|
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, namely: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo
Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus
Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumala and Freira
Gabatan,
Petitioners, -versus- Hon. Court of Appeals and
Lourdes Evero Pacana, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 150206 Present: PUNO,
C.J.,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,** CARPIO,***
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, and BRION,**** JJ. Promulgated: March
13, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside
in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1]
dated
Subject of the present controversy is
a
In their answer, petitioners denied
that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died
single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother
and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or
their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in
actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and
enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole
world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the
former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a
caretaker. Petitioners added that a
similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Vda. de Gabatan, on
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was
amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan,
Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus
Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot
No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering
the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-P10,000.00
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and P2,000.00
for litigation expenses.
SO
ORDERED.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to
the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered
the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned
decision of the lower court dated
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners’ argument
that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that
respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long
line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the
findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the
Deed of Absolute Sale[5]
executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan,
wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age,
married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale
on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and
the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of
the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that
petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally
recognized Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately
passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the
CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property could not ripen
into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo,
never held the property in the concept of an owner.
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with
this Court via the present recourse
principally contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in
not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower
court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and
surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto
“GABATAN”;
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in
declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto “GABATAN” is the child and sole heir
of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower
court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa
and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The
lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.[7]
Before
proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary
matters.
In general,
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions
of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court
is not a trier of facts.[8]
It is not our function to examine and
evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned
tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[9]
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of
the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.[10]
Moreover, our
rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive
the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed
with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors
in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors
on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11]
In the light
of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of
the case.
The respondent’s
main cause of action in the court a quo
is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property,
Jurisprudence
dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for
recovery of possession and ownership. The
Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.[13]
In the early
case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14]
this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v.
Court of Appeals[15]
where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of
the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which
they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased
to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the
conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such
declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence
of the court in Special Proceedings No.
In
the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino
v. Lourdes Reyes,[16]
the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of
filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a
special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17]
this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an
heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
However,
we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v.
Portugal-Beltran,[18]
where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding
for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs,
to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly,
in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed
by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent
as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the
parties to Civil Case
No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in
these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed
jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We
GRANT the petition.
After
a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and
questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of
sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent,
in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned
her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present
preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.
Under the
Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is
proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth
certificates[19] of
respondent were presented at the RTC.
Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a
purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which
indicated that her mother’s maiden name was “Hermogena Clarito Gabatan.” Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a
certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which
differed from the copy presented by respondent.
Among the differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which
was indicated as “Hermogena Calarito” in the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue,
the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic)
each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of
plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit “A” for the plaintiff
and Exhibit “1” for the defendants. Which
of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial
and requires serious scrutiny. The Court
is of the observation that Exhibit “A” for the plaintiff which is a certified
true copy is in due form and bears the “as is and where is” rule. It has the
impression of the original certificate. The
forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is
Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit “1”, the entries found thereof
(sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mother’s maiden
name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems
to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the
omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the
Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit “A” for the plaintiff is far more
genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[20]
Having carefully examined the
questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted
findings of the trial court. To begin
with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten
document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile.
It uses a form of 1950’s vintage[21]
but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 1[22]
was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases
for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1.
On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of
Exhibit 1 states “Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)” which makes
it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus,
the trial court’s finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was
manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A
except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly
certified on
We cannot subscribe to the trial
court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1
was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the
handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8)
were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms.
Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of
the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses
testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth
records in their respective offices,[23]
and (b) the certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate
is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in
their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought
the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and
respondent’s counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was
eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified
that no other copy of respondent’s birth certificate exists in their records
except the handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the
original of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate found in the records of
the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially
transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de
Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and
brought their respective offices’ copies of respondent’s birth certificate in
compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing
that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and
petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater
probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of
argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a
reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s
filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible
and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain
“Hermogena Clarito Gabatan.” It does not
prove that same “Hermogena Clarito Gabatan” is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting
certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved
the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.[28]
It was absolutely crucial to
respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her
mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to
prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate
that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing
in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should
have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child. Only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present
other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to
Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s
(Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the
RTC. Neither did respondent present any
authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of
her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s
mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of
Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They
were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or
when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at
Juan and Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what
they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving
full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be
said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of
Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related
to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships
within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia
Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30]
this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since
respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondent’s)
husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed
blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of
respondent’s husband. They cannot be
said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of
respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy
of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32]
(Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the
siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot
different from Lot 3095 C-5, “Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan
Gabatan” was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an
affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same statement as a
declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34]
However, the admission of this Deed
of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as
competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’
counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the
same.
Under the best evidence rule, when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence
would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public
record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be
established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports
v. Del Rosario,[37]
we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the
transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no
testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or
whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to
pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped
notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy
and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment
Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the authentication of public
documents, the Rules of Court[38]
provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.[39] The attestation of the certifying officer
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may be.[40]
To begin with, no proof whatsoever
was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or
exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of
Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s
certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the
original. Even worse, Velez was not
presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the
original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful
that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s office is
not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not
have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is
mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court
that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original
or a certified true copy thereof.
Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac
Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested
witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge
of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. She did not even know who secured
a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective
manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose
it was offered, i.e. as proof that
Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as
heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack
of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it
still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena
Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of
respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that
respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to “Hermogena Gabatan”
(respondent’s Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented
by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are
inclined to likewise rule against respondent.
According to respondent’s own testimony,[42] Juan
Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of
Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to quiet
title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena,
if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights
as such. It is only in 1978 that
respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile
her cause of action, i.e. the present
case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death
of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already
old.[46]
We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy
reason. It is precisely because Rita
Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters
litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that
respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and
speedily litigate her claim. As we held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy:
“Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the
vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right
while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.”[47]
All in all, this Court finds that
respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were
the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she
presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate
of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause
of action. If the Court cannot now
affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 52273, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice Acting
Chairperson |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
* On official leave
** Additional member in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as per Special Order No. 584.
*** Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 583.
**** Additional member as per Special Order No. 570.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mario M. Umali (ret.) with Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 16-34.
[2] Rollo, p. 35.
[3] Id. at. 37-47.
[4] Supra, note 3.
[5] Rollo, pp. 309-311.
[6] Rule 130.
Sec. 38. Declaration against
interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.
[7] Rollo, p. 8.
[8] Air
Philippines Corporation v. International Business Aviation Services Phils.,
Inc., G.R. No. 151963,
[9] Junson
v.
[10]
Toriano v. Trieste, G.R.
No. 146937, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 264, 267-268; Madrigal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
142944, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 247, 256.
[11] Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112519, November 14, 1996, 332 Phil. 206, 217.
[12] It is only on appeal that petitioners posit the contention that Juan Gabatan and his siblings were co-owners in equal shares of Lot 3095 C-5 since they allegedly inherited the same from their parents. However, it is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 9, 23). In this instance, petitioners conceded in their answer and other pleadings with the court a quo that the subject property was owned by Juan Gabatan and their claim of ownership was based on their status as heirs of Juan Gabatan.
[13] Heirs of Yaptinchay v. del
Rosario, G.R. No. 124320
[14] G.R. No. L-7644,
[15] 182 SCRA 119, 128 (1990).
[16] G.R. No. 154645, 434 SCRA 260, 274 (2004).
[17] 342 Phil. 302, 313 (1997).
[18] G.R. No. 155555, 467 SCRA 184, 199 (2005).
[19] Record, pp. 251 and 415.
[20] Rollo, p. 44.
[21] The printed notation on the upper left hand
corner of Exhibit A states “Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised on
[22] Exhibit 1 is a certified true copy of
respondent’s birth certificate which was identified by witness Rosita Vidal of
the Local Civil Registrar’s Office, Cagayan de Oro. It is identical in material
respects to Exhibit 8 which was identified by witness Maribeth Cacho of the
National Statistics Office,
[23] TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated
[24] TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated
[25] TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated
[26] Id. at. 6-7.
[27] TSN of Ms. Cacho’s Deposition dated
[28] CA Decision, p. 14; rollo, p. 29.
[29] TSN of Frisco Lawan’s testimony dated December 13, 1990 at p. 8.
[30] Justa Gabatan Nagac was the sister of Juan Gabatan.
[31] TSN of respondent’s testimony dated March 31, 1992 at p. 43.
[32] Supra, at note 5.
[33] RTC Decision at pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 44-45.
[34] CA Decision at pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 29-31.
[35] TSN of the Deposition of Felicisima Nagac Pacana dated July 8, 1992 at pp. 7, 8, 15, 21, 27-28 and 38-39.
[36] Rule 130, Section 3, Rules of Court.
[37] G.R. No. 146586,
[38] Rule 132, Sections 24 and Section 25 of the 1989 Rules of Evidence and the present Rules of Court are similarly worded.
[39] Rule 132, Section 24.
[40] Rule 132, Section 25.
[41] Supra note 35, at p. 28.
[42] Supra note 31, at p. 7.
[43] Id. at 36
[44] Id. at 40; see also rollo, p. 51.
[45] The complaint was filed on March 15, 1989 and the amended complaint was filed on June 20, 1989; Records, at pp. 1 and 38.
[46] Supra note 31, at p. 40.
[47] G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005; 451 SCRA 749.