THIRD
DIVISION
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AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-EAST RIZAL,
AMABLE C. AGUILUZ and ANTHONY JESUS R. VINCE CRUZ,
Petitioners, - versus
- ALLAN RAYMOND R. IGNACIO, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 178520 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: June 23, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1]
dated
The factual antecedents of this case
are as follows:
Petitioner
AMACCI is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
Philippine laws, engaged in the business of providing computer education, among
other courses.[3] AMA Computer College-East Rizal (AMACC-ER) is
one of its branches. Petitioners Aguiluz
and Cruz are President and Human Resource Director, respectively, of petitioner
AMACCI.
Respondent
was first employed on P7,700.00.[4] Three months thereafter, on P11,000.00.[5]
Upon
the recommendation of AMACC-ER School Director/Chief Operating Officer (COO)
Lydia Taganguin (Taganguin) to AMACCI Vice President for Human Resource Patrick
Alain Azanza, respondent was transferred to AMACC-ER effective 16 August
1999. The transfer was made because of
the pressing deadline brought about by the ISO 9000 Oplan of AMACCI. AMACC-ER was scheduled to be inspected for
Certification by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)[6] in
the first week of September 1999.[7]
On
his first day of transfer to AMACC-ER, respondent went to AMACCI Head Office to
consult AMACCI Assistant Vice President for Construction, Engineer Noel Nobleza
(Nobleza), on the renovation plan for the AMACC-ER school facilities. The renovation of the AMACC-ER school
facilities was to be undertaken as part of the ISO 9000 Oplan. Nobleza told respondent that since the
renovation was a major one, the latter needed to secure the approval of AMA
Educational System (AMAES)[8]
Vice President Zenaida Carpio (Carpio).
Since Carpio was out of her office, Ignacio went ahead to consult
AMACC-ER School Director/COO Taganguin, and then to secure the approval of Mr.
Joselito Domingo, owner of the JL Domingo Building in which the AMACC-ER school
facilities were located. It was
Taganguin who brought the renovation plan to Carpio, who approved the
same. At around
Respondent
started demolishing the concrete partition wall of the computer laboratory on
However,
on
Respondent
then received on 3 September 1999 a Memorandum[10]
dated 2 September 1999 from petitioner Cruz, the AMACCI Human Resource
Director, informing the former that a complaint was filed against him for
inexcusable gross negligence resulting in serious damage to 35 computers and
loss of class records/exams, and instructing him to submit his written
explanation and evidence on that same day.
Respondent was likewise placed on preventive suspension.[11]
In
a Memorandum dated
On
I. Statements of:
1.1 Allan Ignacio:
· Before I was assigned at AMACC – East Rizal I was already informed of the problem in the building which needs to be renovated based on the copy of the building plan provided to us by the owner. Seeing that the renovation plan was signed by the VP for Education and the School Director, I decided to start with the demolition of the partition taking into serious consideration that I was given only a few days to comply with the deadline. I was then confident that I need not coordinate with anybody because on the evening prior to the demolition, Ms. Taganguin, the School Director called for a meeting to inform the concerned department heads about possible changes within the JL Domingo building. Thinking that the message was clear to everybody present during the meeting, I thought that the agenda is clearly implied; that I can already proceed with the demolition without seeking for another round of approval. Hence, I took it upon myself to start the following day because Ms. Taganguin attended the Corplan on that day.
· I believe that I have taken into consideration the precautionary measures needed, hence, I put an asbestos sheet and a plywood to cover the computers inside the room.
· The computer units did not sustain any damage. This can be attested by the certification issued by the IT Supervisor.
1.2. Elsie Tablisma:
·
On
x x x x
1.3. Mr. Darwin Ramos:
On
1.4. Mr. Arnulfo Necio:
At
II. Analysis of Facts Presented:
Based on the statements submitted, the committee hereby states the findings:
1. That Mr. Allan Ignacio without seeking
written approval to proceed, has ordered the start of the demolition project on
2. Respondent assumed that during the conduct of the meeting the evening before, all concerned employees have already understood what has been implied about the renovation.
3. He did not coordinate his action with the proper channels and did not exercise due diligence before he started the demolition of the computer laboratory.
4. His act could have caused the possible loss/damage of the computer units which were exposed.
x x x x
III. Recommendation:
Taking the above findings into serious consideration, it is recommended that respondent Allan Ignacio be duly sanctioned for his offense. He has clearly violated Rule E Section 4 of the company code of conduct. The corresponding sanction for this is DISMISSAL.[12]
In
accordance with the foregoing recommendation of the HRD of AMACCI, respondent
was terminated from employment on
On
Petitioners
denied that respondent was illegally dismissed.
They contended that on
Petitioners
also alleged that respondent was charged with a very serious offense, i.e., damaging company property thru
gross negligence, or threatening to damage company property either willfully or
thru negligence, covered by letter (e) of No. 4, Rule IV Employee Conduct and
Discipline.[15] The corresponding penalty for such an offense
is dismissal, as provided for in the Disciplinary Actions of the Employees
Manual.[16]
Petitioners
further insisted that they complied with the requirements of procedural due
process. The twin requirements of notice
and hearing, which constitute essential elements of due process in cases of
employee dismissal, were complied with.
Petitioners gave respondent a first notice of investigation and the
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence on his behalf on
In
her Decision dated
There is no doubt that [herein petitioners’] evidence is substantial. We are more than convinced that [herein respondent] committed a very serious offense of demolishing without permission from the management the wall partition of the computer laboratory. Worse, after the demolition, [respondent] left the laboratory open which resulted in the loss of class records.
Yet, [respondent] had the temerity to tell that the safekeeping of documents was not part of his duties as Maintenance Supervisor. This, to our mind demonstrates the reprehensible character of the [respondent]. He knew fully well that it was his unauthorized demolition of the wall partition and leaving it open thereafter which lead to the loss of school records. Moreover, he did not even bother to explain why he caused the demolition of the wall partition on his own without permission or even the courtesy of notice to the management. We should not loss (sic) sight of the fact that [respondent] is a supervisor and not an ordinary laborer whose lapses may be more easily condoned. His is not a mere lapse but a serious misconduct.
Aside from this serious misconduct, the subsequent act of leaving the laboratory open exposing the computers and documents to loss and damage constitutes gross negligence. True enough, class records were lost the next day due to the open wall partition.
Said negligence is not as simple as [respondent] would like to make it appear. Student’s scholastic records is the very meat of an education institution’s business. Organized filing and safekeeping thereof makes the school a reputable one.
x x x x
However, he committed more serious offenses which could no longer be pardoned by the management.[17]
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
petitioners complied with procedural due process in respondent’s dismissal:
Now, on the procedural aspect of termination of employment, time and again, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that a trial type hearing is not a must. When complainant was given the opportunity to submit written explanation, he did not submit. Then, during the scheduled hearings at the company level, he was able to present his side. This is due process, the essence of which is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law and jurisprudence prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard.[18]
At the end, the Labor Arbiter declared:
In fine, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.
PREMISED CONSIDERED, all the claims for damages resulting from the dismissal, i.e., medical expenses, refund of tuition fees, reimbursement for tools and equipment, moral and exemplary damages must necessarily fail, there being no bad faith or illegality on the part of the management in effecting the dismissal.
WHEREFORE, this complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[19]
Respondent appealed the afore-quoted Decision of the Labor
Arbiter to the NLRC. His appeal was
docketed as NLRC NCR CA No. 024664-2000.
On
Refusing to give up, respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals, a Petition for Certiorari,
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
67047. The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of Labor Arbiter Nieves De Castro and
the Resolutions of the National Labor Relation Commission dated
Herein [herein petitioner AMACCI] is hereby ordered to pay [herein respondent] separation pay equivalent to one month for every year of service to be reckoned from the end of his thirty-day suspension up to the finality of this decision, in addition to his full back wages allowances and other benefits. No costs.[22]
Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated
Petitioners are now before this Court
raising the following issues —
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACTS CONTRARY TO WHAT THE LABOR ARBITER AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ADMITTED IN THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT AS SUBSTANTIAL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN MADE UNDER OATH.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF RESPONDENT AS ILLEGAL AND IN STATING THAT THE GROUND UPON WHICH RESPONDENT WAS DISMISSED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS SERIOUS MISCONDUCT.[23]
The Petition is not meritorious.
At the outset, the Court must address
petitioners’ argument that the Court of Appeals went beyond its jurisdiction
when it re-evaluated the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by
the NLRC.[24]
The general rule, no doubt, is that
findings of fact of an administrative agency, which has acquired expertise in
the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded great weight on appeal. The rule is not absolute and admits of
certain well-recognized exceptions, however. Thus, when the findings of fact of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence or
their judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, the appellate court may
make an independent evaluation of the facts of the case, which procedure the
Court of Appeals adopted in this case.[25]
Moreover, where the party's contention appears to be clearly tenable, or where
the broader interest of justice and public policy so requires, the court may,
in a certiorari proceeding, correct
the error committed. The Court of
Appeals, in view of its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated to it
through a petition for certiorari such as in this case, may look into the
records of the case and re-examine the questioned findings if it considers the
same to be necessary to arrive at a just decision.[26]
Hence, the Court of Appeals was
acting within its jurisdiction when, on certiorari,
it did not merely adopt the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC and, instead, made its own findings, which were contrary to the
former.
The Court then proceeds to discuss
its own jurisdiction in reviewing findings of fact in a petition for review,
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In Medina v. Asistio,[27]
this Court already extensively explained that:
It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. (Nicolas et al., v. CA, 154 SCRA 635 [1987]; Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89 [1974]).
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for [review on] certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, is not without exception. Thus, findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances, x x x:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.);** (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). (Emphasis ours.)
The exception, rather than the
general rule, applies in the present case.
When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court or an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
functions, such as the NLRC, this Court must make its own factual findings.[28]
In
termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the
dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and
legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a
case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause.[29]
And the quantum of proof which the
employer must discharge is substantial evidence. An employee's dismissal due to serious
misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise. [30]
Therefore, the Court reviews the case
records herein to determine whether petitioner AMACCI was able to prove by
substantial evidence that respondent was legally dismissed.
The minimum standards of due process
in all cases of termination of employment are prescribed under Article 277(b)
of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 277. Miscellaneous Provisions.
x x x x
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment.[31] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is implemented by Rule XXIII of
the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code, which provides:
Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice. – x x x.
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. x x x.
The
most basic of tenets in employee termination cases is that no worker shall be
dismissed from employment without the observance of substantive and procedural
due process. Substantive due process
means that the ground upon which the dismissal is based is one of the just or
authorized causes enumerated in the Labor Code.
Procedural due process, on the other hand, requires that an
employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer
the same, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and
assisted by a representative if the employee so desires.[32] The employee must be furnished two written
notices: the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and the second is a subsequent
notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.[33]
Hence, under the Labor Code, there
are twin requirements to justify a valid dismissal from employment: (a) the
dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor
Code (substantive aspect) and (b) the employee must be given an opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself (procedural aspect).[34]
We first hew our attention to the
issue of whether or not respondent was accorded procedural due process. Respondent claims in his position paper[35]
that he received a formal notice of investigation for negligence due to failure
to exercise adequate asset control measures within one’s area of responsibility
on 31 August 1999 at 9:51 a.m. and the hearing was scheduled and held
immediately the next day on 1 September 1999 at 10:00 a.m. Another formal notice of investigation for
serious damage of company property and loss of class records/exams was served
on respondent on 3 September 1999 at 7:45 a.m. while the hearing was scheduled
and held on the same day 3 September 1999 at 1:00 p.m. On 9 September 1999, respondent was given a
notice of termination.
The essence of the due process
requirement being a mere opportunity to be heard, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that although respondent was given a limited time to explain his side
and present evidence, he, however, was able to refute the findings of
petitioner. Hence, the chance afforded
to respondent, although limited, is a clear opportunity to be heard on the
issue at hand.[36] What the law abhors and prohibits is the
absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard.[37]
We now turn our attention to the
issue of whether or not there was just cause for the termination of respondent
from his employment.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
one in finding that respondent was liable for serious misconduct which
justifies his dismissal from office.
Petitioner AMACCI terminated respondent’s employment because of gross
negligence resulting to the loss of important documents.[38]
The Labor Code provides that an
employer may terminate the services of an employee for a just cause. Among the just causes in the Labor Code is
serious misconduct. Misconduct is
improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act,
a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and
not mere error in judgment. The
misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code must be of such a
grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must
nevertheless be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause
for his separation.[39]
In National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino,[40] the Court stressed that “[i]n order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.”
After a thorough examination of the
records of the case, however, the Court finds that petitioner AMACCI miserably
failed to prove by substantial evidence its charges against respondent. There is no showing at all that respondent’s
actions were motivated by a perverse and wrongful intent, as required by
Article 282(a) of the Labor Code.
On the loss of school records, the
complaint of AMACCI faculty member Ralp Tumulak was that four of his quizzes
were lost due to the renovation undertaken in the AMACC-ER premises.
The Court of Appeals dismissed
this complaint as insufficient to justify the dismissal of respondent. We agree
with the Court of Appeals. Under the Employee conduct and Discipline of AMACCI,
loss of records is considered a light offense punishable by written reprimand.[41]
The next issue that needs to be resolved
is whether or not the renovation of AMACC-ER premises was done by respondent
without authority, which merits the supreme penalty of dismissal.
The following instances support the
conclusion of this Court that there was no just or authorized cause for respondent’s
dismissal:
1. The renovation
undertaken by respondent was authorized under a renovation plan approved and
signed on
2.
The AMACC-ER authorities were well aware of the ongoing renovation, as Carpio
-- together with an AMACCI official, Assistant Vice- President Panay --
conducted an inspection of the school facilities on
“19 August 1999
x x x x
0936 Arrival of MA’AM CARPIO & MA’AM
BALON J. PANAY, AVP-for (sic) CONDUCT
INSPECTION”
Petitioner AMACCI was unable to refute the inspection of the
renovation site conducted by Carpio and Panay.
The only rational reason for the conduct of such an inspection by said
officials was to ensure that the renovations were being done properly and
according to the approved plan. If
Carpio and Panay had then noticed something amiss, they would have already
brought it to the attention of AMACCI and AMACC-ER officials, especially,
AMACC-ER School Director/COO Taganguin.
There was nothing on record that would show that either Carpio or Panay
made any unsavory observation during their inspection. In fact, after the said inspection,
respondent was able to continue and complete the renovation of the computer
laboratory.
3. On the evening prior to the demolition, Ms.
Taganguin, the School Director called for a meeting to inform the concerned
department heads about possible changes within the JL Domingo building,
negating petitioners’ charge that the renovation initiated by respondent was
without authority.
4. Mr. Arnold Necio,
Network (IT) Supervisor, issued a certification dated 23 August 1999 stating
that the computers in the computer laboratory were randomly tested and found to
be in good working condition; and
5. The security guard, on duty from the evening
of
Considering the foregoing, the Court
can only agree with the Court of Appeals that, even though respondent may be
guilty of negligence for failing to take the necessary precautions to cover or
remove the computers from the computer laboratory before the renovation, or to
block or guard the wall opening to the computer laboratory, respondent’s
blunders did not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience as to
justify the termination of his employment.
To reiterate, for serious misconduct or willful disobedience, it is not
sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established
rules or policies; the act or conduct
must have been performed with wrongful intent.
There is absolute lack of proof herein of such wrongful intent on the
part of respondent.
Respondent’s actions, at their worse,
reveal his negligence, but said negligence can hardly be deemed gross and habitual,
as to constitute a just ground for his dismissal under Article 282(b) of the
Labor Code.
Gross negligence under Article 282 of
the Labor Code connotes want of care in the performance of one’s duties, while
habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances.[43] Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[44] To constitute a just cause for termination of
employment, the neglect of duties must not only be gross but habitual as
well. The single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just
cause for the dismissal of the employee.[45]
Respondent, in the Petition at bar,
exercised enough diligence in his renovation of the computer laboratory as to
pass the inspection of two officials of petitioner AMACCI. Also, other than the incident at the computer
laboratory, no other negligent act was attributed to respondent to establish
habituality.
Moreover, the penalty of dismissal imposed on respondent is disproportionate to his offense. The magnitude of the infraction must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be commensurate thereto, in view of the gravity of the penalty of dismissal or termination from the service. What is at stake here is not simply the job itself of the employee but also his regular income therefrom which is the means of livelihood of his family.[46]
Time and again, the Court has ruled that while an employer enjoys wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees, those directives, however, must always be fair and reasonable, and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed, must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.[47]
Finally, the Court notes that
respondent impleaded in his complaint before the Labor Arbiter petitioners
Aguiluz and Cruz, in their capacity as AMACCI officials. The Court of Appeals, after finding that
respondent was illegally dismissed, did not make any pronouncement as to the liability
of petitioners Aguiluz and Cruz.
Thus, it is necessary for this Court
to clarify and explicitly declare that no liability for respondent’s illegal
dismissal should attach to petitioners Aguiluz and Cruz, and respondent’s
complaint as against them should be dismissed.
Unless they have exceeded their authority, corporate officers are, as a
general rule, not personally liable for their official acts, because a
corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers, stockholders and members. It
is true that as an exception, corporate directors and officers are solidarily
held liable with the corporation, where terminations of employment are done
with malice or in bad faith; but where there is an absence of evidence that
said directors and officers acted with malice or bad faith, as in this case,
the Court must exempt them from any personal liability for the employee’s
illegal dismissal.[48]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is denied. The Decision dated 22 December 2006 and
Resolution dated 4 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67047
are affirmed,
with the CLARIFICATION/MODIFICATION
that only petitioner AMA Computer Colleges, Inc. is held liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent Allan Raymond R. Ignacio, and the latter’s complaint
against petitioners Amable C. Aguiluz and Anthony Jesus R. Vince Cruz is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner AMA Computer
Colleges, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate
Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Regalado E. Maambong with Associate Justices
[2] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[3] CA rollo, p. 23.
[4]
Respondent
actually began working for AMACC-FV earlier, on
[5] CA rollo, p. 23.
[6] Developer and publisher of International Standards; http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm.
[7] CA rollo, p. 24.
[8] The network of computer colleges
under the name of
[9] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[10] Please be advised that a complaint for alleged inexcusable gross negligence resulting to serious damage of Company property (35 computers) and loss of class records/exams has been filed against you. We are furnishing you a copy of the complaint together with the annexes of said complaint.
You are hereby instructed to report to the office of the undersigned and submit your written explanation on or before September 3, 1999 at exactly 1:00 p.m. You are given the right to present your evidence in that said meeting. You are also given the right to confront the complainant and their witnesses.
Your failure to answer will be considered as a waiver of your aforesaid rights. In such instance, this office will rule on the basis of the evidence already submitted.
Meanwhile, you are hereby placed under preventive suspension.
For your strict compliance.
(SGD)ANTHONY JESUS VINCE CRUZ
Human Resource Director (Annex E, CA rollo.)
[11] CA rollo, p. 24.
[12] Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[13] The termination letter reads:
MR. ALLAN RAYMOND IGNACIO
Maintenance Supervisor
Dear Mr. Ignacio:
Please be informed that after a careful deliberation of the case filed against you, it was decided that you are guilty of Gross Negligence in the performance of your job resulting to the loss of important documents. In view of this, the Top Management has decided to terminate your services as Maintenance Supervisor effective immediately.
You are hereby instructed to report to the undersigned for further instructions. Please bear in mind that as a company policy you are required to accomplish your clearance and turn over all documents and responsibilities to the appropriate officers.
You
are barred from entering the company premises unless with clearance from the
HRD. (
[14] CA rollo, p. 21.
[15] Employees Conduct and Discipline; id. at 69.
[16] Employees Conduct and Discipline; id. at 67.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Rollo, p. 198.
[24] Muaje-Tuazon v. Wenphil Corporation, G.R. No. 162447, 27 December 2006, 511 SCRA 521, 528-530.
[25] San
Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R.
No. 149011,
[26] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Imperial, G.R. No. 149379, 15 June 2006, 490 SCRA 673, 685, citing Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, 438 Phil. 756, 764-765 (2002).
[27] G.R. No. 75450, 8 November 1990, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224.
[28]
[29] Cosep v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 148, 157-158 (1998).
[30] Philippine
Commercial Industrial Bank v. Cabrera, G.R. No. 160368,
[31] Suico
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146762,
[32] Waterous Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 345 Phil. 983, 994 (1997).
[34] Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. v. Mesano, 455 Phil. 936, 942 (2003).
[35] CA rollo, p. 24.
[36] Rollo, p. 55.
[37] Casimiro
v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137,
[38] Rollo, p. 71.
[39] Philippine Long Distance Co., v. The Late Romeo F. Bolso, G.R. No. 159701, 17 August 2007, 530 SCRA 550, 559-560.
[40] G.R. No. 164376, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 361, 375-376.
[41] Annex C; rollo, pp. 62-67.
[42] CA rollo, pp. 191-192.
[43] Poseidon
Fishing v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 168052,
[44] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 331 Phil. 633, 641 (1996).
[45] Premiere
Development Bank v. Mantal, G.R. No. 167716,
[46] St. Michael’s Institute v. Santos, 422 Phil. 723, 736 (2001).
[47] VH Manufacturing Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 379 Phil.
444, 451 (2000).
[48] Price
v. Innodata Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 178505,