Republic
of the SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC
OF THE Petitioner, -
versus - IGLESIA
NI CRISTO, Trustee and APPLICANT, with its Executive Minister ERAÑO MANALO as
Corporate Sole, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 180067 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: June
30, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the
Philippines assails the October 11, 2007 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348, which affirmed the April
26, 2005 Decision[2] of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) in Paoay-Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in Land
Registration Case No. 762-C for Application for Registration of Title, entitled
Iglesia Ni Cristo, Trustee and Applicant with its Executive Minister Eraño
Manalo as Corporate Sole v. Republic of the Philippines as oppositor.
The Facts
Subject
of the instant controversy is Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre,
particularly described as follows:
A parcel
of land (Plan Swo-I-001047, L.R.C. Rec. No. ______) situated in the Barrio of
Baramban, Municipality of Currimao, Province of Ilocos Norte, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the SE., along line
1-2 by the
On
The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), entered its
appearance and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Laoag City to appear on
its behalf. It also filed an Opposition
to INC’s application.
The
Ruling of the Cadastral Court
After
the required jurisdictional publication, notification, and posting, hearing
ensued where the INC presented three testimonial witnesses,[7]
the MCTC, acting as cadastral court, rendered its Decision on April 26, 2005,
granting INC’s application. The decretal portion reads:
Wherefore,
the application for registration is hereby granted. Upon finality of this decision, let an Order
be issued directing the Land Registration Authority to register and issue an
Original Certificate of Title to the applicant Iglesia Ni Cristo, as
Corporation Sole, with official address at
SO
ORDERED.
The
cadastral court held that based on documentary and testimonial evidence, the
essential requisites for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over the subject
lot have been complied with.
It
was established during trial that the subject lot formed part of a bigger lot
owned by one Dionisio Sabuco. On
February 23, 1952, Sabuco sold a small portion of the bigger lot to INC which
built a chapel on the lot. Saturnino
Sacayanan, who was born in 1941 and became a member of INC in 1948, testified
to the sale by Sabuco and the erection of the small chapel by INC in 1952. Subsequently, Sabuco sold the bigger lot to
Bernardo Badanguio less the small portion where the INC chapel was built.
Badanguio
in 1954 then declared the entire bigger lot he purchased from Sabuco for tax
purposes and was issued TD 006114.[8] In 1959, Badanguio also sold a small portion of
the bigger lot to INC for which a Deed of Absolute Sale[9]
was executed on January 8, 1959. Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of INC,
testified to the purchases constituting the subject lot and the issuance of TDs
covering it as declared by INC for tax purposes. Thus, these two purchases by INC of a small
portion of the bigger lot originally owned by Sabuco, who inherited it from his
parents and later sold it to Badanguio, constituted the subject lot.
On
September 7, 1970, a Deed of Sale was executed by Badanguio in favor of INC
formally ceding and conveying to INC the subject lot which still formed part of
the TD of the bigger lot under his name.
This was testified to by Teofilo Tulali who became a tenant of the
bigger lot in 1965 and continued to be its tenant under Badanguio. Tulali testified further that the ownership
and possession of Sabuco and Badanguio of the bigger lot were never
disturbed.
Subsequently,
TD 6485[10]
was issued in 1970 in the name of INC pursuant to the September 7, 1970 Deed of
Sale. This was subsequently replaced by
TD No. 406056[11] in
1974, TD 508026 in 1980, and TD 605153 in 1985.
For
the processing of its application for judicial confirmation of title, subject
Lot No. 3946 of the Currimao Cadastre was surveyed and consisted of 4,201
square meters. With the presentation of
the requisite sepia or tracing cloth of plan Swo-1-001047, technical
description of the subject lot, Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate, and Report
given by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office special investigator
showing that the subject lot is within alienable and disposable public zone,
the MCTC found and appreciated the continuous possession by INC of the subject
lot for over 40 years after its acquisition of the lot. Besides, it noted that Badanguio and Sabuco,
the predecessors-in-interest of INC, were never disturbed in their possession
of the portions they sold to INC constituting the subject lot.
Aggrieved,
the Republic seasonably interposed its appeal before the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 85348.
The
Ruling of the CA
On
October 11, 2007, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision affirming
the April 26, 2005 MCTC Decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision AFFIRMED in toto.
SO
ORDERED.
In
denying the Republic’s appeal, the CA found that the documentary and
testimonial evidence on record sufficiently established the continuous, open,
and peaceful possession and occupation of the subject lot in the concept of an owner
by INC of more than 40 years and by its predecessors-in-interest prior to the
conveyance of the lot to INC.
Hence, we have this petition.
The
Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE [MCTC] DECISION GRANTING THE
The Court’s
Ruling
May
a judicial confirmation of imperfect title prosper when the subject property
has been declared as alienable only after
The
petition is bereft of merit. The sole
issue raised is not novel.
The Republic’s
Contention
The
Republic contends that subject
The
Republic maintains further that since the application was filed only on
November 19, 1998 or a scant five years from the declaration of the subject lot
to be alienable and disposable land on May 16, 1993, INC’s possession fell
short of the 30-year period required under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
The Argument of INC
Respondent
INC counters that the Court has already clarified this issue in Republic v.
Court of Appeals (Naguit case), in which we held that what is merely
required by Sec. 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, is that the “property sought to be registered
[is] already alienable and disposable at
the time of the application for registration of title is filed.”[15] Moreover, INC asserts that the Herbieto
pronouncement quoted by the Republic cannot be considered doctrinal in that it
is merely an obiter dictum, stated only after the case was dismissed for
the applicant’s failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of
publication.
Necessity of
declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable
It
is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is indispensable
that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.[16] In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
subject lot has already been declared alienable and disposable by the
government on May 16, 1993 or a little over five years before the application
for registration was filed by INC.
Conflicting rulings in Herbieto and
Naguit
It
must be noted that this Court had conflicting rulings in Naguit and Herbieto,
relied on by the parties’ contradictory positions.
Herbieto
essentially
ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was
classified as alienable and disposable, and possession before such date is
inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of
possession. This ruling is very
stringent and restrictive, for there can be no perfection of title when the
declaration of public agricultural land as alienable and disposable is made
after June 12, 1945, since the reckoning of the period of possession cannot
comply with the mandatory period under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529.
In
Naguit, this Court held a less stringent requirement in the application
of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 in that the reckoning for the period of possession is
the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property
sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of
the application for registration of title is filed.
A
review of subsequent and recent rulings by this Court shows that the
pronouncement in Herbieto has been applied to Buenaventura v.
Republic,[17] Republic
v. Diloy,[18] Ponciano,
Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,[19] and
Preciosa v. Pascual.[20] This Court’s ruling in Naguit, on the
other hand, has been applied to Republic v. Bibonia.[21]
Core issue laid to rest in Heirs of
Mario Malabanan v. Republic
In
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic (Malabanan),[22]
the Court upheld Naguit and abandoned the stringent ruling in Herbieto.
Sec.
14(1) of PD 1529 pertinently provides:
SEC.
14. Who may apply.—The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
In
declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that
which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that “the more
reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires
the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed.”
The
Court in Malabanan traced the rights
of a citizen to own alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as
granted under CA 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended by PD
1073, and PD 1529. The Court observed
that Sec. 48(b) of CA 141 and Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 are virtually the same,
with the latter law specifically operationalizing the registration of lands of
the public domain and codifying the various laws relative to the registration
of property. We cited Naguit and ratiocinated:
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the
OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also
as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s
approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the
alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). “Since June
12, 1945,” as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase “under a
bonafide claim of ownership.” Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which
they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located. Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would
result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not
be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title
is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate
its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of
Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto,
as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands
actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the
current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before
that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more
possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto.
This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners
make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto
are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void
ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of
the notice of initial hearing. There is
no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court’s
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning
Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
Naguit as affirmed in Malabanan more in accord with the
State’s policy
Moreover,
we wish to emphasize that our affirmation of Naguit in Malabanan––as
regards the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 relative to the
reckoning of possession vis-à-vis the declaration of the property of the public
domain as alienable and disposable––is indeed more in keeping with the spirit
of the Public Land Act, as amended, and of PD 1529. These statutes were enacted to conform to the
State’s policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social
justice.[23] The statutes’ requirements, as couched and
amended, are stringent enough to safeguard against fraudulent applications for
registration of title over alienable and disposable public land. The application of the more stringent pronouncement
in Herbieto would indeed stifle and repress the State’s policy.
Finally,
the Court in Malabanan aptly synthesized the doctrine that the period of
possession required under Sec. 14(1) of PD 1527 is not reckoned from the time
of the declaration of the property as alienable and disposable, thus:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as
soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
INC entitled to registrable right over
subject lot
With the
resolution of the core issue, we find no error in the findings of the courts a
quo that INC had indeed sufficiently established its possession and
occupation of the subject lot in accordance with the Public Land Act and Sec.
14(1) of PD 1529, and had duly proved its right to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title over subject lot.
As a rule,
the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are final and
conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they
are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower courts.[24] This is applicable to the instant case.
The
possession of INC has been established not only from 1952 and 1959 when it
purchased the respective halves of the subject lot, but is also tacked on to
the possession of its predecessors-in-interest, Badanguio and Sabuco, the latter
possessing the subject lot way before June 12, 1945, as he inherited the bigger
lot, of which the subject lot is a portion, from his parents. These possessions and occupation––from Sabuco,
including those of his parents, to INC; and from Sabuco to Badanguio to INC––had
been in the concept of owners: open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of property. These had not been disturbed as attested to by respondent’s
witnesses.
WHEREFORE, this
petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly,
the October 11, 2007 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85348 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 24-32. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] (1) Teofilo Tulali, a tenant of Lot No. 3946; (2) Saturnino Sacayanan, a member of INC since 1948; and (3) Jaime Alcantara, the property custodian of Lot No. 3946 and Minister of INC since 1965.
[8] Records, p. 439.
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 46.
[11]
[12]
[13]
G.R. No. 156117,
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 442, 448-449.
[16] Republic v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 169397, March 13, 2007, 518 SCRA 250, 257; citing Herbieto, supra note 13, at 199-200.
[17]
G.R. No. 166865,
[18]
G.R. No. 174633,
[19]
G.R. No. 174536,
[20]
G.R. No. 168819,
[21]
G.R. No. 157466,
[22]
G.R. No. 179987,
[23] Bibonia, supra note 21, at 277; citing Menguito v. Republic, G.R. No. 134308, December 14, 2000, 348 SCRA 128, 141.
[24] Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 485, 491; citing Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161135, April 8, 2005, 455 SCRA 175 (other citations omitted).