|
JIMMY T.
GO, Petitioner, -versus- THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, ILDEFONSO M. VILLANUEVA, JR., and SHERIFF DIOSCORO F. CAPONPON,
JR. and MULTI-LUCK CORPORATION, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 154623 Present: PUNO,
C.J.,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,** CARPIO,***
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BRION,**** JJ
Promulgated: March
13, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Decision[1]
dated April 30, 2002 and Resolution[2]
dated July 31, 2002, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64473, which
reversed and set aside the November 23, 2000 and December 7, 2000 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 266 which in turn, granted
petitioner’s motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denied
respondents’ motion to dismiss, respectively.
The present controversy stemmed from
the execution of the Decision of RTC, Bacolod City, Branch 45 in a complaint
for collection of a sum of money[3]
docketed as Civil Case No. 98-10404. As
culled from the CA decision and from the pleadings filed by the parties in the
present case, the factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On August 10, 1998, respondent
Multi-Luck Corporation (Multi-Luck) filed a collection suit against Alberto T.
Looyuko (Looyuko) as sole proprietor of Noah’s Ark Merchandising Inc.
(NAMI). The complaint pertained to three
(3) dishonored United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks with an aggregate
amount of P8,985,440.00 issued by Looyuko/NAMI to Mamertha General
Merchandising. These checks were
indorsed to Multi-Luck, who claimed to be a holder in due course of such
checks.
On January 27, 2000, upon
Multi-Luck’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Bacolod RTC rendered a
Decision[4]
ordering Looyuko/NAMI to pay Multi-Luck the value of the three (3) UCPB
checks. Looyuko/NAMI did not file an
appeal. Hence, the Decision became final
and executory.
Upon Multi-Luck’s motion, the Bacolod
RTC issued a writ of execution[5]
over a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-126519 registered in the name of
Looyuko and one share in the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. in
the name of NAMI. The auction sales were
scheduled on November 10, 2000[6]
(for the house and lot) and November 6, 2000 (for the stock certificate),[7]
respectively.
On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed
a complaint for injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction against respondents before the RTC,
Multi-Luck filed a motion to dismiss[9] on
the ground, among others, that the Pasig RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of petitioner’s claim and over the public respondent sheriffs as
well as over Multi-Luck.
In the Order[10]
dated October 30, 2000, the Pasig RTC granted petitioner’s prayer for issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
Thereafter, in the Order[11]
dated November 23, 2000, the Pasig RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining public respondent sheriffs Caponpon, Jr. and Villanueva, Jr. from
holding the public auction.
In the Order[12]
dated December 7, 2000, the Pasig RTC denied respondents’ motion to dismiss.
Multi-Luck moved for the
reconsideration of the November 23, 2000 and December 7, 2000 Orders but both
motions were also denied by the Pasig RTC in separate Orders[13]
both dated February 2, 2001.
Multi-Luck
elevated the case to the CA via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of
restraining order and/or injunction.
As previously stated herein, in the
Decision[14] dated
April 30, 2002, the CA granted Multi-Luck’s petition and reversed the ruling of
the Pasig RTC. The CA ruled that the
November 23, 2000 Order issued by the Pasig RTC interfered with the order of
the Bacolod RTC, which is a co-equal and coordinate court. The CA held that the Pasig RTC gravely abused
its discretion when it granted the injunctive relief prayed for by petitioner
despite the glaring lack of a clear legal right on the part of the latter to
support his cause of action. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its equally
challenged Resolution dated July 31, 2002.
Hence, this present petition for
review on certiorari.
Petitioner theorizes that since he
was a “stranger” to Civil Case No. 98-10404, he should be considered a “third
party claimant” pursuant to Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.[15] Corollarily, whatever judgment or decision
rendered in the Civil Case No. 98-10404 did not bind him or his
properties. Petitioner adds that as a
co-owner of all properties and monies belonging to Looyuko/NAMI, he was unduly
prejudiced by the Decision in Civil Case No. 98-10404. Petitioner insists that he should have been
impleaded in Civil Case No. 98-10404 so that there could be a final determination
of the action as to him. He argues that
the principle on “non-intervention of co-equal courts” does not apply where, as
here, a third party claimant is involved.
We
are not persuaded.
We
have time and again reiterated the doctrine that no court has the power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by
injunction.[16] This doctrine of non-interference is premised
on the principle that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not
be opened, modified or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.[17] As correctly ratiocinated by the CA, cases
wherein an execution order has been issued, are still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit.[18] Since the Bacolod RTC had already acquired
jurisdiction over the collection suit (Civil Case No. 98-10404) and rendered
judgment in relation thereto, it retained jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other coordinate courts over its judgment, including all incidents relative to
the control and conduct of its ministerial officers, namely public respondent sheriffs. Thus, the issuance by the Pasig RTC of the
writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 68125 was a clear act of
interference with the judgment of Bacolod RTC in Civil Case No. 98-10404.
The
jurisprudential “exception” adverted to by petitioner, i.e.
To
reiterate, a case, in which an execution order has
been issued, is still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are
still proceedings in the suit.[19]
Hence,
any questions that may be raised regarding the subject matter of Civil Case No.
98-10404 or the execution of the decision in said case is properly threshed out
by the Bacolod RTC.
As
to petitioner’s argument that he was unduly prejudiced by the Decision in Civil
Case No. 98-10404 as a co-owner of all properties and monies belonging to
Looyuko/NAMI, the Court finds the same to be without basis.
Section 3, Rule 58
of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance
of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it
is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Pursuant
to the above provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for
judicial protection must be shown. Injunction
is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights;
it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never
arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual
right.[20] There must be a patent showing by the
complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.[21]
The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some
of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated. Thus, to be entitled to an
injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following
requisites:
(1)
a right in esse or
a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2)
a violation of that right;
(3)
that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[22]
To
bolster his claim of interest on the attached properties, petitioner presented
the Agreement dated February 9, 1982,[23]
which provides in part:
2. That while on record the aforementioned
business ventures (companies) are registered in the name of the FIRST PARTY,
the founder and who initially provided the necessary capital for the very first
business venture which they have established, the management expertise and
actual operation thereof are provided by the SECOND PARTY who by mutual consent
and agreement by the parties themselves, is entitled to ½ or 50% of the
business, goodwill, profits, real and personal properties owned by the
companies now existing as well as those that will be organized in the future,
bank deposits, (savings and current) money market placements, stocks, time
deposits inventories and such other properties of various forms and kinds. It is, however, clearly and explicitly
understood that the foregoing do not include the individual properties of the
parties.
3.
That for official record purposes and for convenience, the aforesaid
business ventures will remain registered in the name of the FIRST PARTY until
the parties decide otherwise.
Petitioner further claimed that the
February 9, 1982 Agreement was complimented by another Agreement dated October
10, 1986,[24] viz:
WHEREAS, the above-named parties, have equally pooled their talents,
expertise and financial resources in forming NOAH’S
-
Noah's
-
Noah’s
Sugar Carriers
-
Noah’s
Ark Sugar Truckers
-
Noah’s
Ark Sugar Repackers
-
Noah’s
Ark Sugar Insurers
-
Noah’s
Ark Sugar Terminal
-
Noah’s
-
Noah’s
Ark Sugar Refinery (including the plant/buildings/machinery situated in the
compound including the land on which the refinery is situated)
and which business enterprise are otherwise
collectively known as the NOAH’S ARK GROUP OF COMPANIES.
WHEREAS, the above-enumerated
business firms are all registered in the name of ALBERTO T. LOOYUKO only as
Proprietor for purposes of expediency;
xxx xxx
xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, and in consideration of the above premises, the parties
hereby agree as follows:
1.
That the
profits and losses of any of the above firms shall be equally
apportioned between the two parties;
2. In
case of the dissolution of any of the above firms, or in the event of
destruction of [sic] loss of any property of the above firm, all the assets
thereof, including the insurance proceeds in the event of total/partial
destruction shall likewise be divided EQUALLY between the parties;
xxx xxx xxx
However,
the Court notes that the authenticity and the due execution of these documents
are presently under litigation in other proceedings which are not pending
before the Pasig RTC. There appears to
be a pending case, wherein Looyuko claims that his signatures on these
Agreements were a forgery.[25]
Moreover,
as correctly observed by the CA, NAMI had already been in existence as early as
the middle part of the 1970’s. It is
undeniable that for a little more than two (2) decades pending the advent of
the present controversy, NAMI has been doing business as a registered single
proprietorship with Looyuko as single proprietor. On this score, we quote the following
discussion of the CA:
At this juncture, this Court notes that even assuming the validity of
the foregoing partnership agreements, for all legal intents and purposes and in
terms of binding effect against third persons, the Noah’s Ark Merchandising is a registered single
proprietorship. Corollarily, third
persons dealing with the said business, including Multi-Luck, had the right to
rely on the fact that the registered single proprietor thereof, in the person
of Alberto Looyuko, may be held personally liable for any and all liabilities
of the single proprietorship and vice-versa.
Moreover, this Court finds it very unlikely that for more than
twenty-years of the existence of the business, and considering Private
Respondent’s purported personal interest in the business, he would risk
allowing third persons to deal with and consequently have the business liable
as a single proprietorship when Private Respondent, assuming a valid
partnership indeed existed, could have easily compelled Alberto Looyuko to
cause the registration of the business as a partnership to afford legitimate
protection to Private Respondent’s property interests therein as a partner
thereof. In any event, Private
Respondent is now estopped from disavowing the standing of Noah’s Ark Merchandising as a registered single proprietorship and
from claiming that the properties in question belong to a purported
partnership. xxx xxx xxx
Proceeding from the foregoing disquisition, it was proper for
Multi-Luck to have not impleaded Private Respondent in Civil Case No. 98-10404
considering that only Alberto Looyuko was being made liable being the single
proprietor of Noah’s Ark Merchandising.
Corollarily, there can be no question on the propriety of
Petitioners-Sheriffs authority to sell at public auction the subject properties
which were owned by and registered in the name of Noah’s Ark Merchandising
and/or Alberto Looyuko which, therefore, negates the existence of a clear right
in favor of Private Respondent which would merit the protection of the courts
through the writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondent Court, therefore, gravely abused its discretion in granting
Private Respondent the injunctive relief sought for in the face of overwhelming
evidence of lack of a clear legal right on the part of Private Respondent to
support its cause of action. Jurisprudentially
settled is the rule that:
It is always a ground for denying injunction
that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought – in other words, that he shows no
equity. Want of equity on the part of
the plaintiff in attempting to use the injunctive process of the court to
enforce a mere barren right will justify the court in refusing the relief even
though the defendant has little equity on his side. The complainant’s right or title, moreover,
must be clear and unquestioned, for equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance
of suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by injunction
where the complainant’s title or right is doubtful or disputed. He must stand on the strength of his own
right or title, rather than on the weakness of that claimed by his
adversary. (Heirs of Joaquin Asuncion versus
Margarito Gervacio, Jr., G.R. No. 115741, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 322,
330.)
At best, Private Respondent may file the
proper action to enforce his rights, as against Alberto Looyuko, in the
purported partnership. The institution
of the instant injunction suit, however, is definitely not the proper forum.
The
attached real properties are registered solely in the name of Looyuko and
NAMI. Corollarily, petitioner had no
standing to question the Bacolod RTC’s judgment as he is a stranger to Civil
Case No. 98-10404 and he has no clear right or interest in the attached
property. Likewise, the stock
certificate is registered in the name of NAMI.
Moreover, the checks subject of Civil Case No. 98-10404 were made in
payment for obligations incurred by Looyuko in the course of the business
operation of NAMI. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that indeed, petitioner co-owns NAMI, whatever obligation the
business incurred in the course of its operation is an obligation of petitioner
as a part owner. In effect, petitioner
was merely forestalling the implementation of a final judgment against the
corporation which he purportedly co-owns.
On
the issue of estoppel, the CA ruled that petitioner was estopped from claiming
that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. Petitioner would argue that on
June 6, 1998, he had caused the annotation of an “Affidavit of Adverse Claim”[26]
over the attached real property covered by TCT No. 126519. According to him, in
so doing, the whole world, including respondents, was informed of his being a
co-owner thereof. However, the
annotation of petitioner’s adverse claim is not notice to third parties dealing
with the property that he is in fact a co-owner, only that he claims to be a co-owner and intends to
file the appropriate action to confirm his right as such. Under Section 70 of
P.D. 1529, petitioner’s adverse claim was effective for thirty days from its
registration. Yet, from the records, it
does not appear that petitioner filed an appropriate action with respect to his
adverse claim prior to the attachment of the properties on execution. Thus, Looyuko and/or NAMI remained the sole
owners of the subject properties at the time the Bacolod RTC ordered their sale
on execution.
To recapitulate, once a decision
becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the presiding judge
to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent events
would render execution of the judgment unjust.[27] The present case does not fall within the
recognized exceptions. In Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[28]
we declared that a court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution
proceedings in another court with concurrent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 30, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 31, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64473 are AFFIRMED.
Cost against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice Acting
Chairperson |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* On official leave
** Additional member in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as per Special Order No. 584.
*** Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 583.
**** Additional member as per Special Order No. 570.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera (ret.) and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (ret.) and Sergio L. Pestaño (ret.), rollo, pp. 48-61.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp.65-69.
[4] Id. at 79-82.
[5] Id. at 83-84.
[6] Id. at 86-87.
[7] Id. at 85.
[8] Rollo, pp. 194-200.
[9] Id. at 212-220.
[10] Id. at 202-203.
[11] Id. at 221-223.
[12] CA rollo, pp. 33-37.
[13]
[14] Supra note 1.
[15] SEC. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by
third person. - If the property levied on is claimed by any
person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an
affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the
levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the
officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the
same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action
therefor is filed within one hundred twenty days (120) days from the date of
the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the
taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is
filed. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the
property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming
damages in the same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who
filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. xxx xxx xxx
[16] Aquino, Sr. v. Valenciano, A.M. No. MTJ-93-746, December 27, 1994, 239 SCRA 428, 429; Prudential Bank v. Gapultos, G.R. No. L-41835 and Prudential Bank v. Leopoldo M. Serrano and Paquito Fuentes, G.R. No. L-49293, January 19, 1990, 181 SCRA 159, 171; Investors Finance Corporation v. Ebarle, G.R. No. L-70640, June 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 60, 70.
[17] Philippine National Bank v. Pineda, G.R. No. 46658, May 13, 1991, 197 SCRA 1, 12.
[18] David v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 115821, October 13, 1999, 316 SCRA 710, 719, citing Balais v. Velasco, G.R. 118491, January 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 707, 708.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Republic of the
[21] Government
Service Insurance System v. Florendo, G.R. No. 48603, September 29, 1989,
178 SCRA 76, 83-84; National Power
Corporation v. Vera, G.R. No. 83558, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 721, 727.
[22] Limitless
Potentials, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Crisostomo Yalung and Atty. Roy
Manuel Villasor, G.R. No. 166459, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 70, 83, citing Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 140228, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 150, 159.
[23] Annex “C,” RTC records, pp. 16-18.
[24] Annex “D”, RTC records, pp. 19-21.
[25] DOJ Resolution dated September 17, 2001, CA rollo, pp. 271-280.
[26] Annex “F”, RTC records, 23-24.
[27]
Leticia T.
Fideldia and
[28] G.R. No. L-71365, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 161.