THIRD
DIVISION
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DINAH C. CASTILLO,
Petitioner, - versus- ANTONIO M.
ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 171056 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: March 13, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision,[2] dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533, as well as the Resolution,[3] dated 11 January 2006 of the same court denying reconsideration of its afore-mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint Resolution[4] dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order[5] dated 20 June 2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillo’s complaint for grave misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas) and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a
judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel
Buenaventura. In the course of her
search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (
Petitioner set
about verifying the ownership of
Only thereafter
did petitioner proceed to levy on execution
The public
auction sale pushed through on
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of Raquel’s 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry Book and Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344[10]: (a) Notice of Levy;[11] (b) Certificate of Sale;[12] (c) Affidavit of Publication;[13] and (d) Writ of Execution.[14]
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration No. 00942-A,[15] indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while Urbana and Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner
attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share in
ENTRY
NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes
more particularly stipulated in the contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M.
Vergara of
Date
of instrument –
Date
of inscription –
ENTRY
NO. 185833:
ENTRY
NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: – Of the parcel of land described in this cert. of
title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No. 134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671-A,
having been issued by virtue of the aforesaid instrument ratified before
Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page
31, Book No. LXVII, Series of 2002.
Date
of instrument:
Date
of inscription:
On 25 July
2002, at
The foregoing incidents prompted
petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit[19]
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
32. I
respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002 and
onwards in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M.
[Escutin], the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of
the City Assessor’s Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta
Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are
public officers and acting in concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto
L. Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively[,] of
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge of
their administrative functions did then and there unlawfully, through evident
bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards
Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my TD
#00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead issuing in
the name of Francisco Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well
knew that TCT No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled
to a new tax declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in-interest of
Francisco Catigbac, all to my damage and prejudice.[20]
(Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit gave
rise to simultaneous administrative and preliminary (criminal) investigations,
docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and
OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several
irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the alleged sale of
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Summit Realty executed on 22 July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as
Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact, appeared to be a “one-way street.” It did not express the desire of Summit
Realty, as vendee, to purchase
Petitioner also averred that, being a
corporation, Summit Realty could only act through its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Lot 1-B was presented for recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not
accompanied by a Secretary’s Certificate attesting to the existence of a Board
Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit Realty. There was no entry regarding such a
Secretary’s Certificate and/or Board Resolution, whether on TCT No. 129642 or
TCT No. T-134609. A Secretary’s Certificate
eventually surfaced, but it was executed only on
The Deed of Absolute Sale was
presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead
and buried. The agency Catigbac
supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was extinguished by Catigbac’s
death. Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no
longer had authority to execute on
Petitioner asserted that Summit
Realty was well-aware of Catigbac’s death, having acknowledged the same in LRC
Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate of TCT No.
181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of
Petitioner further cast doubt on the
acts undertaken by Summit Realty in connection with Catigbac’s property,
purportedly without legal personality and capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6
February 1976 granted Yagin the right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was
Summit Realty which instituted LRC Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no
participation at all in said case.
Likewise, it was not Yagin, but
Lastly, petitioner questioned why,
despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the
issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was
the former cancelled title which was used as basis for canceling petitioner’s
Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead
of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together,
petitioner recounted in her Complaint Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated
against her and the involvement therein of each of the conspirators:
28. Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation went into action right after I paid
Both
then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on
29. Thereafter, Leviste and
After
filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff’s Deed
of Final Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of
Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the
annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on
TCT No. T-134609 of
Escutin,
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner Juanita
H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriff’s Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic) ownership in favor of the
Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen (sic) that the
presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already transfer (sic) in the name
of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff (sic)
Final Sale is no longer necessary.[24]
Escutin
likewise denied petitioner’s request to have her Affidavit of Adverse Claim
annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the
registered owner. The registered owner
is Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-134609 of the Registry of Deeds for
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the
rights or interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution
by the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City,
in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel
Buenaventura. The registered owner,
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest
are not the judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of
contract between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel
Buenaventura, the judgment debtor who holds no title over the property.[25]
Escutin
did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of
her request for registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and
annotation of her adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner did on
While her
Consulta was pending before the LRA,
petitioner filed a Supplemental Complaint Affidavit[26]
and a Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit[27]
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
The
persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed their
respective Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent
Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609 reflected the
same date and time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin (as
Catigbac’s attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e.,
Respondent
Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the
City Assessor,
Respondent
Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office of
the City Assessor,
Leviste
and
After
more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F were
finally submitted for resolution.
In a
Joint Resolution[29]
dated
Going to the charges against
respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that he allowed the registration
of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as Register of Deeds, has
no power to look into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract presented to him
for registration, owing to the ministerial character of his function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said
respondent, all the documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale
were submitted by the applicant.
We likewise find said
respondent’s explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of P.D. 1529 mandates
that the TCT bear the date of registration of the instrument on which the said
TCT’s issuance was based. It is for this
reason that TCT 134609 bears the same date and time as the registration of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register
[herein petitioner’s] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and Sheriff’s Certificate of
Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds Examiner Juanita H.
Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order denying registration thereof, such matter
had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As the criminal and administrative charges
respecting this issue is premised, in part, on a matter still pending with the
LRA, we find it premature to make a finding on the same.
It is for the same reason that we
deny the motion contained in the Second Supplemental Complaint Affidavit
praying for the inclusion, as additional respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana,
who is impleaded solely on the basis of having signed, by authority of Escutin,
the
Finally, respondent Escutin was
able to successfully demonstrate, through Consulta 2103 dated 25 July 1994,
wherein the denial of registration by the Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City was upheld by the LRA Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice
in the different Registries that Examiners are given authority by the Register
to sign letters of denial.[30]
The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
In this respect, this Office
notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina Mistas caused the
disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting documents received
from [petitioner] on 13 March 2003 when she applied for the issuance of a Tax
Declaration in her favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof
showing that it was Mistas who received said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the
employee responsible for record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly
answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta Linatoc cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration 00949-Q (sic) on the basis
of a cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title upon the behest of Summit
[Realty], which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting
squarely [petitioner’s] allegation, admits having physically cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new declaration covering the same
property in Catigbac’s [name], as mandated by the flow of work in the City
Assessor’s Office. However, she denies
having the authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency
of the documents supporting the application for the issuance of the Tax
Declaration, arguing that her official function is limited to the physical
preparation of a new tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration
number and the cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the application
had passed the other divisions of the City Assessor’s Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to
establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the ones officially
designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration, evaluate
the sufficiency of the documents supporting such applications, and on the basis
of the foregoing recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax
Declaration and direct the annotation of any fact affecting the property and
direct the issuance of a new tax declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a
discrepancy as to the official designation of said respondents. While [petitioner] impleads Mistas, in her
capacity as Local Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records
Clerk, Mistas, in her counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e.,
Assistant City Assessor for Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the
Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the City Assessor’s Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents
not having been neatly defined by [petitioner], this Office cannot make a
definitive determination of their liability for Grave Misconduct and violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which charges both relate to the performance
or discharge of Mistas’ and Linatoc’s official duties.[31]
Neither
did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Anent private respondents, with
the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the transfer of the title of [herein
petitioner’s] property to Summit sufficiently explained by respondent Register
of Deeds, such allegation against private respondents loses a legal leg to
stand on.
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not
able to sufficiently outline the official functions of respondents Mistas and
Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the imputation that
private respondent (sic) conspired with said public respondents respecting the
cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of any factual
and legal bases.[32]
As to
whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square meter
property, which issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled that such matter was not
within its jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil action before the
courts of justice.
In the
end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is
respectfully recommended that : (1) the administrative case against public
respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be
DISMISSED, for lack of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against
the same respondents including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and
BENEDICTO L. ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of probable cause.[33]
In a Joint
Order[34]
dated
The Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint Order, took into account petitioner’s
withdrawal of her appeal en consulta
before the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her request for
registration of the Sheriff’s Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse
Claim, which prompted the LRA Administrator to declare the consulta moot and academic.
For want of a categorical declaration on the registerability of
petitioner’s documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the
said matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public
officers could be held administratively or criminally liable for the acts
imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals
by filing a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging
the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution and 20 June 2005 Joint Order of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.[35] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
90533.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision[36]
on
Without
evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other pay-off or
that they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any taint of
direct corruption in the questioned acts of respondents. Thus, any indication of intent to violate the
laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule may be negated by
respondents’ honest belief that their acts were sanctioned under the provisions
of existing law and regulations. Such is
the situation in the case at bar. Respondent
Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the agency recognized by the
court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered owner Francisco Catigbac
and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with respect to the conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to
Summit as the vendee, and that the Special Power of Attorney and Deed of
Absolute Sale presented as evidence during said proceedings are valid and
binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was
justified in believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in
registering the documents and proceeding with the transfer of title of
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent
policy of the Supreme Court not to interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman
of his investigatory power. If the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court
shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion. The appellate court
pronounced that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The challenged Joint Resolution
dated
In its Resolution dated
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE
TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
II.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD NOT
BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR UNDULY FAVORING
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section
109 of the Property, Registration Decree which provides:
SEC.
109. Notice
and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. – In case of loss or theft of an owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the
owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any new instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the
registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the
petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may,
after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate
certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled
to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No.
00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181 in
lieu of the lost one. However,
respondents did not only issue a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also
cancelled petitioner’s Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate petitioner’s
existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the
cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new owner’s
duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing
one. Under Section 109 of the Property
Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the
old; it cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioner’s position on this issue rests on
extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title
is different from a certificate of title.
Title is generally defined as
the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of
ownership of property, real or personal.[40] Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as
that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property.[41] Certificate
of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the
title to the land itself.[42]
Under the
Summit Realty acquired its title to
Petitioner’s reliance on Section 109 of the Property
Registration Decree is totally misplaced.
It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title. It cannot, in any
way, be related to the cancellation of petitioner’s tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioner’s Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the
5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No.
181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute
and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.[43] All persons must take notice, and no one can
plead ignorance of the registration.[44] Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No.
129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of
As between Catigbac’s title, covered by a
certificate of title, and petitioner’s title, evidenced only by a tax
declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any
other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as
to Catigbac’s ownership of
Petitioner’s allegations of defects or
irregularities in the sale of
Which now brings the Court to the second issue
raised by petitioner on the administrative liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it
establishes that petitioner’s Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to two charges: (1) OMB-L-A-03-0573-F involved
the administrative charge for Gross Misconduct against respondent public
officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728-F concerned the criminal charge for violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[47]
against respondent public officers and private individuals Leviste and
Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for
In Domingo v.
Quimson,[49]
the Court adopted the well-written report and recommendation of its Clerk of
Court on the administrative matter then pending and involving the charge of
gross or serious misconduct:
"Under
Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary action.
And under MC No. 8, S. 1970, issued by the Civil Service Commission on
‘Hence,
even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be merely
an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term `serious misconduct’
is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action more
particularly, unlawful behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. For serious
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial
acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or
were a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled
that negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation. This is not so in the case at bar.’” (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there
must be reliable evidence showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were a persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules. Both the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court
would necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence
presented in the proceedings below. It is not the function of the Court to
reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law that
may have been committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies performing
quasi-judicial functions. It should be
emphasized that findings made by an administrative body, which has acquired
expertise, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the Court. In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only
substantial.[51]
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
the Court shall not disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more
the evidence submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before the
Court of Appeals. Under Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as
long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[52] Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[53]
The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Respondents were able to clearly describe their
official functions and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in
accordance therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her
documents. Respondents also enjoy in
their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
duty. The burden of proving otherwise by
substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to
identify correctly the positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the
Office of the City Assessor. How then
could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their
jurisdiction to perform? While it may be
true that petitioner should have at least been notified that her Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was not able to establish that
such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present
statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents
should have done or not done a particular act.
A perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc
should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name
of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite
any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the annotation of an adverse
interest on a tax declaration. Finally,
absent any reliable evidence, petitioner’s charge that respondents conspired
with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than
speculation, surmise, or conjecture.
Just because the acts of respondents were consistently favorable to
Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause
petitioner prejudice. Respondents’
actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-36.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring; id. at 37-57.
[3]
[4] Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Raquel R.M. Cunanan-Marayag, with the recommending approval of Director Joaquin F. Salazar, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez; id. at 102-118.
[5] Penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Joy N. Casihan-Dumlao, with the recommending approval of Director Joaquin F. Salazar, and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez; id. at 119-122.
[6] Records, pp. 22-28.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Now Chapter XIII, Section 113 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, on recording of instruments related to unregistered Lands.
[11] Records, p. 32.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Penned
by Judge
Vicente F. Landicho; id. at 46-48.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] SEC. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies - Each Register of Deeds
shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he
shall enter, in the order of their reception, all instruments including copies
of writs and processes filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date, hour and minute of reception of all
instruments, in the order in which they were received. They shall be regarded
as registered from the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument,
when made on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as the provincial and
city governments shall be exempt from the payment of such fees in advance in
order to be entitled to entry and registration.
Every deed or other
instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, so filed with the Register of
Deeds shall be numbered and indexed and endorsed with a reference to the proper
certificate of title. All records and papers relative to registered land in the
office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public in the same manner
as court records, subject to such reasonable regulations as the Register of
Deeds, under the direction of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may
prescribe.
All deeds and voluntary
instruments shall be presented with their respective copies and shall be
attested and sealed by the Register of Deeds, endorsed with the file number,
and copies may be delivered to the person presenting them.
Certified copies of all
instruments filed and registered may also be obtained from the Register of
Deeds upon payment of the prescribed fees.
[29] Rollo,
pp. 102-118.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] Petitioner
no longer impleaded Leviste and
[36] Rollo, pp. 37-57.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40] Antonio
H. Noblejas and Edilberto H. Noblejas, Registration
of Land Titles and Deeds (2007 revised ed.), p. 2, citing Hunt v. Easton, 21 N.W. 429, 431.
[41]
[42]
[43] Barrera v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil.
559, 569-570 (2001).
[44] Heirs of Vencilao v. Court of Appeals,
351 Phil. 815, 823 (1998).
[45] See
Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, 404
Phil. 651, 659 (2001); Cureg v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73465, 7 September 1989, 177 SCRA
313, 320-321.
[46] Rollo, p. 53.
[47] Section 3(e) of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act reads:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
[48] See
Philippine National Bank v. Spouses
[49] A.M. No. P-1518,
[50] Crisostomo
v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 164787,
[51] See Basuel v. Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 143664,
[52] Dr. Almanzor v. Dr. Felix, 464 Phil.
804, 810-811 (2004).
[53] Rule
133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.