THIRD DIVISION
|
LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 168544
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, TINGA,* NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 31,
2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] of
the Sandiganbayan dated
Petitioner was the mayor of the P2 million. For the said projects,
the municipality owed the contractor P791,047.00.[4]
Relative to the aforesaid projects,
petitioner, together with Venturanza, then the Municipal Security Officer, was
indicted in an Information for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about the month of January, 1999, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, LINDA CADIAO PALACIOS and VIC VENTURANZA, public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Security Officer to the Mayor, respectively, of the Municipality of Culasi, Antique, and as such, accused Mayor is the approving authority of contracts involving the Municipality, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent of (sic) gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand money from Grace Superficial of L.S. Gamotin Construction, which undertook the construction of the following government projects, for the Municipality of Culasi, Province of Antique, to wit:
a)
Rehabilitation of
b)
Rehabilitation of
c)
Rehabilitation of
which projects
amounted to TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00), Philippine Currency,
which was sourced from the National Disaster Coordinating Council and channeled
to the Municipality of Culasi, under condition that the final payments for said
projects would not be released, if said amounts would not be given, and
consequently received the amounts of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00)
in cash and ONE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P162,400.00)
in LBP Check No. 3395274, thus accused Mayor Linda Cadiao Palacios, directly or indirectly through her
co-accused Vic Venturanza, demanded or received money from a person, in
connection with contracts or transactions between the government, wherein the
public officer in her official capacity has to intervene under the law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On April 16, 2002, both accused
voluntarily surrendered and, upon motion, posted a reduced bail bond of P15,000.00
each.[6] They were subsequently arraigned wherein they
both pleaded “Not Guilty.”[7]
Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution
presented its sole witness—the private complainant herself, Grace M.
Superficial (Superficial). Her testimony may be summarized as follows:
For and on behalf of L.S. Gamotin,
she (Superficial) took charge of the collection of the unpaid billings of the
municipality.[8] Prior to
the full payment of the municipality’s obligation, petitioner demanded money
from her, under threat that the final payment would not be released unless she complied. Acceding to petitioner’s demand, she gave the
former’s husband P15,000.00.[9]
Sometime in January 1999, petitioner demanded from Superficial the full payment
of her total “kickback” which should be 10% of the project cost. Superficial thus proposed that she would deliver
a check in lieu of cash, to which petitioner agreed.[10]
On P162,400.00. The check
was encashed by Venturanza at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
The prosecution likewise offered the
following documentary evidence: 1) Minutes of the Meeting of Pre-Qualification,
[Bid] and Award Committee (PBAC) held at the Municipality of Antique;[14]
2) Land Bank Check No. 3395274P dated January 26, 1999 in the amount of P162,400.00;[15]
3) Complainant’s Consolidated Sur-Reply;[16]
and 4) Deposit Slip of the three LBP Checks representing full payment of the
project.[17]
The defense, on the other hand, presented
the following witnesses: 1) petitioner herself, 2) Venturanza, 3) Engr. Armand
Cadigal, 4) petitioner’s husband Emmanuel Palacios, 5) petitioner’s Executive
Assistant Eugene de Los Reyes, and 6) Atty. Rex Suiza Castillon. Their testimonies may be summarized as
follows:
Petitioner denied Superficial’s
allegations. She insisted that she only dealt with the owner of L.S. Gamotin,
Engr. Leobardo S. Gamotin (Engr.
Gamotin), relative to the infrastructure projects; thus, she could have made
the demand directly from him and not from Superficial. Contrary to Superficial’s contention, it was
Engr. Gamotin himself who claimed payment through a demand letter addressed to
petitioner.[18] She added that she only met Superficial when
the latter received the checks representing the final payment. She further testified that she never
entrusted any highly sensitive matter to Venturanza since her trusted employee
was her chief of staff. She also averred that she was not the only person
responsible for the release of the checks since the vouchers also required the
signatures of the municipal treasurer, the municipal budget officer, and the
municipal accountant.[19]
As far as Venturanza was concerned, she denied knowledge of such transaction as
he did not ask permission from her when he used the vehicle of the municipality
to go to
Emmanuel Palacios likewise denied
having received P15,000.00 from Superficial. He claimed that he was financially stable, being
a Forester; the manager of a 200-hectare agricultural land and of a medium
piggery establishment; and the owner of a residential house valued at no less
than P6 million, a parcel of land and other properties.[22] He also claimed that the institution of the
criminal case was ill-motivated as Neil Superficial, in fact, initiated a
complaint against him for frustrated murder.[23]
Venturanza, for his part, admitted
that he indeed received the check from Superficial but denied that it was
“grease money.” He claimed that the said amount (P162,400.00) was
received by him in the form of a loan. He explained that he borrowed from
Superficial P150,000.00 to finance his trip to P15,000.00 in processing his visa.
Venturanza stated that he was able to repay the entire amount immediately
because he obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Aklan, Pandan Branch, to pay the
amount he used in applying for his visa. He further testified that he was
persuaded by the Superficials to campaign against petitioner.[25]
On January 28, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting both accused of the crime charged,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LINDA CADIAO-PALACIOS and VICTOR S. VENTURANZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Accordingly, in view of the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of both accused, each of them are hereby sentenced to (i) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9) years, as maximum; (ii) suffer all accessory penalties consequent thereto; and (iii) pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The Sandiganbayan concluded that the
following circumstances established the guilt of both petitioner and
Venturanza: 1) that the municipality had outstanding obligations with L.S.
Gamotin for the construction of several public works that were completed in
1998; 2) that petitioner was the person authorized to effect the payment of
said obligations which, in fact, she did; 3) that Venturanza was a trusted
employee of petitioner as he was in charge of the security of the municipal
buildings and personnel as well as the adjoining offices; 4) that Venturanza
received the three LBP checks representing the full payment to L.S. Gamotin and
the LBP check bearing the amount of P162,400.00; 5) that Venturanza went
to San Jose, Antique on January 26, 1999 to deposit the three checks and
encashed the P162,400.00 check; 6) that Venturanza did not receive the
above amount by virtue of a loan agreement with Superficial because there was
no evidence to prove it; 7) that Venturanza used the vehicle of the
municipality to encash the check in San Jose, Antique; and 8) that the amount
of P15,000.00 initially given to Emmanuel Palacios and the P162,400.00
appearing on the check corresponded to the 10% of the total project cost after
deducting the 10% VAT and P10,000.00 Engineering Supervision Fee.[27]
In arriving at this conclusion, the
Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimony of the lone witness for the
prosecution. It added that contrary to
the claim of the defense, no ill motive could be attributed to her in
testifying against petitioner and Venturanza.
This is especially true in the case of the latter, as she was related to
him. In finding both accused guilty, the
Sandiganbayan concluded that, together, they conspired in committing the
offense charged.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Venturanza
separately appealed their conviction. The latter petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 168548 which was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
The petition lacks merit.
Section 3 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
To be convicted of violation of
Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
following elements: 1) the offender is a public officer; 2) who requested or
received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or benefit; 3) on behalf of
the offender or any other person; 4) in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government; 5) in which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.[28]
At the time material to the case,
petitioner was the mayor of the
Petitioner’s refutation of her
conviction focuses on the evidence appreciated by the Sandiganbayan
establishing that she demanded and received “grease money” in connection with
the transaction/contract.
Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct
acts – 1) demanding or requesting; 2) receiving; or 3) demanding, requesting
and receiving – any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or
for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an official
capacity has to intervene under the law.
Each of these modes of committing the offense is distinct and different
from one another. Proof of existence of any of them suffices to warrant
conviction.[31]
The Sandiganbayan viewed the case as
one, the resolution of which hinged primarily on the matter of credibility. It found Superficial and her testimony worthy
of credence, that petitioner demanded “grease money” as a condition for the
release of the final payment to L.S. Gamotin.
Aside from the demand made by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan likewise
concluded that, indeed, she received the “grease money” through
Venturanza. Therefore, petitioner was
convicted both for demanding and receiving “grease money.”
We find no cogent reason to disturb
the aforesaid conclusions.
Well-settled is the rule that factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court[32]
save in the following cases: 1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly an
error or founded on a mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the findings of fact are
premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record;[33]
and 6) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based.[34]
The instant case does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
The assessment of the credibility of
a witness is primarily the function of a trial court, which had the benefit of
observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness.[35]
It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence
presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith to those it regards
as credible and reject those it considers perjurious or fabricated.[36]
Between the Sandiganbayan and this Court, the former was concededly in a better
position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the truth.[37]
Petitioner contends that it was
improbable for her to have demanded the “grease money” from Superficial, when
she could have talked directly to the contractor himself. She insists that Superficial was never a
party to the transaction and that Engr. Gamotin was the one who personally
facilitated the full payment of the municipality’s unpaid obligation.
This contention does not
persuade. As held in Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan,[38] it
is irrelevant from whom petitioner demanded her percentage share of the project
cost – whether from the contractor himself or from the latter’s
representative. That petitioner made
such a demand is all that is required by Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019, and
this element has been sufficiently established by the testimony of Superficial.[39]
Notwithstanding her claim that the
prosecution failed to present a special power of attorney to show Superficial’s
authority to represent L.S. Gamotin, petitioner admitted that it was
Superficial (or her husband) who received the three checks representing full
payment of the municipality’s obligation.
Moreover, although the checks were issued to L.S. Gamotin, the deposit
slip showed that they were deposited by Venturanza to the account of
Superficial. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the evidence clearly shows that Superficial was not a
stranger to the transaction between the municipality and L.S. Gamotin, for she,
in fact, played an important role in the receipt of the final payment of the
government’s obligation. It was not, therefore, impossible for petitioner to
have demanded the “grease money” from Superficial, for after all, it was the
latter who received the proceeds of the final payment. This was bolstered by the fact that the P162,400.00
check in the name of Venturanza was encashed by him on the same day that he
deposited the three checks. If indeed the amount given to Venturanza was in the
form of a loan to finance his trip to
In
holding that petitioner and Venturanza conspired in committing the offense, we
agree with the Sandiganbayan that the circumstances enumerated above point to
the culpability of the accused.
Admittedly, there was no direct evidence showing that petitioner
demanded and received the money but the testimony of Superficial, corroborated
by the documentary evidence and the admissions of the witnesses for the
defense, sufficiently establishes that Venturanza received the money upon
orders of petitioner.
The sad reality in cases of this
nature is that no witness can be called to testify since no third party is
ordinarily involved to witness the same.
Normally, the only persons present are the ones who made the demand and
on whom the demand was made.[41]
In short, like bribery, the giver or briber is usually the only one who can
provide direct evidence of the commission of this crime.[42]
While it is true that entrapment has been a tried and tested method of trapping
and capturing felons in the act of committing clandestine crimes[43]
like the instant case, we cannot fault Superficial in not resorting to this
method because of the position occupied by petitioner during that time, as well
as the power attached to her office.
This is especially true in the instant case as the person who made the
demand assigned another person to receive the “grease money”; and ordered that
the check be issued in the name of another person.
One final note. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean evidence that which produces absolute certainty;
only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[44] We find that such requirement has been met in
the instant case.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 590 dated March 17, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Raoul V. Victorino and Norberto Y. Geraldez, concurring; rollo, pp. 76-111.
[2] Otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”
[3] Records, p. 67.
[4] Rollo, p. 87.
[5] Records, pp. 1-2.
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 80.
[9]
[10]
[11] Land Bank Check No. 0033150 – P212,246.59
as final payment for the Janlagasi Diversion Dam project;
Land Bank Check No. 3396376 – P523,800.00 as
final payment for the
Land Bank Check No. 033149 – P55,000.00 as
final payment for the San Luis Diversion Dam project.
[12] Rollo, p. 82.
[13] Records, p. 98.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Rollo, p. 90.
[19]
[20]
[21] She allegedly declined Neil Superficial’s proposal to merge forces with him to run as his wife’s Vice-Mayor.
[22] Rollo, p. 91.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Garcia
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 155574,
[29] Rollo, p. 89.
[30] See Peligrino v. People, 415 Phil. 94, 117 (2001).
[31]
[32] Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 28, at 282.
[33]
[34] Balderama v. People, G.R. Nos. 147578-85 and 147598-605, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 423, 432.
[35] Peligrino v. People, supra note 30, at 121.
[36]
[37] Merencillo
v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70,
[38] 317 Phil. 542 (1995).
[39] Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 554.
[40] Venturanza testified that
Superficial told him that if she will be able to collect from her contract with
the
[41] But see Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 449 Phil. 664 (2003).
[42] See Peligrino v. People, supra note 30, at 118.
[43] Spouses Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., supra note 41, at 675.
[44] Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 38, at 554.