THIRD
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA
and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants. |
|
G.R. No.
178300 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairperson, CARPIO,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: March
17, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For
review is the Decision,[1] dated
The
facts culled from the records are as follows:
On
The
undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses
Domingo Reyes y Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
That
on or about P5,000,000.00),
that during the detention of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused
with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs in such amount
as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
During
their arraignment,[5]
appellants, assisted by a counsel de
oficio, pleaded “Not guilty” to the charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The
prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao
(Robert), Yao San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien,
Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the
following:
The
On
After
about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of
appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan
(Abagatnan) stepped out of the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and
one of their male companions.[7] Appellant
Later,
the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to
produce the amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in
exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male
companion left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and
Josephine remained inside the van. Upon
sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the
poultry farm and sought the help of relatives.[9]
Meanwhile,
Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated
in the mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the
whole night.[10]
On the
morning of the following day, at around
In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release
him so he could help Abagatnan in locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and
after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert
then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon
arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the
ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert
also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants
and their cohorts.[12]
On P5 million
for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants’ demand. Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong
Ping Sim.[13]
On the
morning of P5
million at
On
On
Subsequently,
appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were
identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as their
kidnappers.[18]
On
The
prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations,
to wit: (1) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Abagatnan (Exhibit A);[20]
(2) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay
of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B);[21]
(3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);[22]
(4) death certificates of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E);[23]
(5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Robert (Exhibit F);[24]
(6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San
(Exhibit H);[25] (7) joint
affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien
(Exhibit I);[26] (8) joint
affidavit of PO3 Alex Alberto and PO3 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J);[27]
(9) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Flores (Exhibit K);[28]
(10) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);[29]
and (11) sketch made by appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit M).[30]
For its
part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene
Flores Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo.
Appellants denied any liability and
interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by their
witnesses, are as follows:
Appellant
Arnaldo testified that he was an “asset” of the PAOCTF. He narrated that on P500,000.00.
He accepted Yao San’s offer under the
condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave him P30,000.00.[31]
Subsequently,
he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the
He denied
having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not
assisted by the latter when he was forced by the PAOCTF to make a written
extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the
On the other
hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from
6:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early
morning of 26 July 1999, five policemen barged into his house and arrested him;
that the policemen told him that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao
family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house; that the
policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently
tortured; that he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the
family’s poultry farm at Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he
had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo
implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held a
grudge against him.[34]
For his
part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sister’s house at
Antipolo City from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house
on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday of her child; that he worked as a
construction worker during his stay in his sister’s house; that he was arrested
in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by
policemen for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family;
that after three days of beating, he was forced to sign a document which he
later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession; that he never met
nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near
the family’s poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had
no participation in the kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo
implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because he and appellant Reyes had
mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago.[35]
The
defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing
claims, to wit: (1) prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for
appellant Arnaldo);[36]
(2) calling card of Colonel Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo);[37]
and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant
After
trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants
of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and
sentencing each of them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly
and severally the P150,000.00 as civil indemnity, P500,000.00 as moral
damages and the costs of the proceedings. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding
herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA, and
JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are
hereby sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by
law, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond Yao in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00),
and all the private offended parties or victims, including the heirs of the
deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.[39]
By
reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case
was elevated to us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[40]
we remanded the instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
On P150,000.00 to P100,000.00.
Further, it directed appellants to pay jointly and severally the P100,000.00
as exemplary damages. The fallo of the Court of Appeals’ decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting
accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double)
Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1) accused-appellants are instead
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100,000;
and
3) accused-appellants are further ordered
to pay private complainants the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.[41]
Appellants
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision but this
was denied. Hence, appellants filed
their Notice of Appeal on
In
their separate briefs,[42] appellants
assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY
BETWEEN APPELLANTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT
FLORES;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE
CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN APPELLANTS’ GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[43]
Anent
the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San.
In
resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is
guided by the following well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will
not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that the
latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor
when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a
clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.[44]
After
carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines
to this case, we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTC’s ruling finding
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan,
Robert, and Yao San positively identified appellants and their cohorts as their
kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial. Abagatnan
specifically testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts
forcibly entered the van where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores
drove the van away from the poultry farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were
among the kidnappers who guarded her, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in
the safe-house; and that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo accompanied her in going
to the poultry farm to search for Yao San and remind him about the ransom
demanded.[45] Robert confirmed that appellants and
their cohorts blindfolded them inside the van during the incident. He also recounted that appellants and their
cohorts detained him and Chua Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house.
He was later instructed by appellants to
find Yao San and remind him about the ransom.[46] Yao San
declared that during the incident, appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him,
poked their guns at him, and dragged him into the van. Appellant P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of
Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan.[47]
Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their respective testimonies were consistent
with one another. They were steadfast in
recounting their ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in harmony
with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found their
testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both
courts also found no ill motive for Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify
against appellants.
Appellants,
nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have
identified their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness
of the night; (2) they were blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the
kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.
It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the
incident. At that time, there was a light from a fluorescent bulb hanging above
the gate of the poultry farm wherein Yao San was held at gunpoint by appellant
Reyes and Pataray.[48]
The headlights of the van were also
turned on, making it possible for Abagatnan and Robert to see the faces of
appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two approached and poked their guns at Yao
San.[49]
Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which turned on when the door’s van
was opened. This bulb lighted up when
appellants and their cohorts forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San to glance at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.[50]
Although the
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads
of appellants and their cohorts were covered by T-shirts, their faces were,
nonetheless, exposed and uncovered, allowing them to see their faces.[53]
Robert and Yao San also declared that they recognized the faces of appellants
during the incident because the latter resided near the poultry farm of the
Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San that they were able to recognize the kidnappers -- because
although the kidnappers’ heads were covered with T-shirts, their faces were nevertheless
exposed or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants
argue that it is against human nature and experience that kidnappers would
cover only their heads and not their faces in concealing their identities.
It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and
their cohorts to cover their heads with T-shirts, while leaving their faces exposed
and uncovered when they kidnapped the
Appellants dispute the plausibility
of Enrico Cebuhano’s claim that he was able to identify the assailants because
they took off their masks. Persons who
wear masks would not take them off so casually in the presence of their
victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.
The
above arguments are untenable. In his
testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men who entered his home
removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there
was no one in the vicinity who could identify them, or that they wanted Enrico
to see who they were so as to intimidate him.
It is also possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them
who were all armed. In any event, what is
important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhano’s testimony to be both
credible and believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants
herein, because the men who entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were
brutally killed as a result of the kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao
San would point to appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers if such
were not true. A witness’ relationship
to the victim of a crime makes his testimony more credible as it would be
unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a crime done to their family
to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[56]
Relationship with a victim of a crime
would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural and usual interest would be to
identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true justice
for the death of a relative.[57]
Appellants
put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the
incident and identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that
they recognized appellants, as the latter used to work in the poultry farm.
Robert
and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to the
authorities. Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts when the ransom was
demanded for their release. Appellants
and their cohorts were armed and dangerous. Appellants and their cohorts also
threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San and Robert would
report the incident to the authorities.[58] Understandably, Yao San and Robert were
extremely fearful for the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to
refrain from reporting the incident. Robert
and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to the police
even after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already been found,
and appellants and their cohorts had cut their communication with them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their cohorts were still
at large then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining members
of the
Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution
failed to prove that they conspired in kidnapping the
Under
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes
unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective among the
accused.[61] When the accused by their acts aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as
to complete the crime, with a view to the attainment of the same object,
conspiracy exists.[62]
As can
be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan,
Robert and P5
million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim,
Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Appellant
Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded Abagatnan,
Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in
going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom
demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo
and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial confessions[64]
how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the
Appellants,
however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial
confessions.
Appellant
Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the
Appellant
Appellant
Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded
as evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to
have an independent counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to
choose his counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the
custodial investigation whether he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether
he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents of the PAOCTF suggested
the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
An
extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement by a person under custodial investigation, stating or
acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a
crime.[65] In order that an extra-judicial confession may
be admitted in evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that the following safeguards be observed[66]:
Section 12. (1) Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Thus,
we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the
following requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must
be express; and (4) it must be in writing.[67]
The
mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision
covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for the
investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or
from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense
although not yet in custody.[68]
The
right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[69] Such right contemplates effective
communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.[70]
The
right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.[71]
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from the accused.[72] The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the
accused. If the lawyer is one furnished
in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must
be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.[73] A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from
the time the latter answers the first question asked by the investigator until
the signing of the confession. Moreover,
the lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that
the person under investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence
of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-vis
his constitutional rights. [74]
However,
the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing
guilt if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from
admitting what he is being coerced to admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not
challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer
is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate
him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest
coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never prevent an accused
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[75]
We have
gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly
apprised appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel of their own choice during
their respective custodial investigations.
The Pasubali[76]
of appellants Arnaldo and
Records
reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to
competent and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
As
regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning
of appellant Arnaldo about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF
investigators and agents to give him and appellant Arnaldo space and privacy,
so that they could freely converse. After
the PAOCTF investigators and agents left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to
a cubicle where only the two of them were present. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog
language regarding the latter’s personal circumstances and asked him why he was
in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that
he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the kidnapping of the
Further,
Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to
the latter’s entire confession. After
the taking of appellant Arnaldo’s confession, Atty. Uminga requested the PAOCTF
investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldo’s confession. Upon obtaining such copy, he read it entirely
and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo to read and
comprehend the same carefully. He told
appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification and comment if he did not agree
or understand any part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo read his entire written
confession and handed it to him. Atty.
Uminga asked him if he had objections to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the
latter could still change his mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would
sign his written confession. Later, he
and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to the written confession.[79]
With
respect to appellant
Additionally,
Atty. Rous stayed with appellant
It is
true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of
Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically imply
that their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence
of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
client’s defense without any intervening conflict of interest.[82]
There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal assistance rendered
by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both
counsels had no interest adverse to appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a
former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless,
clarified that he had been separated therefrom since 1994[83] when
he went into private practice. Atty.
Uminga declared under oath that he was a private practitioner when he assisted
appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.[84] It appears that Atty. Uminga was called by the
PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Uminga’s telephone number was
listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF. Atty.
Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the
The
Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot
be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a
municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused.
Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration. Nor is there any
evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible
fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the
Further,
as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an
accused is entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. The phrase “preferably of his own choice” does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation
is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense. Otherwise,
the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect
his interest.[88] While the choice of a lawyer in cases where
the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel
– or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection to the
counsel’s appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.[89] Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object
to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous as their lawyers,
respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning, appellants Arnaldo
and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo manifested that he would be assisted
by Atty. Uminga, while appellant
Since
the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial
confessions of appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in
accordance with the constitutional guarantees, these confessions are admissible.
They are evidence of a high order
because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would
deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.[90]
Consequently, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to
procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.[91]
In the
case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of
proving that they were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than their self-serving statements that
they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any
plausible proof to substantiate their claims. They did not submit any medical report showing
that their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the
persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective
confessions despite several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that
they informed their family members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but
the latter did not report such allegations to proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
declared in their respective confessions that they were not forced or harmed in
giving their sworn statements, and that they were not promised or given any
award in consideration of the same. Records
also bear out that they were physically examined by doctors before they made
their confessions.[92] Their physical examination reports certify
that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted
during their examination.[93] In People
v. Pia,[94] we held
that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-judicial confession: (1) where
the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or duress or
violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers
who administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where
there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and (5) where they
did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim.
It should
also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores are replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was
committed, thereby ruling out the possibility that these were involuntarily
made. Their extra-judicial confessions
clearly state how appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well
as the sequence of events before, during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be
inferred from its language if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being
replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.[95]
With
respect to appellant Reyes’s claim that the extra-judicial confessions of
appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled
that although an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of
other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.[96] In People
v. Alvarez,[97] we
ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is
receivable as evidence against a co-accused.
In People v. Encipido[98]
we elucidated as follows:
It is also to be noted
that APPELLANTS’ extrajudicial confessions were independently made without
collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are,
therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused
implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s actual participation
in the commission of the crime. They are
also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear
from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the
declarants themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and
proved. They are what is commonly known
as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that
extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against
the declarants thereof.
Appellants
Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes
participated in their kidnapping of the
Nevertheless,
even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores,
evidence on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of
appellant Reyes. As earlier found,
Abagatnan, Robert and
Appellants
argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant
Reyes avers that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the
Alibi
is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
prove. Alibi must be proved by the
accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over
the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must likewise prove that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[99]
The
defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up
must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.[100]
It
should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed
to have slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[101] This is the same barangay where the
Appellant
Appellant
Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from his self-serving testimony that he
was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included as accused in the
kidnapping of the
It is
true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up
of appellant Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some
of their relatives/friends. We have, however,
held that alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are
corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality.[104]
Indeed,
the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San prevail
over the alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.[105]
We
shall now determine the propriety of appellants’ conviction for the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding
penalties imposed.
Under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed
with the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the
latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it
is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer.[106] All of the foregoing elements were duly
establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in
the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private individuals. Second,
appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the
Republic
Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two
qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the
motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap
victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of
the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration
paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him
from captivity.[107] Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to
or received by the perpetrators is of no moment.[108] It is sufficient that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of exacting ransom;[109]
and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the
kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are alleged
in the information and proven during trial.
As
testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts
demanded the amount of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim
and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to the
Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money
to appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and their
cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond who were still under their custody, because they heard the radio report
that the incident was already known to the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong
Ping Sim and Raymond were later found dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that
they died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Withal,
the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346 on
The
Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and
severally pay civil indemnity and exemplary damages to the P75,000.00
was still proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition
of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying
circumstances of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two of
the kidnap victims were alleged in the information and proven during trial. Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond, their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are
entitled to a total amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.[111] In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be
recovered when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying.[112] Since both the qualifying circumstances of demand
for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap victims (Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and proven
during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable
acts, the award of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages should be modified. In
several cases,[113]
we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to each of the kidnap victims. As in this case, the amount of P100,000.00
as exemplary damages should be awarded each to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew,
Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This
makes the total amount of exemplary damages add up to P700,000.00.
The
appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code,
moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the
same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. There is no doubt that each member of the P100,000.00 as moral damages.
Per computation, the total amount of
moral damages is P700,000.00 and not P500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC
and the Court of Appeals.
Finally,
we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed
by appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping
for ransom with double homicide
since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The
word “double” should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings
or deaths that occurred as a consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate
denomination of the crime should be the special complex crime of kidnapping for
ransom with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of exemplary
damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00;
and (4) the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is
the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
|
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision/Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third
Division |
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice |
* Per
Special Order No. 568, dated
** Associate Justice Renato C. Corona was
designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin and Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo concurring; rollo, pp.
3-34.
[2] CA
rollo, p. 445.
[3]
[4] Records,
pp. 42-43.
[5]
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] Records,
p. 34.
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] Records,
p. 35.
[14] Id;
TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] Records,
pp. 15-17.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] TSN,
[32] TSN,
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35] TSN,
[36] Records,
Volume VI, Index of Exhibits.
[37]
[38] Records,
p. 357.
[39] CA
rollo, p. 61.
[40] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[41] Rollo, p. 34.
[42] CA
rollo, pp. 85-132, 148-164 &
198-219.
[43]
[44] People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 182192,
[45] TSN,
[46] TSN,
[47] TSN,
[48] TSN,
[49] TSN,
[50] TSN,
[51] TSN,
[52] TSN,
[53] TSN,
[54] TSN,
[55] 357
Phil. 924, 933-934 (1998).
[56] People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017,
[57] People v. Ubaldo, 396 Phil. 509, 520 (2000).
[58] TSN,
[59] People v. Fajardo, Jr., G.R. No. 173022,
[60] People v. Dadles, 343 Phil. 916, 924 (1997).
[61] People v. Dorico, 153 Phil. 458, 475 (1973).
[62] People v. Geronimo, 153 Phil. 1, 10 (1973).
[63] At
large.
[64] Records,
pp. 312-318.
[65] People v. Fabro, 342 Phil. 708, 721 (1997).
[66]
[67] People v. Base, 385 Phil. 803, 815 (2000).
[68]
[69] People v. Sayaboc, 464 Phil. 824, 839 (2004).
[70] People v. Agustin, 310 Phil. 594, 612 (1995).
[71] People v. Olermo, 454 Phil. 147, 165 (2003).
[72] Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291,
[73] People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 103499,
[74] People v. Velarde, 434 Phil. 102, 119 (2002).
[75] People v. Base, supra note 67.
[76] Records,
pp. 312-318.
[77] TSN,
[78] TSN,
[79]
[80] TSN,
[81]
[82] People v. Velarde, supra note 74.
[83] TSN,
[84]
[85] TSN,
[86]
[87] Supra
note 65 at 726.
[88] People v. Mojello, 468 Phil. 944, 954 (2004).
[89] People v. Base, supra note 67.
[90] People v. Bagnate, G.R. Nos. 133685-86,
[91] People v. Fabro, supra note 65.
[92] Records,
p. 18.
[93]
[94] 229
Phil. 577, 582 (1986).
[95] People v. Bagnate, supra note 90.
[96]
[97] G.R.
No. 88451,
[98] 230
Phil. 560, 574 (1986).
[99] People v. Guevarra, supra note 44.
[100] People v. Montesa, G.R. No. 181899,
[101] TSN,
[102]
[103] TSN,
[104] People v. Guevarra, supra note 44; People v. Larranaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75,
21 July 2005, 463 SCRA 652, 662; People v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 158203, 31
March 2005, 454 SCRA 719, 736; People v.
Datingginoo, G.R. No. 95539,
[105] People v. Fajardo, Jr., supra note 59.
[106] People v. Jatulan, G.R. No. 171653,
[107]
[108]
[109]
[110] G.R.
No. 170236,
[111] New
Civil Code, Article 2229.
[112] New
Civil Code, Article 2223.
[113] People v. Garalde, G.R. No.
173055,
[114] People v. Garalde, id.; People v. Borromeo, 380 Phil. 523, 531
(2000); People v. Reyes, 329 Phil.
1043, 1049 (1996).