Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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SOFIA ANIOSA SALANDANAN, |
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G.R. No. 160280 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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- versus - |
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Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
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NACHURA,
and |
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PERALTA,
JJ. |
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SPOUSES MA. ISABEL and |
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BAYANI MENDEZ, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondents.* |
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March 13, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to
the Petition for Review on Certiorari of the June 27, 2003 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its September 3, 2003 Resolution[2]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336 denying the petition for clarification and intervention
filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan (petitioner) and affirming in toto the
March 6, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30
in Civil Case No. 02-104406 which affirmed the August 9, 2002 Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 172530 ordering
Delfin Fernandez[3]
and Carmen Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez) and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate and surrender possession of a house and lot located at 1881
Antipolo St., corner Vision St., Sta. Cruz, Manila (subject lot) to Spouses
Bayani Mendez and Ma. Isabel S. Mendez (respondents) and to pay the latter
monthly rental of P5,000.00 from P15,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
The case stemmed
from a complaint for ejectment instituted by respondents against Spouses
Fernandez before the MeTC on
In their
Complaint,[4]
respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767 of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila; that they became the owners thereof by virtue of a deed of donation;
that Spouses Fernandez and their families were occupying the subject property
for free through the generosity of respondent Isabel’s father; that a letter of
demand to vacate the subject property
was sent to Spouses Fernandez but they refused to vacate the same; that
respondents brought the matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible
settlement but the same failed.
In their Answer,[5]
Spouses Fernandez denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that
Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan (Spouses Salandanan) are the registered
owners of the subject property and the improvements therein; that respondent
Isabel is not a daughter of Spouses Salandanan; that Delfin Fernandez (Delfin) is
the nearest of kin of Pablo Salandanan being the nephew of the latter; that
Delfin has continuously occupied the said property since time immemorial with
the permission of Spouses Salandanan; that they did not receive any notice to
vacate the subject property either from respondents or their counsel.
Further, Spouses
Fernandez claimed that respondents were able to transfer the subject property
to their name through fraud; that sometime in November 1999, respondents went
to the house of Spouses Salandanan in Dasmariñas, Cavite and asked the latter
to sign a special power of attorney; that the supposed special power of
attorney was in fact a deed of donation wherein Spouses Salandanan was alleged
to have donated in favor of respondents the subject property; that said deed of
donation was simulated and fictitious and that by virtue of the alleged deed of
donation, respondent Isabel was able to transfer the title of the subject
property in her name; that in fact, the subject property is the subject of a
separate case filed on July 31, 2001 before the RTC of Manila docketed as Civil
Case No. 01101487[6]
for annulment, revocation and reconveyance of title. By way of counterclaim, Spouses Fernandez
prayed for moral damages and attorney’s fees.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering
the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to peacefully vacate the
premises and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs and for the
defendants to pay plaintiffs: 1) P5,000.00 a month beginning January 29,
2002 (when the demand letter was received by defendants by registered mail)
until they finally vacate the premises and 2) the amount of P15,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees.
The counterclaim of the
defendants is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Dissatisfied,
Spouses Fernandez appealed to the RTC.
Respondents then filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal with the
RTC. On
Thus, on
On
Meanwhile, on
On
Verily, the only
issue to be resolved in the present ejectment case is who between petitioners
[Spouses Fernandez] and respondents has the better right to possess the
disputed premises. The issue as to who
between Sofia Aniosa Salandanan and respondents is the real owner of subject
premises could be properly threshed out in a separate proceedings, which in
this case is already pending resolution in another court.
Interestingly,
nowhere in any pleadings of petitioners submitted below could We find any allegations
to the effect that their possession of the disputed premises sprung from their
claim of ownership over the same nor, at the very least, that they are in
possession of any document that would support their entitlement to enjoy the
disputed premises.
As between
respondents' Torrens Title to the premises juxtaposed that of petitioners'
barren claim of ownership and absence of any document showing that they are
entitled to possess the same, the choice is not difficult. Simply put, petitioners plainly have no basis
to insist that they have a better right to possess the premises over
respondents who have a Torrens Title over the same. Hence, the MTC, as well as the RTC, correctly
ordered petitioners to vacate the premises since respondents have a better
right to possess the same by virtue of the latter's Torrens Title.[11]
The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 06 March
2003, of Hon. Judge Lucia Peña Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Brach 50, affirming on appeal the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (MTC for brevity), Branch 15, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Accordingly, the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby LIFTED. As a legal consequence, petitioners and
all persons claiming rights under them, including Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are
hereby ORDERED to vacate the premises immediately upon receipt hereof. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
On
On even date, Sofia
Salandanan (petitioner) filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention[14]
and attached a Motion for Reconsideration.[15] In her motion for clarification and
intervention, she alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners
of the subject property; that she was not a party to the case for ejectment and
did not receive any notice therefrom; and that by virtue of the said decision,
she was about to be evicted from her property without having participated in
the entire process of the ejectment proceeding.
Petitioner
further claims that sometime in 1999, respondents went to their house and
showed certain papers purportedly copies of a special power of attorney but
which turned out to be a deed of donation involving the subject property; that
by virtue of the said donation, respondents were able to register the subject
properties in their name and were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 246767;
that on July 31, 2001, Spouses Salandanan with the assistance of Delfin, filed
a civil case before the RTC of Manila for Revocation/Annulment of the said
title and Reconveyance; and that consequently, petitioner was forced to
intervene in order to protect her interests over the subject property. Petitioner prayed for (1) clarification of
the CA’s decision asking whether the said decision applies to her as a relative
of Spouses Fernandez claiming right under them or as possessor of the subject
property in her right as owner of the subject property; (2) that she be allowed
to intervene in the appeal; and (3) that the attached motion for
reconsideration be admitted.
In a Resolution
dated
We have carefully perused
petitioner’s Motion and find the arguments raised therein a mere rehash, if not
a repetition, of the arguments raised in their petition, which have already
been thoroughly discussed and passed upon in our Decision.
Anent the movant Sofia
Salandanan’s Motion for Clarification and Intervention, We hereby deny the same
on the ground that it is belatedly filed by virtue of the rendition of Our
Decision on
Section 2, Rule 19 of 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
Section 2. Time to Intervene.
– The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. x x x
Moreover, it is undisputed that on
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion for Clarification and Intervention are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Hence, herein
petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
1. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT INCLUDED PETITIONER IN ITS ADVERSE JUDGMENT IN
VIOLATION OF THE LATTER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE FACT
THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE INSTANT CASE AND DOES NOT DERIVE HER RIGHT
TO STAY IN THE CONTESTED PROPERTY FROM THE SPOUSES DELFIN AND CARMEN FERNANDEZ.
2. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION BY PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT IT WAS ONLY BY VIRTUE OF ITS DECISION DATED JUNE 27, 2003 THAT
PETITIONER WAS INCLUDED IN THE EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND THE EARLIEST
OPPURTUNE TIME WHEN PETITIONER COULD HAVE INTERVENED WAS AFTER THE COURT OF
APPEALS RULED AGAINST HER.
3. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP
IN RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF WHO HAS BETTER POSSESSION.
4. THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT SUSPEND THE CASE DESPITE THE EQUITABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE AMAGAN VS. MARAMAG
CASE.[18]
Petitioner
contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it included
petitioner in its decision despite the fact that she is not a party in the ejectment
case, thus, violating her right to due process; and considering that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over her person, she cannot be bound by the Decision
of the CA.
Petitioner also
asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion for clarification and
intervention. According to her, she was
constrained to file a motion for clarification and intervention because the CA
included her in its decision in spite of the fact that she was not impleaded as
a party to the unlawful detainer case.
Petitioner
ascribes grave abuse of discretion when the CA failed to resolve the issue of
ownership in order to determine the party who has the better right to possess
the subject property. She asserts that
the CA should have suspended the unlawful detainer case since the ownership of
the subject property is in issue.
Finally,
petitioner maintains that she is the owner of the property by virtue of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9937 issued on
We find the
petition unmeritorious.
Let us first
tackle the issue of whether petitioner should have been allowed to intervene
even after the CA had promulgated its Decision.
Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:
Section 1. Who
may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time
to intervene. – The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.
As a rule,
intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial
court. After the lapse of this period,
it will not be warranted anymore because intervention is not an independent
action but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation.[19] The permissive tenor of the provision on
intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full
measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same,[20] but
under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are nevertheless mandated
to consider several factors in determining whether or not to allow
intervention. The factors that should be
reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the
intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Keeping these
factors in mind, the courts have to give much consideration to the fact that
actions for ejectment are designed to summarily restore physical possession
to one who has been illegally deprived of such possession.[21] It is primarily a quieting process intended
to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to
possession without involvement of the title.[22] In Five Star Marketing Co., Inc. v. Booc,[23] the Court elucidated the purpose of actions
for ejectment in this wise:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to
provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right
to the possession of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay in
the determination thereof. It is a
“time procedure” designed to remedy the situation. Stated in another way, the avowed
objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have
purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time,
thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community;
otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of
long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into
his hands and seize the same by force and violence. And since the law discourages
continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities
or details of procedure which may cause unnecessary delays should accordingly
and carefully be avoided.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as stated
above, ejectment cases must be resolved with great dispatch.
Moreover,
petitioner's intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a complete
adjudication of her rights. The issue
raised by petitioner is mainly that of ownership, claiming that the property in
dispute was registered and titled in the name of respondents through the use of
fraud. Such issue cannot even be
properly threshed out in an action for ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides
that “[t]he judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall
be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building. x x x” In Malison v. Court of Appeals,[25]
the Court held thus:
Verily, in ejectment cases, the word “possession”
means nothing more than actual physical possession, not legal possession, in
the sense contemplated in civil law. The
only issue in such cases is who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independently of any claim of ownership
set forth by any of the party-litigants.
It does not even matter if the party's title to the property is
questionable.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, a just and complete determination of
petitioner's rights could actually be had in the action for annulment,
revocation and reconveyance of title that she had previously filed, not in the
instant action for ejectment.
It is likewise
for this reason that petitioner is not an indispensable party in the instant
case. The records bear out that the
disputed property is in the possession of Spouses Fernandez. Even petitioner does not allege that she was
in the possession of subject premises prior to or during the commencement of
the ejectment proceedings. Since her
claim of ownership cannot be properly adjudicated in said action, she is,
therefore, not an indispensable party therein.
It is also
misleading for petitioner to say that the earliest opportune time when
petitioner could have intervened was after the CA ordered her to vacate the
subject property in its Decision dated
Verily, allowing
petitioner's intervention at this late stage of the ejectment proceedings would
only cause undue delay without affording petitioner the relief sought since the
issue of ownership cannot be determined with finality in the unlawful detainer
case.
There is also no merit to
petitioner's argument that it was grave abuse of discretion for the CA to
include her in its Decision because she is not a party to the ejectment case,
and neither is she claiming right to possession under the Spouses Fernandez,
but as its alleged rightful owner.
Note that the MeTC,
RTC, and the CA unanimously found that the disputed property is presently
registered under the Torrens System in the name of respondents. The lower courts then concluded that
respondents presented the best proof to establish the right to possess the
same. It should be borne in mind that
unless the case falls under one of the recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27]
factual findings
of the trial court are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court, more so when the CA affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[28] This case does not fall under any of the
exceptions, thus, the factual finding of the lower courts, that the new
registered owners of the subject premises are respondents, must be respected
and upheld by this Court.
In Malison,
the Court emphasized that when property is registered under the Torrens system,
the registered owner's title to the property is presumed legal and cannot be
collaterally attacked, especially in a mere action for unlawful detainer.[29] In this particular action where petitioner's
alleged ownership cannot be established, coupled with the presumption that
respondents' title to the property is legal, then the lower courts are correct
in ruling that respondents are the ones entitled to possession of the subject
premises.
Petitioner's
ownership not having been fully established in this case, she cannot,
therefore, claim that the lower court's decision divesting the Spouses
Fernandez of possession should not apply to her. In Stilgrove v. Sabas,[30] the Court held that:
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession
of a property to another is in personam.
x x x Any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an
opportunity to be heard. However, this
rule admits of the exception, such that even a non-party may be bound by the
judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a)
trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises
with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of
the family, relative or privy of the defendant.[31]
(Emphasis supplied)
Of particular
significance is the fact that in Spouses Fernandez's Answer, they never alleged
that petitioner was in actual possession of the disputed property. In fact, in said Answer, they stated that it
was Delfin Fernandez, Jr. who has continuously occupied the premises since time
immemorial and that petitioner resides in her house in Dasmariñas,
Taking the
foregoing into account, it is clear that petitioner, even though a non-party, is
bound by the judgment because aside from being a relative of or privy to Spouses
Fernandez, she is also acting as their agent when she occupied the property after
the RTC ordered execution pending appeal in order to frustrate the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition
for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 27, 2003 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court and its
Resolution dated September 3, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76336, denying the
petition for clarification and intervention filed by Sofia Aniosa Salandanan, are
AFFIRMED.
Cost against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
diosdado
m. peralta
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief
Justice
* The Court of Appeals is deleted from the title per Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Edgardo F. Sundiam, rollo, pp. 49-57.
[2]
[3] Delfin
Fernandez, Jr. in other pleadings, records, pp. 21, 24, 26.
[4] Records,
pp. 2-6.
[5]
[6] Entitled,
“Sofia Aniosa Salandanan herein represented by Delfin L. Fernandes, Jr. v. Sps.
Bayani and Isabel Mendez and Expedito A. Javier of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila,” records, p. 21.
[7]
[8] Records,
pp. 180-182.
[9]
[10] CA
rollo, pp. 2-27.
[11] CA rollo, pp. 269-270.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Annex
“A” of the Petition, rollo, p. 47.
[17]
[18]
[19] Manalo v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 215, 234 (2001).
[20] Yau v. Manila Banking Corporation, 433 Phil. 701, 714 (2002).
[21] Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. v.
Adao, G.R. No. 158227,
[22] Cayabyab v. Gomez de Aquino,
G.R. No. 159974,
[23] G.R. No. 143331,
[24]
[25] G.R. No. 147776,
[26]
[27] C&S Fishfarm Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 288 (2002).
[28] Malison v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25, at 117.
[29]
[30] A.M.
No. P-06-2257,
[31]
[32] CA rollo, p. 13.