THIRD DIVISION
|
NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS
MALAZARTE, Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF
APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA AUNZO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 166519
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 31,
2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the May 12, 2004 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 43085 and the December 1, 2004
Resolution[2]
denying reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The
pertinent facts and proceedings follow.
In
1974, petitioners[3] filed a
complaint for recovery of title to property with damages before the Court of
First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of Maasin,
Respondents,
for their part, denied petitioners’ allegation of ownership and possession of
the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the subject land was
inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.[6]
Revealed
in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land.
Based on the testimonies of petitioners’ witnesses, the property passed on from
Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves’
grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her
siblings—Jose, Victor and Victoria.[7]
After
resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument that
the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners’ failure to
implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners – Jose, Victor and Victoria.
In
its April 19, 1993 Order,[8]
the trial court, without ruling on the merits, dismissed the case without
prejudice, thus:
This
Court, much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one of
the old inherited cases left behind, finds difficulty if not impossibility of
doing so at this stage of the proceedings when both parties have already rested
their cases. Reluctantly, it agrees with
the defendants in the observation that some important indispensable
consideration is conspicuously wanting or missing.
It
is not the Court’s wish to turn its back on the crucial part of the case, which
is the pronouncement of the judgment to settle the issues raised in the
pleadings of the parties once and for all, after all the time, effort and
expense spent in going through the trial process.
But,
rules are rules. They have to be
followed, to arrive at a fair and just verdict.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
“x
x x Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants.”
What the Court wants to say here is that the
instant case should have been dismissed without prejudice a long time ago for
lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves
Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal personality to sue by themselves
alone without joining the brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as
INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the final determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment would have
no effectiveness.
They
are that indispensable that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the Court cannot proceed without their presence. There are abundant authorities in this
regard. Thus –
“The
general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires
the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345,
348) For this reason, our Supreme Court
has held that when it appears of record that there are other persons interested
in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the
action, it is the duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are
made either plaintiffs or defendants.
(Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156).
x x x Where the petition failed to join as party defendant the person
interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be
dismissed. x x x When an indispensable party is not before the court, the
action should be dismissed. (People, et
al. v. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. Nos. L-14059-62, September 30, 1959) (sic)
“Parties
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
(Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the
plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent
the multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all
persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may
be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, 38 Phil. 177, 178).
“An
indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence,
without inquiring or affecting such interest; a party who has not only an
interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. (67 C.J.S. 892). Indispensable parties are those without whom
no action can be finally determined.”
(Sanidad v. Cabataje, 5 Phil. 204)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, both the complaint and the counterclaim in the instant case are
ordered DISMISSED without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved,
petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In the challenged May 12, 2004
Decision,[10] the
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA, further,
declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would violate the
principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be
applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for recovery
of title or a reivindicatory action.[11]
With
their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December 1,
2004 Resolution,[12]
petitioners filed the instant petition.
The
Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for
disposition on the merits.
Article
487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an
action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery
of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory
action. A co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will
benefit the other co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot
prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.[13]
With
this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners’ complaint
is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the
Civil Code applies to both actions.
Thus,
petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as
parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled
to the possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the
plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.[14]
Here, the allegation of petitioners
in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation
is immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the
property is co-owned by Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners have been
authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.[15]
Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, as
mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
In any event, the trial and appellate
courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after
both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in
1974, on the sole ground of failure to implead indispensable parties. The rule
is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to
comply therewith.[16]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is GRANTED, and the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for
appropriate proceedings. The trial court is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 602 dated March 20, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring; rollo, pp. 25-42.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-46.
[3] Substituted by their heirs. (Records, p. 87.)
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Supra note 1.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 103-111.
[12] Supra note 2.
[13] Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80, 90-91.
[14] Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 275, 283.
[15] Rollo, pp. 54-59.
[16] PepsiCo, Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 58, 67.