SAMAHAN
NG MGA MANGGAGAWA G.R. No. 149050
SA HYATT – NUWHRAIN-APL,
Petitioner, Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ*
CORONA,**
- versus - TINGA,
Acting Chairperson.
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR FROILAN
M.
BACUNGAN and HYATT REGENCY Promulgated:
Respondents. March 25, 2009
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Tinga,
J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,[1]
assailing the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60959.
The Resolution[2] dated
The
following factual antecedents are matters of record.
In
1995 and 1996, Mario Dacles and Teodoro
Meanwhile, in April 1998, respondent Hyatt
hired Amelia Dalmacio and Renato Dazo on a casual basis as florist/sales clerk
and helper/driver, respectively. After their contracts expired on
During the Labor Management Committee
Meeting (LMC), petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL
(petitioner union), a legitimate labor organization composed of the
rank-and-file employees of respondent Hyatt, questioned the status as
non-regular employees of Dacles, Valencia, Dalmacio and Dazo (Dacles, et al.).[7]
On
On
Petitioner union and respondent Hyatt
were unable to settle the dispute through the grievance procedure and, thus,
agreed to elevate the issue for voluntary arbitration. The parties selected
Dean Froilan Bacungan as voluntary arbitrator. After the exchange of responsive
pleadings, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On
WHEREFORE, the Voluntary Arbitrator rules that:
1. Mario Dacles and Teodoro
2. As employees of the Hotel, Amelia Dalmacio and Renato
Dazo can not be legally terminated on
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner
union moved for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution dated
In
the assailed Resolution dated
Contrary to Secs. 1, 4 and 6, in relation to Sec. 7,
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner resorted to the
instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of a petition for review;
its payment of the docket fees is short by P10.00; and the petition is
not accompanied by a certified true copy of the motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated January 11, 2000.
If
the action were to be treated as a petition for review, then it was filed out
of time. On
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner
sought reconsideration, arguing that the voluntary arbitrator’s decision was
rendered under Title VII-A of the Labor Code and, therefore, is not covered by
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as provided in Section 2 thereof. On
Hence, the instant petition,
attributing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS
ERROR IN RULING THAT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS AN APPEAL BY PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 AND NOT
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS
ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN
RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[11]
Petitioner union argues that the
proper remedy to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator is a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not an appeal via
a petition for review under Rule 43. Petitioner union’s theory is based on the
following ratiocinations: first, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is
similar to the decisions rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Secretary of Labor and Employment, which become final and executory
after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice, in that the Labor Code
expressly disallows an appeal from their judgment or final order; second,
Section 2 of Rule 43, which exempts judgments or final orders issued under the
Labor Code from an appeal via Rule 43, should apply with equal force to
decisions of labor voluntary arbitrators.
The petition lacks merit.
The question on the proper recourse
to assail a decision of a voluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees,[12]
where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in
line with the procedure outlines in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95
(now embodied in Rule 43
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicial
agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, and consistent with the
original purpose to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of
adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.[13]
Subsequently,
in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[14]
and
The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it
is far from being a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration of the
exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as
provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7902:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees’ Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of
the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Court took into account this exception in Luzon
Development Bank but, nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntary
arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit x x
x[16]
On some occasions, rules of procedure
may be relaxed and on that basis the Court of Appeals could have treated the
petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 43. However, as
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 43. It is
elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is a cause
for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been repeatedly
stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.[17]
In any event, the voluntary
arbitrator did not commit any reversible error in ruling that Dacles and
The Court also affirms the voluntary
arbitrator’s findings that Dalmacio and Dazo were project employees, whose
employment may be terminated only upon the closure of the flower shop. Said
findings are in accord with the conditions of the employment contracts between
respondent Hyatt and the two employees.
Well-settled is the rule that findings
of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are
binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion
or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record.[18]
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*Additional member per Special Order No. 593 in lieu of J. Quisumbing who is on official leave.
**Additional member per Special Order No. 600 in lieu of J. Carpio-Morales who is on official leave.
[1]Rollo, pp. 3-26.
[2]
[16]Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19 at 404-405.