EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN,
JR., G.R. Nos. 148213-17
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus -
QUISUMBING,
J.,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE Chairperson,
SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT CARPIO MORALES,
OF JUSTICE, FELICIANA OLALIA,
TINGA,
PEROLINA ALAY-AY, and
THE VELASCO,
JR., and
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
71,
BRION,
JJ.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
OSCAR E. LEGASPI, G.R. No. 148243
Petitioner,
-
versus -
SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, in his capacity
as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT Promulgated:
OF JUSTICE, FELICIANA C. OLALIA,
PEROLINA ALAY-AY and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, March
13, 2009
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga, J.:
Petitioners face criminal charges in
connection with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando
Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. These consolidated petitions ask us to
consider whether petitioners are immune from prosecution for the Alay-ay/Olalia
slayings by reason of a general grant of amnesty issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos to rebels, insurgents and other persons who had committed crimes in
furtherance of political ends. The Court of Appeals, in its Joint Decision[1] dated
I.
Olalia
and Alay-ay were both found dead with their bodies riddled with bullets on
On
12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana C. Olalia and Perolina G.
Alay-ay filed a letter-complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charging petitioner Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. (Kapunan, Jr.), petitioner Oscar E.
Legaspi (Legaspi), and other officers and men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) for the complex
crime of kidnapping with murder of Alay-ay and Olalia. The affidavits of TSgt. Medardo Barreto
(Barreto) and Eduardo E. Bueno were annexed to the complaint, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 98-025.
Then
Secretary of Justice Serafin R. Cuevas created a panel of investigators[3]
(Panel) who were tasked to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
complaint. Bueno and especially Barreto
provided the crux of the factual allegations against petitioners.
On
In a Resolution[7]
dated 18 March 1998, the Panel recommended the filing of two informations each
for a separate count of murder against Kapunan, Jr., Legaspi, Ricardo Dicon,
Cirilio Almario, Filomeno Crizaldo Maligaya, Edger Sumido, Jose Bacera, Jr.,
Dennis Jabatan, Freddie Sumagaysay, Fernando Casanova, Gene Paris, Gilberto
The Panel rendered the following
findings on the involvement of Kapunan, Jr., and Legaspi in the Olalia/Alay-ay slayings,
thus:
Respondent Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. is alleged to have created the Counter-Intelligence and special project team. He later ordered the transfer of the agents of SOG-OMND to the Operation Control (OPCON) headed by respondent Ricardo Dicon. On that occasion, he ordered Barreto and Sabalza to help Sumido in his surveillance mission on Rolando Olalia. When a news item came about the [sic] Lancer with Plate No. BBB-678, used in the abduction of Olalia and Alay-ay, he called Barreto and Sabalza and [discussed] the matter. He ordered the two (2) to clean-up the mess. Upon the suggestion of Barreto and Sabalza to change the paint of all the vehicles involved, he instructed the Finance Officer, Evelyn Estocapio to extend the needed financial support. Subsequently, in the [sic] small gathering in his office, he admonished the agents involved in [the] Olalia-Alay-ay operation to keep everything secret. In his defense, he denies his presence at the safehouse. Likewise, he claims Barreto did not point to him as the one who gave the orders to respondent Dicon. Similarly, he cannot be considered among those superiors (itaas) of the group because Barreto, Sabalza and Sumido were no longer under him. Also, he claims as grantee of Amnesty pursuant to Proclamation No. 347, it [sic] extinguished his criminal liability.
We find the denial insufficient to prevail over the positive and clear assertions of the witness about his participation (People v. Pasiliao, 215 SCRA 163). The specific acts committed by him before, during and after the Olalia-Alay-ay SOG-OMND operation as pointed out by Barreto are [sic] clear indication of his concurrence to the said operation in pursuance of a common unlawful objective. Hence, it is inescapable for us to conclude that he is a co-conspirator in the offense charged.
Respondent Oscar Legaspi, per allegations of Barreto, was present at the
safehouse when Sumido announced the arrival of Olalia and Alay-ay upon their
abduction. He went to the living room and peered over them up to the moment
they were brought upstairs by Matammu [sic]. Months later, when the
Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was hotly pursued by the authorities for
investigation, he planned the sending abroad of the SOG agents suspected of
being involved in the killing, and gave respondent Almario P80,000.00 to
send Sabalza abroad. In his defense, he did not controvert these points.
Instead, he claims that the offense charged is absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. He being a grantee of amnesty pursuant to Proclamation No. 347, his
criminal liability is extinguished. Thus, his presence at the safehouse, and
the giving of the P80,000.00 to Almario to send Sabalza abroad, are
impliedly admitted by him [sic]. Such act, although apparently appearing
as independent acts from the commission of the offense, are however, suggestive
of concurrence of will in pursuance of the common unlawful objective.
Accordingly, probable cause against him exists as co-conspirator in the
commission of the offense.[9]
The Panel refused to consider petitioners’
defense of amnesty on the ground that documents pertaining to the amnesty
failed to show that the Olalia-Alay-ay murder case was one of the crimes for
which the amnesty was applied for. Moreover, the Panel pointed out that the
criminal liability of therein respondents (herein petitioners) was not
obliterated by the amnesty granted to them.
It was held that the killings were not committed in furtherance of a political
belief because at that time, there was no rebellion yet launched against the
Cory Aquino government. The rebellion
mounted by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) against the government
was made long after the killing.[10]
On 23 April[11]
and
In a letter-resolution[15]
dated
We are in accord with the findings of the Investigating Panel that in this particular case, the grant of amnesty to the respondents concerned, does not extinguish their criminal liability for the Olalia-Alay-ay killings. There is no showing that this case was one of those crimes for which amnesty was applied for and subsequently granted. Logic and reason dictate that amnesty for a particular offense could not have been granted when it was not even applied for. Besides, Proclamation No. 348 (granting amnesty to certain AFP/PNP personnel who may have committed certain acts defined herein) dated March 25, 1994, as amended by Proclamation No. 348 dated May 10, 1994, provides that for amnesty to be granted, the acts or omissions for which it is sought do not constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or robbery of any form (underscoring supplied). Evidently, the Olalia-Alay-ay murder partakes of the nature of extra-legal execution and could not have come within the ambit of the law.
Section 2(a) of Proc. No. 347 provides that amnesty under such Proclamation shall extinguish any criminal liability for acts committed in pursuit of a political belief. However, considering the circumstances and factual backdrop of the instant case, it cannot be assumed or even safely concluded that the Olalia-Alay-ay killing was committed in pursuance of a political belief. At the time of the abduction and killing, there was no rebellion yet launched against the Corazon Aquino government. As aptly found by the Panel, the rebellion mounted by the RAM against the government was made long after the killings.[16]
Kapunan, Jr. and Legaspi moved for
reconsideration[17] but their
motion was denied in another resolution dated
Kapunan, Jr. filed his second
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
52142[18]
while Legaspi brought his first petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52188. In these petitions, they impugned the
In a Joint Decision dated
The Court of Appeals has held that:
x x x a perusal of the Certificate of Amnesty granted in favor of petitioner Kapunan, Jr. x x x and the certification issued in favor of petitioner Legaspi x x x inevitably brings us several questions of facts, to wit: (1) whether or not the murder of Rolando Olalia and Leonor Alay-ay were committed in pursuit of political beliefs; (2) whether or not said crimes of murder were committed for personal ends; and (3) whether or not the murder of victims Olalia and Alay-ay were disclosed in Legaspi’s application because if only “mutiny” was invoked, then it follows that the subject crime of murder is not covered by the amnesty in favor of Legaspi – matters which are not within the province of this Court to determine in the present petitions.
x x x
Both Proclamations [Proclamation Nos. 347 and 348] unequivocally gives the impression that Proclamation No. 347 covers rebels and insurgent returnees and not personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); and, that Proclamation No. 348 applies to all personnel of the AFP and the PNP, such as herein petitioners Kapunan and Legaspi who both hold the rank of Colonel.
x x x
Thus, another set of questions involving both factual and legal issues crop up – (1) whether or not petitioners are rebels/insurgents or personnel of the AFP, a factual issue which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to ascertain in the present petitions for certiorari; and
(2) whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi under Proclamation No. 347 is valid; stated differently, are Kapunan and Legaspi covered by Proclamation No. 347 or No. 348? – a legal issue which is likewise not within the jurisdiction of this Court to determine under the present petitions for certiorari.
The determination of the above issues as to which proclamation covers petitioners is crucial considering that the crimes that are not covered by the amnesty under said Proclamations are different. Under Proclamation No. 347, all persons, more particularly, rebels and insurgents, who committed “crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends” cannot avail of amnesty; while under Proclamation No. 348, all personnel of the AFP and PNP who committed crimes which “constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity, or robbery of any form” are not entitled to amnesty.
Thus, it must be established first by competent evidence whether petitioners are rebels or insurgents covered by Proclamation No. 347 or members of the AFP covered by Proclamation No. 348. If petitioners are rebels or insurgents, then they may invoke the amnesty granted to them under Proclamation No. 347 at any stage of the criminal proceedings before the RTC of Antipolo as earlier discussed in this decision subject to the sound discretion of said court whether or not it will take judicial notice of the amnesty or admit further evidence to satisfy itself that the subject crimes of murder are covered by the amnesty granted to petitioners by the National Amnesty Commission. If petitioners are members of the AFP, then they should have been granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 348 and not under Proclamation No. 347; in which case, it becomes necessary to determine whether or not the subject crimes constitute “acts of torture or extra-legal execution.” If in the affirmative, petitioners could not validly avail of the amnesty under Proclamation No. 348; and in the negative, then we go back to the question, is the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi under Proclamation No. 347 valid or not?
Clearly from the foregoing, Proclamation No. 347 or Proclamation No. 348 could not be applied automatically in favor of petitioners and they are not entitled to instant exoneration from criminal prosecution without first proving in court that the amnesty granted to them is not within the exceptions provided for in the Proclamations.
Furthermore, respondent Secretary of Justice did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in not considering the finding of the Fact-Finding Commission or Davide Commission sufficient to sustain petitioners’ claim that the murders were in pursuit of political beliefs.
x x x
As can be readily gleaned therefrom, the findings were merely referred to as allegations of the NBI and a mere suggestion that the murders of Olalia and Alay-ay “could have been” part of simulated events to effect a tense and unstable atmosphere necessary for a coup d’ etat.
And even if we are to consider the “findings” of the Davide Commission, still another set of questions of fact arises – are petitioners mere loyalists or members of the RAM-HF?; are the murders of Olalia and Alay-ay in pursuit of petitioners’ political beliefs?; are the petitioners covered by Proclamation Nos. 347 or 348? – issues which are ascertainable only after due hearing in the RTC of Antipolo and not this Court in the present petitions for certiorari as herein previously discussed.
Consequently, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice in the absence of a showing that the latter has committed a grave abuse of discretion. (Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 136, 144-145)[21]
x x x
In time, Kapunan and Legaspi moved
for a reconsideration[22]
but their motion was similarly denied by the appellate court in its Resolution[23]
of
On
Kapunan
invokes as grounds for the allowance of this petition the Court of Appeals’
erroneous refusal to: (1) rule on the applicability of amnesty to him; and (2)
the issue of whether the Olalia-Alay-ay double murder was committed in pursuit
of a political belief.[26]
On
On
II.
The main issues raised by Kapunan and
Legaspi may be synthesized into one, that is, whether or not the grant of
amnesty extinguished their criminal liability.
Before we turn to those issues, let us focus briefly on the findings of
probable cause determined by the Investigating Panel and the Secretary of
Justice.
As a rule, the Court considers it
sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of
discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed
offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the
Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause
except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.[30]
Earlier, we restated the rationale
propounded by the Investigating Panel for finding probable cause against
petitioners. They do not possess any inherent flaws that would ring alarm bells.
Moreover, both petitioners do not offer before this Court any argument that
disputes such findings of fact or probable cause offered by the Investigating
Panel or the DOJ. Instead, they squarely focus their arguments on whether the
grant of amnesty to them entitles them to shelter from prosecution for the
Olalia/Alay-ay killings.
III.
Kapunan claims that he is a military
rebel and that he committed crimes in furtherance of a political end. He is no longer connected with the AFP and
has not committed any crime in connection with counter-insurgency
operations. Thus, Proclamation No. 347
and not Proclamation No. 348 should have been used by the Secretary of Justice
in determining whether criminal liability is extinguished by the grant of amnesty.
He further argues that the exclusion of “serious human rights violations, such
as acts of torture and extra-legal executions” from the coverage of amnesty
under Proclamation No. 348 should not be applied to those who have been granted
amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 as it only covers “those crimes against
chastity, and other crimes committed for personal ends.”[31]
Legaspi, on the other hand, assails
the Court of Appeals’ refusal to rule on the factual issue of whether he is
covered by Proclamation Nos. 347 or 348.
He insists that he is a grantee of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 by
virtue of the Certificate of Amnesty issued to him on
A.
Proclamation
Nos. 347 and 348 were issued on the same day,
Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefore and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before thirty (30) days following the publication of this Proclamation in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, in pursuit of political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d’ etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection or coup d’ etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion or insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes) 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War: Provided, that the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes committed for personal ends.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 348, as
amended by Section 1 of Proclamation No. 377, provides:
Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. – Amnesty is hereby granted to all personnel of the AFP and PNP who shall apply therefore and who have or may have committed, as of the date of this Proclamation, acts or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War or other special laws, in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with counter-insurgency operations; Provided, that such acts or omissions do not constitute serious human rights violations, such as acts of torture, extra-legal execution, arson, massacre, rape, other crimes against chastity or robbery of any form; and Provided, That the acts were not committed for personal ends. (Emphasis supplied)
Administrative
Order No. 1-94, as amended, serves as the implementing rules to the two
proclamations.[34] It
provides further clarification as to their respective coverage.
RULE III
Section 1. Persons Who May Apply. ― The following persons may apply for amnesty, whether or not they have been investigated, detained, charged, convicted or have served sentence or escaped imprisonment, or are serving sentence:
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347. ―Any and all rebels, insurgents, or persons who have or may have
committed acts or omissions as defined in Section 2(a) hereunder.
(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. ― Any member of the AFP or PNP who have or may have committed acts or omission as defined in Section 2(b) hereunder.
Section 2. Crimes/Acts Covered. ― The following acts or omissions may be subject to amnesty, whether or not punishable under the Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War, or special laws:
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347. – Crimes committed in pursuit of a political belief on or before
a. Rebellion or insurrection
b.
Coup d’ etat
c. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’ etat
d. Disloyalty of public officers or employees
e. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection
f. Sedition
g. Conspiracy to commit sedition
h. Inciting to sedition
i. Illegal assembly
j. Illegal association
k. Direct assault
l. Indirect assault
m. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person
n. Tumults and other disturbances of public order
o. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances
p. Alarms and scandals
q. Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion or insurrection.
r. Violation of the following Articles of War:
AW 59 (desertion),
AW 62 (absence without leave),
AW 67 (mutiny or sedition)
AW 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition)
AW 94 (various crimes),
AW 96 (conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman)
AW 97 (general article)
(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. ― Crimes/acts committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in
connection with counter-insurgency operations on or before
a. Willfull killing
b. Willful infliction of physical injuries
c. Illegal detention
d. Arbitrary detention
e. Coercion
f. Threats
g. Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives
h. Violation of the following Articles of War:
AW 94 (various crimes),
AW 96 (conduct unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman)
AW 97 (general article)
Section 3. Crimes/Acts Not Covered. ― Amnesty shall not be extended for the crimes committed for personal ends, and the crimes enumerated hereunder:
(a) Under Proclamation No. 347. ―
i. Rape
ii. Other Crimes Against Chastity
(b) Under Proclamation No. 348, as amended. ― Serious human rights violations, including but not limited to:
i. Torture
ii. Extra-legal execution
iii. Arson
iv. Massacre
v. Rape
vi. Other crimes against chastity
vii. Robbery of any form (Emphasis supplied)
The
Court of Appeals alluded to a measure of ambiguity in respect to whether
Proclamation No. 347 also extend to personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines considering that Proclamation No. 348, issued on the same day, does
specifically cover such class of persons. It ultimately concluded that AFP
personnel were not included in Proclamation No. 347, the same including only
“rebels and insurgent returnees” in its ambit.
We note
that on the contrary the text of Proclamation No. 347 is sufficiently clear
that members of the Armed Forces of the
SECTION. 2. Effects. ― x x x
(b) The amnesty herein proclaimed shall not ipso facto result in the reintegration or reinstatement into the
service of former Armed Forces of the
It
appears that the interpretation of the Court of Appeals that military personnel
were not covered under Proclamation No. 347 was derived from the belief that
rebels/insurgents were mutually exclusive with military personnel. There is no
doubting that “rebels” or “insurgents” have acquired a connotative association
with armed insurrectionists who originate outside the forces of the government,
as contradistinguished from members of the AFP who take up arms against the
State. Still, the very text of Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347 extends to
“all persons” who committed the particular acts described in the provision, and
not just “rebels” or “insurgents.” Nothing in the text of the proclamation
excludes military personnel by reason of their association, and indeed as we
pointed out, Section 2(b) makes it evident that they are included.
B.
At the
same time, a close reading of Proclamation No. 347 reveals that it is not a
unilateral grant of amnesty. Section 1 states that it is granted “to all
persons who shall apply therefore.”[35]
Pursuant to Section 4, it is the NAC which is primarily tasked “with receiving
and processing applications for amnesty, and determining whether the applicants
are entitled to amnesty under this Proclamation.”[36]
Pursuant to its functions, it has the power to “promulgate rules and
regulations subject to the approval of the President.”[37]
Final decisions or determinations of the NAC are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
The
extension of amnesty under Proclamation No. 347 takes effect only after the
determination by the National Amnesty Commission as to whether the applicant is
qualified under the terms of the proclamation. To fulfill its mandate, the NAC
is empowered to enact rules and regulations, to summon witnesses and issue
subpoenas. Evidently, the NAC does not just stamp its approval to every
application before it. It possesses the power to determine facts, and
therefrom, to decide whether the applicant is qualified for amnesty. The fact
that the decisions of the NAC are subject to judicial review further supports
the conclusiveness of its findings.
Both
petitioners had duly applied for amnesty with the National Amnesty Commission,
and both had been issued amnesty certificates. However, an examination of these
certificates reveals that the grant of amnesty was not as far-reaching as the
petitioners imply.
Kapunan’s
Certificate of Amnesty states:
This is to certify that
EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR.
was granted AMNESTY for acts constituting Rebellion on
The
amnesty granted to Kapunan extends to acts constituting only one crime,
rebellion. Thus, any inquiry whether he is liable for prosecution in connection
with the Olalia killings will necessarily rely not on the list of acts or
crimes enumerated in Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347, but on the definition
of rebellion and its component acts.
Let us
now examine the Certificate of Amnesty issued in favor of Legaspi.
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the amnesty application (No. A-270) under Proclamation No. 347 of MR. OSCAR E. LEGASPI, filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Metro Manila, was GRANTED by the NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION en banc on 13 November 1995 subject to the qualification that the grant of amnesty shall cover only those offenses which Mr. Legaspi disclosed in his application. In his application, Mr. Legaspi stated that he participated in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts, for which respective acts, he was charged with mutiny before a General Court Martial and Rebellion (which was archived) before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Mr. Legaspi further stated in his application that he went on AWOL in 1987 (Please refer to attached resolution addressed to Mr. Oscar Legaspi, dated 13 January 1995).[38]
The
limited scope of the amnesty granted to Legaspi is even more apparent. At most,
it could only cover offenses connected with his participation in the 1987 and
1989 coup attempts.
IV.
Given
these premises, is there sufficient basis for us to enjoin the prosecution of
petitioners for the slayings of Olalia and Alay-ay?
A.
Let us
first examine the circumstances surrounding Kapunan. On their face, the murders
of Olalia and Alay-ay do not indicate they are components of rebellion. It is
not self-explanatory how the murders of two private citizens could have been
oriented to the aims of rebellion, explained in the Revised Penal Code as “removing
from the allegiance to [the] Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
other armed forces, of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly
or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.”[39]
For
exculpatory context, Kapunan cites the Final Report of the independent
fact-finding commission popularly known as the “Davide Commission”[40]
created by Republic Act No. 6832 (R.A. No. 6832) to “investigate all the facts and
circumstances of the failed coup d'état of December 1989, and recommend
measures to prevent similar attempts at a violent seizure of power.”[41]
The Final Report adverted to a planned coup
d’etat codenamed “God Save the Queen” in November 1986, the same month as
the murders of Olalia and Alay-ay. The Final Report recounted the killings as
well as the resulting nationwide protests in reaction thereto “where labor and
other cause-oriented groups denounced the military as the perpetrators of the
crime.”[42] The Final Report took note of the accusations as to the possible
motive for the military to execute the murders, and the investigation
undertaken by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which allegedly found
evidence to link some RAM officers to the killing. The Final Report stated:
“The argument was made that the timing and brutality of the murders were meant
to create an unstable situation favorable for a coup. Perhaps, it was the
realization that their actions could be exploited by the ultra-right that
radical labor unions and organizations desisted from prolonged massive
demonstrations at that time.”[43]
The
Final Report also concluded that among the possible classifications for
“triggering events” leading to military intervention was “simulated events that
could be created or provoked in order to effect the tense and unstable
atmosphere necessary for a coup.”[44]
Political assassinations, “which the brutal killing of Rolando Olalia could
have been,” were described as “a good example” of such simulated events.[45]
We do
not wish to denigrate from the wisdom of the Davide Commission. However, its
findings cannot be deemed as conclusive and binding on this Court, or any court
for that matter. Nothing in R.A. No. 6832 mandates that the findings of fact or
evaluations of the Davide Commission acquire binding effect or otherwise
countermand the determinative functions of the judiciary. The proper role of
the findings of fact of the Davide Commission in relation to the judicial
system is highlighted by Section 1(c) of R.A. No. 6832, which requires the
Commission to “[t]urn over to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities all evidence
involving any person when in the course of its investigation, the Commission
finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that he appears to be liable
for any criminal offense in connection with said coup d'état.”[46]
Whatever
factual findings or evidence unearthed by the Davide Commission that could form
the basis for prosecutorial action still need be evaluated by the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities to serve as the nucleus of either a criminal
complaint or exculpation therefrom. If a criminal complaint is indeed filed,
the same findings or evidence are still subject to the normal review and
evaluation processes undertaken by the judge, to be assessed in accordance with
our procedural law.
Any
equation between rebellion and the Olalia/Alay-ay killings requires
accompanying context such as that possibly provided by the Final Report. However,
there is no such context that we are able to appreciate and act upon at this
juncture. Assuming that Kapunan, Jr. was intent to invoke the amnesty granted
him in his defense against the charges connected with the Olalia/Alay-ay slays,
it would be incumbent upon him to prove before the courts that the murders were
elemental to his commission or attempted commission of the crime of rebellion,
and not just by way of a general averment, but through detailed evidence.
The same
may be said of the affidavit of Barreto, which made two relevant claims: that
the entire force of the Security Group of the Ministry of Defense was then
actively preparing for the launch of a rumored military exercise akin to the
1986 People Power Revolution;[47]
and that he was told by another respondent, Captain Dicon, that the murder of
Olalia was needed to create an atmosphere of destabilization spurred by the
protest actions of the KMU which the RAM could then use as justification for military
intervention similar to the
first EDSA
revolt.[48]
Based on these claims in Barreto’s affidavit, the Investigating Panel itself
stated in its findings that the killings of Olalia and Alay-ay were undertaken
on the premise “that their death would bring about massive protest action that
will contribute to the destabilization of the Cory Aquino government and
eventually a military take over of the government.”[49]
Barreto’s
affidavit, as integrated in the findings of the Investigating Panel, would have
been extremely favorable to Kapunan had the relevant question been whether the
Olalia/Alay-ay murders were committed in furtherance of a political belief.
However, as we pointed out earlier, such motive under Proclamation No. 347 operates
only to the extent of entitling the criminal to apply for amnesty. The actual
grant of amnesty still depends on the NAC’s determination as to whether the
applicant is indeed entitled to amnesty. In Kapunan’s case, the grant of
amnesty extended to him pertains only to the crime of rebellion.
Kapunan
himself admits before this Court that the November 1986 “God Save the Queen”
coup plot “was pre-empted.”[50] We can take judicial notice that there was no
public uprising or taking up of arms against the Aquino government that took
place in November of 1986, and no serious coup attempt until
contemporaneous with or
immediately after the Olalia/Alay-ay killings calls to question whether there
was a causal connection between the murders and the consummated crime of
rebellion. At the very least, that circumstance dissuades us from concluding
with certainty that the killings were inherent to or absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. Such a matter can be addressed instead through a full–dress trial on
the merits.
B.
What we
said as to Kapunan, Jr. also answers Legaspi’s similar contentions. In the
latter’s case, the grant of amnesty was specifically limited to his
participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts against the Aquino
administration. The murders took place in November 1986. They were supposedly
intended to create an atmosphere that would facilitate an immediate coup d’etat. It is difficult for the
Court to appreciate at this point how the Olalia/Alay-ay killings were
connected with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts, though Legaspi is free to
establish such a connection through a trial on the merits.
The
Court is satisfied that there is prima
facie evidence for the prosecution of the petitioners for the murders of
Rolando Olalia and Leonor Alay-ay. The arguments that petitioners are exempt
from prosecution on account of the grants of amnesty they had received are
ultimately without merit, on account of the specified limitations in the said
grant of amnesty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The
assailed Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
[1]Rollo (G.R. No. 148243), pp. 30-56. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
[34]Rules and Regulations Implementing Proclamation No. 347, Dated March 25, 1994, and Proclamation No. 348, Dated March 25, 1994, as amended by Proclamation No. 377 Dated May 10, 1994.
[40]So-called after its Chairman, then COMELEC Chairman (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr.