FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., G.R. No. 180122
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,*
QUISUMBING,**
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
-
versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) NACHURA,
and
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondents. BRION,
and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 13, 2009
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
This is a
Petition for Certiorari[1]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Resolution[2]
dated
The antecedents follow.
In June 1990, the National Housing
Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the infrastructure works on
the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in P7,666,507.55,
was funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on
A.C. Cruz
Construction commenced the infrastructure works on
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was
approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works. As
a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth
billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on
The contractor failed to comply with
the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.’s further verification, it was established
that there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C.
Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.’s findings are summarized as follows:
1. No topographic map was
appended, even if the same is necessary in land development works; a discarded
drawing sheet: “Spot Elevations and Existing Gradelines” of the project site
was found, but this contrasted significantly with the alleged joint-survey
results in support of the Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1;
2.
No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of materials,
even if the same should have been required as essential basis thereof;
3.
There were no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials
and of road filling works having been made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo
de los Santos and Noel Lobrido at the time said activities were allegedly
executed;
4.
The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works were
overestimated to the prejudice of the government:
a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road,
the entire width of 10.00 meters was used in calculating the volume of cut of
unsuitable materials when the undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the
road was only 6.00 meters;
b. the mathematical calculation in
determining the volume of cut of unsuitable materials are contrary to the
contract’s technical specifications which provides for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by end-area method;
c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width
of 8.70 meters was used in calculating the volume of road fill when the
undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters
apart;
d. the mathematical calculations in
determining the volume of roadfill are contrary to the contract’s technical
specifications, specifically Section 3.11 thereof, i.e., by end-area method.
5.
No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported road fill
materials.[7]
In a Memorandum dated
In
its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee
determined the total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10
out of the total revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount of P710,717.54.
Thereafter, said Committee recommended
that the temporary project suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred
delays in the project completion, be referred to the Legal Department for appropriate
action.[9]
On
In March
1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, approved the mutual termination
of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad
Construction and Development Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the
remaining work was P9,554,837.32.[11]
Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad and NHA-Bacolod
conducted a joint measurement at the site to determine the total accomplishment
of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of accomplishments after NHA inventory.
The Project Office was subsequently
informed by the Central Office that the accomplishments made by A.C. Cruz
Construction after the NHA inventory would be paid directly to said contractor
by Triad. As of P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo M.
Cruz per Official Receipt No. 3003.[12]
In its Memorandum dated
Thereafter, Triad discovered that
certain work items that had been in under the inventory report as accomplished
and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these
irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).
After its special audit investigation,
the COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are ghost activities,
specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works and
substandard, defective workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the
irregularities.[14]
Further, according to the COA, while it is true
that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction had not been paid its
accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory found acceptable by NHA
amounting to P896,177.08 were paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had been
overpaid by as much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net
payment due per the computation of the unpaid fourth billing.[15]
Consequently, petitioner, as manager
of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the Inventory and
Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an Information[16]
dated
INFORMATION
The
undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas,
accuses ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS,
JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ
for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That
in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS,
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and NOEL H. LOBRIDO,
Public Officers, being the
General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt.
Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and
Supervising Engineer, Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official
functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and
with accused ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C.
Cruz Construction with address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with
deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C. Construction
public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE
CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy
Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were
undertaken by A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by
the Commission on Audit, thus accused public officials in the performance of
their official functions had given unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[17]
On 2 October 2006, petitioner
filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following grounds: (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the
information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual
participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the
Resolution dated 27 March 2005.[18]
On
Among
the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged
offense is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo
Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC),
which undertook the inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of
A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain
constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or
the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he
supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and
Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual
inspection because he allegedly saw that all the members of the Committee had
already signed are matters of defense which he can address in the course of the
trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is
denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(1) Accused Robert Balao,
Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos’ Motion to Admit Motion to Quash dated
October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006
attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the case is hereby DISMISSED insofar
as the said accused-movants are concerned.
(2)
The
Motion to Quash dated
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte,
Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Let the arraignment of the accused proceed as scheduled on
SO
ORDERED. [19]
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed
resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it
held:
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated
the grounds and arguments which had been duly considered and passed upon in the
assailed Resolution. Nonetheless, after a careful review of the same, the Court
still finds no cogent reason to disturb the finding of probable cause of the
Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and
Cruz of the offense charged. In its Memorandum dated
The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of
the information against accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz. The
information has particularly alleged the ultimate facts constituting the
essential elements of the offense charged which are as follows:
1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and
Lobrido are public officers being the Department Manager, Project Management
Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the NHA during the time material in the
criminal information; and
2. that the said accused, in their
respective official capacities and in conspiracy with accused Cruz, a private
individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, have acted with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith and have given unwarranted benefits,
preference, and advantage to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction or have
caused damage and prejudice to the government, by “[causing] to be paid A.C.
Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand
Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos (P232,628.35)
supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted
by the Commission on Audit.”
The other factual details which accused
Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of evidence best threshed out in the course of
the trial.[20]
Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration
of petitioner’s submissions. Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding
the validity and sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make out
an offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to quash
considering that the remaining averments in the Information have been rendered
unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused; and
(3) using as bases the Prosecution’s Memoranda
dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him had been
violated for failure of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts charged in the
Information do not constitute an offense as no damage or injury had been made
or caused to any party or to the government. Finally, petitioner maintains that
the Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the
charges against his co-accused as the remaining accused are public officers
whose salary grade is below 27.
In its
Comment[21]
dated
salary
grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g),
Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8249.[25]
In his Reply[26]
dated
Petitioner’s main argument is that the Information
filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the essential elements of
the crime charged as it failed to specify the individual participation of all
the accused.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the
denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari. Well-established
is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion
to quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion
to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this
rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.[31]
This general rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies.[32]
And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability
of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law.[33]
Matters aliunde will not be
considered.[34]
Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court states that:
SEC. 6.
Sufficiency of complaint or
information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed
by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to know the
proper judgment. The Information must
allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes.[35]
The test is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.[36]
Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction
in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or
synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.[37]
Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, reads:
SEC.
3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x
x x
(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.[38]
The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:
1. The accused is a public
officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits
the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in
relation to his public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any
party, whether the government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused
by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. The public officer has acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[39]
The Court finds that the Information in this case
alleges the essential elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are
public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A
and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance
of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each
other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz
Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and
road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in
On the contention that the Information did not
detail the individual participation of the accused in the allegation of
conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under
Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of committing a
crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is
not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is
punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such
as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.[40]
When conspiracy is charged as a
crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be set
forth in the complaint or information. But
when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting
its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen
of the offense charged. The conspiracy
is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the
accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless
of the degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for
the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.[41]
Notably, in People v. Quitlong,[42]
as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled on how conspiracy as a mode of
committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being
imputable to all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information
whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for
the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy
indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege
all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all
the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe
conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that
the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of
the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the
nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the
accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. It is said,
generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient “if it follows the words
of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of
the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated
crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S.
842-844).
x x x Conspiracy
arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue
it. Verily, the information must state
that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony
among the accused. Such an allegation,
in the absence of the usual usage of the words “conspired” or “confederated” or
the phrase “acting in conspiracy,” must aptly appear in the information in the
form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime,
the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term “conspire” or its derivatives
and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it.
In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to
support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred
from shown acts and conduct of the accused.[43]
In addition, the allegation of
conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it.
A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts
indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A
statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.[44]
The other details cited by petitioner,
such as the absence of any damage or injury caused to any party or the
government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.
As to the contention that the residual
averments in the Information have been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal
of the charges against some of his co-accused, the Court finds that the
Information sufficiently makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining
accused.
With regard
to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the Prosecution’s Memoranda
dated
It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was
ordered by this Court because the prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply
with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson and Members of the First
Division, after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the
participation of each of the accused. In ordering the reinvestigation, the
Court noted that the prosecution’s July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the
apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division as to
the inadequacy of the allegations in the information.
This time, despite a
reinvestigation, the prosecution’s Memorandum dated
Finally, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position
with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a
government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of
the offense, which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction.
Apropos, the Court held in the case of Geduspan
v. People[46]
which involved a regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26, to wit:
It is of no
moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade
26. While the first part of the above–quoted provision covers only
officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the
second part thereof “specifically includes” other executive officials whose
positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is
vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private
individual charged together with her.
The position of manager in a
government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is
within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that
petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v.
Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of
R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration
cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a),
(b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public
officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and
controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in
paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was
committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the
subject matter of the case.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Acting
Chief Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting
Chief Justice
[2]
[25]Otherwise known as “An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended” which pertinently states:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. —The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
x x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
[26]
[34]People of the
[42]354 Phil. 372 (1998).