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BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE Petitioner, - versus - LA SUERTE TRADING & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as represented by
EDWARD O. JOSON, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 164875
Present: Quisumbing, J.,
Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, VELASCO, JR., and PERALTA,* JJ. Promulgated: March 20, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This
petition for review assails the Decision[1] dated
The antecedent facts are as follows:
La Suerte Trading and Industrial Corporation
(La Suerte) is the registered owner of five parcels of land located in
In
1994, Ricardo Joson, allegedly without authorization from the Board of
Directors of La Suerte, mortgaged the said properties to Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC). La Suerte
discovered the mortgage only in 2001 when it received a notice[8]
of the extra-judicial sale of the subject properties to be held on
On
On
On
On
During the
On
In an Order[15] dated
BPI elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. It argued that
while the prayer for the issuance of the writ was set for hearing on
The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. It held that from a perusal of the RTC’s
BPI moved to
reconsider the dismissal of its petition. This time it attached the TSNs[17] of the
Hence the instant
petition citing the following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY THE PETITIONER BY HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF [ITS] OPPOSITION AGAINST THE PRAYER FOR INJUNCTION OF THE
RESPONDENT, WHEN IN FACT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND WAS NOT GIVEN
OPPORTUNITY BY THE COURT A QUO TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE COURT A QUO ON
THE BASIS MERELY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADING/COMPLAINT AND
NOTWITHSTANDING DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS UPON THE PETITIONER.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
WOULD BE DAMAGED AND STANDS TO LOSE ITS PROPERTY SHOULD THE PETITIONER PROCEED
WITH THE FORECLOSURE AND CONSOLIDATE ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WHEN IN FACT IT
WAS THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS DAMAGED AND PREJUDICED WHEN THE AUCTION SALE OF
THE MORTGAGED PROPERTIES DID NOT PUSH THROUGH IN SPITE OF FAILURE OF THE
RESPONDENT TO PAY ITS OBLIGATIONS WITH THE PETITIONER.[18]
Briefly
stated, the present controversy boils down to this factual question: Did the RTC conduct a hearing on La Suerte’s
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction?
As we
had stressed time and again, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a
petition for review under Rule 45, since only questions of law may be raised
therein. However, there are several
exceptions to the said rule, and one of which is present in the instant case,
i.e. the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.[19]
The
Court of Appeals could not be faulted in previously finding in its Decision
dated November 20, 2003 that the RTC held a hearing on La Suerte’s prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, considering BPI’s failure to
adequately prove its allegation that no hearing was conducted thereon last
September 4, 2001. However, when BPI was
able to indubitably show in its motion for reconsideration and the stenographic
notes of the hearing dated September 4, 2001, that the scheduled hearing on the
matter did not really push through because of a pending motion to dismiss, it
was clear that the Court of Appeals erred in not invalidating the said writ
since a prior hearing before the issuance of the same is absolutely required.[20]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Designated member of Second Division per Special Order No. 587 in place of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion who is on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 35-41. Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara- Salonga and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 48.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 59.
[13]
[14] Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. —No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the
preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order
effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance, but shall immediately
comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending
shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two
hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court
of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be
effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be
enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof
shall be effective until further orders.
The
trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the Court of Tax
Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary injunction against a lower court,
board, officer, or quasi-judicial agency shall decide the main case or petition
within six (6) months from the issuance of the writ. (As amended by A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, took effect on
[15] Rollo, p. 80.
[16] CA rollo, p. 7.
[17]
[18] Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[19]
[20] Supra note 14.