor did he
receive an accounting of the money he paid to the respondent. He stated in his
“Opposition/Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration” that the respondent’s
empty claims -- that he already returned the documents sometime in the middle
of July 2006 and that he rendered an accounting of the money paid to him
immediately after July 25 or 26, 2006 -- are refuted by the demand letter sent
by the complainant on November 27, 2006, four months after the alleged time of
return.
We agree with the complainant.
If the respondent had indeed returned
the documents sometime in the middle of July 2006, he would have presented a
receipt to prove such turnover of documents. And if the respondent had indeed rendered
an accounting of the money that was paid to him, he would have attached a
received copy of the accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration. But he
failed to do both. There was no proof presented. We cannot rely on his bare
allegation, especially when the complainant demanded the return of the
documents months after they were allegedly returned.
Neither are we persuaded by the
respondent’s explanation as to how and where the P900,000.00 was spent.
He claims that out of the P900,000.00, he only received P600,000.00
because he paid P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives. In paying
the intelligence operatives, he stated in his Motion for Reconsideration that
he deposited P100,000.00 to the Land Bank account of one Investigator
Operative Collado (Collado) sometime in
the second week of January 2006, and that the rest of the P200,000.00
was personally handed by him to Collado in the last week of January 2006 at
McDonald’s restaurant at the corner of Pasong Tamo and J.P. Rizal Streets at
Makati City.[34]
Such an account offered by the
respondent is insufficient to free him from liability. If the respondent indeed
paid P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives with the knowledge of
the complainant, he would have presented a receipt issued by Collado, and he
would have also presented a validated deposit slip or certification as proof
that he deposited the amount he claims to have deposited to Collado’s account.
His failure to attach proof of payment of the P300,000.00 to the
intelligence operatives does not only make his defense flawed, it also
highlights his incompetence in handling the money he received from the client.
It is a lawyer’s duty to properly
account for the money he received from the client.[35] If
indeed the respondent told the client that he would pay P300,000.00 to
two intelligence operatives, as he claims in his Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have held this money in trust, and he was under an obligation to make an
accounting. It was his duty to secure a receipt for the payment of this amount
on behalf of his client. But he failed
to present any receipt or certification from Collado that the payment was
received. Since the respondent was not able either to present an accounting of
the P900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainant’s demand, or to provide
a sufficient and plausible explanation for where such amount was spent, he must
immediately return the same.
For these reasons, and those
previously stated in the September 30, 2008 Decision of this Court, we find
that respondent
We must emphasize that the right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise,[36] and
it may be extended or withheld by this Court in the exercise of its sound
discretion. As guardian of the legal profession, this Court has ultimate
disciplinary power over members of the Bar in order to ensure that the highest
standards of competence and of honesty and fair dealing are maintained. We find
that the respondent has fallen below such exacting standard and is unworthy of
the privilege to practice law.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This Court’s en banc decision in Administrative Case No. 7902 dated September
30, 2008, entitled Torben B. Overgaard
v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 104-127.
[2]
[3] A.C. 7902, September 30, 2008.
[4]
[5] Rollo,
pp.104-105.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Rollo, pp. 114-115.
[29]
[30] CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 21.
[31] Rollo, p.
121.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY, Canon 16, Rule 16.01.
[36] In Re:
SyCip, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30,
1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10, citing, 7 C.J.S. 708.