THIRD DIVISION
|
LAND BANK OF THE Petitioner, - versus - HERNANDO T. CHICO and
LORNA CHICO, in her capacity as Attorney-In-Fact, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 168453
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 13,
2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this
Court is a Petition[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]
dated March 17, 2005, which affirmed with modification the Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The Facts
The property subject of this controversy
is the 8.3027[4]-hectare
portion (subject property) of three (3) parcels of irrigated rice land
particularly denominated as Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3, located at Sitio Sta.
Cruz, Sto. Tomas Feria, Quezon, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area of 12.2209
hectares and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-18893[5]
(entire property) in the name of respondent Hernando T. Chico (respondent).
In his Amended Petition[6]
for Fixing Just Compensation dated June 2, 2002, filed before the SAC,
respondent, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, herein respondent Lorna
Chico (Lorna), asseverated that the subject property was taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the
title thereto transferred to farmer-beneficiaries (FBs) Amador Gamboa, Regino
Ambrocio and Romualdo Francisco,[7]
with the issuance of Emancipation Patents (EPs) in their favor on December 27,
1994, without prior notice to respondent and without payment of just compensation.
Traversing the petition, the DAR
claimed that respondent was duly notified of the subject property's coverage
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of the government and the
compensation therefor was already agreed upon at P10,000.00 per hectare,
pursuant to the Landowner-Tenant Production Agreement[8]
(LTPA) executed between respondent and the FBs. DAR submitted that the petition
for just compensation was baseless and ought to be dismissed.[9]
On the other hand,
Trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses testified
and both parties submitted their respective sets of evidence.
The SAC's
Ruling
On May 17, 2004, the SAC ruled that
the price of P10,000.00 per hectare as just compensation for the subject
property, as contained in the LTPA, could not be sustained in the absence of
concrete proof that respondent and the FBs voluntarily agreed thereto;
otherwise, respondent would not have filed the petition for just compensation
before the SAC. Moreover, the SAC noted that it would have been unrealistic and
illogical for respondent to agree that the subject property, which was a prime
lot, should be priced at only P10,000.00 per hectare. Thus, the SAC
held:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Department of Agrarian Reform through
the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay petitioner Hernando T. Chico the total
amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND
(sic) PESOS (P1,860,540.00), Philippine Currency, representing the just
compensation for his property with a total area of 9.3027 hectares, situated at
Sto. Tomas Feria, Quezon, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. N-18893, with
12% legal interest annually, from date of acquisition, until fully paid.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.[11]
Upon an Ex-Parte Motion to Correct
Clerical Errors[12]
filed by respondent on May 24, 2004, the SAC amended the aforementioned
Decision in its Order[13]
dated May 26, 2004, thus:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Department of Agrarian Reform through
the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay petitioner Hernando T. Chico the total
amount of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY
THOUSAND (sic) PESOS (P1,660,540.00), Philippine Currency,
representing the just compensation of his property with a total area of 8.3027
hectares, situated at Sto. Tomas Feria, Quezon, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT
No. N-18893, with 12% legal interest annually, from date of acquisition,
until fully paid.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the SAC should have considered October 21, 1972 as the date of
taking, inasmuch as the subject property was acquired under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27[14]
and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228;[15]
thus, it erred when it applied instead Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657[16]
as the legal basis for just compensation. In the meantime, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Partial Release,[17]
a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the Judgment[18]
and a Motion to Deposit in Court Money Judgment and Interests.[19]
On July 29, 2004, the SAC denied LBP's Motion for Reconsideration and
correlatively granted respondent's motion for execution, directing LBP to
partially pay respondent the amount of P800,000.00 as just compensation.[20]
Aggrieved, LBP appealed to the CA with
an application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Preliminary Injunction.[21]
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a TRO, enjoining the SAC from enforcing
the Writ of Partial Execution.[22]
The CA's
Ruling
On March 17, 2005, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the SAC giving no probative value to the LTPA because of the absence
of concrete proof that the parties voluntarily agreed thereto. The CA concurred
with the SAC's logic that respondent's act of filing the petition for fixing of
just compensation was clear proof to the contrary. Moreover, the CA held that
the ruling of the SAC was in accord with Sec. 21[23]
of R.A. No. 6657. Citing our decision in Land Bank v. Court of Appeals,[24]
the CA declared that the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 should now govern all
cases of just compensation for the acquisition of lands while the provisions of
P.D. No. 27 should only be suppletory in character. However, the CA ruled that the lease rentals
collected from the FBs in 1991-1993, in the total amount of P178,200.00,
should be treated as advance payments for the subject property and must be
deducted from the just compensation due respondent. The CA also opined that the twelve (12%)
percent interest imposed by the SAC had no legal basis. Pursuant to Sec. 26[25]
of R.A. No. 6657 and P.D. No. 27, the CA imposed an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment is made. Thus,
the CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the DECISION dated May 17, 2004 and the ORDER dated July
29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 23 of Cabanatuan City sitting as P1,482,340.00)
with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until fully paid.
SO
ORDERED.[26]
On
April 13, 2005, LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27]
which the CA denied in its Resolution[28]
dated June 9, 2005.
Hence
this Petition based on the following grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE SAC WHICH ORDERED THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE RESPONDENTS THE
AMOUNT OF P1,482,340.00 AS JUST COMPENSATION FOR SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE
ABSENCE OF A LAND TRANSFER CLAIM COMING FROM DAR WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE
PETITIONER TO PROCESS AND PAY THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAIM.
B.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITIONER
IS LIABLE TO PAY JUST COMPENSATION SANS ANY LAND TRANSFER CLAIM, THE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN USING FACTORS PRESCRIBED IN SEC. 17 OF R.A. NO. 6657, GRAVELY ERRED
IN SUSTAINING THE JUST COMPENSATION IN THE AMOUNT OF P1,482,340.00 WHICH
TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE VALUATION FORMULA PROVIDED FOR UNDER P.D. 27, E.O. 228
AND THE LANDOWNER-TENANT PRODUCTION AGREEMENT (LTPA) DATED APRIL 19, 1987.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING SIX PERCENT (6%) INTEREST PER ANNUM FROM THE TIME OF TAKING
UNTIL FULL PAYMENT [OF] JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.[29]
LBP claims that before it could make
any payment to the landowner, as part of the legal process, it is necessary
that the records or the Land Transfer Claim (LTC) should be endorsed by DAR to
LBP, because without such records, LBP has nothing to evaluate, value, process,
and pay; that the evidence showed that there were no records of DAR's
acquisition of the subject property as no LTC was forwarded by DAR to the LBP
because respondent actually entered into a VLT which pegged the amount of P10,000.00
per hectare as just compensation; that this amount was reasonable, considering
that the agreement was entered into in 1987; that the LTPA, being a consensual
contract bearing all the requisite formalities, was valid and binding upon the
parties and must, therefore, be complied with in good faith; that LBP is
duty-bound to protect the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF) from being illegally
disbursed, hence, any disbursement from the ARF, being a public fund, must
comply with the usual and accepted accounting and auditing rules and procedure
such as the existence of the LTC; and that the CA did not resolve the issue
whether or not LBP was legally obliged to compensate respondent in the absence
of any LTC. Moreover, LBP argues that
assuming arguendo that it is legally obliged to finance the transfer
herein, the CA erred in making the award based on R.A. No. 6657 and not on P.D.
No. 27 and/or E.O. No. 228 and the LTPA; that the CA seriously erred when it
upheld the SAC's use of the zonal valuation of the subject property in the
amount of P200,000.00 per hectare since that valuation is intended only for
taxation purposes and not for the determination of just compensation under P.D.
No. 27 and/or E.O. No. 228; that the determination by the SAC of the amount of
just compensation was highly speculative, conjectural and lacked legal basis;
and that the CA improperly imposed an annual six percent (6%) compounded
interest on the amount of just compensation because R.A. No. 6657 does not
provide for payment of interest. LBP submits that the amount of P10,000.00
per hectare, as agreed upon by the parties under the LTPA, should be sustained
as just compensation in this case.[30]
Respondent counters that since
December 27, 1994, he has been deprived of the subject property and yet, has
never been paid by the LBP; that where there is delay in tendering a valid
payment of just compensation, the imposition of interest is in order, citing Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco;[31]
that the determination of just compensation is not an administrative matter but
a judicial function;[32]
that all the issues raised by LBP were squarely discussed and resolved by the
CA in its assailed Decision; that LBP repeatedly raises questions of fact in
its petition, which is improper, because the factual findings of the SAC and
the CA are binding and conclusive, and only questions of law may be reviewed by
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent submits
that the assailed CA Decision should be affirmed.[33]
Our Ruling
Significant is the absence of claim
folders, or LTC, which would ordinarily impel us to remand this case to the
SAC. However, even if the obvious
recourse is to remand the case, considering the lapse of time, the efforts and
resources exerted, and the age and physical condition of respondent, this Court
deems it proper to resolve the case on the merits here and now, if only to
write finis to this controversy.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Spouses Placido Orilla and Clara Dy Orilla,[34]
we had the occasion to explain the matter of just compensation:
Constitutionally,
"just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in
the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
value of the property as between the one who receives and the one who desires
to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by
this Court that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
Just compensation, under the premises,
presupposes the expropriation or taking of agricultural lands for eventual
distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
which provides for the parameters in the determination of just compensation,
reads as follows:
Sec.
17. Determination of Just Compensation.
— In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the
property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.
There is no question that, in this
case, the subject property was expropriated. In fact, EPs have already been
issued to the FBs, and respondent has been deprived of the use and the fruits
of the subject property.[35]
Yet, respondent remains unpaid. LBP disavows any liability to respondent,
relying on the LTPA which, according to LBP, proves that respondent entered
into a VLT scheme with the FBs. In the same breath, LBP insists that on the
basis of the LTPA, the amount of just compensation must be pegged at P10,000.00
per hectare. Lastly, the LBP surmises that the LTPA is the reason why no claim
folder or LTC was forwarded by the DAR to LBP.
By and large, LBP invites us to look closely into the LTPA.
It is hornbook doctrine that under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be
raised before the Supreme Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is
not its function to re-examine and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence
of the parties. Factual findings of the RTC, herein sitting as a SAC,
especially those affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on this Court when
supported by the evidence on record.[36]
The Court shall analyze or weigh the evidence again only in the exercise of
discretion and for compelling reasons, because it is not our duty to review,
evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before the
lower courts.[37]
Here, we find that none of these exceptional circumstances obtains. Outright,
respondent denied having signed the LTPA.[38]
Both the SAC and CA gave no probative weight to the LTPA. No proof was adduced
that respondent and the FBs ever entered into a VLT scheme; neither is there
evidence that the rentals given to respondent by the FBs constituted payment
for the subject property. As correctly pointed out by the SAC and the CA, it
would indeed be highly contrary to ordinary logic that respondent would
voluntarily enter into the LTPA and, subsequently, deny the same, deprive
himself of the fruits of his own land, file a case before the court and as a
result, painfully undertake the rigorous, expensive and tedious process of
litigation. Based on the foregoing, we find no cogent reason to deviate from
the common finding of both the SAC and the CA giving no probative value to the
LTPA. Necessarily, the amount of P10,000.00
per hectare as just compensation for the subject property must be discarded.
As to the absence of claim folders,
while we understand that the LBP must give a valuation of the subject property
through claim folders or LTCs forwarded by the DAR, we cannot close our eyes to
the obvious reality that respondent was dispossessed of his property and has
received no payment therefor.
LBP invokes our ruling in Crisologo-Jose
v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[39]
where claim folders were not forwarded to LBP, and we dismissed the petition of
the landowner. However, we note that Crisologo-Jose
and this case do not share the same factual milieu. In Crisologo-Jose, the
properties were not actually acquired by the government, as the landowner failed
to prove the fact of actual or symbolic compulsory taking by competent evidence,
through such proof as the required Notice of Valuation which usually follows
the Notice of Coverage, the letter of invitation to a preliminary conference
and the Notice of Acquisition that DAR sends, pursuant to DAR administrative
issuances, to the landowner affected. In this case, EPs were already issued in
favor of the FBs. Moreover, it cannot be denied that respondent was actually
deprived of rentals due him since 1994 as the FBs said that the subject
property would be acquired by LBP.
In the exercise of our mandate as a
court of justice and equity,[40]
we rule in favor of respondent
despite the absence of claim folders pro hac vice. If respondent is deprived
of the just compensation due him mainly because of the absence of claim folders
which were not prepared by the DAR even after it had already taken the subject
property and issued the EPs in favor of the FBs, we would be abetting the
perpetration of a grave injustice on the respondent.
As
to the legal basis of just compensation, we hold that the applicable law is
R.A. No. 6657. Our recent ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pacita
Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., etc., et al.[41]
is enlightening. Therein, the Court made a comparative analysis of cases that confronted
the issue of whether properties covered by P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, for
which the landowners had yet to be paid, would be compensated under P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228 or under the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657. We observed
that in Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines[42]
– a case
which LBP invokes in this controversy – the Court declared that the reckoning period for the
determination of just compensation should be the time when the land was taken, i.e.,
in 1972, applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228. However, the Court also noted that
after Gabatin, the Court had decided several cases in which it found it more
equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at
the time of payment. These cases are Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Natividad,[43] Meneses
v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[44]
and Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[45]
including the earlier cases of Office of the President v. Court of Appeals[46]
and Paris v. Alfeche.[47]
Thus, based on foregoing
jurisprudence, we reiterate our ruling in Natividad, to wit:
Land Bank's
contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on
October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation
should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at the
time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacańang,
Under
the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to
be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before
the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and
the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable
law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our
ruling in Paris v. Alfeche.
x
x x x
It
would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to
determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or
EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[48]
Inasmuch as the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function, the SAC did not
capriciously or arbitrarily act in setting the price at P200,000.00 per
hectare — an award merely modified by the CA.
We see no reason to disturb the factual findings on the valuation of the
subject property. The amount fixed by the SAC and CA does not appear to be grossly
exorbitant or otherwise unjustified. In
this case, the SAC properly arrived at the amount of just compensation for the
subject property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, market value,
assessed value at the time of the taking, and the volume and value of its produce,
as it made the following findings:
(a) [t]he prevailing market value of
agricultural lands in Quezon, Nueva Ecija, and adjacent areas, where it is of
public knowledge is sold at P80,000.00 to P300,000.00 per
hectare;
(b)
[t]he presence [and] availability
of an irrigation system to augment and increase agricultural production;
(c)
[t]he available comparable sales in
the area, i.e. P80,000.00, P300,000.00 and P200,000.00;
and
(d) [t]he
average harvests per hectare which [is] 100.05 cavans.[49]
Thus, it cannot be said that the SAC
had no basis for its valuation of the subject property. It took into consideration the important
factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 which, in turn, are the
very same criteria that make up the DAR formula. In Apo Fruits Corporation
v. Court of Appeals,[50]
we held:
What
is clearly implicit, thus, is that the basic formula and its alternatives —
administratively determined (as it is not found in Republic Act No. 6657, but
merely set forth in DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998) — although referred to and
even applied by the courts in certain instances, does not and cannot strictly
bind the courts. To insist that the formula must be applied with utmost
rigidity whereby the valuation is drawn following a strict mathematical
computation goes beyond the intent and spirit of the law. The suggested
interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory
construction should not kill but give life to the law. As we have established in earlier
jurisprudence, the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a
judicial function which is vested in the regional trial court acting as a SAC,
and not in administrative agencies. The SAC, therefore, must still be able to
reasonably exercise its judicial discretion in the evaluation of the factors
for just compensation, which cannot be arbitrarily restricted by a formula
dictated by the DAR, an administrative agency. Surely, DAR AO No. 5 did not
intend to straightjacket the hands of the court in the computation of the land
valuation. While it provides a formula, it could not have been its intention to
shackle the courts into applying the formula in every instance. The court shall
apply the formula after an evaluation of the three factors, or it may proceed
to make its own computation based on the extended list in Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657, which includes other factors, like the cost of
acquisition of the land; the current valuation of like properties; its nature,
actual use and income; the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
and the assessment made by the government assessors.[51]
However, when just compensation is
determined under R.A. No. 6657, no incremental, compounded interest of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be assessed. In this regard, LBP's point is
well taken. The CA erred in imputing interest, because the same applies only to
lands taken under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, pursuant to Administrative
Order No. 13, Series of 1994[52]
(A.O. No. 13), and not Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 6657 as cited by the CA. Pertinent
is our ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[53]
to wit:
The
purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests.
Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and corn was valued at P35.00
and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposited in a bank,
they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if
the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35 or P31)
could be multiplied by (1.06)n to determine the value of the land plus the
additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972. However,
since the PARAD already increased the GSP from P35.00 to P300.00/cavan
of palay and from P31.00 to P250.00/cavan of corn, there is no
more need to add any interest thereon, muchless compound it. To the extent that
it granted 6% compounded interest to private respondent Jose Pascual, the Court
of Appeals erred.[54]
Likewise, the twelve percent (12%)
interest imposed by the SAC has no legal basis. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco,[55]
this Court held that the interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation is due the landowner in case of delay in payment, which will, in
effect, make the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance.
On the other hand, interest in the form of damages cannot be imposed where
there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Interest on just compensation
is assessed only in case of delay in the payment thereof, a fact which must be adequately
proved. In this case, it is noteworthy that the LBP, all the while, believed in
good faith in the validity of the LTPA, assumed that the acquisition of the
subject property was by way of a VLT scheme, and, thus, was not obligated to
finance the transfer. Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition of
interest on the award of just compensation is not justified and should
therefore be deleted.
A
final note.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program was undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless farmers. However,
the undertaking should not result in the oppression of landowners by pegging
the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, the taking of properties for
agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation,[56]
but not at the undue expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection
under the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.[57]
Verily, to pay respondent only P10,000.00 per hectare for his land today,
after he was deprived of it since 1994, would be unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85806 dated March 17, 2005 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Raffle dated March 4, 2009.
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-70.
[2] Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85806, penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; id. at 71-84.
[3] Particularly docketed as AGR. Case No. 154 (AF); rollo, pp. 162-172.
[4] Although petitioner LBP claims that, as stipulated by the parties per Order dated March 18, 2003, the total area covered by the DAR is 8.7337 hectares (records, pp. 188-192); however, the SAC and CA found that the area covered is only 8.3027 hectares.
[5] Rollo, pp. 121-122.
[6]
[7] Also referred to as “Ronaldo Francisco” in other pleadings and documents.
[8] Rollo, pp. 160-161.
[9] DAR's Answer with Motion to Dismiss; id. at 140-141.
[10] LBP's Answer; rollo, pp. 135-137.
[11] Rollo, p. 172.
[12] Records, pp. 256-257.
[13] Rollo, p. 173.
[14] Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefore (October 21, 1972).
[15] Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and Corn Lands Subject of P.D. No. 27, and Providing for the Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the Landowner (July 17, 1987).
[16] An Act Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to Promote Social Justice and Industrialization, Providing the Mechanism for Its Implementation, and for other Purposes, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (June 10, 1988).
[17] Records, pp. 259-261.
[18]
[19]
[20] SAC's Order; rollo, pp. 174-180.
[21] CA rollo, pp. 11-49.
[22]
[23] Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
SECTION 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries under
In the event they cannot agree on the price of land, the procedure for compulsory acquisition as provided in Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall extend financing to the beneficiaries for purposes of acquiring the land.
[24] 378 Phil. 1248 (1999).
[25] Sec. 26 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
SECTION 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. — Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest per annum. The payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC: Provided, That the first five (5) annual payments may not be more than five percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR. Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed ten percent (10%) of the annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the repayment affordable.
The LBP shall have a lien by way of mortgage on the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three (3) annual amortizations. The LBP shall advise the DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholdings to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land, as provided herein, has been foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary under this Act.
[26] Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] LBP's Memorandum dated August 25, 2006; id. at 261-294.
[31] 464 Phil. 83 (2004).
[32] Comment filed on October 15, 2005; rollo. pp. 187-200.
[33] Respondent's Memorandum dated August 15, 2006; rollo, pp. 240-259.
[34] G.R.
No. 157206, June 27, 2008. (Citations omitted.)
[35] TSN, July 15, 2003, pp. 8-9.
[36] Security Bank and Trust Company v. Gan, G.R. No. 150464, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 239, 242-243, citing Pleyto v. Lomboy, 432 SCRA 329, 336 (2004).
[37] Frondarina
v. Malazarte, G.R. No.
148423, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 223, 233.
[38] TSN, August 12, 2003, pp. 12-17 and TSN, September 16, 2003, p. 5.
[39] G.R.
No. 167399, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 322.
[40] Republic of the
[41] G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009.
[42] G.R. No. 148223, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 176.
[43] G.R.
No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441.
[44] G.R. No. 156304, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 90.
[45] G.R. No. 170220, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 415.
[46] 413 Phil. 711 (2001).
[47] 416 Phil. 473 (2001).
[48] Supra note 43, at 451-452. (Citations omitted.)
[49] Rollo, p. 73.
[50] G.R.
No. 164195, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 117.
[51]
[52] Subject: Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%) Yearly Interest Compounded Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 (October 27, 1994).
[53] Supra
note 24.
[54]
[55] Supra note 31, at 100, citing Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 443 Phil. 603 (2003), further citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 106 (2002).
[56] Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 386.
[57] Land
Bank of the Philippines v. CA, 319 Phil. 246, 262 (1995), citing Mata v.
Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).