Republic of
the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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VILLARICA
PAWNSHOP, INC., |
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G.R. No. 163344 |
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represented by
Atty. Henry R. Villarica, |
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Maria Consolacion
Valmadrid and |
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Present: |
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Rafael Valmadrid
Tan, |
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Petitioners, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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TINGA,* |
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SPOUSES ROGER G.
GERNALE and |
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NACHURA, and |
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CORAZON C.
GERNALE, FAR EAST |
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PERALTA, JJ. |
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BANK & TRUST
CO. (now Bank of the |
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Philippine |
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Promulgated: |
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OF DEEDS of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, |
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Respondents. |
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March 20, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
The facts of the case are as follows:
On
The Gernale spouses alleged that on
April 16, 1978, they purchased two parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan
from Valmadrid as evidenced by two deeds of sale of even date; subsequently,
they sought to register the sale and cause the transfer of the title to their
names, but they failed because the then acting Register of Deeds of Marilao,
Bulacan informed them that Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 90266 and
90267 covering the subject lots were among those totally burned during a
conflagration that took place on March 7, 1987; on June 20, 1994 the Gernale
spouses filed a petition for the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT
Nos. 90266 and 90267; their petition was granted and the reconstituted titles
TCT Nos. RT-46962(90266) and RT-46963(90267) were issued; by virtue of the deed
of sale in favor of the Gernales, TCT Nos. T-286452(M) and T-286453(M) were
subsequently issued in their names in 1996; thereafter, the Gernale spouses saw
representatives of Villarica fencing the said properties; upon verification
with the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent spouses
discovered that TCT Nos. T-225971(M) and T-225972(M), covering the same parcels
of land which they bought, were issued in the name of Villarica in 1995; and
the titles of Villarica were void, as the issuance thereof proceeded from an
illegal source. The Gernales prayed that
the TCTs in the name of Villarica as well as all documents and conveyances
relevant thereto be declared null and void, and that Villarica be ordered to
pay them moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
On
On July 3, 2002, Villarica filed its
Answer with Counterclaim[4] denying
the material allegations of the Complaint and contending in its special and
affirmative defenses that it was the registered owner of 10 adjoining lots
denominated as Lots 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, with a total
area of 3,102 square meters located at the De Castro Subdivision in Ibayo,
Marilao, Bulacan; Lots 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 were purchased from Valmadrid
on May 23, 1995; while Lots 19, 20, 21 and 22 were bought from Tan on even
date; on June 7, 1995, separate and individual TCTs were issued for each lot;
from May 23, 1995 up to the filing of its Answer, Villarica had been in actual,
open, physical and continuous possession of the 10 lots, and it had been regularly
paying real estate taxes thereon; Lots 13 and 14 were the parcels of land being
claimed by the Gernale spouses; the deeds of sale in favor of the Gernale
spouses which were supposedly executed on April 16, 1978 were fake; in her
affidavit, Valmadrid denied having met or known respondent spouses or having
sold Lots 13 and 14 to them; she claimed in said affidavit that her signature
appearing in the Deed of Sale in favor of the Gernale spouses was falsified;
and it was only in 1996 that the said Deed of Sale was registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. As counterclaim, Villarica alleged that the
Gernale spouses were guilty of malicious prosecution, and that they should be
made liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and cost of suit.
Meanwhile, on
On
Petitioners filed their Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss[7]
asserting that the elements of litis pendentia were not present in the
subject cases.
In its Order[8] dated
On
On
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Orders of respondent Judge denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 is now reversed and set aside. Accordingly, public
respondent is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 on the ground of litis
pendentia.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution[12] dated
Hence, herein petition based on the
following Assignment of Errors:
1.
CONTRARY
TO THE SWEEPING, MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS AND HIGHLY ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR
EVEN ERROR OF JUDGMENT IN CORRECTLY, FAIRLY AND JUSTIFIABLY DENYING THE “MOTION
TO DISMISS” OF RESPONDENTS ROGER G. GERNALE AND CORAZON C. GERNALE AND IN
DIRECTING THEM TO ANSWER THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS IN CIVIL CASE NO.
502-M-2002.
2. CONTRARY TO THE SWEEPING, MANIFESTLY
ERRONEOUS AND HIGHLY ARBITRARY CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THERE IS
CLEARLY AND EVIDENTLY NO “LITIS PENDENCIA” (sic) BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO.
502-M-2002 WHERE ALL THE HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE THE PLAINTIFFS AND WHERE
RESPONDENTS GERNALES, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (BPI) ARE THE DEFENDANTS, AND
CIVIL CASE. NO. 438-M-2002 WHERE RESPONDENTS GERNALES ARE THE PLAINTIFFS AND
WHERE VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC. IS THE ONLY DEFENDANT.[13]
which boils down to the basic question of whether there is litis
pendentia involving Civil Case Nos. 502-M-2002 and 438-M-2002.
However, before proceedings to resolve
the main issue, we shall first address the question of whether the petition for
certiorari filed by respondents with the CA was the proper remedy to
question the orders of the RTC, which denied their motion to dismiss and their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in granting the Gernale spouses's
petition for certiorari, because what was being questioned in the said
petition was the September 10, 2002 Order of the RTC, which denied the
Gernales's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 and the November 27,
2002 RTC Order which denied their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners aver that these are interlocutory
orders which cannot be questioned in a petition for certiorari, and that the proper procedural remedy is to file an
answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the same on
appeal from the final judgment.
The petition lacks merit.
While indeed, the general rule is that the
denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari which is not intended to correct every controversial
interlocutory ruling,[14] and
that the appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as
defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to
trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by
appeal in due course,[15]
this rule is not absolute.
Even when appeal is available and is the
proper remedy, the Supreme Court has allowed a writ of certiorari (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of
or without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (3) for certain
special considerations, as public welfare or public policy; (4) where in
criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as,
in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent
nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations.[16]
As will be shown forthwith, the CA correctly held that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed orders. Moreover, the assailed decision of the CA will
avoid future litigations that may arise from the judgments that will be issued
by the trial courts where Civil Case Nos. 438-M-2002 and 502-M-2002 are
pending. More importantly, it would
avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions by these courts.
We now come to the main issue.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and
vexatious.[17]
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a
party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action.[18]
This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter
should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order
that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the
stability of the rights and status of persons.[19]
The requisites of litis pendentia
are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[20]
With respect to the first requisite, the Court finds no error in the
ruling of the CA that there is identity of parties in Civil Case Nos.
438-M-2002 and 502-M-2002. It is true that
in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002, Valmadrid and Tan were added as plaintiffs, while
BPI and the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan were added as defendants. However, identity of parties does not mean
total identity of parties in both cases.[21]
It is enough that there is substantial
identity of parties.[22]
The inclusion of new parties in the
second action does not remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis
pendentia.[23] What is primordial is that the primary
litigants in the first case are also parties to the second action.[24]
A different rule would render illusory
the principle of litis pendentia.[25]
The facility of its circumvention is not
difficult to imagine given the resourcefulness of lawyers.[26] The fact that new parties were included in Civil
Case No. 502-M-2002 does not detract from the fact that the principal
litigants, Villarica and the Gernale spouses, are the same in both cases. Besides, it is clear that Valmadrid and Tan,
being the previous owners from whom Villarica bought the subject properties,
represent the same interests as the latter. On the other hand, the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan was impleaded merely as a nominal party.
With respect to the second and third requisites, hornbook is the rule
that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity;[27]
otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought.[28]
The test to determine whether the causes
of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain
both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions.[29]
If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action.[30] Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be
twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.[31]
Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 is for quieting of title and damages, while
Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 is for annulment and cancellation of titles and
damages. The two cases are different
only in the form of action, but an examination of the allegations in both
cases reveals that the main issue raised,
which is ownership of the land, and the principal relief sought, which is cancellation
of the opposing parties' transfer certificates of title, are substantially the
same. The evidence required to
substantiate the parties' claims is likewise the same. The proceedings in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002
would entail the presentation of essentially the same evidence, which should be
adduced in Civil Case No. 438-M-2002. As
cited by the CA, this Court held in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi[32]
that:
The underlying objectives or
reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases
are essentially the same – adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot
and nullification of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes
readily apparent that the same evidence of facts as those considered in the
quieting-of-title case would also be used in this petition.[33]
The subject cases are so intimately related to each other that the
judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
From the foregoing, it is clear that there is litis pendentia,
and that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to grant
respondents' motion to dismiss.
Having resolved that there is litis
pendentia, the remaining question is: which of the two cases, Civil Case No.
438-M-2002 or Civil Case No. 502-M-2002,
should be dismissed?
There is no hard and fast rule in
determining which actions should be abated on the ground of litis pendentia.
However, the Supreme Court has set the relevant factors that lower courts must
consider when they have to determine which case should be dismissed, given the
pendency of two actions. These are:
(1) the date of filing, with preference generally
given to the first action filed to be retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was
filed merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its filing and lay
the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle
for litigating the issues between the parties.[34]
Consistent with the third factor, the Court has ruled that the earlier
case can be dismissed in favor of the later case if the later case is the more
appropriate forum for the ventilation of the issues between the parties.[35]
In the present case, the mere fact that the action for quieting of title
(Civil Case No. 438-M-2002) was filed earlier than the case for annulment and
cancellation of titles (Civil Case No. 502-M-2002) does not necessarily mean
that the first case will be given preference. Indeed, the rule on litis
pendentia does not require that the latter case should yield to the earlier
case. What is required merely is that
there be another pending action, not a prior pending action.[36]
There is reason to dismiss Civil Case No. 438-M-2002,
considering that the issue of whether or not the contract of mortgage entered
into between BPI and the Gernale spouses should be annulled is, understandably,
not raised in this case and was brought up only in Civil Case No.
502-M-2002. Thus, to dismiss Civil Case
No. 502-M-2002, instead, would leave
this issue unresolved.
Another reason why Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 should not be dismissed
is that it is a direct action attacking the registered titles of the Gernale
spouses over the properties in question, as opposed to petitioners' answer in
Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 which would merely be considered a collateral and not
a direct attack on the said titles. Settled is the rule that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to a collateral attack; and it cannot
be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.[37] Hence, to dismiss Civil Case No. 502-M-2002
would, in effect, deprive petitioners of their right to attack respondent
spouses' titles over the disputed properties and pray for their cancellation.
On the other hand, there are countervailing considerations which make
dismissal of Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 inequitable. Aside from the fact that it was the first
action which was filed, pre-trial conference has already been conducted in this
case as evidenced by the Pre-Trial Order issued by the RTC of Malolos, Branch
18 on October 29, 2002, and the first trial date already set as early
as January 28, 2003.[38] In fact, the trial court in said Order has
noted that the deposition of Valmadrid, who is one of the witnesses for
petitioners, was already taken.
This Court has held that two cases involving the same parties and
affecting closely related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and
jointly tried in the court where
the earlier case was filed.[39] This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 31 of
the Rules of Court, which provides as follows:
Section 1. Consolidation. - When actions
involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
In the instant case, it would therefore be more in keeping with the
demands of law and equity if Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 will be consolidated
with Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 in order that all the issues raised by the
parties in both cases will be properly resolved,
and so that the evidence already presented in the former case will no longer
have to be presented in the latter.[40] Consolidation of cases, when
proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the
resources of the parties and the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of
trial.[41] It is a desirable end to be
achieved within the context of the present state of affairs, where court
dockets are full and individual and state finances are limited.[42] It contributes
to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of
affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their
cases before the courts.[43] Another compelling argument that weighs heavily
in favor of consolidation is the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would
otherwise require a single judgment.[44]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 26, 2004 and its Resolution of April 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74967
are SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered DIRECTING
that Civil Case No. 502-M-2002, now pending before Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, be CONSOLIDATED with Civil Case No.
438-M-2002 pending in Branch 18 of the same court, the two cases to be heard
and decided by the latter court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
diosdado
m. peralta
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* In
lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 590 dated
[1] Penned
by Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Amelita G.
Tolentino and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), rollo, pp. 73-80.
[2]
[3] Rollo,
pp. 181-186.
[4] Rollo,
pp. 187-208.
[5]
[6] Rollo,
pp. 159-166.
[7] Rollo,
pp. 167-180.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] CA rollo, p. 434.
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[14] Heirs
of Florencio Adolfo v. Cabral, G.R. No. 164934, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA
111, 117; Khemani v. Heirs of Anastacio Trinidad, G.R. No. 147340,
[15] Hasegawa
v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177,
[16] Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Pingol Land Transport System Company, Inc., G.R.
No. 145908, January 22, 2004, 420 SCRA 652, 661, citing Casil v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 187 (1998).
[17] Guevarra
v. BPI Securities Corporation, G.R. No. 159786,
[18] Sherwill
Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc.,
G.R. No. 158455,
[19] Forbes
Park Association, Inc. v. Pagrel, Inc.,
G.R. No. 153821, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 39, 49.
[20] Dayot
v. Shell Chemical Company, (Phils.) Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26, 2007,
525 SCRA 535, 545-546; Abines v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R.
No. 167900, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 421, 429.
[21] Ssangyong
Corporation v. Unimarine Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 162727, November
18, 2005, 475 SCRA 523, 537.
[22] City
of
[23] Ssangyong
Corporation v. Unimarine Shipping Lines, Inc., supra note 21.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797,
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] Lim
v. Montano, A.C. No. 5653,
[32] 374
Phil. 879 (1999).
[33]
[34] Panganiban
v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 443 Phil. 753, 767 (2003).
[35] Id.;
Calo v. Tan, G.R. No. 151266,
[36] Ramos
v. Peralta, G.R. No. 45107,
[37] Caraan
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543, 549;
Co v. Militar, 466 Phil. 217, 225 (2004).
[38] Rollo,
p. 222.
[39] Esguerra
v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 561, 568; Zulueta
v. Asia Brewery, Inc., 406 Phil. 543, 556 (2001).
[40] Allied
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 710, 719-720 (1996).
[41] Yu,
Sr. v. Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 138701-02, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 618, 633.
[42]
[43]
[44]