Republic of
the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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JAMES
ESTRELLER, EDUARDO |
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G.R. No.
170264 |
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CULIANAN,
GREG CARROS, |
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RAQUEL
YEE, JOSELITO |
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PENILLA,
LORNA DOTE, |
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CRESENCIANA
CLEOPAS, |
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Present: |
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PENILLA,
ANITA GOMINTONG, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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CHING
DIONESIO, MARIBEL |
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Chairperson, |
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MANALO,
DESIRES HUERTO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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and
RAYMUNDO CORTES, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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Petitioners, |
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NACHURA, and |
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PERALTA, JJ. |
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- versus - |
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LUIS
MIGUEL YSMAEL and |
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CRISTETA
L. SANTOS-ALVAREZ, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents.* |
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March 13, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In the present petition, the Court finds occasion to reassert the legal
precepts that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs since
the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all; and that Section 2
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2016, reinforced by P.D. No. 1517, which
prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants, extends only to landless
urban families who are rightful occupants of the land and its structures, and
does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and
without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit,
or those whose possession is under litigation.
Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 216,
Quezon City, a case for Recovery of Possession against petitioners, claiming ownership
of the property subject of dispute located in E. Rodriguez Avenue and La
Filonila Streets in Quezon City, by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 41698 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on
Petitioners denied respondents' allegations. According to them,
respondent Luis Miguel Ysmael (Ysmael) had no personality to file the suit
since he only owned a small portion of the property, while respondent Cristeta
Santos-Alvarez (Alvarez) did not appear to be a registered owner thereof. Petitioners also contended that their
occupation of the property was lawful, having leased the same from the
Magdalena Estate, and later on from Alvarez. Lastly, petitioners asserted that
the property has already been proclaimed by the Quezon City Government as an
Area for Priority Development under P. D. Nos. 1517 and 2016, which prohibits
the eviction of lawful tenants and demolition of their homes.[2]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Luis Miguel Ysmael and Cristeta L. Santos-Alvarez and against defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same to the plaintiffs.
Defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiffs the following:
1. The amount of P400.00 each per month
from the date of extra-judicial demand until the subject property is
surrendered to plaintiffs as reasonable compensation for the use and possession
thereof;
2. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages;
3. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses;
4. Cost of suit.
Corollarily, the counter-claims of defendants are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which, in a Decision[4]
dated
Hence, the present petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENTS YSMAEL AND ALVAREZ ARE BOTH “REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST” WHO WOULD BE BENEFITED OR INJURED BY THE JUDGMENT OR THE PARTY ENTITLED TO THE AVAILS OF THE SUIT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER AND DECIDE THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS AND ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN ROMAN NUMERALS II, III AND IV OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE APPELLANTS BRIEF WHICH ARE HEREUNTO COPIED OR REPRODUCED.[5]
The present petition merely reiterates the issues raised and settled by
the RTC and the CA. On this score, it is
well to emphasize the rule that the Court’s role in a petition under Rule 45 is
limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. Factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the
parties. Since such findings are
generally not reviewable, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, unless the
factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on
record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.[6]
The Court then finds that the petition is without merit.
Respondents are real parties-in-interest in the suit below and may,
therefore, commence the complaint for accion publiciana. On the part of Ysmael, he is a named co-owner
of the subject property under TCT No. 41698, together with Julian Felipe
Ysmael, Teresa Ysmael, and Ramon Ysmael.[7] For her part, Alvarez was a buyer of a
portion of the property, as confirmed in several documents, namely: (1)
Decision dated August 30, 1974 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 9 (IX), in Civil Case No. Q-8426, which was based on a Compromise
Agreement between Alvarez and the Magdalena Estate;[8]
(2) an unnotarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1985 executed between the
Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez;[9]
and (3) a notarized Memorandum of Agreement between the Ysmael Heirs and
Alvarez executed on
Recently, in Wee v. De Castro,[11]
the Court, citing Article 487 of the Civil Code, reasserted the rule that any
one of the co-owners may bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned
properties since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all
co-owners.
The Court also stressed that Article 487 covers all kinds of action for
the recovery of possession, i.e.,
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion
de reivindicacion), thus:
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,this
Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be
afforded even in his absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners
are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any
kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one
of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of
the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a
complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation,
since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners persistently question the validity of the transfer of
ownership to Alvarez. They insist that
Alvarez failed to establish any right over the property since the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not inscribed on TCT No. 41698. Interestingly, petitioners debunked their own
argument when they themselves claimed in their Answer with Counter-claim that
they derived their right to occupy the property from a lease agreement with,
first, the Magdalena Estate, and thereafter, Alvarez herself.[12] More importantly, the fact that the sale was
not annotated or inscribed on TCT No. 41698 does not make it any less
valid. A contract of sale has the force
of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide, in good
faith, by their respective contractual commitments. Article 1358 of the Civil Code which requires
the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument, is only for
convenience; and registration of the instrument only adversely affects third
parties, and non-compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of
the contract or the contractual rights and obligations of the parties
thereunder.[13]
Petitioners further contend that the property subject of the Deed of
Absolute Sale –
Notably, TCT No. 41698 in the name of the Ysmael Heirs covers several
parcels of land under Subd. Plan Psd No. 33309.
These include:
The existence of a title in the same TCT No. 41698, this time in the
names of Victoria M. Panganiban and Teodoro M. Panganiban, was adequately
explained by the Certification of the Register of Deeds dated
At
the instance of RUY ALBERTO S. RONDAIN, I, SAMUEL C. CLEOFE, Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, do hereby certify that TCT No. 41698, covering
This
is to certify further that TCT No. 41698 presented by Ruy Alberto S.
Rondain covering
That
it is further certified that the similarity in the title numbers is due to
the fact that after the fire of June 11, 1988, the Quezon City Registry issued
new title numbers beginning with TCT No. 1.[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
Finally, petitioners' claim that they are entitled to the protection
against eviction and demolition afforded by P.D. Nos. 2016,[15] 1517,[16]
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279,[17]
is not plausible.
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 grants preferential rights to
landless tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform areas, while
Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/ occupants.
In Dimaculangan v. Casalla,[18]
the Court was emphatic in ruling that the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517
and P.D. No. 2016 extends only to landless urban families who meet these
qualifications: a) they are tenants as defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No.
1517; b) they built a home on the land they are leasing or occupying; c) the
land they are leasing or occupying is within an Area for Priority Development
and Urban Land Reform Zone; and d)
they have resided on the land continuously for the last 10 years or more.
Section 3(f) of P.D. No. No. 1517
defines the term "tenant" covered by the said decree as the “rightful
occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence
on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who
enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under
litigation.” It has already been ruled
that occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of any legal
authority, or those whose contracts of lease were already terminated or had
already expired, or whose possession is under litigation, are not considered
"tenants" under the Section 3(f).[19]
Petitioners claim that they are lawful
lessees of the property. However, they
failed to prove any lease relationship or, at the very least, show with whom
they entered the lease contract.
Respondents, on the other hand, were able to prove their right to enjoy
possession of the property. Thus,
petitioners, whose occupation of the subject property by mere tolerance has
been terminated by respondents, clearly do not qualify as “tenants” covered by
these social legislations.
Finally, petitioners failed to
demonstrate that they qualify for coverage under R. A. No. 7279 or the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992.
R. A. No. 7279 provides for the
procedure to be undertaken by the concerned local governments in the urban land
development process, to wit: conduct an
inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities, and
in coordination with the National Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, the National Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the
Land Management Bureau; identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement
areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and homeless in
the urban areas; acquire the lands; and dispose of said lands to the
beneficiaries of the program.[20] While there is a Certification that the area
bounded by E. Rodriguez, Victoria Avenue, San Juan River and 10th
Street of Barangay. Damayang Lagi,
All told, the Court finds no reason to
grant the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice |
diosdado
m. peralta
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third
Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
* The Court of Appeals is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Records, pp. 6-7.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 409-410.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 88-93.
[5] Rollo, pp. 21 and 23.
[6] Quimpo v. Abad, G.R. No.
160956,
[7] Records, p. 153.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] G.R. No. 176405,
[12] Records, p. 43.
[13] Agasen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508,
[14] Exhibit “G,” records, p. 196.
[15] Entitled, "Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant from Land Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting such Land from Payment of Real Property (Taxes).”
[16] The Urban Land Reform Law.
[17] The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.
[18] G.R. No. 156689,
[19] Carreon v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 112041, June 22, 1998, 291 SCRA 78; See also Delos Santos v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 127465.
[20] City of
[21] Records, p. 50.