THIRD
DIVISION
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PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ and
RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN, INC., Petitioners, - versus
- JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG, accompanied and
joined by her husband, LEOPOLDO HONG and GENOVEVA LITANIA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 179540 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 13, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision[2]
dated
The factual and procedural antecedents
of the case proceed as follows:
On
Of
particular interest in this case are the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956. The lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 7421 was
described in the Deed of Partition as “bounded on the North by Simplicio Cavile antes
Roman Echaves, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by Riachuelo Napasu-an,
and on the West by Riachuelo Napasu-an y Julian Calibug antes Francisco Tacang.” The lot covered
by Tax Declaration No. 7956 was identified to be the one “bounded on the North by
Hilario Navaro, on the East by Silverio Yunting, on the South by Fortunato
Cavile, and on the West by Maximiano Balasabas.”
In
accordance with the Deed of Partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and
Tranquilina were divided into two parts.
The first part, corresponding to Bernardo’s share, was further divided
into six equal shares and distributed among his six heirs. The second part, corresponding to Tranquilina’s
share, was subdivided only into three shares and distributed among her children
with Bernardo, i.e., Susana, Castor,
and Benedicta.
Also stated in the Deed of Partition
was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir Castor of
their aliquot shares in the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7143, No. 7421,
and No. 7956; thus, making Castor the sole owner of the said properties. Similarly, the Deed of Partition acknowledged
the sale by all the legal heirs to Ulpiano Cavile of their respective shares in
the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 5729, thus, transferring to the latter
absolute ownership of said parcel of land.
Thereafter, on 5 August 1960, Castor
and Susana executed a Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition,[7]
whereby Castor recognized and confirmed that the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 were
the just and lawful shares of Susana in the properties left by their deceased
parents Bernardo and Tranquilina, and that Susana was in actual possession of
the said properties. According to the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
2039 was “bounded
on the North by Simplicio Cavile, on the East by Rio Bayawan, on the South by
Napasu-an, and on the West by Napasu-an Creek and Julian Calibog;” while the
one covered by Tax Declaration No. 2040 was “bounded on the North by Hilario
Navvaro (sic), on the South by Fortunato Cavile, on the East by Silverio
Yunting, and on the West by Maximino (sic) Balasabas.”
The descriptions
of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 2039 and No. 2040 in the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition were strikingly close to those of the
lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956, respectively, in the
Deed of Partition.
Fourteen
years after the execution of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition in
1960, respondents filed on 23 December 1974 a Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of
Property with Damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile, the daughter of
Castor, Jose de la Cruz, the husband of Perfecta (hereinafter petitioner
spouses), and the Rural Bank of Bayawan, Inc.
The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6111.[8]
Respondents
averred in the Complaint that respondents Justina and Genoveva inherited two
parcels of land, covered by Tax
Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 (subject lots),[9] from their mother Susana, who, in turn,
inherited the same from her parents Bernardo and Tranquilina. Respondents invoked the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition dated
After Susana’s death in 1965, the subject
lots were inherited by her daughters, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who then
assumed the mortgage thereon. However, respondents
alleged that Castor and petitioner spouses eventually intruded upon and
excluded respondents from the subject lots.
When Castor died in 1968, petitioner spouses continued their unlawful
occupancy of the subject lots, planting on the same and harvesting the
products. Respondents claimed that they
exerted efforts to settle the matter, but petitioner spouses stubbornly refused
to accede. In 1974, prior to the filing
of the Complaint, respondents again sought an audience with petitioner spouses,
yet the latter only presented to them the Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
No. FV-4976,[10] No.
FV-4977,[11]
and No. FV-4978[12]
covering the subject lots, issued by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Negros Oriental, on 9 October 1962, in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondents were, thus, constrained to institute
Civil Case No. 6111 against petitioner spouses and the Rural Bank of Bayawan,
Inc., seeking the cancellation of the OCTs in the name of petitioner Perfecta or,
alternatively, the reconveyance by petitioner spouses of the subject lots to
respondents, plus award for damages. The Rural Bank of
Bayawan, Inc. was impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint since petitioner
spouses mortgaged the subject lots in its favor as security for a loan in the
amount of P42,227.50. However,
the bank was later dropped as a party after the aforesaid loan was settled.
Petitioner spouses
countered in their Answer to the Complaint that, by virtue of the Deed of Partition
dated
Petitioner spouses
asserted that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition dated
Trial in Civil Case No. 6111
thereafter ensued before the RTC.[13]
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [herein petitioner spouses]
as the absolute owners over the parcels of land in litigation. Consequently, [herein respondents’] complaint
is ordered dismissed. [Respondents’]
counterclaim is likewise entered dismissed for lack of merit.[14]
The RTC ruled that the petitioner spouses’
evidence was more worthy of credence in establishing their ownership of the
subject lots. As petitioner Perfecta testified
before the RTC, Castor immediately took possession of the subject lots after
the Deed of Partition was executed in 1937.
This fact was supported by the unrebutted testimony of Luciana Navarra, petitioner
Perfecta’s cousin, who declared that her husband was petitioner Perfecta’s
tenant on the subject lots since 1947 and that respondents never actually occupied
the said properties. The RTC observed
that it was highly questionable and contrary to human experience that
respondents waited nine long years after their ejection from the subject lots
in 1965 before taking any legal step to assert their rights over the same.
The RTC further
subscribed to the testimony of Perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial
Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain
a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral. It noted that Susana did not bother to apply
for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name. Contrarily, it was Perfecta who applied for
and obtained title to the subject lots, which, surprisingly, respondents were
not even aware of. The RTC found that
the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties after the execution of
the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition evidently demonstrated their
intention to merely accommodate Susana in her loan application. Hence, the RTC concluded that the Confirmation
of Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated contract which was void and without
any legal effect.
Without seeking a reconsideration of
the above RTC Decision, respondents challenged the same by way of appeal before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66873.
On
WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING
[herein petitioner spouses] and/or their heirs, assigns and representatives as
follows:
1.
To
reconvey to [herein respondents] the possession and title to the litigated
parcels of land.
2.
Upon
reconveyance of the litigated properties, the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete
City is ordered to cancel Certificate of Title No. 4877 (sic), 4976 and 4978
and to issue a new certificate to [respondents] or their successors in
interest.
3.
With
costs against [petitioner spouses].[15]
The Court of Appeals agreed in the
respondents’ contention that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was
not a simulated document. The said
document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was
executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of
Partition of 1937. Moreover, the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition constituted evidence that was of the
highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a
declaration against his proprietary interest.
Other than petitioner Perfecta’s testimony, the appellate court found no
other proof extant in the records to establish that the Confirmation of
Extrajudicial Partition was a simulated document or that it did not express the
true intent of the parties. The Court of
Appeals likewise highlighted the fact that Castor did not attempt to have the
subject lots declared in his name during his lifetime and that petitioner Perfecta
herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject
lots in 1993. It was Susana and, later,
her children, respondents Justina and Genoveva, who had been paying for the
realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937.
Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[16] of
the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[17]
dated
Petitioner spouses filed the instant Petition,
raising the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
I.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW IN RULING THAT EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF AN
AFFIDAVIT, THE “CONFIRMATION OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION,” MAY BE ADMITTED IN
EVIDENCE TO VARY THE TERMS OF A JUDICIALLY DECLARED VALID AGREEMENT ENTITLED
“DEED OF PARTITION”?
II.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A LEGAL ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA?
III.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING?
IV.
WHETHER [OR NOT] THE FREE PATENT TITLES ISSUED TO THE
PETITIONERS MAY BE RECONVEYED TO THE RESPONDENTS?[18]
Essentially, the Court finds that the
fundamental issue that must be settled in this case is who, among the parties
herein, have the better right to the subject lots.
The Court notes prefatorily that in
resolving the present case, an examination of the respective evidence of the
parties must necessarily be undertaken. Although the jurisdiction of the
Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
we find that an exception[19]
to this rule is present in the instant case in that the Court of Appeals made
findings of fact which were contrary to those of the RTC.
Before proceeding, the Court further
establishes as a foregone fact, there being no issue raised on the matter, that
the subject lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the Complaint in Civil Case
No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 7956
and No. 7421 included in the Deed of Partition, and by Tax Declarations No. 2040
and No. 2039 subject of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition.
Respondents, as plaintiffs before the
RTC in Civil Case No. 6111, sought the reconveyance and recovery of the subject
lots purportedly illegally usurped by petitioner spouses who succeeded in
having the same titled in the name of petitioner Perfecta. Respondent Justina testified in open court
that the subject lots were inherited by her and co-respondent Genoveva’s mother,
Susana, from their grandparents, Bernardo and Tranquilina.[20] As proof of Susana’s ownership of the subject
lots, respondents presented the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition executed
on
On the other hand, to prove their
entitlement to the subject lots, petitioner spouses presented before the RTC
the Deed of Partition[23]
entered into by the heirs of spouses Bernardo and Tranquilina on
After a careful evaluation of the
evidence adduced by the parties in the instant case, the Court rules in favor
of petitioner spouses.
At this point, let it be stated that
the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition executed in 1937 is not
directly assailed in this case, thus, the Court need not pass upon the
same. Under the said Deed of Partition,
the other heirs of Bernardo and Tranquilina clearly and unequivocally sold
their shares in the subject lots to Castor, petitioner Perfecta’s father. What appeared to be the clear right of
ownership of Castor over the subject lots was put in doubt by the execution of
the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition by Castor and his sister Susana in
1960. Respondents, children and heirs of
Susana, base their claim of ownership of the subject lots on the said document,
while petitioner spouses denounce the same to be simulated, executed for
purposes other than to transfer ownership of the subject lots, and cannot
legally alter the terms of the previously duly executed Deed of Partition.
As held by the Court of Appeals, the
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition partakes of the nature of an admission
against a person’s proprietary interest.[27] As such, the same may be admitted as evidence
against Castor and petitioner spouses, his successors-in-interest. The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence, notwithstanding that they are hearsay, is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence advisable and,
further, that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against
his own pecuniary or moral interest.[28]
Nevertheless,
the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition is just one piece of evidence
against petitioner spouses. It must
still be considered and weighed together with respondents’ other evidence vis-à-vis petitioner spouses’
evidence. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. “Preponderance of evidence” is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” “Preponderance of evidence” is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[29] Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider
all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may
also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
Herein, despite the admission made by
Castor in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition against his own interest,
the Court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses
preponderated over that of the respondents.
In
analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the Court discerns that while
the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the
subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though
confirming Susana’s ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why
or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents Bernardo
and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance.
Other
than the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, respondents were only able to
present as evidence of their title to the subject lots tax declarations covering
the same, previously, in the name of Susana and, subsequently, in their own
names. We find such tax declarations
insufficient to establish respondents’ ownership of the subject lots. That the disputed property has been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of any party does not necessarily prove
ownership. Jurisprudence is consistent
that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the
properties stated therein. A disclaimer
is even printed on the face of such tax declarations that they are "issued
only in connection with real property taxation [and] should not be considered
as title to the property." At best,
tax declarations are indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner.[30] Conversely, non-declaration of a property for
tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership.[31]
On
the other hand, the Court is at a loss as to how the Court of Appeals failed to
give due consideration to the
Sometime
in 1962, petitioner Perfecta applied for and was granted by the Bureau of Lands
free patents over the subject lots. Pursuant
thereto, Original Certificates of Title No. FV-4976, No. FV-4977,
and No. FV-4978, covering the subject lots, were issued by the Registry of
Deeds for the
A
On
this matter, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141[34]
provides that all actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the
public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor
General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name
of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the
Although jurisprudence recognizes an exception
to this case, the respondents may not avail themselves of the same.
Verily,
an aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based on implied
or constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance
of the Certificate of Title over the property, provided that the property has
not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks
to transfer property, wrongfully or fraudulently registered by another, to its
rightful and legal owner.[36] If the registered owner, be he the patentee
or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred, knew that
the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to
another, who together with his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
thereof, and if the patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in
possession thereof, the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership of
or title to the land judicially settled. The court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the
In
the instant case, respondents brought the action for reconveyance of the
subject lots before the RTC only on
And even if respondents’ Complaint
was filed on time, the Court would still rule that respondents failed to
satisfactorily prove that they were in possession of the subject lots prior to
the grant of free patents and issuance of
Furthermore, respondents’ allegation
that petitioner Perfecta committed fraud and breach of trust in her free patent
application is specious. The
fact that the document evidencing the sale of the subject lots by Castor to
petitioner Perfecta was not presented does not automatically mean that said contract
was never in existence. Also undeserving
of much consideration without sufficient proof is respondents’ averment that
the subject lots were private lands which could no longer be granted to any
person via free patent. Respondents ought to remember that mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive and
deprive another party of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be alleged and proved.[38] Also, the issuance by Bureau of Lands of free
patents over the subject property to petitioner Perfecta enjoys the presumption
of regularity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-36.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Francisco P. Acosta; rollo, pp. 38-44.
[3] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[4] Penned
by Judge Victor C. Patrimonio; rollo,
pp. 116-127.
[5] Folder
2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibit 1.
[6] Having
died before the execution of the Deed of Partition, Fortunato and Vevencia were
merely represented therein by their eldest children, Lucio Cavile and Vicente
Navarra, respectively.
[7] Folder
2, Index of Exhibits, Exhibit A.
[8] In 1985, the complaint was amended in view of the death of petitioner Jose de la Cruz. His children Solon de la Cruz and Don de la Cruz were impleaded as defendants. Felicitas L. Reston was also impleaded as a plaintiff, as she was likewise a daughter of Susana Cavile.
[9] The
descriptions of the boundaries of the lots covered by Tax Declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 in the Complaint
correspond to those of the lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421, respectively, in the Deed of Partition,
as well as to the lots covered by Tax
Declarations No. 2040 and No. 2039 in the Confirmation of Extrajudicial
Partition.
[10] Folder 2,
Index of Exhibits, Exhibits B to B-2.
[11]
[12]
[13] In the
RTC, respondent Justina Litania-Hong was presented as a lone witness for the
plaintiffs in 1975. In 1987, the
Perdices Coliseum, upon which the trial court was situated, was burned. The original records of the case were, thus,
lost and were only duly reconstituted on
[14] Rollo, p. 127.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] In a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, questions of fact may
be determined by the Court when: (1) the conclusion of the Court of Appeals is
a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record. (See Rosario v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R. No.
139233, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 500, 506, citing Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 846 [1998]).
[20] TSN,
[21] The
pertinent portions of the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition provide:
Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition
KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That
I, CASTOR CAVILE, xxx, hereinafter called and referred to as the PARTY OF THE
FIRST PART; and SUSANA CAVILE, xxx, hereinafter called and referred to as the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART,
WITNESSETH:
That the parties herein are the
only legitimate children of the deceased spouses Bernardo Cavile and
Tranquilina Alvier Galon, who both died intestate, in the Municipality of
Bayawan, Negros Oriental, sometime on the year 1917, and February 19, 1945,
respectively.
That the said deceased spouses
left several parcels of agricultural land in the
x x x x
That the PARTY OF THE FIRST PART hereby recognizes, agree, bind and
confirm that the above-described parcels of land are (sic) the just and lawful
share of the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, and which property is actually in the
possession of the latter.
x x x x
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have
hereunto signed this instrument on this 5th day of August, 1960, at
the
SGD CASTOR CAVILE SGD
SUSANA CAVILE
(Party of the First Part) (Party of the Second Part)
[22] Folder 2,
Index of Exhibits, Exhibits E to L-2.
[23] The
pertinent portions of the Deed of Partition read:
DEED OF PARTITION
KNOW
ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT Susana Cavile, Castor
Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia Cavile, Lucio Cavile and Vicenta Navarra
both (sic) of legal age and residents in the Municipality of Tolong,
Province of Oriental Negros, Philippine Islands, after being duly sworn to in
legal form, WITNESSETH:
That Susana Cavile, Castor
Cavile and Benedicta Cavile are the only children of Bernardo Cavile with his
wife Tranquilina Galon, and that Simplicia Cavile and Fortunato Cavile and
Vevencia Cavile are the children of Bernardo Cavile outside from the conjugal
home of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon.
That Fortunato Cavile and
Vevencia Cavile having already been dead are survived by their corresponding
children and represented in this document by their oldest child, Lucio Cavile
and Vicenta Navarra, respectively.
That during the union of
Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon several properties have been acquired by
them and declared under the name of Bernardo Cavile all situated in the
x x x x
That by this document it is
hereby agreed by the legal heirs of Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon to
divide and by these presents it is hereby divided the above mentioned
properties in the following manner:
1 - That the
conjugal properties of said Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon which are
already described are hereby divided into two parts ONE (1) part which
corresponds to the share of Bernardo Cavile is also divided into SIX (6) equal
parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor Cavile, Benedicta Cavile, Simplicia
Cavile, Fortunato Cavile represented by his oldest son, Lucio Cavile, and
Vevencia Cavile represented by her oldest child Vicenta Navarra.
2 - That the other
ONE (1) part which corresponds to the share of Tranquilina Galon is also hereby
equally divided into THREE (3) parts, that is among Susana Cavile, Castor
Cavile and Benedicta Cavile.
SHARE
OF BERNARDO CAVILE
x x x x
That
the share of Bernardo Cavile in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and
7956 are sold by the legal heirs to Castor Cavile in consideration of the sum
of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-) SIX PESOS (P166.00), Philippine currency, which
amount has been received and divided equally among them.
x x x x
SHARE
OF TRANQUILINA GALON
x x x x
That
the share of Tranquilina Galon in parcels Tax Declaration Nos. 7421, 7143 and
7956 are hereby sold by the heirs of said Tranquilina Galon to Castor Cavile in
consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY(-)SIX PESOS (P166.00),
Philippine currency(,) which sum has been received and divided equally among
them.
That the said heirs of Bernardo
Cavile and Tranquilina Galon above mentioned hereby agree and accept as it is
hereby agreed and accepted all the items and conditions in this DEED OF
PARTITION.
IN
WITNESS HEREOF we have this 5th day of April, 1937, A.D., sign our names below
in the
[24] TSN,
[25] Folder 2,
Index of Exhibits, Exhibits 2 to 2-e.
[26] TSN,
[28] Parel v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 146556,
[29] Go v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 883, 890-891 (2001).
[30] Azana v. Lumbo, G.R. No. 157593,
[31]
[33] Republic
of the
[34]
[35] See Maninang v. Consolacion, 12 Phil. 342,
349 (1908).
[36] See Heirs of Sanjorjo v. Heirs of Quijano,
G.R. No. 140457,
[37] Vital v. Anore, 90 Phil. 855, 858-859 (1952).
[38] Crisologo v. Court of Appeals, 160-A
Phil. 1085, 1093-1094 (1975).