THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioner, - versus - HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO
LA’O y GONZALES, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 168918 Present: PUNO, C.J.,* QUISUMBING, J.,** CARPIO,*** CHICO-NAZARIO, and Acting Chairperson, PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 2, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On appeal is the Resolution[1] of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699 dated
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Dismiss/Quash filed by accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao to be meritorious this case as against him is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The cash bond posted by him is hereby cancelled and accused Dumlao is allowed to withdraw the same from the Cashier’s Office of this Court.
The hold departure order issued by this Court against herein accused Dumlao is lifted and set aside.
The Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is ordered to cancel the name of accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao from the Bureau’s Hold Departure List.
This case as against Emilio La’o who is still at large is ordered archived.[2]
On
That on or about May 10, 1982, or for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, Aber Canlas, Jacobo C.
Clave, Roman A. Cruz, Jr., and Fabian C. Ver, being then the members of the
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which is a
government corporation and therefore all public officers, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, while in the performance
of their official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. La’o, a private
person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell to said Emilio G. La’o, a GSIS acquired
property consisting of three parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters
together with a 5-storey building situated at 1203 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila, known as the Government Counsel Centre for the sum of P2,000,000.00
with a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance payable in fifteen
years at 12% interest per annum compounded yearly, with a yearly amortization
of P264,278.37 including principal and interest granting Emilio G. La’o
the right to sub-lease the ground floor for his own account during the period
of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly
amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.[3]
When arraigned on
PRE-TRIAL ORDER
The Prosecution and Accused
Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, as assisted by counsel, submitted their “JOINT
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS” dated
I. STIPULATION OF FACTS
The Prosecution and Accused Dumlao jointly stipulate on the following:
1. That at the time material to this case, the following were members of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS):
a. Hermenegildo C. Dumlao
b. Aber P. Canlas
c. Jacobo C. Clave
d. Roman A. Cruz
e. Fabian C. Ver
f. Leonilo M. Ocampo and
g. Benjamin C. Morales;
2. That Emilio Gonzales La’o is a private person;
3. That GSIS was the owner of a property consisting of three (3) parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters, together with a 5-storey building situated as 1203 A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila known as the Government Counsel Centre;
4. That
on June 22, 1978, the GSIS entered into a Lease-Purchase Agreement with the
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) involving the property described under paragraph 3 above, for a
consideration of P1.5 million payable in equal yearly amortizations for
a period of fifteen (15) years with zero interest. The period should commence after the GSIS
shall have renovated the building according to the specification of the OGCC;
5. That
in accordance with the
6. That
Ferdinand E. Marcos was, at all-times material hereto, the President of the
Republic of the
7. That then President was at all times material hereto, legislating through the issuance of Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders and the like;
8. That among the three Members of the Board who signed the Minutes only accused Dumlao was charged in this case;
9. That
there are only seven (7) members of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS present
during the board meeting held on
10. Exhibit
“A” and “1” entitled Agreement was signed by Luis A. Javellana, for and in
behalf of the GSIS, Felipe S. Aldaña, for and [in] behalf of the Republic of
the
II. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
The Prosecution and Accused Dumlao admitted the authenticity and due execution of the following documentary evidence:
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EXHIBITS |
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DESCRIPTION |
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“A” (also Exhibit “1” for accused Dumlao |
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The Agreement executed by and among the GSIS, the Republic
of the |
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“B” (also Exhibit “2” for accused Dumlao) |
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The pertinent portion, including the signature page, of
Minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the GSIS Board of Trustees held on |
III. RESERVATION
The Prosecution and Accused Dumlao reserve the right to mark and offer in evidence the documents mentioned in their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, as well as to present the witnesses listed therein.
IV. ISSUE
Whether or not accused Dumlao is liable for violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019.
WHEREFORE, with the submission by the parties of their Joint Stipulation of Facts, the pre-trial is deemed terminated. Let the above-mentioned joint stipulation as recited in this pre-trial order bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the proceedings in this case unless modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice.[6]
On
On
The Court finds the motion
meritorious. The minutes of the meeting
held on
No amount of evidence can change the
fact that Resolution dated
On 2 September 2005, the People of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, thru the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari[9]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent Dumlao. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DISMISS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 16699 AS AGAINST RESPONDENT DUMLAO AFTER THE PRE-TRIAL AND BEFORE THE PETITIONER COULD PRESENT ITS WITNESSES AND FORMALLY OFFER ITS EXHIBITS.
II) WHETHER OR NOT THE SIGNATURES OF THE
MAJORITY OF THE GSIS BOARD OF TRUSTEES ARE NECESSARY ON THE MINUTES OF MEETING
NO. 14 DATED
III) WHETHER OR NOT THE VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(G), RA 3019.
IV) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RESOLVED TO ARCHIVE THE CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT LA’O.
On the other hand, respondent Dumlao
proffers the following grounds to support the dismissal of the case against
him:
1. TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE OMBUDSMAN’S PETITION IS TO PLACE DUMLAO IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY, IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
2. THE SANDIGANBAYAN COULD NOT BE SAID TO HAVE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT MERELY FOLLOWED THE RULE ON PRE-TRIAL AND DECIDED THE CASE ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS STIPULATED IN THE PRE-TRIAL;
3. THE FACTS AS AGREE (SIC) BY THE PROSECUTION AND RESPONDENT DUMLAO IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION AND AS APPROVED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN SHOWED THAT HE DID NOT COMMIT ANY CRIME; AND
4. CONTINUALLY PROSECUTING DUMLAO, TO THE
EXCLUSION OF OTHER GSIS TRUSTEES, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING,
CONSTITUTES UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.[10]
Petitioner argues it was denied its right to due process when the court a quo dismissed the case against
respondent Dumlao after pre-trial and before it could present its witnesses and
formally offer its exhibits. The court a quo deprived it of the opportunity to
prove its case – that the Resolution dated
Respondent Dumlao was charged, he
being one of the members of the GSIS Board of Trustees who allegedly approved
the lease-purchase of the subject GSIS properties consisting of three parcels
of land with an area of 821 square meters, together with a five-storey
building, in favor of respondent La’o, which lease-purchase agreement was
deemed by the Office of the Ombudsman to be grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
A review of the Motion to
Dismiss/Quash filed by respondent Dumlao reveals that the ground he invoked was
that “the facts charged do not constitute
an offense.” He contends that the
alleged approved Board Resolution was not approved by the GSIS Board of
Trustees, contrary to the allegation in the information. Since the signatures of four out of the seven
members of the board did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on
The Sandiganbayan, basing its
resolution on the Pre-trial Stipulation entered into by the prosecution and
respondent Dumlao, dismissed the case against the latter, since it found that
the GSIS Board of Trustees failed to approve or validly pass the Lease-Purchase
Agreement, because only three out of the seven members of the Board signed the
minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982.
It explained that, “no amount of evidence can change the fact that the
Resolution dated
The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is
that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an information is
whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde,
or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.[11]
The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are
as follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such
contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.[12]
After examining the information, we find that the facts alleged therein,
if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of Section 3(g) as
against respondent Dumlao.
It can be gathered from the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that it did
consider the ground invoked by Dumlao (that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense); otherwise, it could have
denied respondent Dumlao’s motion. From
the reasoning given by the Sandiganbayan, it is clear that it dismissed the
case because of insufficiency of evidence.
Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to
Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Insufficiency
of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution
rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
In the case under consideration, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of
evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its
evidence. In so doing, it violated the prosecution’s
right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s
culpability.
It was therefore erroneous for the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground
invoked by respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the case on a ground not raised
by him, and not at the appropriate time.
The dismissal was thus without basis and untimely.
On the second issue raised by
petitioner, it maintains that the Sandiganbayan erred in equating, or
confusing, the minutes of the meeting of
We agree with petitioner that the
Sandiganbayan erred in equating the minutes of the meeting with the supposed
resolution of the GSIS Board of Trustees.
A resolution is distinct and different from the minutes of the meeting. A board resolution
is a formal action by a corporate board of directors or other corporate
body authorizing a particular act, transaction, or appointment.[13] It is ordinarily special and limited in its
operation, applying usually to some single specific act or affair of the
corporation; or to some specific person, situation or occasion.[14] On the other hand, minutes are a brief statement not only of what transpired at a
meeting, usually of stockholders/members or directors/trustees, but also at a
meeting of an executive committee. The
minutes are usually kept in a book specially designed for that purpose, but
they may also be kept in the form of memoranda or in any other manner in which
they can be identified as minutes of a meeting.[15]
The Sandiganbayan concluded that since
only three members out of seven signed the minutes of the meeting of
The proper custodian of the books, minutes and official records of a
corporation is usually the corporate secretary.
Being the custodian of corporate records, the corporate secretary has
the duty to record and prepare the minutes of the meeting. The signature of the corporate secretary
gives the minutes of the meeting probative value and credibility.[17] In this case, Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura,[18]
Deputy Corporate Secretary, recorded, prepared and certified the correctness of
the minutes of the meeting of
The minutes of the meeting of
Petitioner likewise faults the Sandiganbayan for archiving the case
against respondent La’o, arguing that since he had already been arraigned, it
should have ordered the prosecution to adduce evidence against him.
We agree. However, said issue has
already been mooted by the death of respondent La’o.[20] The death of an accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal as well as civil liability based solely
thereon.[21] Accordingly, the case against respondent La’o
was dismissed.[22]
In support of the dismissal of the case against him, respondent Dumlao
contends that to give due course to the Ombudsman’s petition would place him in
double jeopardy, in violation of his constitutional rights. Respondent Dumlao
asserts that all the elements of double jeopardy are present in the case at
bar. Citing Heirs of Tito Rillorta v.
Firme,[23] he added: “[A]ssuming arguendo that the
Sandiganbayan committed an error, whatever error may have been committed by the
Sandiganbayan was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of
the decision. This is the kind of error
that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution, no matter how
obvious the error may be.”
To raise the defense of double jeopardy,
three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy
must be for the same offense as that in the first.[24] The first jeopardy attaches attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court;
(3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the
defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[25]
We do not agree. In the instant case, double jeopardy has not
yet set in. The first jeopardy has not
yet attached. There is no question that
four of the five elements of legal jeopardy are present. However, we find the last element – valid
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of the case – wanting. As previously discussed, the Sandignabayan violated the prosecution’s right to
due process. The prosecution was
deprived of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused’s
culpability. The dismissal was made in a
capricious and whimsical manner. The
trial court dismissed the case on a ground not invoked by the respondent. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence, while the ground invoked by the respondent was that the facts charged did not constitute an
offense. The dismissal was clearly premature, because
any dismissal based on insufficiency of evidence may only be made after the
prosecution rests its case and not at any time before then.[26] A purely capricious dismissal of an
information deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
convict. It denies the prosecution a day
in court. It is void and cannot be the
basis of double jeopardy.[27]
The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Where the denial of the
fundamental right to due process is apparent, a decision in disregard of the
right is void for lack of jurisdiction.[28] In the instant case, there was no error of
judgment but a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction. Respondent Dumlao would
not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very
beginning, the Sandiganbayan had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
exist.[29] Otherwise put, the
dismissal of the case below was invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite,
that is, due process. In rendering the
judgment of dismissal, the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
for a judgment which is void for lack of due process is equivalent to excess or
lack of jurisdiction.[30] This being the case, the prosecution is
allowed to appeal because it was not given its day in court.
As heretofore explained, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it dismissed the case against respondent Dumlao based only on the
stipulations made by the parties during pre-trial. The erroneous equation of the number of
members who signed the minutes of the meeting with the number of members who
approved the alleged resolution necessarily led to the Sandiganbayan’s faulty
conclusion that there was no evidence showing that the GSIS Board of Trustees
approved the alleged Lease-Purchase Agreement.
As we have said, the minutes issued by the Depute Corporate Secretary
were enough, at that time, to set the case for trial and to allow the
prosecution to prove its case and to present all its witnesses and evidence.
Respondent Dumlao claims that the GSIS
has not been prejudiced because it still owns the properties subject matter of
this case. This Court cannot rule on
this claim, the same being a factual issue and a defense he is raising. The appreciation of this claim is not proper
in this forum and is better left to the trial court, since the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts.[31]
Respondent Dumlao maintains he was
charged with conspiring with the other GSIS Board Members in approving the
Lease-Purchase Agreement. However, of
the seven members, two died, two were acquitted and the other two were not
charged. He was left alone. He argues that since a conspiracy requires
two or more persons agreeing to commit a crime, he can no longer be charged because
he was left alone to face a charge of conspiracy.
His assumption that he can no longer
be charged because he was left alone -- since the co-conspirators have either
died, have been acquitted or were not charged -- is wrong. A conspiracy is in its nature a joint
offense. One person cannot conspire
alone. The crime depends upon the joint
act or intent of two or more person.
Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. As long as the acquittal or
death of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy,
one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.[32] In the case at bar, the absence or presence
of conspiracy is again factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the
trial court during trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or
disprove its presence.
Lastly, respondent Dumlao submits that
his prosecution, to the exclusion of others, constitutes unfair discrimination
and violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the law. He says that the dismissal of the case
against his co-accused Canlas and Clave were not appealed by the prosecution;
and the two government officials who signed the Lease-Purchase Agreement, and
the two other members (Ocampo and Morales) of the GSIS Board of Trustees who
signed the minutes were not charged.
We are not convinced that respondent Dumlao was unfairly
discriminated against and his constitutional right to equal protection
violated. It must be remembered that the
manner in which the prosecution of the case is handled is within the sound
discretion of the prosecutor, and the non-inclusion of other guilty persons is
irrelevant to the case against the accused.[33] We find that there was no clear and
intentional discrimination in charging respondent Dumlao. A discriminatory purpose is never presumed.[34] It must be remembered that it was not solely
respondent who was charged, but also five of the seven board members. If, indeed, there were discrimination,
respondent Dumlao alone could have been charged. But this was not the case. Further, the fact that the dismissal of the
case against his co-accused Canlas and Clave was not appealed is not sufficient
to cry discrimination. This is likewise
true for the non-inclusion of the two government officials who signed the
Lease-Purchase Agreement and the other two board members. Mere speculation, unsupported by convincing
evidence, cannot establish discrimination on the part of the prosecution and
the denial to respondent of the equal protection of the laws.
In
The
prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not
prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory
classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its
unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a
denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face
of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may
only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over
another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and
intentional discrimination.” Appellant has failed to show that, in charging
appellant in court, that there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on
the part of the prosecuting officials.
The
discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution’s sound assessment
whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person
has committed an offense. The
presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,
and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere
speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to
overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana,
was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty
party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion
that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There
is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant’s prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to
be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they
are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable,
for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have
murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law
in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense
of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all
persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has
the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
Likewise, [i]f the failure of prosecutors to
enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense
for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the
district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many
persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a
complete breakdown. (Emphases ours.)
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699 dated 14 July 2005 granting the
Motion to Dismiss/Quash of respondent Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan
is forthwith DIRECTED to set the
case for the reception of evidence for the prosecution.
As to respondent Emilio G. La’o, on
account of his demise, the case against him is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice Acting Chairperson |
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Acting Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
raffle dated
** Per
Special Order No. 564 dated
*** Per
Special Order No. 568 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi with Associate Justices Efren N. de la Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez, concurring; rollo, pp. 13-19.
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 204-205.
[4] Records, Vol. 7, p. 250.
Emilio La’o was arraigned on
The cases against Roman A. Cruz, Jr. and Fabian C. Ver were likewise dismissed on the account of their deaths. (Records, Vol. VI, p. 125.)
Aber P. Canlas and Jacobo C.
Clave were arraigned on
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 18.
[9] Same was filed after this Court granted the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s motion for extension within which to file the petition for review on certiorari. (Rollo, pp. 25-233. )
[10]
[11] Go
v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602,
[12] Dans, Jr. and Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,
349 Phil. 434, 460 (1998).
[13] Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition, 2004), p. 1337.
[14] Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations (Permanent Edition), Vol. 8, §4167, p. 625.
[15] The Corporation Code of the
[16] Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68 which took effect on
[17]
[18] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[19] Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries
in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of
the
[20] Certificate of Death of Emilio Gonzalez La’o; rollo, p. 335.
[21] Republic
v. Desierto, G.R. No. 131966,
[22] Rollo, pp. 338-339.
[23] G.R. No. 54904,
[24] Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
136264,
[25]
[26] Section 23, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[27] People v. Gomez, 126 Phil. 640, 645 (1967).
[28] People
v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-27935,
[29] People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 559 (2000).
[30] Merciales v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil.
70, 81 (2002).
[31] Francisco, Jr. v. Fernando, G.R. No.
166501, 16 November 2006, 507 SCRA 173, 179.
[32] Aquino, The Revised Penal Code (1997 Edition), Vol. 1, p. 125, citing United States v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599, 612 (1918).
[33] People v. Nazareno, 329 Phil. 16, 20-23 (1996).
[34] People v. Dela Piedra, 403 Phil. 31 (2001).
[35] G.R. No.173176,
[36] Supra note 34 at 54-56.