SECOND
DIVISION
|
FE LA
ROSA, OFELIA VELEZ, CELY DOMINGO, JONA NATIVIDAD and EDGAR DE LEON, Petitioners, - versus - AMBASSADOR HOTEL, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 177059 Present:
QUISUMBING, J.*, Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: March 13, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On April
17, 2002, employees of Ambassador Hotel including herein petitioners filed
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) several complaints, docketed as NLRC Case
Nos. 04-02018-02, 30-04-02019-02, 08-06442-02 and 02-03643-02, for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, and illegal deductions against the hotel (respondent)
and its manager, Yolanda L. Chan. They
alleged that, following their filing of complaints with the Department of Labor
and Employment-NCR which prompted an inspection of the hotel’s premises by a labor
inspector, respondent was found to have been violating labor standards laws and
was thus ordered to pay them some money claims.
This purportedly angered respondent’s management which retaliated by
suspending and/or constructively dismissing them by drastically reducing
their work days through the adoption of a work reduction/rotation scheme. Criminal cases for estafa were likewise
allegedly filed against several of the employees involved, some of which cases
were eventually dismissed by the prosecutor’s office for lack of merit.
The
complaints against respondent subject of the present petition were consolidated. By Decision[1]
of
Respondent
appealed to the NLRC which, by Decision[2]
dated September 8, 2005, affirmed the labor arbiter’s ruling with the
modification that five of the complainants, namely Diana P. Castillo, Lorena L.
Hildao, Gilbert Ongjoco,
Thus, the
NLRC disposed:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Diana P. Castillo, Lorena I. Hildao, Gilbet
Ongjoco,
[Herein
petitioners] Fe La Rosa, Ofelia Velez, Cely Domingo and Jona Natividad were
constructively dismissed, and Edgar de Leon actually dismissed but
illegally. Accordingly, the awards
made in their favor are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
(Underscoring supplied)
On
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the NLRC, by Decision[4]
dated
Respondent appealed and prayed for the
issuance of an injunctive writ before the Court of Appeals, faulting the NLRC to
have committed grave abuse of discretion 1) in finding that petitioners were
illegally dismissed, 2) in awarding backwages and separation pay, and 3) in
requiring it to pay them the monetary equivalent of their service incentive
leaves. Respondent maintained that its
act of reducing the number of work days per week was valid, as it was done to
save its business from bankruptcy due to economic reverses.
The
appellate court granted respondent’s prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and subsequently for a writ of preliminary injunction.
By Decision[5]
dated December 12, 2006, the appellate court reversed the NLRC
decision and dismissed petitioners’ complaints, holding that there was no
constructive dismissal because petitioners “simply disappeared from work” upon
learning of the work reduction/rotation scheme; and that in their position
paper submitted before the NLRC, petitioners only prayed for separation pay and
not for reinstatement, hence, following settled jurisprudence, the latter
relief has been foreclosed.
The
appellate court went on to hold that respondent’s adoption of the work
reduction/rotation scheme, as well as its reassignment of petitioners, was a
valid exercise of management prerogative, absent any showing that the same was
done out of vengeance. It further held
inapplicable the rule that the institution of a complaint for illegal dismissal
is inconsistent with abandonment, because petitioners failed to pray for
reinstatement as they instead prayed for separation pay.
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution[6]
dated
Petitioners
deny having abandoned their jobs. And
they take exception to the appellate court’s finding that they did not pray for
reinstatement, they inviting attention to paragraph 14, page 5 of their
verified position paper reading: “x x x Hence they are entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages, or in the alternative to full separation
pay of one month per year of service,” as well as to their prayer in the
pro-forma complaints filed before the labor arbiter asking for the same relief.
Petitioners
question as bereft of specific proof the appellate court’s ruling that the work
reduction/rotation scheme adopted by respondent was a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
Finally, petitioners
question the issuance by the appellate court of a TRO, and subsequently of a
writ of preliminary injunction conditioned on respondent’s posting of a bond
which was lower than the judgment award, hence, prejudicial to them.
The
petition is impressed with merit.
While it is settled that the Court is not a trier of
facts and does not, as a rule, re-examine the evidence presented by the parties
to a case, there are a number of recognized exceptions, such as when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings of facts of
lower courts are conflicting; or when the findings of facts are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence but which are contradicted by the evidence on
record.[7]
The
appellate court predicated its reversal of the NLRC decision that petitioners were
illegally dismissed on petitioners’ supposed abandonment of their jobs, and
justified the work rotation/reduction scheme adopted by respondent as a valid
exercise of management prerogative in light of respondent’s business
losses.
The records
fail, however, to show any documentary proof that the work reduction scheme was
adopted due to respondent’s business reverses.
Respondent’s memorandum[8]
dated April 5, 2000 (sic, should be
2002) informing petitioners of the adoption of a two-day work scheme effective
April 5, 2002 made no mention why such scheme was being adopted. Neither do the records show any documentary
proof that respondent suffered financial losses to justify its adoption of the
said scheme to stabilize its operations.
What is
undisputed, as found by both the labor arbiter and the NLRC and admitted by
respondent itself, is that the complaints for violation of labor standards laws
were filed by petitioners against respondent at the DOLE-NCR, some of which complaints
were partially settled; and that almost immediately after the partial
settlement of the said complaints, the work reduction/rotation scheme was
implemented.
Case law holds
that constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when
there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or
when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee.[9] Respondent’s sudden, arbitrary and unfounded adoption
of the two-day work scheme which greatly reduced petitioners’ salaries renders
it liable for constructive dismissal.
Respecting
the appellate court’s ruling that petitioners “simply disappeared” from their
work, hence, they are guilty of abandonment, the same does not lie.
Absence must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back
to work rests on the employer.
x x x x
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The second element is the more determinative factor. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal thus requires clear, willful, deliberate, and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent,
which has the onus of proving that petitioners abandoned their work, failed to
discharge the same, however.
Upon the
other hand, petitioners’ immediate filing of complaints for illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal after the implementation of the questioned work scheme, which
scheme was adopted soon after petitioners’ complaints against respondent for
violation of labor standards laws were found meritorious, negates respondent’s
claim of abandonment. An employee who takes steps to protest
his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.[11]
As for the
appellate court’s ruling that petitioners are not entitled to reinstatement
because they did not pray for it in their complaints, the same does not lie. In all the pro-forma complaints[12]
filed by petitioners before the NLRC, they prayed for reinstatement or, in the
alternative, for the award to them of separation pay. And they reiterated this prayer
in their Position Paper,[13]
specifically in paragraph 14 thereof, viz:
14. Due process was
not followed in the constructive dismissal of the complainants. Hence they are entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages or in the alternative to full
separation pay of one month per year of service. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Besides, under Article 279[14]
of the Labor Code and based on settled jurisprudence, an employee dismissed
without just cause and without due process, like petitioners herein, are
entitled to reinstatement and backwages or
payment of separation pay.
In fine,
the Court finds that petitioner Edgar de Leon was illegally dismissed on
November 7, 2001, and the rest of the petitioners were illegally dismissed
on April 15, 2002 from which dates the payment of backwages (cum separation pay), at the above-stated
rate determined by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC, are to be
reckoned with. This leaves it
unnecessary to still pass on the issue of the propriety of the appellate
court’s issuance of a TRO and injunctive writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Court
of Appeals Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
* Acting Chief Justice.
[1] Records, pp. 96-100. Penned by Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 118
[4] Records, pp. 300-303.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 254- 261. Penned by then Associate Justice, now Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso.
[6]
[7] Insular Life v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850,
[8] Records, p. 48.
[9] Uniwide Sales v. NLRC, G.R. No. 154503,
[10] Seven Star Textile Company v. Dy, G.R. No. 166846, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 486, 499.
[11] Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 146118, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 162, 168.
[12] Records, pp. 1-3, 11,
[13]
[14] Art.
279. Security of Tenure. – x x x
In
cases of regular employment the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.