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RONNIE CALUAG, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 171511
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- versus - PEOPLE OF
THE Respondent. |
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, CHICO-NAZARIO,* VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: March 4, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING,
J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate Informations[5] docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed against Caluag
and Sentillas. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and Sentillas with slight physical
injuries committed as follows:
That on or
about the 19th day of March, 2000,
in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ
personal violence upon the person of NESTOR
PURCEL DENIDO, by then and there mauling him, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries which required medical attendance for less than nine (9) days
and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period
of time.
CONTRARY TO
LAW.[6]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358 charged Caluag
with grave threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March 2000, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by
personal resentment which he entertained against one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously threaten said JULIA LAVIAL
DENIDO with the infliction on her person of a harm amounting to a crime, by
then and there poking his gun at her forehead and uttering the following words
in tagalog, to wit:
“Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?”
thereby causing said
complainant to be threatened.
CONTRARY TO
LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, Caluag and Sentillas pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the two private complainants, the
spouses Nestor and Julia Denido, as witnesses.
Their version of the facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of
Later, at around
For its part, the defense presented the accused Caluag and
Sentillas; and the barbecue vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as witnesses. According to them, in the afternoon of March
19, 2000 at around 6 o’clock in the evening, Caluag was on his way home with
his three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and unruly, blocked his way and asked
him, “Pare, galit ka ba sa akin?” He
answered in the negative but Nestor persisted in his questioning and would not
allow him to pass through. Annoyed, he
told Nestor, “Hindi nga! Ang kulit kulit mo!” Nestor
then boxed him on his face which caused him to fall down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety of
his son and then punched Nestor back. As
people around pacified them, he was led to the store owned by the son of
Sentillas. Nestor pursued him and
punched him again. As he retaliated, some bystanders separated them. Nestor then shouted, “Putang ina mo, Pare! Gago
ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong niloko!” Thereafter, an unidentified man from the
crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas timely
interceded and pacified the man.
Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.[12]
In a Joint Decision dated
The MeTC relied on Nestor’s testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny that he was
drunk at the time of the incident while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by
Nestor’s attitude. The MeTC concluded
that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their tempers due to Nestor’s unruly behavior. On the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia
did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to the barangay. While she had intended to report the mauling
of her husband, as he instructed her, what she reported instead was what
happened to her. With such
straightforward and seemingly natural course of events, the MeTC was convinced
that the negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of Nestor and Julia.
The decretal portion of the joint decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all
the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds and declares accused RONNIE
CALUAG AND JESUS S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Slight Physical Injuries under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences them to
pay [a] fine of P200.00 each. The
two (2) accused are also censured to be more complaisant and well-bred in
dealing with people.
The Court also
finds accused RONNIE CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Grave Threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under
Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to suffer two (2) months
imprisonment [and to] pay [a] fine of P200.00.
Criminal Case
No. 47382, as earlier explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a
duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto
the joint decision of the MeTC.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC on
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to this Court on the ground
that the Court of Appeals:
I.
… MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED
WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION;
II.
… ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE [MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT
DECISION THAT ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE
GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
III.
… ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PETITIONER HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.[14]
Simply, the issue is:
Was there sufficient
evidence to sustain petitioner’s conviction of slight physical injuries and of
grave threats?
Petitioner contends that he was able to present Barrameda, an
independent and impartial witness, who supported his version of events and
debunked those of Nestor and Julia.
Contrary to the findings of the lower courts that petitioner offered
mere denials, Barrameda’s testimony is actually a positive statement that
should have been given full credit.
Petitioner also argues that although the lower courts acknowledged that
Nestor was drunk and troublesome at the time of the incident, they chose to
believe his testimony rather than petitioner’s.
Petitioner adds that there is no basis for the lower courts to conclude
that he lost his temper because of Nestor’s unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains that just because Julia
immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not
necessarily mean that it actually happened.
Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia,
the crime committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.[15]
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the MeTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of
Nestor and Julia. The MeTC found that
the positive assertions of Nestor and Julia, their straightforward manner of
testifying, and the seemingly natural course of events, constituted the more
plausible and credible version. The MeTC
also noted that Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-poking incident to
the barangay authorities immediately after it happened. The OSG also agrees with the MeTC that
petitioner lost his temper, given the unruly behavior of Nestor.
We find the petition with insufficient merit and accordingly sustain
petitioner’s conviction.
At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioner raises questions of
fact. Certainly, such matters mainly
require a calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of
the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[16]
The well-entrenched rule is that only errors of law and not of fact are
reviewable by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
under which this petition is filed. It
is not the Court’s function under Rule 45 to review, examine and evaluate or weigh
once again the probative value of the evidence presented.[17]
Moreover, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to weigh
anew the evidence already passed upon by the Court of Appeals for these are
deemed final and conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on appeal.[18]
A departure from the general rule, however, may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence
on record. Nevertheless, we find that there
is no ground to apply the exception in the instant case because the findings
and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full accord with those of the MeTC
and the RTC. This Court will not assess
and evaluate all over again the evidence, both testimonial and documentary,
adduced by the parties to the appeal particularly where, as in this case, the
findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.[19]
Even if the Court relaxes the abovecited general rule and
resolves the petition on the merits, we still find no reversible error in the
appellate court’s ruling.
As the lower courts and the Court of Appeals correctly stated,
the testimonies of Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the natural course
of things. There could be no doubt that
Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their temper as Caluag himself admitted
that he got annoyed by Nestor’s unruly behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident also
happened since Julia did not waste time in reporting it to the barangay
authorities. Instead of reporting the
mauling of her husband, she reported what happened to her in her hurry,
excitement and confusion. Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and Julia
that petitioner committed the acts complained of undermined his negative
assertions. The fact that Barrameda
testified in petitioner’s behalf cannot be given more weight than the
straightforward and credible statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find they had no reason to concoct
stories to pin down petitioner on any criminal act, hence their testimonies
deserve full faith and credit.
The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found
petitioner guilty of grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P200. We find no reason to reverse the
findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave
threats (Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light threats
(Article 285). These provisions state:
Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any
person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime,
shall suffer:
1.
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he
threatened to commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding
money or imposing any other condition, even though not unlawful, and said
offender shall have attained his purpose. If the offender shall not have
attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be imposed.
If
the threat be made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2.
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.
Art. 283. Light threats. — Any
threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in the manner expressed
in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by
arresto mayor.
Art. 285.
Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1.
Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in
a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall
orally threaten another with some harm not constituting a crime, and who by
subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the idea involved in his
threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it
within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.
3.
Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a
felony.
In grave threats,
the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by
a condition. In light threats, the
wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by a
condition. In other light threats,
the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that at around
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed
falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting
someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a
condition.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable
although it specifically states, “shall threaten another with a weapon or draw
such weapon in a quarrel”, since it presupposes that the threat to commit a
wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will
constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave
threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for utter lack of merit. The
Decision dated
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Designated member of Second Division pursuant to Special Order No. 580 in place of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, who was earlier designated as an additional member per Special Order No. 571 but will take no part being then the Solicitor General.
[1] Rollo, pp. 46-57. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. Delos Santos and Josefina Guevara-Salonga concurring.
[2] Id. at 68.
[3] Records, pp. 256-261. Penned by Judge Erlinda Nicolas-Alvaro.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Time as stated during
cross-examination. In the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, the time of the incident is stated as “bandang
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 24.
[15]
[16] Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923,
[17] Lorenzo
v. People, G.R. No. 152335,
[18] Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, March 20, 2002, 379 SCRA 590, 593-594.
[19] Id. at 594.
[20] Exhibit A, Records, p. 25.