THIRD DIVISION
|
HEIRS OF LORETO C.
MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners, - versus - EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN
MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA
ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC
LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 181132
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO,* NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: June 5,
2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This
is a petition[1] for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution[2]
dated January 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 85948,
dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The
case stems from a petition[3]
filed against respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, for
revocation and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or
inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction.
The petition alleged that: (1)
petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto),
while respondents were Loreto’s illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva)
was a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she
is disqualified to receive any proceeds from his insurance policies from
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)[4]
and Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);[5]
(3) the illegitimate children of Loreto—Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie—were
entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus, the
proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha
Angelie were inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be
deprived of their legitimes, which should be satisfied first.
In support of the prayer for TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners alleged, among others, that part of
the insurance proceeds had already been released in favor of P320,000.00 as actual litigation
expenses and attorney’s fees.
In
answer,[6]
Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and
Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that
they filed their claims for the insurance proceeds of the insurance policies;
that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that
it released Odessa’s share as she was of age, but withheld the release of the shares
of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission of letters of
guardianship. Insular alleged that the
complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action insofar as it sought to
declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked
her designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in
Policy No. A001693029; and insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the
shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie, considering that no
settlement of Loreto’s estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of
the heirs been determined. Insular
further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating
the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the
Insurance Code.
In
its own answer[7] with
compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an
insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and
Trisha Angelie were denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a
misrepresentation in his application form that he was born on December 10, 1936
and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in September 2001; that
the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of
Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the designation of
insurance beneficiaries is clear.
As
the whereabouts of Eva,
During
the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the
issues raised in their respective answers be resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners to
comment within 15 days.
In
their comment, petitioners alleged that the issue raised by Insular and
Grepalife was purely legal – whether the complaint itself was proper or not – and
that the designation of a beneficiary is an act of liberality or a donation
and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Articles 752[8]
and 772[9] of
the Civil Code.
In
reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong
exclusively to the designated beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate
or to the heirs of the insured.
Grepalife also reiterated that it had disqualified Eva as a beneficiary
when it ascertained that Loreto was legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan
Maramag.
On
September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads –
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss
incorporated in the answer of defendants Insular Life and Grepalife is granted
with respect to defendants
SO ORDERED.[10]
In
so ruling, the trial court ratiocinated thus –
Art. 2011 of the Civil Code provides that the contract of insurance is governed by the (sic) special laws. Matters not expressly provided for in such special laws shall be regulated by this Code. The principal law on insurance is the Insurance Code, as amended. Only in case of deficiency in the Insurance Code that the Civil Code may be resorted to. (Enriquez v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 41 Phil. 269.)
The Insurance Code, as amended, contains a provision regarding to whom the insurance proceeds shall be paid. It is very clear under Sec. 53 thereof that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. Since the defendants are the ones named as the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the deceased Loreto C. Maramag and there is no showing that herein plaintiffs were also included as beneficiary (sic) therein the insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them. This is because the beneficiary has a vested right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil. [sic] 63).
Neither could the plaintiffs invoked
(sic) the law on donations or the rules on testamentary succession in order to
defeat the right of herein defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a contract of insurance is
not the donee spoken in the law of donation.
The rules on testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the
insurance indemnity does not partake of a donation. As such, the insurance indemnity cannot be
considered as an advance of the inheritance which can be subject to collation
(Del Val v.
“With
the finding of the trial court that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy
belongs exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property,
we agree that the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the
beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and
that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary
and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in
America. We believe that the same
doctrine obtains in these
In [the] light of the above pronouncements, it is very clear that the plaintiffs has (sic) no sufficient cause of action against defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie Maramag for the reduction and/or declaration of inofficiousness of donation as primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) of the late Loreto C. Maramag.
However, herein plaintiffs are not
totally bereft of any cause of action.
One of the named beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the
late Loreto C. Maramag is his concubine Eva Verna De Guzman. Any person who is forbidden from receiving
any donation under Article 739 cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance
policy of the person who cannot make any donation to him, according to said
article (Art. 2012, Civil Code). If a
concubine is made the beneficiary, it is believed that the insurance contract
will still remain valid, but the indemnity must go to the legal heirs and not
to the concubine, for evidently, what is prohibited under Art. 2012 is the
naming of the improper beneficiary. In
such case, the action for the declaration of nullity may be brought by the
spouse of the donor or donee, and the guilt of the donor and donee may be
proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action (Comment of Edgardo L.
Paras, Civil Code of the
Insular[12]
and Grepalife[13] filed
their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the
petition failed to state a cause of action.
Insular further averred that the proceeds were divided among the three
children as the remaining named beneficiaries.
Grepalife, for its part, also alleged that the premiums paid had already
been refunded.
Petitioners,
in their comment, reiterated their earlier arguments and posited that whether
the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action must be
determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, such that
the defenses of Insular and Grepalife would be better threshed out during
trial.
On
June 16, 2005, the trial court issued a Resolution, disposing, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by defendants Grepalife and Insular Life are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the portion of the Resolution of this Court dated 21 September 2004 which ordered the prosecution of the case against defendant Eva Verna De Guzman, Grepalife and Insular Life is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case against them is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In
granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial
court considered the allegations of Insular that Loreto revoked the designation
of Eva in one policy and that Insular disqualified her as a beneficiary in the
other policy such that the entire proceeds would be paid to the illegitimate
children of Loreto with Eva pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance Code. It ruled that it is only in cases where there
are no beneficiaries designated, or when the only designated beneficiary is
disqualified, that the proceeds should be paid to the estate of the insured. As to the claim that the proceeds to be paid
to Loreto’s illegitimate children should be reduced based on the rules on
legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance proceeds is
governed primarily by the Insurance Code, and the provisions of the Civil Code
are irrelevant and inapplicable. With
respect to the Grepalife policy, the trial court noted that Eva was never
designated as a beneficiary, but only
Petitioners
appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the decision of the trial court
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action involved a pure
question of law. The appellate court
also noted that petitioners did not file within the reglementary period a motion
for reconsideration of the trial court’s Resolution, dated September 21, 2004,
dismissing the complaint as against Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie; thus,
the said Resolution had already attained finality.
Hence,
this petition raising the following issues:
a. In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, may the Court consider matters which were not alleged in the Complaint, particularly the defenses put up by the defendants in their Answer?
b. In granting a motion for reconsideration of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, did not the Regional Trial Court engage in the examination and determination of what were the facts and their probative value, or the truth thereof, when it premised the dismissal on allegations of the defendants in their answer – which had not been proven?
c. x x x (A)re the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the concubine?[15]
In essence, petitioners posit that
their petition before the trial court should not have been dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action because the finding that Eva was either
disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance companies or that her
designation was revoked by Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was raised
only in the answers and motions for reconsideration of both Insular and
Grepalife. They argue that for a motion
to dismiss to prosper on that ground, only the allegations in the complaint
should be considered. They further contend
that, even assuming Insular disqualified Eva as a beneficiary, her share should
not have been distributed to her children with Loreto but, instead, awarded to
them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured deceased, in accordance with
law and jurisprudence.
The petition should be denied.
The
grant of the motion to dismiss was based on the trial court’s finding that the
petition failed to state a cause of action, as provided in Rule 16, Section
1(g), of the Rules of Court, which reads –
SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.
A
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.[16] A complaint states a cause of action when it
contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action—(1) the legal right of the
plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.[17]
When a motion to dismiss is premised
on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in
the complaint. The court must resolve
the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests
on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be
true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with
the prayer in the complaint. This is the
general rule.
However, this rule is subject to
well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracity of the allegations if:
1.
the
falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2.
such
allegations are legally impossible;
3.
the
allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4.
by
the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
5.
there
is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties
or in the course of the hearings related to the case.[18]
In this case, it is clear from the
petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the
insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva,
being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from
being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s
children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser
share of the proceeds of the policies. They
also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,[19]
Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former
having brought about the death of Loreto.
Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of
Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate
heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.
It is evident from the face of the
complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of
Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance
contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section
53 of the Insurance Code states—
SECTION 53.
The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless
otherwise specified in the policy.
Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the
only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured,
if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon
the maturation of the policy.[20] The exception to this rule is a situation where
the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not
parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue
and claim from the insurer.[21]
Petitioners are third parties to the
insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to
the proceeds thereof. Accordingly,
respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the
insurance proceeds to petitioners. The
revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as
such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate
children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in
naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured,[22] the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds,
whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under
Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based
on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children,
the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not
designated any beneficiary,[23]
or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
proceeds,[24] that the
insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the
insured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16,
2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA
dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to state a
cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being no findings
of fact in the first place.[25]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales per Special Order No. 646 dated May 15, 2009.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 631 dated April 29, 2009.
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-36.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; id. at 37-52.
[3] Rollo, pp. 59-64.
[4] Two Life Insurance plans with
Policy Nos. A001544070, for the sum of P1,500,000.00; and 1643029, for
the sum of P500,000.00.
[5] Two Pension Plans with Policy Nos.
PTLIG 1000326-0000, with a maturity value of P1,000,000.00; and PTLIG
1000344-0000, with a maturity value of P500,000.00; and a Memorial Plan
with Policy No. M0109-159064-0000 with plan value of P50,000.00.
[6] Cited in the January 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85948; rollo, pp. 40-41.
[7]
[8] ART.
752. The provisions of Article 750
notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than
he may give or receive by will.
ART. 750. The
donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof,
provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for
the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance
of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall
be reduced on petition of any person affected.
[9] ART.
772. Only those who at the time of the
donor’s death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and successors in
interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot
renounce their right during the lifetime of the donor, either by express
declaration, or by consenting to the donation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not
entitled to the legitime and the creditors of the deceased can neither ask for
the reduction nor avail themselves thereof.
[10] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
[17] Bank of America NT&SA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, March 31, 2003, 400 SCRA 156, 167.
[18] Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170; China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409, 412; Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939 (2000); Peltan Dev., Inc. v. CA, 336 Phil. 824 (1997); City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109173, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 175, 182-184; United States of America v. Reyes, G.R. No. 79253, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 192; Santiago v. Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank, No. L-77502, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 100; Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, No. L-55935, July 30, 1986, 143 SCRA 178, 187-189; Tan v. Director of Forestry, No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302, 315.
[19] SECTION 12. The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy shall be forfeited when the beneficiary is the principal, accomplice, or accessory in willfully bringing about the death of the insured; in which event, the nearest relative of the insured shall receive the proceeds of said insurance if not otherwise disqualified.
[20]
[21] Coquila v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., No. L-23276, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 178, 181; Guingon v. Del Monte, No. L-22042, August 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1043.
[22]
[23] Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, No. L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
[24] The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Ebrado, No. L-44059, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 181.
[25]