THIRD
DIVISION
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NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL
HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners, - versus
- HONORABLE Respondent. |
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G.R. Nos. 174813-15 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 17, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of
respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The facts
of the case are as follows.
On
On
On
On
On
On
Without
moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the
present Petition for Mandamus,
bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ
commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the
respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or
when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[3]
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy
of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary one; mandamus will not
issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner
in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court.[4]
In the case
at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is
to grant the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of
Informations against petitioners. In
effect, petitioners seek to curb
There is
indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion
are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus,
for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.[5] However, mandamus is never available to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.[6] In other words, while a judge refusing to act
on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can
be compelled by mandamus to act on
the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e.,
to grant or deny such Motion. In the
case at bar,
Petitioners
counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor
General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the
proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from
our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[7]:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar
a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be
reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the
The
possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of
discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the
executive. But in such a case the proper
remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari
or prohibition.[8] (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners
have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging
the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the
Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and
homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor
Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the
non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against
whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in
that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel
the filing of charges against said two other persons.
In the case
at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is
directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to
compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City
Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has
already filed a case against petitioners.
Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,[9]
we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,[10]
that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any
disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused
rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial
court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo
v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence,
and discretion of the trial court. The
trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. Contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the
Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the
accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private
complainant to due process of law. When
the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case,
or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with
the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does
so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners
also claim that since
In the instant case, the respondent Judge
granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider
the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the
information it had filed should stand.[13]
Like what
was done to our ruling in Sanchez,
petitioners took specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting off
the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr.
was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the
accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the
basis of a Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the
dismissal of the case. The dismissal of
the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite
the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by the
Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact
that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing, since the
Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained
finality. We held that the judge should
have waited
for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before
acting on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable
cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph
of our Decision in Montesa, Jr.
reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to
wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for
it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter
disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the
reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also,
under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No.
911.[14]
As can be
clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine that the judge
should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there
is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and
control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the
court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case
filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a
reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the
court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights
of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.[15]
In a
seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to
convince us that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations
from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the
Motion to Withdraw Informations is void.
Petitioners’ counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10.
Furthermore, the ORDER dated
“In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of
discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to withdraw information
pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void.” (Underscoring ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully
submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because
of its falsity.[16]
This
statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in
Ledesma.[17] The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement
allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
No Grave
Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the
justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's
letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion
to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for
reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely
on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is
inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment
of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was
tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of
probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do
so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for
disregarding the secretary's recommendation.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)
It very
much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court,
in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or
assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Counsel’s
use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it
appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words “Underscoring
ours” after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a
faithful reproduction of the original.
Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show
cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify,
we never stated in Ledesma that a
judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there
is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of
the Motion to Withdraw Information is void.
What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion
if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and
complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw
an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of
the secretary of justice, the bounden
duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of
such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but
is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the
secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits
reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to
evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on
the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal
action.[19] (Emphases supplied.)
Petitioners
also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed
Order apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause
against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of lasciviousness,
the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and
pre-trial on
Thus,
petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no
probable cause against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office
of the City Prosecutor should be granted.[21]
Even a
cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the
insertion of the word “no” in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical
error. The assailed Order states in full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements
of the complainants and the resolution dated
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be
expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a
situation. It is not proper to judge the
actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of
behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is
yet to be captured even by calculus. It
is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90,
The Court finds no need to discuss in
detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and
acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and
should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of
prejudgment against the accused.[22]
As can be
seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court
found probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate
discussion of the reasons for such finding.
Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the
dispositive portion or the fallo and
the body of the decision, the fallo
controls. However, where the inevitable
conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was
a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[23]
In sum, petitioners’
resort to a Petition for Mandamus to
compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is
improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving
judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.[24] The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to
Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound
by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to
make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement
satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.[25]
Finally, if
only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the
finding of probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully
reviewed the records of the case. After
going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court
that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold
them for trial. We decided to omit a
detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the
undue influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such
discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records
of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption
of the proceedings therein. The Regional
Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.
Atty.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED
to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein
discussed.
SO ORDERED.
|
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per Special Order No. 568, dated
[1] The real name of the alleged victim is withheld per Republic Act No. 7610 and Republic Act No. 9262, as held in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
[2] Rollo, pp. 346-347.
[3] Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
[4] Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407 Phil. 619, 646 (2001).
[5] Angchangco v. The Honorable Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766, 772 (1997).
[6]
[7] G.R. Nos. 111771-77,
[8]
[9] G.R. No. 158236,
[10] G.R. No. L-53373,
[11] Rollo, pp. 369-370.
[12] G.R. No. 114302,
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 370.
[17] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207 (1997).
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, p. 41.
[21]
[22]
[23] Olac
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84256,
[24] Angchangco v. The Honorable Ombudsman, supra note 5 at 771-772.
[25] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 at 235-236.