CESAR P. GUY, G.R.
Nos. 166794-96
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus
-
VELASCO, JR., and
PERALTA, JJ.*
Promulgated:
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, March 20, 2009
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
FELIX
T. RIPALDA,
C. ESPERAS, EDUARDO
VILLAMOR, and ERVIN C.
Petitioners,
-
versus -
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
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NARCISA A. GREFIEL, G.R. Nos. 167088-90
Petitioner,
-
versus -
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE
Respondents.
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Tinga,
J.:
These
are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
The facts, as culled from the records,
follow.
Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin C. Martinez (Ripalda, et
al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineer’s Office of the City of
It
appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission on Audit
(COA) in response to a letter-complaint of one Alfredo Alberca regarding the
three projects.[5] The audit team found that the Sangguniang
Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) accepted bid proposals from Amago Construction and General
Services (Amago Construction) without issuing the proper plans and
specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work
programs for the day care center and the
elevated path walk were prepared long after the construction had been
completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction of the projects to the City Engineer’s Office
only after they had already been completed; thus, petitioner employees inspected the
projects only after they had already been accomplished. Petitioner employees approved
the accomplishment of the projects despite the absence of material documents,
according to the audit team’s report.
Finally, the audit team found
material defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the
basketball court and elevated path walk was overpriced.[6]
The
Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the corresponding information for
the offenses, essentially charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
Petitioner
employees claimed that the participation of the City Engineer’s Office of
Tacloban City in the barangay infrastructure projects was only to provide
technical assistance to implementing barangays and that it was the barangay
officials who supervised the construction
of the projects. They aver that the City Engineer’s Office was not a
member of the PBAC which conducted the
bidding process for the subject projects, and that they did not personally know
their co-accused Guy and Grefiel, much more did they have any association with them prior to the approval of the three
projects. It was Guy and Grefiel who requested the City Engineer’s Office to
inspect the projects, and that when the City Engineer’s Office conducted the
inspection, it found the projects already completed. Lastly, they found the
three projects to be in accordance with the plans and specifications set for
them and there were no anomalies or irregularities in their construction. They add that the residents of Barangay 36 have
benefited from the three projects.[7]
On
the other hand, Guy maintained that the three projects were authorized by
resolutions duly-enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay. He claimed that a public bidding was
conducted before the construction of the projects and that Amago Construction
was the winning bidder. He added that
Amago Construction constructed the projects and was accordingly paid for the
work done and the materials supplied by it.[8]
Meanwhile,
Grefiel argued that her only participation in the projects was her signing of
the blank disbursement vouchers and blank checks covering the projects, and
that it was Guy who instructed her to affix her signature on the said
documents. She added that she did not
participate in the supervision of the construction of the projects nor in the
disbursement of the payment of any amount for the projects to Amago Construction.[9]
On
The Sandiganbayan found that Guy and
Grefiel awarded the contracts to Amago Construction even if there were no plans and
specifications for the day care center and
basketball court projects prior to their construction; and that
while there was a plan and specification for the
elevated path walk, they tolerated Amago Construction’s failure to abide by the
said plan.[10] Furthermore,
Guy and Grefiel are also responsible for
giving Amago Construction the check payments even before requests for
obligation of appropriations and disbursement vouchers were made.[11] The
graft court also found that the construction of the projects were reported to petitioner
employees after the projects had already been completed, and that these
anomalies notwithstanding, petitioner employees
certified that the projects were
made in accordance with the plans and that the same were 100% completed. Further, the Sandiganbayan found that the
quality of the day care center project was substandard, the program of work was
not followed, and worse, the contract amounts for the basketball court and the elevated path walk exceeded the
allowable project costs.[12] Finally,
the Sandiganbayan ruled that the acts of
the petitioners, taken collectively, satisfactorily prove the existence of conspiracy.[13]
Disposing of the graft cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled as
follows:
Considering that all the elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt established in these cases and the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is achieved to find the accused liable for the acts they committed.
WHEREFORE, accused FELIX RIPALDA, EDUARDO VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION
ESPERAS, ERVIN MARTINEZ, CESAR GUY and NARCISA GREFIEL are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of having violated R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) and are sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month as
minimum and nine (9) years as maximum for each of the three offenses, perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of eleven thousand eight hundred ninety (P11,
895.00).
Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused EDGAR AMAGO, let the cases against him be, in the meantime, archived, the same to be revived upon his arrest. Let an alias warrant of arrest be then issued against accused EDGAR AMAGO.
SO
ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed their separate
motions for reconsideration of the decision.
However, on
Before
this Court, petitioners separately raise the following issues, thus:
In
166794-96 (Cesar P. Guy v. People of the
1. The SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) has decided the above numbered three (3) criminal cases in gross disregard and contrary to the applicable decision of this Honorable Court in the case of LACSON v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., and thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION despite the fact that it had no jurisdiction over the instant three (3) cases due to the failure to aver “the specific factual allegations in the INFORMATIONS that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.”
2. GRANTING ARGUENDO that the SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) had jurisdiction over these three (3) criminal cases—it further committed serious errors of law and disregarded applicable jurisprudence of this Honorable Court and thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed DECISION convicting herein petitioner and his co-accused and issued the questioned RESOLUTION denying their MOTIONs FOR RECONSIDERATION despite the fact that the prosecution evidently failed to prove the guilt of petitioner and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt and further miserably failed to prove the allegation of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
In
G.R. No. 167088-90 ( Narcisa M. Grefiel v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan and the
People of the
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND, INSTEAD, REVERSED THE PRESUMPTION AND CONVICTED THE PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW INSPITE OF THE CONCEDED FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE PRE-BIDDING, BIDDING, AWARD, PROSECUTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE PROJECTS OF THE BARANGAY, THE CONVICTION RESTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE INCULPATORY EVIDENCE BUT ON THE SWEEPING DECLARATION THAT SHE WAS ONE OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS AND THE CHECKS RESULTED IN A DUBIOUS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUED FOR THE SUBSTANDARD CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARANGAY PROJECTS.[17]
In G.R. No. 166880-82 (Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C.
Esperas, Eduardo Villamor, and Ervin C.
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
I
THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
II
THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;
III
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT A QUO FRINDING THE PETITIONERS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON ESTIMATES, SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND/OR CONJECTURES[18]
In essence, petitioners maintain that
the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over them because the three informations failed to
state the specific actual allegations that would indicate the connection
between the discharge of their official duties and the commission of the
offenses charged; or alternatively,
assuming that the Sandiganbayan had
actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of
conspiracy.
The People of the
The OMB asserts that the prosecution
had satisfactorily proven the existence
of the elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the
existence of conspiracy among the accused.[20]
In addition, the OMB alleges that Grefiel’s claim that she was
merely constrained to sign the disbursement vouchers and checks relative to the
subject projects is pure sophistry, since as barangay treasurer she is mandated
to disburse funds in accordance with the Local Government Code. Even Grefiel’s
claim of miniscule educational attainment should not excuse her from liability.[21] The OMB
posits that petitioners’ allegation of error is “actually designed to lure the Court into
re-opening the case on the basis of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which, however, on close scrutiny appear
to be credible and substantiated.”[22]
The
petitions have to be denied.
Petitioners
were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which states:
“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”
To hold a person liable under this
section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established, viz:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”[23]
Petitioners,
citing the case of Lacson
v. The Executive Secretary,[24] assert
that the informations do not contain the specific factual allegations showing the close intimacy between the discharge of petitioners’ official duties and the commission of the offense charged to
qualify the offense as one committed in
relation to public office. In Lacson, the Court ruled that before the
Sandiganbayan may acquire jurisdiction
over the offense charged, the intimate relation between the offense charged and
the discharge of official duties “must be alleged in the information.”[25]
Indeed,
jurisprudence is replete with cases describing
when an offense is deemed committed “in relation to office.” In Montilla and Tobia v. Hilario and Crisologo,[26]
this Court held that for an offense to be committed in relation to the office,
the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not
accidental, such that the offense cannot exist without the office. In Adaza
v. Sandiganbayan,[27] we held that:
It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office or that he took advantage of his position as these are conclusions of law. The specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the offender’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office, are controlling.[28]
The Court finds that the Informations sufficiently show
the close intimacy between petitioners’ discharge of official duties and the commission
of the offense charged. We reproduce the
accusatory portions of the Informations
in the subject cases, thus:
Criminal Case No. 26508
That in or about the
year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the City of Tacloban,
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused: FELIX T.
RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ,
public officers, being the City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector
and ICD Representative, City Administrator’s Office, respectively, of the City
Government of Tacloban, CESAR P. GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public
officers, being Barangay Captain and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of
Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating together and
mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private individual,
Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc.,
Tacloban City, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct
and/or cause the construction of an elevated path walk of Barangay 36, Sabang
District, Tacloban City, with the contract cost of SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P62,000.00),
Philippine Currency without following
the approved program of work and drawing plan, in violation of the DILG
Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thereby resulting to
(sic) an increase in the project cost by 17.5% or NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
SEVENTY-FOUR PESOS AND EIGHTY-FOUR CENTAVOS (P9,274.84), Philippine
Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official
functions had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar
Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[29]
Criminal Case No. 26509
That in or about the year 1996, and
for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban,
Contractor
and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban City,
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct and/or cause the
construction of the Basketball Court of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban
City, without adhering to the approved program of work and non-preparation of
the plans and specifications in violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No.
94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thus resulting to (sic) the increase in the
contract amount to SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P68,000.00), Philippine
Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official
functions had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar
Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[30]
Criminal Case No. 26510
That in or about the
year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of Tacloban,
THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00), Philippine Currency, to
NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P93,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated
CONTRARY TO LAW.[31]
The Lacson
case is not applicable because in that case there was a failure to show
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the
accused. Specifically, the Court observed:
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder “in relation to their public office,[”] there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.[32]
In the
case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated in the
Informations. The Informations allege
that while in the performance of their respective functions either as city or
barangay officials, petitioners caused the construction of the subject
structures, either without following the
approved program of work and drawing plan, or worse, even without any plans and
specifications; and furthermore, had given unwarranted benefits to themselves
and to Edgar Amago, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
Contrary also to petitioners’ assertions, the specific acts
of the accused do not have to be described in detail in the information, as it
is enough that the offense be described with sufficient particularity to make
sure the accused fully understand what he is being charged with. The particularity must be such that a person
of ordinary intelligence immediately knows what the charge is.[33] Moreover,
reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices.[34] It is often difficult to say what is a
matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order
to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a
general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the
description of the offense, need not be averred.[35]
The particular acts of the accused which pertain to “matters of evidence,” such as how accused city officials prepared
the inspection reports despite the absence of a project plan or how the contractor was able to use
substandard materials, do not have to be indicated in the information.
Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty
verdict handed down by the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the prosecution failed
to prove petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole
case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even
reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds other than those that the parties
raise as errors.[36] We have examined the records of the case and
find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the evidence on record amply
supports the findings and conclusions of the respondent court. The elements of
the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioners could not have
committed the offense charged were it
not for their official duties or functions as public officials. Their
malfeasance or misfeasance in relation to their duties and functions underlies their
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Second, the undue injury caused to the government is evident from the clear
deviation from the material specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the case of the
basketball court and elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard
materials in the case of the day care center.
Otherwise stated, “the People did
not get the full worth of their money in terms of the benefits they will derive
from the (above) sub-standard infrastructure projects.”[37] Third,
unwarranted benefits were accorded to Amago Construction when the three
projects were not inspected and supervised during construction, allowing it to
cut costs and save money by using substandard materials and deviating from the specific materials and measurements
prescribed in the work programs. Moreover,
Amago Construction was able to receive payments for the projects even before
the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government
from refusing or deferring payment on
account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is clear that from the very
inception of the construction of the subject projects up to their completion, petitioners
had exhibited manifest partiality for
Amago Construction, and acted with evident bad faith against the government and
the public which they had sworn to serve.
Neither are we inclined to vacate the
Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy among petitioners.
Jurisprudence
teaches us that “proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as
the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing
a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show
that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out.”[38] Therefore,
if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment,
then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved.[39] Conspiracy
was thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan because even though there
was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government
and give unwarranted benefits to Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as
a whole showed that they were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the
same unlawful objective. The barangay
officials’ award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific
plans and specifications, the preparation of work programs only after the
constructions had been completed, the
issuance and encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even before
any request to obligate the appropriation or to issue a disbursement voucher
was made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of
completion by petitioner employees despite the absence of material documents were
all geared towards one purpose—to cause undue injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction.
WHEREFORE, the
consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1]Penned by Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Efren N. De La Cruz, concurring.
[2]Rollo (G.R. Nos. 166880-82), p. 4; Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 166880-82.
At the time of the petition, Ripalda was the City Engineer; Esperas was
Engineer IV, Villamor was Engineer III; and
[4]Petitioner in G.R. Nos. 167088-90.
[9]
[10]Id. at 60; DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185 dated October 20, 1994, requires the PBAC to issue plans and specification for the project to be bid.
[11]
[25]
[26]90 Phil. 49 (1951).
[33]Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.