THIRD
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus
- JUDITO MOLINA and JOHN DOE, Accused, JOSELITO TAGUDAR, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 184173 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, J., AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: March 13, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For
review is the Decision[1]
dated 16 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02327,
which affirmed the Decision[2]
dated 24 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Norte, Laoag
City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case Nos. 2003-011-16 to 2003-028-16, finding
herein appellant Joselito Tagudar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts
of murder (Criminal Cases No. 2003-011-16 to 2003-014-16) and 14 counts of
attempted murder (Criminal Cases No. 2003-015-16 to 2003-028-16). The appellant was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with
all its accessory penalties for each count of murder and was ordered to pay the
heirs of each victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. He was also sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each
count of attempted murder and was ordered to pay each victim the amount of P20,000.00
as civil indemnity.
Appellant
Joselito Tagudar, together with Judito Molina and a certain John Doe, both of
whom remain-at-large, was charged before the RTC of Bangued, Abra, in 4 separate
Informations for murder committed against Jansen Bersamin, Eric Pacurza, Rogee
Montorio and Algie Pacurza; and 14 separate Informations for attempted murder
committed against Ronald Ta-a, Jomar Pilor, Romel Pacurza, Jerome Bayubay,
Gilbert Baruela, Crisanto Baruela, Roger Bersamin, Robert Baruela, Sammy
Abundo, Albert Batalla, Carmelo Daganato, Filomeno Blosan, Allan Montorio and
Eugene Philip Baruela.
The
four separate Informations for murder[3] were
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2003-011-16 to No. 2003-014-16. Except for the names of the victims, the Informations
in these four cases identically read:
“That on or about 11:30 to 12:00 midnight of [4 October 2002] at Barbarsic, Ba-ug, San Juan, Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, in conspiracy with one another, with treachery, taking advantage of darkness and use of unlicensed firearms (unrecovered), unlawfully and feloniously shot [name], causing the latter’s death, to the great damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.”
The
other 14 separate Informations for attempted murder[4]
were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2003-015-16 to No. 2003-028-16. Again, except for the names of the victims,
the aforesaid Informations contained similar averments, to wit:
That on or about 11:30 to 12:00 midnight of [4 October 2002] at Barbarsic, Ba-ug, San Juan, Abra, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, in conspiracy with one another, with treachery, taking advantage of darkness and use of unlicensed firearms (unrecovered), unlawfully and feloniously shot [name], inflicting gunshot wounds thereby commencing the commission of murder by overt acts but do not perform all the acts of execution necessary to commit murder as a consequence for reasons other than their spontaneous desistance, to the damage and prejudice of the victim.
A
Warrant of Arrest[5] dated
Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY
to the crimes charged.
On
During
the pre-trial conference,[7]
the prosecution and the defense entered into the following stipulation of
facts:
1. The identity of the [appellant] is admitted meaning that whenever the prosecution witnesses mention the name Joselito Tagudar they would be referring to the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar who was charged and arraigned under the information[s];
2.
That on [
3. That many people adults and children were playing cards at the wake;
4. That on that night 4 people died, namely: Rog[e]e Montorio, Eric Pacur[z]a, Jansen [Bersamin] and Algie Parcur[z]a;
5. The defense admit (sic) their respective certificates of death;
6. That during the shooting incident 14 other people were injured, namely: Ronald Ta[-]a, Crisanto Bar[u]ela, Robert Bar[u]ela, Carmelo Daganato, Jomar Pillor, Allan Montorio, Filomeno Bulosan, Jerome Bayubay, Philip Eugene Bar[u]ela, Gilbert Bar[u]ela, Rommel Pacur[z]a, Sammy Abundo and [Roger] Bersamin;
7.
That
in the early morning of [
8.
That on [
9. The existence of the following exhibits are admitted. Exhibit “1” which is a certification[8] issued by Police Inspector Lambert Alban Suerte regarding the holding of scout class at Camp Bado, Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet;
10. Exhibit “2” is the joint affidavit[9] of Police [Senior] Inspector Reguel Sta. Maria, PO1 Robert Banatao, PO1 Gregorio Pari[ñ]as, PO2 Engel Perez, PO1 June Beleno, PO1 Joel Semanero and PO1 Rogelio Federico;
11. Exhibit “3” is the joint affidavit[10] of Jerome Bersamin, Darwin Bersamin and Robinson Bersamin;
12. Exhibit “4” the joint affidavit[11] of PO3 [Florante] S[o]berano and PO1 Norman Labanen.[12]
Upon
termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued.
The
prosecution presented the victims, Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor, as
witnesses.
Allan
Montorio testified that on
When
the gunshots had stopped, he peeped from inside the house of Carmen Daganato and
saw Eric Pacurza already sprawled, lying prostrate on the ground. Also, Algie Pacurza was not moving
anymore. He too was not spared as he was
also hit by shrapnel on his left arm.
Thereafter, Allan ran towards their house, which was around 100 meters
away from the house of the deceased, and there he saw Jansen Bersamin lying at
their door. He helped carry Jansen
Bersamin’s body to a vehicle to be brought to the hospital. Unfortunately, Jansen Bersamin died.[14]
Allan
Montorio was also treated at the
Another
prosecution witness, Jomar Pillor, who was also at the wake of Carmen Daganato in
the evening of 4 October 2002 between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, similarly
testified that he saw thereat Filomino Blosan, Eric Pacurza, Algie Pacurza,
Rogee Montorio, Allan Montorio, Jerome Bayubay, Jansen Bersamin, Ronald Ta-a,
Chris Baruela, Carmelo Daganato, Albert Batalla, Gilbert Baruela, Eugene
Baruela and many others. While he was
watching those who were playing “dado,”
he suddenly heard a burst of gunfire.
Thereafter, he heard successive gun reports. He was standing when he heard the gunshots. Then, he saw two men coming from the western
part (ricefields) of Carmen Daganato’s house.
These two men went to the cemented pavement and kept shooting their
firearms at their direction. As he was
only five meters away from these two men and the light coming from the
fluorescent lamp placed above the gambling table illuminated the place, he was
able to recognize them as the appellant and Judito Molina. The appellant and Judito Molina were wearing
black sweaters, short pants and black bonnets with the faces exposed. He stated that he knew the appellant as a
policeman assigned at Bangued, Abra, because they were from the same barangay. He had known the appellant since the age of
reason. Likewise, he knew Judito Molina;
he used to see him whenever their Mayor went to their place, as he was a
bodyguard of the Mayor.[17]
When
he saw the appellant and Judito Molina coming up to the cemented pavement while
continuously firing their firearms at them, he immediately went inside Carmen
Daganato’s house to seek refuge, but he was hit on his thigh and shoulder. When the gunshots had stopped, he saw Algie Pacurza
and Eric Pacurza dead. He also saw that those
who were playing “dado” were injured. They were all brought to the provincial
hospital where he stayed for a week. He heard
that Rogee Montorio and Jansen Bersamin likewise died as a result of that shooting
incident.[18]
He
admitted before the court a quo that
he was also investigated by the police authorities from the
For
its part, the defense presented the appellant, who interposed the defense of
alibi; Julieta Pacurza, one of the daughters of Carmen Daganato; Ricky Lopera,
a media practitioner; Police Inspector 3 (PO3) Dante Cardona, an Assistant
Investigator at the San Juan, Abra, Police Station; and Robert Banatao,
appellant’s companion in going back from Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet to
Bangued, Abra.
The
appellant narrated before the court a quo
that on
When
he arrived at the hospital, the other victims were already there so he helped
in carrying them in. There he saw Allan
Montorio and Jomar Pillor, who were also victims of the shooting incident. He was able to talk to them. He asked them if they were able to recognize
those persons who were responsible for the shooting incident. Both Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor replied
in the negative and stated that it was dark and the assassins wore bonnets. The following day, he came to know that those
who were killed in the shooting incident were Jansen Bersamin, Rogee Montorio,
Algie Pacurza and another Pacurza whose first name he could not remember. He admitted that he knew his co-accused,
Judito Molina, because the latter was employed with the Municipal Government of
San Juan, Abra as a utility worker.[21]
Julieta
Pacurza claimed that she was outside her mother’s house serving coffee when the
shooting incident happened. She stated that the moment she heard the gun
reports, she witnessed those who were playing “dado” in the gambling table hide themselves. While the gun reports were being heard, she
looked at the western part of her mother’s house and did not see anything, as
it was dark. She saw Allan Montorio hide
himself at the cemented bench, while Jomar Pillor went upstairs to hide. After the shooting incident, she assisted
those who were injured including her son, Carmelo Daganato, and brought them to
the hospital. While she was at the
hospital, she saw the appellant talking to Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor.[22]
Ricky
Lopera confirmed that he came to know of the massacre that happened in
Barbarsic,
PO3
Dante Cardona testified that he was on tour of duty on
Robert
Banatao stated that he was with the appellant when they arrived in Bangued,
Abra, at around
On
rebuttal, the prosecution presented Irene Pacurza, Julieta Pacurza’s
sister. Irene Pacurza testified that at
the exact moment that the shooting incident was taking place, Julieta Pacurza was
with her, together with their brother, inside the kitchen of the house of
Carmen Daganato, as they were preparing coffee to be served to the people
present at the wake of their mother.
They just stayed there until the gun reports stopped. Thereafter, they went outside and saw the
bodies of the victims lying prostrate on the ground.[27]
On
sur-rebuttal, the defense presented the testimony of Primitivo Pillor. He stated that he was, indeed, at the wake of
Carmen Daganato on
After
trial, a Decision was rendered by the court a
quo on
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of four (4) separate crimes of Murder qualified by
treachery. He is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua with all its
accessory penalties for each crime of Murder committed and to pay the heirs of
each victim Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Likewise, the Court
finds him GUILTY of Fourteen (14) separate crimes of Attempted Murder for which
he is sentenced, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to Two (2) years and
Four (4) months of Prision Correccional
minimum as minimum to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor medium as maximum for each crime of Attempted Murder
committed and to pay each victim Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as civil
indemnity.[29]
The
appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to the Court of Appeals. In his brief, the appellant made the
following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court erred in giving full credence to prosecution witnesses Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor and their long delayed, uncorroborated and uniform testimony they allegedly saw the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar on the night in question, standing 3, 4 or 5 meters away from them, clad in black attire, wearing black mask (bonnet), or ski mask but with face exposed, and firing at them continuously with a long firearm and at the others attending the wake that night of the late Carmen Daganato in Sitio Barbarsic, Ba-ug, San Juan, Abra.
II. The trial court erred in finding that there was positive identification by these 2 prosecution witnesses [Allan] Montorio and [Jomar] Pillor of the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged in these cases.
III. The trial court erred in not finding these 2 prosecution witnesses and their said testimony of identification to be unworthy of belief, for being doubtful, unreliable, incredible, and contrary to the common experience and observation of mankind.
IV. The trial court erred in discrediting arbitrarily and entirely the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar, his witnesses, and his defense of alibi, despite the clear, corroborative and substantial evidentiary support thereof in the records of these cases.
V. The trial court erred in not acquitting the [appellant] Joselito Tagudar of the crimes charged in all these cases, on ground of reasonable doubt.
VI.
Independently of the appellant’s defense
of alibi as discussed above under the five (5) assigned errors in this appeal,
the appellant submits the trial court erred in awarding the victims in fourteen
(14) cases of attempted murder, damages as civil indemnity in the unwarranted,
arbitrary and excessive fixed sum, or flat rate of P20,000.00 for each
of the victims involved, regardless of the nature, extent, and required
treatment of the injury suffered, and despite the lack of legal basis, or
sufficient evidentiary support in the records of these cases, insofar as the
figure P20,000.00 is concerned.[30]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
The appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal.[36] Thereupon, the Court of Appeals forwarded the
records of this case to this Court.
This
Court notified the parties that they may submit their respective supplemental
briefs. In compliance therewith, the
appellant submitted his Supplemental Brief[37]
dated
In
essence, the issue boils down to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
to convict the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant argues that the testimonies
of Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor - that they saw the appellant on the night
of the shooting, together with one or two other assailants, just 3, 4 or 5
meters away from them continuously firing long firearms at their direction – are
unworthy of belief, for it is an unnatural and uncommon reaction to a sudden,
startling and shocking massacre for the prosecution witnesses to remain standing
and to note the details of what the perpetrators were wearing, including the
firearms they used, instead of immediately protecting themselves to avoid being
hit upon hearing the sudden burst of gunfire.
The
appellant underscores that almost two months had passed from the time of the
shooting before the prosecution witnesses disclosed to the NBI their knowledge
about the incident and who the perpetrators were. Their failure to immediately report to the
police authorities that they saw the appellant on the night of the shooting as
one of the assailants therein militates against their credibility. The same raises grave doubts as to its
veracity, and it weakens the prosecution’s evidence of positive identification
of the appellant. Thus, the defense
firmly believes that there was no positive identification of the appellant by
the prosecution witnesses.
Finally,
the appellant holds that although alibi is a weak defense, the same assumes
importance where the identification of the accused is weakened and rendered
unreliable. He avers that none of those
investigated by the Philippine National Police (PNP)-
The
appellant’s contentions are bereft of merit.
As
oft repeated by this Court, the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it
is more competent to so conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they
gave their testimonies. The trial judge
therefore can better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being
in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.[39] Further, factual findings of the trial court
as regards its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great
weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms
the said findings,[40] and
will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the
case.[41]
There is nothing in the records that
would impel this Court to deviate from the findings and conclusion of the trial
court, which findings were also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, this Court finds the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses credible and worthy of belief.
In the present case, the trial court
gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor. The
court a quo characterized their
testimonies as vivid and straightforward.
Both prosecution witnesses narrated before the court a quo the details of the shooting
incident that happened in Barbarsic, Ba-ug,
Truly, the appellant and his
co-accused were wearing bonnets at the time of the commission of the crimes;
however, their bonnets were akin to ski masks, which exposed their faces. It also bears stressing that the place where
the shooting incident happened was properly illuminated by a light coming from
a 50-watt bulb, which was attached to the roof directly above the gambling
table where the people were playing “dado.” Further, the prosecution witnesses were only
three to five meters away from the assailants.
The prosecution witnesses were familiar with the appearance of the
appellant, as they all came from the same barangay. In fact, Jomar Pillor even stated in his
testimony before the trial court that he had known the appellant since the age
of reason. With respect to accused
Judito Molina, the prosecution witnesses were also familiar with his appearance,
as they always saw him whenever the mayor of
Contrary to the claim of the
appellant, it can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
that they did not remain standing while the shooting incident was going on. In fact, Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor sought
refuge inside the house of Carmen Daganato.
It was at this point that they saw two persons shooting at their
direction with an armalite and clad in a black long-sleeved shirt, short pants
and bonnets. They recognized them as the
appellant and Judito Molina. Experience shows that precisely because of
the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of
reliability the identities of criminals.
This Court has ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailant and observe the
manner in which the crime was committed.
Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create an
impression which cannot easily be erased from their memories.[42]
Neither can the appellant cast suspicion
on the prosecution witnesses’ failure to immediately report the crimes and the
identities of their assailants. This
Court has previously ruled that delay in revealing the author of the crime does
not impair the credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.[43] In this case, the delay in reporting the
shooting incident and the identities of those responsible for the same were
satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. As the Court of Appeals stated in its Decision,
the delay and hesitation of Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor to reveal the
identities of the assailants to those people who interviewed them, i.e., the police authorities of San
Juan, Abra, a media practitioner, and the appellant himself, were attributable to
fear for their lives and those of their families; more so, if the one asking about
the identities of the assailants is the assailant himself. It must be remembered that the appellant in
this case is a policeman, while his co-accused Judito Molina is a bodyguard of
the Mayor. Considering their standing in
the community, it is quite natural for the eyewitnesses to be scared and to
keep the information to themselves until they found enough courage to disclose
the same.[44] Such fear was quite obvious on the part of
the prosecution witnesses, as they were placed under the Witness Protection
Program of the Department of Justice the moment they revealed what they knew
about the shooting incident and who were responsible for the same.
In light of the positive
identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill motive
on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either
of them institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a
serious crime he did not commit, appellant’s defense of alibi must necessarily
fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction
that the defense of alibi, being
inherently weak, cannot prevail over the
clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.[45] Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal
based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the
offense; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed.[46] These, appellant miserably failed to show.
As the Court of Appeals has observed, the appellant
failed to substantiate the element of physical impossibility. Records reveal that the distance and
negligible time negate appellant’s claim of alibi and destroy any attempt to
prove that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity
at the time of the commission of the crime.
It was even admitted by the defense during the pre-trial that appellant
was at Bangued, Abra, on
Finally, as regards the presence of
treachery as a qualifying circumstance, this Court holds that the attack was
undoubtedly treacherous. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the
perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself
or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.[48]
As the appellate court enunciated in
its Decision, the prosecution was able to show that the assault made upon the
victims at the time of the shooting incident was so sudden and unexpected as to
have caught them unprepared to meet the assault. At the time of the shooting incident, the
victims were merely playing or watching the on going game of dice just outside
the house of Carmen Daganato, who was lying in state. They had no foreboding of any danger, threat
or harm upon their lives at the said time, place and occasion. Likewise, it was clearly established that the
sudden and unexpected attack adopted by the appellant and his co-accused, who
peppered the unsuspecting victims with bullets, deprived the latter of any
chance to defend themselves, thereby, ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk or any possible retaliatory attack on the aggressors.[49]
The presence of treachery qualifies the
killings of the four victims to murder.
With respect to the 14 injured victims, the crime committed by the
appellant is attempted murder, as the appellant already commenced the criminal
acts by overt acts but failed to perform all the acts of execution as to
produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous
desistance. Similarly, treachery
qualifies the attempted killings.
As to penalty. All told, the appellant is guilty of four
counts of murder qualified by treachery.
Under Article 248[50]
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count,
pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2[51]
of the Revised Penal Code.
The appellant is likewise guilty of
14 counts of attempted murder. The
penalty prescribed by law for murder, which is reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees,
conformably to Article 51[52]
of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation
to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the same should be imposed in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 1[53]
of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the maximum shall
be taken from the medium period of prision
mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional,
in any of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Thus, this Court finds the indeterminate
penalty of 2 years and 4 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, imposed by the lower courts on the
appellant for each count of attempted murder, proper.
As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[54]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission
of the crime.[55] We affirm the award of civil indemnity given
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Under the prevailing jurisprudence,[56]
the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of murder, to
be paid to the heirs of the victims, is proper.
As to actual damages, the heirs of
the victims of murder are not entitled thereto because said damages were not
duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.[57]
Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory
in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other
than the death of the victim.[58] The award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of murder, to be given to the heirs of the four victims,
is likewise in order.
The award of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[59] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[60] Thus, this Court similarly award P25,000.00
as temperate damages for each count of murder.
The heirs of the four victims of
murder are also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
each, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established.[61]
The
award of P20,000.00, as civil indemnity to each victim of attempted
murder, is neither arbitrary nor excessive because such award is in line with
this Court’s ruling in People v.
Gutierrez,[62] citing People v. Almazan.[63] The lower courts did not award moral and
exemplary damages. To conform to this
Court’s current ruling in People v.
Domingo,[64] awards
of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P10,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively,[65] to each
victim, are in order.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02327 - finding herein appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and to
pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count; and of 14 counts of
attempted murder and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum, for each count, and to pay P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count - is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modifications that (1) moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00, should also be awarded
for each count of murder; and (2) moral damages of P10,000 and exemplary
damages of P25,000.00 for each count of attempted murder should also be
given to each victim. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Regalado
E. Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 3-48.
[2] Penned
by Judge Conrado A. Ragucos; CA rollo,
pp. 123-146.
[3] Records,
Vol. 1, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. II, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-2; and
Records, Vol. IV, pp. 1-2.
[4] Records,
Vol. V, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. VI, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. VII, pp. 1-2;
Records, Vol. VIII, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. IX, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. X, pp.
1-2; Records, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. XII, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. XIII,
pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. XV, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol.
XVI, pp. 1-2; Records, Vol. XVII, pp. 1-2; and Records, Vol. XVIII, pp. 1-2.
[5] Records,
Vol. I, p. 35.
[6]
[7] As
evidenced by a Pre-trial Order dated
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN,
[28] TSN,
[29] CA rollo, p. 146.
[30]
[31] Rollo, p. 27.
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] People v. Castillon III, 419 Phil. 92,
102-103 (2001).
[40] Perez v. People, G.R. No. 150443,
[41] Yulo v. People, G.R. No. 142762,
[42] People v. SPO3 Mendoza, 401 Phil. 496,
510-511 (2000).
[43] People v. Albacin, 394 Phil. 565, 581
(2000).
[44] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[45] People v. Cañete, 350 Phil. 933, 946 (1998).
[46] People v. Diopita, 400 Phil. 653, 664 (2000).
[47] Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[48] People v. Gutierrez, 426 Phil. 752, 767
(2002).
[49] Rollo, pp. 43.
[50] ART.
248. Murder.-
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed
with any of the following attendant circumstance:
1.
With
treachery, x x x.
x x x x.
[51] ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties. - x x x.
In
all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof;
x
x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
[52] ART.
51. Penalty
to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. – The penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principal in an attempt to commit a felony.
[53] ART.
64. Rules
for the application of penalties which contain three periods. – x x x.
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium
period.
[54] People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051,
[55] People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[56] People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309,
[57] People v. Tubongbanua, supra note 55 at
742.
[58] People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700
(2003).
[59] People v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368,
[60] People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478,
[61] People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 54 at
741.
[62] Supra
note 48.
[63] 417
Phil. 697 (2001).
[64] G.R.
No. 184343,
[65] People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 54 at
740.