THIRD DIVISION
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ANSON TRADE CENTER, INC., ANSON EMPORIUM CORPORATION and TEDDY KENG SE CHEN, Petitioners, - versus - PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION, Represented by Its Liquidator,
the President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 179999 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: March
17, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioners Anson Trade Center,
Inc., (ATCI), Anson Emporium Corporation (AEC), and Teddy Keng Se Chen (Chen),
seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision[2]
dated 31 May 2007 and Resolution[3]
dated 16 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93734. In its assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals annulled the Order[4]
dated
The following are the undisputed
facts:
Petitioners ATCI and AEC are
corporations engaged in retail and/or wholesale general merchandising.[6] Petitioner Chen is the Vice Head of said
commercial entities. Respondent is a closed banking institution undergoing
liquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
On different dates, petitioner ATCI
obtained several loans[7]
from respondent, amounting to P4,350,000.00. On P1,000,000.00 as a loan from respondent. As security for the said loan obligations,
petitioner Chen, with the late Keng Giok,[8]
executed, on behalf of petitioners ATCI and AEC, two Continuing Suretyship
Agreements on
This prompted respondent to file
before the RTC a collection case against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-102198.
On
After petitioners filed their joint Answer
to the Complaint, a pre-trial conference was set by the RTC on
In order to simplify the issues to be
threshed out in the trial, another pre-trial conference was scheduled by the
RTC on
Petitioners moved for the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 01-102198 on the ground of the non-appearance of respondent
at the pre-trial of
The above precipitated respondent to file
with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93734. Respondent prayed for the reversal of the RTC
Orders dated
The Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision on
In a Resolution dated
Petitioners now come before us via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DATED
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF ITS NON-APPEARANCE AT PRE-TRIAL.[10]
At
the core of this controversy is a question of procedure.
The petitioners, on one hand, argue
that the appearance of the parties during pre-trial is mandatory, and the
absence of respondent therefrom constitutes a serious procedural blunder that
merits the dismissal of its case.
On the other hand, respondent claims
that the Rules must be relaxed if it will cause irreparable damage to a
party-litigant and to promote the ends of justice. Respondent urges us to brush aside
technicalities and to excuse its non-appearance during the pre-trial
conference.
We find the Petition unmeritorious.
Pre-trial, by definition, is a
procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the
parties[11]
and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering.[12] It is an answer to the clarion call for the
speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as
the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth
century,[13] it thus
paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case.[14]
Pertinent
provisions of Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court on Pre-Trial read:
SEC. 4.
Appearance of parties. – It shall be the duty of the parties and
their counsel to appear at the pre-trial.
The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is
shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully
authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative
modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of
facts and of documents.
SEC. 5.
Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to
appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause
for dismissal of the action. The
dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex
parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Pursuant to
the afore-quoted provisions, non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial
shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule 18 of the Revised
Rules of Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be
excused if a valid cause is shown therefor.
We find such a valid cause extant in the case at bar.
There is no
question that herein respondent received notice of the pre-trial conference
scheduled on
The Monetary
Board ordered the closure of respondent by reason of insolvency on
It is
important to note that the respondent was not remiss in its duties to prosecute
its case. Except for the lone instance
of the pre-trial conference on
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals,[15] we
ruled that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of
the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules,
courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
If Civil Case No. 01-102198 is
allowed to proceed to trial, it will not clog the dockets of the RTC or run
counter to the purposes for holding a pre- trial. Inconsiderate dismissals, even without
prejudice, do not constitute a panacea or a solution to the congestion of court
dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the
parties. In the absence of clear lack of
merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance,
trial on the merits, and final disposition of cases before the court.[16]
Moreover, respondent is already
insolvent and undergoing liquidation. It
instituted Civil Case No. 01-102198 precisely to recover from petitioners the
unpaid loans. Even if the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-102198 by the RTC was without prejudice, the re-filing of the
case would be injurious to respondent.
Respondent already paid P344,878.23 as docket fees for Civil Case
No. 01-102198 and with the dismissal of said case, the amount would be
forfeited. Respondent would have to pay
docket fees once more when it re-files its Complaint, a substantial amount
considering that respondent is already financially shaped. As the Court of Appeals noted, for respondent
to again pay docket fees for the re-filing of its Complaint against petitioners
would truly be detrimental to the creditors of respondent.
Given the foregoing, the Court of
Appeals did not err in pronouncing that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Civil Case No. 01-102198 for the failure of
respondent to attend the pre-trial conference on 10 October 2005. As the appellate court so astutely stated:
In refusing to resuscitate Civil Case No. 01-102 198 despite a showing that there was an excusable ground for the [herein respondent]’s absence during the pre-trial, the respondent judge manifested a dire fixation towards procedural perfection. Indeed, the extraordinary writ of certiorari would lie when a trier’s obsession with the stringent tenets of technicality would occasion an injustice against a party litigant.
Litigation is not a game of
technicality, in which one more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art
of movement and position entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each
contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and
then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfection of forms
and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits.
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts.[17]
As we have stressed emphatically on
previous occasions, the rules of procedure may not be misused and abused as
instruments for the denial of substantial justice. Here is another demonstrative instance of how
some members of the bar, availing themselves of their proficiency in invoking
the letter of the rules without regard to their real spirit and intent, succeed
in inducing courts to act contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and,
in some instances, to wittingly or unwittingly abet unfair advantage by
ironically camouflaging their actuations as earnest efforts to satisfy the
public clamor for speedy disposition of litigations, forgetting all the while
that the plain injunction of Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the “rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties
in obtaining” not only “speedy” but more imperatively, “just ... and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”[18]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per Special Order No. 568, dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 25- 33.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associates Justices Aurora Santiago- Lagman and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 25-32.
[3] Rollo, pp. 34- 36
[4] Penned by Hon. Antonio Rosales, CA rollo,
p. 19-A.
[5] Represented by its Liquidator,
President of the PDIC.
[6] The pleadings did not allege the relationship between the two corporations. What was alleged was the fact that the two corporations had the same President and Vice Head.
[7] These loans were obtained by
petitioner ATCI on 30 August
1982, 5 July 1983, 2 November 1983, and 26 October 1984, in the amounts
of P2,000,000.00, P1,000,000.00, P350,000.00,
and P1,000,000.00, respectively, exclusive of interest and charges.
[8] Keng Giok was the President of ATCI and AEC.
[9] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[10]
[11] Interlining Corporation v. Philippine Trust Company, 428 Phil. 584, 588 (2002).
[12] Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. v. Teodoro, 135 Phil. 364, 367 (1968).
[13] Tiu v. Middleton, 369 Phil. 829, 835 (1999).
[14]
[15] 362 Phil. 362, 369 (1999).
[16] Macasa v. Herrera, 101 Phil. 44, (1957).
[17] Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 322 (1910).
[18] Tanhu v. Ramolete, 160 Phil. 1101,
1113-1114 (1975).