THIRD DIVISION
|
ANGELINE CATORES, Petitioner, - versus - MARY D. AFIDCHAO, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 151240
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: March 31,
2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision,[2] dated
October 23, 2000, which affirmed the Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
The
facts as narrated by the CA are as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee, Mary D. Afidchao [respondent],
is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 8,383 sq. meters
situated in Residence Section “J,” Sto. Tomas, Barangay Dontogan,
Immediately
thereafter, plaintiff-appellee declared the aforesaid property for tax purposes
in her name under Tax Declaration No. 23347 and paid religiously the realty
taxes thereon.
Sometime
in June 1984, defendant-appellant, Angeline Catores [petitioner], occupied and
entered a portion of the subject property by building her house thereon and
making improvements therein such as levellings, riprapping, planting trees,
fencing, etc. Thus, on August 2, 1984,
plaintiff-appellee filed a case for Forcible Entry against defendant-appellant
with the Municipal Trial Court [MTC] of
The
verification and relocation survey conducted by the Office of the Bureau of
Lands of Baguio City pursuant to the aforementioned Order dated January 7, 1985
confirmed the allegation of plaintiff-appellee that defendant-appellant
encroached on the former’s titled property by constructing a house with a
calculated size of 8’ x 10’ and by destroying some of the stonewallings within
the subject property. Hence,
plaintiff-appellee required defendant-appellant to vacate the portion illegally
occupied and to remove the improvements made thereon, which the latter refused.
Consequently,
on August 13, 1985, plaintiff-appellee
filed a complaint for Accion Publiciana
against defendant-appellant.
In
her Answer, defendant-appellant raised the defenses inter alia that she has been in possession of the land in question
as early as 1977; that the land in question is not within the property of
anybody, including the plaintiff-appellee; and that her possession of the land
in question is with color of title.[4]
The RTC's Ruling
On
June 6, 1990, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, giving great weight to the
findings of Mr. Edilberto R. Quiaoit (Quiaoit), head of the survey team of the
Bureau of Lands, who conducted the relocation verification survey of the
subject property. Further, the RTC said that these findings of Quiaoit were
corroborated by the geodetic engineer, Venancio Figueres[5]
(Engr. Figueres), who conducted the subdivision survey of the subject property
for respondent in December 1977. Hence, the trial court declared that these
findings ought to prevail over those of geodetic engineer Jose Fernandez (Engr.
Fernandez), petitioner's expert witness. The RTC also ratiocinated that as
between respondent who had a title and a tax declaration over the subject
property, who paid the taxes due thereon, and acquired the same by purchase from
the original registered landowners, and petitioner who had no title or tax
declaration, and was not shown to have acquired any title from the Sunrise
Village Association, preponderance of evidence was in favor of respondent.
Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff Mary Afidchao and against
defendant Angeline Catores, as follows:
1. Declaring the land in question
consisting of about 2,138 sq. meters located at Residence Section J, Sto.
Tomas, Barangay Dontogan, Baguio City, occupied by defendant Angeline Catores
as part of the land owned by plaintiff Mary Afidchao covered by
TCT 27839 and therefore plaintiff has a better right to possess the same
as the owner of the land is entitled to the possession hereof as a consequence
of her ownership;
2. Declaring that the house, the
levellings, plants, trees, fence, garden, riprapping and other improvements of
defendant Angeline Catores on the land in question are inside the titled
land of plaintiff Mary Afidchao covered by TCT 27839 and therefore defendant
must vacate the premises of the land in question and restore
possession thereof to plaintiff and remove her house and other structures
provided the same can be done without damage to the plaintiff’s titled land
within 30 days from the time this Judgment becomes final and executory;
3. Ordering defendant Angeline Catores to
cease and desist from further disturbing the ownership and possession of
plaintiff of the land in question which is part of plaintiff’s titled land
covered by TCT 27839 described in paragraph 2 of the Complaint.
4. Dismissing the claim for Exemplary
damages, Attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of plaintiff there being no
gross and evident bad faith shown on the part of defendant Angeline Catores;
5. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant
Angeline Catores for Moral damages, Attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for
lack of merit; and
6. Ordering defendant Angeline Catores to
pay the costs of the suit.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7]
which was, however, denied by the RTC because the matters treated therein had
been fully considered, discussed and resolved in the RTC decision and the RTC
found no cogent reason to change or disturb the same.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.[9]
After
both parties had filed their respective briefs, on July 18, 1992, petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for New Trial and/or Reception of New Evidence[10]
before the CA claiming that these pieces of newly discovered evidence could not
have been discovered and produced before the RTC. Petitioner alleged that she
did not get any cooperation from the Bureau of Lands-Baguio City. Respondent filed her Opposition[11]
thereto, arguing that the pieces of evidence sought to be introduced were not,
at all, newly discovered evidence for they were the same pieces of evidence
submitted before the RTC. Moreover, respondent opined that the Motion was filed
out of time because it should had been filed after judgment by the trial court but
before the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, and not after the
appealed case had already been submitted for resolution. Finding merit in respondent's Opposition,
the CA denied petitioner's Motion.[12]
The CA's Ruling
On
October 23, 2000, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, holding that:
Admittedly,
there is evidence to support the allegation of discrepancy in the technical
description of the plaintiff-appellee’s title.
But this does not mean that the property covered by the title cannot be
concretely located as to warrant the dismissal of the case. The title is just an evidence of ownership
but it does not vest ownership.
Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that other than the title itself, the
actual location of a given property can still be identified by referring to the
control map of the Bureau of Lands and/or by relocating the same using at least
three existing monuments which are verified to be correct.
The
foregoing may explain why despite the conflicting testimonies of Quiaoit and
Engr. Figueres on whether or not there was a discrepancy in the technical
description of plaintiff-appellee’s title, they still arrived at the same
conclusion – that the questioned lot being occupied by defendant-appellant is
within the property of plaintiff-appellee.
Quiaoit used both the control map of the Bureau of Lands and the
existing monuments in making his findings, while Engr. Figueres, though he
relied on the plaintiff-appellee’s title, still made use of the existing
monuments. Thus, plaintiff-appellee was
able to concretely identify her property and accordingly proved that the
questioned lot being occupied by defendant-appellant is within her
property. The testimony of
defendant-appellant’s witness, Medino Balusdan, that the questioned lot being
occupied by defendant-appellant is within the land owned by one Balinsat from
whom, indisputably, plaintiff-appellee acquired the subject property,
corroborates the said findings.
What
further wreck havoc in the case of defendant-appellant are the admissions on
cross-examination of her expert witness, Engr. Fernandez, that the subject
properties adjoin each other thereby recanting his earlier testimony to the
contrary; that he failed to conduct an ocular inspection on the subject
properties and that he likewise failed to take into account the actual location
of the monuments in formulating his findings.[13]
The
CA likewise referred to the Report[14]
of the ocular inspection of the subject property conducted on February 16,
1990, made by Atty. Ma. Clarita C. Tabin, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC
(Clerk of Court), in support of the CA’s finding that indeed petitioner
encroached into the property of respondent.
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15]
which the CA denied in its Resolution[16]
dated December 19, 2001 for lack of merit.
Hence,
this Petition raising the following grounds:
A.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN BASING ITS DECISION IN
FAVOR OF AFIDCHAO ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE TITLE IS JUST AN EVIDENCE OF
OWNERSHIP BUT DOES NOT VEST OWNERSHIP, WHICH PRINCIPLE IS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT TO
THE CONTROVERSY.
B.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF
AFIDCHAO, DESPITE THE FATAL DEFECT IN THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF AFIDCHAO'S
C.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT TITLED
PROPERTY CAN STILL BE IDENTIFIED BY MEANS OTHER THAN THE DEFECTIVE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION THEREOF.
D.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT AFIDCHAO'S
PROPERTY WAS IDENTIFIED BY REFERRING TO A SUPPOSED CONTROL MAP OF THE BUREAU OF
LANDS, WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS NOT INTRODUCED AS EVIDENCE IN THE CASE.
E.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR [OF] LAW IN HOLDING THAT AFIDCHAO'S
PROPERTY WAS IDENTIFIED BY WAY OF RELOCATION BASED ON THREE (3) EXISTING
MONUMENTS THE INTEGRITY OF WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS ADMITTEDLY NEGATED.
F.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT AFIDCHAO'S
PROPERTY WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT IN A
SUPPOSED REPORT THAT WAS NOT EVEN MENTIONED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS DECISION.
G.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN FOCUSING AND RELYING ON
SUPPOSED WEAKNESSES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF CATORES' WITNESSES, THEREBY
CONTRADICTING THE DOCTRINAL RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN MISA VS. COURT OF
APPEALS (212 SCRA 217) TO THE EFFECT THAT A PLAINTIFF WHO SEEKS TO RECOVER
PROPERTY MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS TITLE AND NOT ON THE SUPPOSED
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM.
H.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF
AFIDCHAO ON THE BASIS OF SUPPOSED BUT NON-EXISTENT WEAKNESS IN THE EVIDENCE OF
CATORES.
I.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN CLOSING ITS EYES TO THE
NEWLY-DISCOVERED [PIECES OF] EVIDENCE OF CATORES WHICH FURTHER STRENGTHEN HER
POSITION THAT HER LOT IS NOT WITHIN THE LAND OF AFIDCHAO.
J.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN AFFIRMING INSTEAD OF
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, ON THE BASIS OF THE AFORESTATED
REVERSIBLE ERRORS OF LAW.[17]
Petitioner
asseverates that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence, not only of
ownership of the land referred to but also of the land’s location, metes and
bounds; that per testimony of Quiaoit, there was a discrepancy in the tie line
as appearing in the technical description of respondent's title; that such
discrepancy would mean the failure to locate respondent's property with
precision and exactitude, fatal to the identification of the property, and
consequently, to respondent's cause; that in foreign jurisdictions, the
certificate of title does not vest in the registered owner the title over the
property in respect to which a wrong description was made; and that respondent
should have first filed the proper application and/or petition for the
administrative and/or judicial correction of the erroneous tie line. Petitioner
claims that the survey and sketch plans made by Quiaoit were worthless, as the
latter was not a geodetic engineer and he did not use the Original Plan Psu
184580 of Nellie Balinsat (Balinsat) which was not presented before the RTC.
Rather, he used the Projection Map of the Bureau of Lands-Baguio City which did
not show the tie points and tie lines of all properties in
For
her part, respondent argues that the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed
by the CA, must be accorded respect and great weight; that respondent
concretely established that the subject property was well within her titled
property; that petitioner merely quoted portions of the testimonies of
witnesses to suit her claims and utterly disregarded the whole substance of
said testimonies; that the entire testimony of Quiaoit revealed that, while
there was an error in the tie line as appearing in the technical description of
respondent's title, the area occupied by petitioner was within the property of respondent; that such factual
finding was corroborated by Engr. Figueres' testimony; that petitioner herself
and her witnesses, in their respective testimonies, established said finding
because the names of the owners of the adjoining properties, as testified to by
petitioner herself, tallied with the names of the owners of the adjoining
properties of respondent's titled property; that petitioner's witness Medino
Balusdan pointed out that the area claimed and occupied by petitioner was
between the lot claimed by one R. Villena and Balinsat; and that petitioner did
not dispute the fact that respondent acquired the subject property from the
late Balinsat, hence, the area testified to by petitioner's witness was
actually respondent's property. Respondent adds that the testimonies of Quiaoit
and Engr. Figueres were confirmed during
the ocular inspection conducted by the RTC, with the Clerk of Court as hearing
officer. Respondent concludes that the subject property occupied and claimed by
petitioner was well within the titled property of respondent by preponderance
of evidence. While respondent reiterates her prayer before the RTC for the
payment of damages, she prays for the denial of the instant Petition.[21]
Our Ruling
The
instant Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner's
reliance on Lorenzana and Misa is unavailing inasmuch as the facts
therein are not similar to the facts in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the actions filed in Lorenzana and Misa were for quieting of
title, while here it is for accion publiciana. In Lorenzana,
petitioners prayed that their error-filled titles should be adjudged superior
to the regularly issued titles of the private respondents. On the other hand, Misa
involved unregistered properties which were partitioned but, due to lack of
evidence, were not particularly identified. Conversely, the subject property in
this case is covered by TCT No. T-27839 issued in the name of respondent. To
highlight the disparity, petitioner is not even a holder of any title over the
subject property as duly observed by the RTC.
Verily,
as enunciated in Lorenzana[22]
and Misa,[23] it may
be reiterated that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, our jurisdiction over cases brought to us from the CA is limited to
reviewing and correcting errors of law committed by said court. This Court is
not a trier of facts. Thus, it is not our function to review factual issues and
to examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties. We are not bound to analyze
and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.[24]
Necessarily, the jurisprudential doctrine that findings of the CA are
conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when they coincide with
the factual findings of the trial court must remain undisturbed.[25]
In
this case, it is evident that petitioner asks this Court to undertake the
re-examination and re-evaluation of the pieces of evidence presented before the
courts below, and reverse the uniform factual findings of both the RTC and the CA
in favor of respondent. However, we can
do so only in any of the following instances:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record[26]
and petitioner has failed to show
that this case falls within any of the aforementioned exceptions.
Notwithstanding
the apparently numerous issues raised by petitioner, the ultimate question is
simply: Did petitioner encroach on the subject property covered by respondent’s
title?
The
petitioner posits that the resolution of the issue will involve the
alteration, correction or modification of TCT No. T-27839 issued in
the name of respondent. However, the rectification of the title may be made
only through a proper action filed for that purpose. It should be borne in mind
that Section 48, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, provides that "a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.” It cannot be
altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding filed in
accordance with law. This was our pronouncement in De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation,[27]
and in Caraan v. Court of Appeals,[28] we defined a collateral attack in
this wise:
When is an action an attack on a title? It is
when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus
challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an
attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[29]
In
the action for recovery filed by respondent in the trial court, petitioner's
Answer[30]
did not directly impugn the validity of respondent's title. Rather, she alleged that the area which she
occupied was not within the titled property of respondent. Thus, her petition in the instant case is
replete with claims of errors in the technical description as appearing in the
title of respondent and even in that of her predecessors-in-interest. However,
these allegations constitute a collateral attack against respondent’s title,
which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana. In sum, the defenses
and grounds raised by petitioner ascribe errors in respondent's title that
would require a review of the registration decree made in respondent's favor.[31] Unfortunately
for the petitioner, we cannot do so in the present action which is simply for recovery
of possession.
What
we said in De Pedro and Caraan, citing Ybañez v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[32] is
squarely in point:
It
was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of
Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an
ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by the registered owner
of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order
of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the
investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land
Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a
collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of
the
Moreover,
the CA did not err when it partially relied on the Report of the Clerk of Court,
the duly appointed hearing officer for the ocular inspection by virtue of RTC
Order[34]
dated November 10, 1989, upon agreement of all the parties. Petitioner did not
interpose any objection to such appointment nor to the conduct of the inspection,
as it is on record that petitioner's counsel participated in said inspection.[35]
When the Clerk of Court made her observation that the boundaries pointed to by
petitioner were within the area of respondent’s property, petitioner's counsel
did not object to such observation.[36]
The RTC's failure to mention the Report in its Decision is of no moment. When
petitioner appealed to the CA, the appealed case was thereby thrown wide open
for review by the CA. Given this power,
the CA has the authority to either affirm, reverse or modify the appealed
decision of the trial court,[37] because,
unlike this Court, the CA has the power to review factual matters. The Report forms
part of the records of this case which must have been taken into consideration
by the CA in its resolution of the case filed before it.
As
the registered owner is entitled to the possession of the property from the
time the title thereof was issued in her favor,[38]
and preponderance of evidence being in favor of respondent, there can be no
other conclusion but that respondent should be placed in possession thereof.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the assailed
Decision.
WHEREFORE,
the instant Petition is DENIED. This is without prejudice to
the filing by petitioner of the appropriate action before the proper forum for
the correction of what she claims are errors in the certificate of title. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 602 dated March 20, 2009.
[1] Dated January 17, 2002; rollo, pp. 3-37.
[2] Particularly docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29528; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 127-136.
[3] Particularly docketed as Civil Case No. 640-R; rollo, pp. 66-75.
[4] Rollo, pp. 128-130. (Citations omitted.)
[5] Also referred to as Venancio Figuerres in other pleadings and documents.
[6] Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[7] Records, pp. 216-219.
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo, pp. 119-125.
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 132-133. (Citations omitted.)
[14] Records, pp. 194-195.
[15] CA rollo, pp. 225-246.
[16]
[17] Supra note 1, at 17-19.
[18] G.R. No. 105027, April 22, 1994, 231 SCRA 713.
[19] G.R. No. 97291, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 217.
[20] Petitioner's Memorandum dated July 18, 2007; rollo, pp. 233-283.
[21] Respondent's Memorandum dated July 30, 2007; rollo, pp. 347-360.
[22] Supra note 18, at 722.
[23] Supra note 19, at 221.
[24] Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 123346, 134385, and 148767, November 29,
2005, 476 SCRA 305, 334-335, citing Asia Trust Development Bank v. Concepts
Trading Corporation, 404 SCRA 449 (2003); Omandam v. Court of Appeals,
349 SCRA 483 (2001).
[25] Valdez v. Reyes, G.R. No. 152251, August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 212, 215, citing Development Bank of the Philippines v. Perez, 442 SCRA 238 (2004); Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, 436 SCRA 213 (2004); Pleyto v. Lomboy, 432 SCRA 329 (2004); Mindanao State University v. Roblett Industrial & Construction Corp., 431 SCRA 458 (2004).
[26] Sps.
Casimiro v. Court of Appeals, 433
Phil. 219, 224-225 (2002).
[27] G.R.
No. 158002, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 564, 575.
[28] G.R.
No. 140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543.
[29] Caraan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 549, citing Mallilin, Jr. v. Castillo, 389 Phil. 153 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)
[30] Records, pp. 16-17.
[31] Mallilin,
Jr. v. Castillo, supra note 28, at
165.
[32] G.R. No. 68291, March 6, 1991, 194 SCRA 743.
[33]
[34] Records, p. 181.
[35] TSN, February 16, 1990.
[36]
[37] Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, G.R. No. 131667, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 280, 294-295.
[38] Apostol
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125375, June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 351, 359.