PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee, |
G.R. No. 171085
|
- versus - RODOLFO “RUDY” SORIANO, Appellant. |
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,* and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: March 17,
2009 |
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QUISUMBING,
J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated
The Information dated
248[3] of the Revised
Penal Code, reads as follows:
x x x x
That on or
about
Contrary to Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8294.[4]
Appellant was arrested by the police authorities while Ireneo
“Rene” Lumilay remained at large. Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented, as witnesses, Genaro R. Lumilay,
an eyewitness; PO3 Dante N. Marmolejo, the police investigator of the PNP
Manaoag, Pangasinan; and Dr. Arnulfo T. Bacorro, Rural Health Physician of
Manaoag, Pangasinan.
Genaro R. Lumilay[5] testified that on
PO3 Dante N. Marmolejo[6] testified that
upon receiving a report that there was a shooting incident at Barangay Oraan,
Manaoag, Pangasinan, he immediately proceeded to the place of the
incident. He saw the lifeless body of
Diodito lying on the side of the road. Rowena told him that it was appellant
who shot Diodito. Thereafter, he
searched for and arrested appellant at his house.
Dr. Arnulfo T. Bacorro conducted an autopsy on Diodito. In his Autopsy Report[7] and testimony,[8] he declared that Diodito’s body bore
two gunshot wounds. The first wound was
fatal because it trajected the inferior lobe of the left lung up to the upper
lobe of the right lung thereby causing massive bleeding.
On the other hand, the defense presented, as witnesses,
appellant Rudy Soriano; Elvira Soriano, appellant’s wife; and Edwina C. de
Jesus.
Elvira Soriano[9] testified that
at around
Elvira declared that Genaro hated appellant for the following
reasons: First, appellant borrowed a male duck which they failed to return
because it died. Second, appellant was close to Ireneo, who won a land dispute case
against Genaro’s father, and to one Jonathan Fernandez,[10] the private
complainant in a robbery case against Genaro.
Appellant Rudy Soriano[11] testified that
at around
Appellant added that Genaro testified against him because he
failed to return the male duck he borrowed.
He was also very close to Ireneo who won a land dispute case against
Genaro’s father, and Jonathan Fernandez, the private complainant in a robbery
case against Genaro.
Edwina C. de Jesus[12] testified that she was selling
cooked food near the place of the incident on the night of
Edwina added that she knows appellant but does not know if he
was at the place of the incident because many people were there.
On
The trial court appreciated treachery which qualified the
killing to murder. It ruled that Diodito
was attacked in a swift and unexpected manner affording him no chance to defend
himself.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the
court finds the accused guilty of murder penalized by Article 248 as amended by
R.A. 7659 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of [Reclusion Perpetua] and to pay the heirs of the victim Diodito
Broniola alias “Perlito” the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and with
costs against the said accused.
SO ORDERED.[13]
On
The appellate court likewise affirmed that treachery attended
the killing. Diodito and his companions
were merely walking when appellant suddenly appeared and shot him. Appellant consciously adopted said mode of
nighttime attack to insure the success of his purpose without any risk to
himself. Diodito was unaware of the
attack and was not in a position to defend himself. There was treachery not only because of the
suddenness of the attack but also because of the absence of an opportunity on
Diodito’s part to repel appellant’s attack.
Dissatisfied, appellant appealed to this Court. As appellant and the Office of the Solicitor
General opted not to submit their supplemental briefs, we shall review the
decision of the appellate court based on the lone assignment of error before
it:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[14]
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in relying on
Genaro’s positive identification since he was impelled by ill motive in
testifying against appellant. This motive allegedly stemmed from an
incident wherein Ireneo won a land dispute case against Genaro’s father. Allegedly, Genaro also testified falsely against
him because at that time, appellant was close to one Jonathan Fernandez who was
the private complainant in a robbery case against Genaro. Appellant
also contends that the failure to present Rowena, the other eyewitness, to
corroborate Genaro’s testimony raised the suspicion that Genaro was not telling
the truth.
Appellee counters that the testimony of a prosecution witness
is entitled to full faith and credit sans
any indication of ill motive in testifying. The fact that Genaro’s father lost a land
dispute case against Ireneo is insignificant. For one, Genaro did not testify against Ireneo
but against appellant. For another, the
land dispute case was between Genaro’s father and Ireneo which only indicates
that any ill motive Genaro may have would have been against Ireneo and not
appellant. On the other hand, the
robbery case against Genaro does not involve appellant. It is foolhardy that Genaro would testify
falsely against appellant just because his close friend filed the robbery case
against Genaro. Appellee contends that
the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In our considered view, the appeal
is without merit.
Appellant’s
assigned error basically refers to the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, particularly of Genaro R.
Lumilay. According to appellant, Genaro
was impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against him and that Genaro’s
testimony was uncorroborated.
Well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts. This doctrine is based on the time-honored
rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh the testimony in the light of the declarant’s demeanor,
conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the
credence accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses unless it
is clearly shown that the trial court has overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily
facts and circumstances of significance in the case. None of the exceptions, we note, was shown in
the case at bar.[15]
Appellant’s argument that Genaro
was impelled by ill motive to testify falsely against him must be rejected
since the presence of personal motives on the part of a witness to testify in
favor of the victim and against the accused should be supported by satisfactory
proof before his testimony may be considered biased.[16] The records are barren of any satisfactory
proof to show such bias on the part of Genaro.
The trial court gave credence to
Genaro’s testimony after noting that he had no time to fabricate or concoct any
story since his statement was taken immediately after the incident. It also
observed that Genaro withstood the rigors of cross-examination and was
consistent that it was appellant who shot Diodito. In the same vein, the Court of Appeals noted
that the alleged ill motive on Genaro’s part was speculative and insufficient
to impel him to perjure himself and put appellant behind bars for life. As appellee also pointed out, although Genaro’s
father lost a land dispute case against Ireneo, Genaro did not testify against
Ireneo but against appellant. Any ill motive
Genaro may have would have been against Ireneo and not appellant. Moreover, the robbery case against Genaro did
not involve appellant. It was filed by
appellant’s close friend and it would be stretching the imagination too far to
conclude that Genaro would take that circumstance against appellant in order to
testify falsely against him.
Finally, the
testimony of prosecution witness Genaro, as corroborated by the medical
findings of Dr. Bacorro, suffices for conviction. Dr. Bacorro confirmed Genaro’s testimony
that Diodito sustained two fatal gunshot wounds.
Well settled is the rule that the
testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness is sufficient for
conviction.[17] Likewise, the prosecution has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness
but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. We have ruled that the non-presentation of
corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not
fatal to the prosecution’s case.[18]
All told, we rule that the appeal lacks
merit.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Designated member of Second Division pursuant to Special Order No. 571 in place of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga who is on sabbatical leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-12. Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Edgardo P. Cruz concurring.
[2] Records, pp. 147-161. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Alicia B. Gonzalez-Decano.
[3] ART. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.)
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7] Records, p. 28.
[8] TSN, October 1, 2001, pp. 3-5.
[9] TSN,
[10] Appears as Jonathan Bautista in some parts of the records.
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN, January 22, 2002, pp. 2-7.
[13] Records, p. 161.
[14] Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[15] People v. Escote, G.R. No. 151834, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 345, 350-351; People v. Bolivar, G.R. No. 130597, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 438, 451.
[16] People v. Baniega, G.R. No. 139578, February 15, 2002, 377 SCRA 170, 181; People v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 129933, February 26, 2001, 352 SCRA 678, 686.
[17] People v. Manansala, G.R. No. 147149, July 9, 2003, 405 SCRA 481, 490; People v. Mira, G.R. No. 123130, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 631, 642.
[18] People v. Pidoy, G.R. No. 146696, July 3, 2003, 405 SCRA 339, 346-347; People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621, 629-630 citing People v. Jumamoy, G.R. No. 101584, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 333, 344.