FIRST DIVISION
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 171137
INTERNATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
BERSAMIN, JJ.
SPOUSES WILSON DY HONG
PI and LOLITA DY and Promulgated:
SPOUSES PRIMO CHUYACO,
JR. and LILIA CHUYACO,
Respondents. June 5, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - -
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a
petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1]
dated July 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP. No. 85282, and its
Resolution[2]
dated January 10, 2006, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Spouses Damian and Tessie Amadeo are indebted to petitioner Philippine
Commercial International Bank, a domestic uni-banking corporation, as sureties
for Streamline Cotton Development Corporation. The promissory notes became due
and demandable, but the Amadeo spouses failed to pay their outstanding
obligations despite repeated demands. As of February 15, 1994, these
obligations stood at Ten Million, Six Hundred Seventy-One Thousand, Seven
Hundred Twenty-Six Pesos and Sixty-One Centavos (P10,671,726.61).
Petitioner subsequently discovered that roughly a month before the due
date of the promissory notes, the Amadeo spouses (i) sold three (3) or nearly
all of their real properties to respondents, Spouses Wilson and Lolita Dy and
Spouses Primo and Lilia Chuyaco, and (ii) immediately caused the transfer of
the titles covering the parcels of land in favor of the latter. The
consideration for these sales was further alleged to have been grossly
insufficient or inadequate.
Believing that the transfers were done in fraud of creditors, petitioner instituted
an action for rescission and damages on April 22, 1994. In its Complaint[3]
in Civil Case No. 94-1585 against Spouses Amadeo, Dy and Chuyaco, petitioner
asked the
1. Annulling the
Deeds of Absolute Sale both dated September 16, 1993 and thereafter, direct the
Registries of Deeds of Sultan Kudarat and
2. Ordering the
defendants to pay the plaintiff moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00;
exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000.00; and P100,000.00
as[,] and for[,] attorney’s fees.[4]
The case was then raffled to Branch 133, presided
over by Judge Napoleon E. Inoturan.
Upon service of summons on
the Amadeo spouses, the latter filed a Motion to Dismiss[5]
on the ground that the Complaint violated the explicit terms of Supreme Court
Circular No. 04-94, as the Verification was executed by petitioner’s legal
counsel. [6]
Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,[7]
where it argued that (i) the rule cited by the Amadeo spouses should not be
applied literally, and (ii) at any rate, petitioner’s legal counsel was
authorized by petitioner to institute the Complaint.[8]
On February 4, 1995, the trial court issued an Order[9]
denying the Motion to Dismiss.
The Amadeo spouses
subsequently filed an Answer[10]
where they alleged that petitioner failed to release the loans to Streamline
Cotton Development Corporation on the agreed date, thereby constraining them to
incur loans from third parties at high interest rates to keep the company afloat.
These loans were covered by postdated checks which had to be funded once the
obligations fell due, lest the Amadeo spouses face criminal prosecution. In
order to pay the said loans, they thus had to sell the properties subject of
this case. The Amadeo spouses further claimed that the purchase price for the
three (3) parcels of land was the fair market value, and that they had other
personal and real properties which may be availed of to answer for their
obligations. In their Counterclaim, they prayed for moral damages of P200,000.00,
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
Petitioner filed its Reply
and Answer to Counterclaim[11]
on March 8, 1995.
On September 13, 1995, petitioner
filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication[12]
on Spouses Dy and Chuyaco. However, this was denied in an Order[13]
dated September 14, 1995 on the ground that summons by publication cannot be
availed of in an action in personam.
Accordingly, on March 4, 1996, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint[14]
to include allegations in support of, and a prayer for, a writ of preliminary
attachment. Petitioner then presented evidence in relation thereto, and on
February 25, 1997, the trial court issued an Order[15]
for the issuance of the writ. Upon petitioner’s ex-parte motion, the trial
court likewise directed the Clerk of Court of the
In Orders[17]
dated January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998, respectively, petitioner was
directed to inform the court whether it still intended to pursue the case. This
appears to have been motivated by the fact that no property of the defendants
had been attached as of yet. Petitioner did not comply with the said Orders;
consequently, the case was dismissed without prejudice on June 26, 1998 for
failure to prosecute.[18]
By this time, petitioner had already caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the titles of
the properties subject of this case (i.e.,
TCT Nos. T-27628, T-202868, and T-202869).
On August 3, 1998,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 26, 1998 Order, alleging
that its failure to notify the trial court of its intention to pursue the case
was prompted solely by the difficulty of locating properties against which the
writ of attachment could be enforced. In the interest of justice, the trial
court granted the motion.[19]
Defendant Spouses Amadeo,
Dy and Chuyaco then filed an “Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and to Annul All the
Proceedings Taken Against the Defendants”[20]
on December 11, 1998, in which motion they questioned the jurisdiction of the
trial court over their persons. Petitioner filed its Opposition[21]
thereto on February 15, 1999. Defendants filed their Reply[22]
on March 10, 1999, while petitioner filed its Rejoinder[23]
on June 9, 1999. Said motion, however, was merely noted without action in an
August 2, 2001 Order[24]
since its notice of hearing was addressed only to the Clerk of Court, viz.:
It appears from
the Motion that its Notice of Hearing is not addressed to any of the parties
concerned as otherwise required by Rule 15[,] Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Such being the case, the Motion is deemed a mere scrap of
paper as held in Provident International Resources Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 259 SCRA 510.
In any event, the record shows that
defendants Sps. Amadeo have been duly served with summons as early as November
11, 1994 per Sheriff’s Return of Service dated November 14, 1994, and they are
therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, defendants Spouses Dy
and Chuyaco have not been served with summons as evidenced by Officer’s Return
dated May 24, 1994 and Return of Service dated June 10, 1994, respectively, and
so the Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them. Since aforesaid
Motion is deemed a scrap of paper, it cannot be construed to manifest a (sic) voluntary appearance on their
part.
Wherefore, the Omnibus Motion is
noted without action. Let alias summons be issued to defendants-spouses Dy and
Chuyaco. For plaintiff’s guidance, it may avail itself of Rule 14[,] Section 14
on summons by publication if it so desires, upon proper motion.
SO ORDERED. (underscoring in the
original)
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco subsequently
filed a “Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction)”[25]
on February 18, 2002, in which motion they essentially accused petitioner of not
causing summons to be served upon them and losing interest in the case.
Petitioner filed its Opposition[26]
thereto, and in an April 23, 2002 Order,[27]
the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on account of (i) petitioner’s
Compliance and Manifestation[28]
that it had not lost interest in pursuing the case, and (ii) the Motion for
Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication that petitioner filed
simultaneously with its Opposition. On April 24, 2002, the Motion for Leave of
Court to Serve Summons by Publication was submitted for resolution.[29]
Respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco next filed a “Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute”[30]
on June 17, 2003. The significant portions of the motion state:
2. That based on
the order of this Honorable Court dated April 23, 2003 (sic), the Motion for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by
Publication was submitted for resolution, but the movants-defendants would like
to remind the Honorable Court that a Motion of the same nature was already
filed on September 13, 1995 and was DENIED on September 14, 1995. xxx;
3. That therefore,
the order dated August 21, 2001 of this Honorable Court which advised the
complainant to avail of Rule 14 Section 14 of the Rules is contrary to its
order dated September 14, 1995;
4. That up to this
date, the complainant has not lifted a finger to pursue this case against
movants-defendants, hence, this Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that this case be dismissed
against the movants-defendants and to order the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens at the back of the subject
title (sic).
This was opposed by petitioner, arguing that it had
already filed a motion for the service of summons by publication, but the trial
court had yet to act on it.[31]
On July 25, 2003, this Motion was submitted for resolution.[32]
On November 4, 2003,
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco personally, and not through their counsel, filed a
“Motion for Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court,”[33]
the relevant portions of which state:
1. That since
1998, the defendants-movants have been moving for the dismissal of this case as
far as the movants are concerned and to nullify the proceedings taken against
them since the Honorable Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over their
persons when the plaintiff presented its evidence against defendants (sic) Sps. Damian and Tessie Amadeo and
even thereafter;
2. That, however only on (sic) August 2, 2001 or after more than
three (3) years, that this Honorable Court denied the said Motion to Dismiss
due to technicality (sic) and merely
require (sic) the plaintiff to serve
the summons either personally or thru publication;
3. That, however in the order of
this Honorable Court dated September 14, 1995, it already denied the Ex-Parte
Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by Publication “considering that the action
herein is in personam”, hence, this order is contrary to its latest order dated
August 2, 2001;
4. That another
Motion to Dismiss was filed last June 11, 2003[34]
on the ground of lack of interest to pursue the case but up to this date, the
Honorable Court has done nothing that delays (sic) the proceedings to the prejudice of the defendants-movants;
5. That this
continuous delay in the proceedings shows that the Honorable Court may not be
competent enough to further hear this case.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed for the inhibition of this
Honorable Court (sic) from further
hearing this case.
This was submitted for resolution on November 13,
2003.
The motion for inhibition was adopted by their counsel on record,
Clarissa Castro, through a “Motion to Adopt Motion for Inhibition and
Manifestation,” which was filed on February 11, 2004[35]
and noted by the trial court in a February 20, 2004 Order.[36]
On June 23, 2004, however, the trial court (i) denied the motion for inhibition
for lack of merit, (ii) ruled that Spouses Dy and Chuyaco have voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, and (iii) gave
them fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order within which to file their
respective answers, as follows:
Acting on the
Motion for Inhibition, the Court hereby denies the same for lack of legal
basis.
In any event, the
fact that defendants Wilson Dy and Primo Chuyaco, Jr. signed said Motion
themselves and in behalf of their respective spouses undoubtedly indicates
their voluntary appearance in this case and their submission to the
jurisdiction of this Court. The phrase “without submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court” in the heading of said Motion can not
qualify the clear import of Rule 14 section 20 which states:
Voluntary
appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)
It may be noted
that subject Motion for Inhibition is not a Motion to Dismiss.
Wherefore, defendants-spouses
Dy and Chuyaco are given fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to
file their respective answers.
All pending
incidents are deemed resolved.[37]
Unsatisfied with the
Order, respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65[38]
before the CA, alleging that “the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion when he considered the Motion to Inhibit (without submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court) which they had filed to question his impartiality
and competence due to the delay in resolving the Motion to Dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction, as voluntary appearance, and wherein he required the
respondents to file their Answer within the required period.” The CA granted
the petition in this wise:
The old provision
under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provided that:
Section 23. What is equivalent to service. The
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service.
Under Section 20,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the provision now reads as
follows:
Sec. 20. Voluntary Appearance. — The defendant's
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
What remains the
same, carry (sic) over from the old
doctrine, is that the issue of jurisdiction must be raised seasonably.
But everything
else changed.
What changed is
that: if a motion is filed, whatever kind it is, it need no longer be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court because
the motion may raise myriad issues in that one motion of special appearance as
long as the objection to the jurisdiction of the court is included. xxx
What necessarily
changed also is that the medium of “special appearance” is no longer restricted
to a motion to dismiss because one could now file any type of motion provided
you included the issue of lack of jurisdiction due to defective service of
summons.
Thus, in this case
at bar, the “two motions to dismiss” and the “motion to inhibit” may be treated
as “special appearance” since they all included the issue of lack of jurisdiction
due to non-service of summons. They did not constitute as submitting the movant
to the jurisdiction of the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There being no
proper service of summons on petitioners and there being no voluntary
appearance by petitioners, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants, the herein petitioners. Any proceeding
undertaken by the trial court against them would consequently be null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the assailed June 23, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, is hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID as against herein
petitioners. The April 22, 1994 complaint filed by Philippine Commercial
International Bank is hereby DISMISSED as against herein petitioners DY and CHUYACO
only, no jurisdiction over their persons having been acquired.
SO ORDERED.[39]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the appellate court.[40]
Hence this appeal, where petitioner argues that:
I.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE JUNE 23, 2004 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND
VOID AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENTS DY AND CHUYACO AND
RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN A WAY THAT IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE FACTS AND APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH HOLD THAT BY THEIR
SUCCESSIVE FILING OF MOTIONS WITH THE CONVENIENT CAVEAT THAT THEY ARE NOT
SUBMITTING TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO, THEY HAVE VOLUNTARILY
SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION.
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DISMISSED THE CASE AS AGAINST DY AND CHUYACO.
B.
THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE LOST THEIR RIGHT TO
QUESTION THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER THEM WHEN THEY DID NOT RAISE THE
DENIAL OF THEIR APRIL 22, 2002 MOTION TO DISMISS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
C.
THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE MISERABLY FAILED TO
SHOW BASIS IN SEEKING THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION.
D.
THE SPOUSES DY AND CHUYACO HAVE VOLUNTARILY
SUBMITTED THEMSELVES TO THE TRIAL COURT’S JURISDICTION.
II.
THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED
Simply stated, the issues
are: (1) Was the petition for certiorari prematurely filed? (2) Has there been
voluntary appearance on the part of respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco as to
confer the trial court with jurisdiction over their persons? and (3) Did the
trial court correctly deny the motion for inhibition?
We shall discuss these issues in seriatim.
First
Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
Petitioner contends that respondents subverted the settled rule that a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is available only when there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[42]
It asserts that respondents’ failure to move for reconsideration of the June
23, 2004 Order of the trial court, denying the latter’s motion for inhibition,
provides sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.
We disagree.
Petitioner is correct that a motion for reconsideration, as a general
rule, must have first been filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against
whom the writ of certiorari is sought.[43]
This is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it.[44]
However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari
will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:
a.
where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b.
where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
c.
where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner, or the subject
matter of the action is perishable;
d.
where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e.
where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
f.
where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
g.
where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h.
where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
i.
where the issue raised is
one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[45]
Otherwise stated, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with only
if there are concrete, compelling, and valid reasons for doing so.[46]
We find that respondents’ non-filing of a motion for reconsideration is
justifiable under the circumstances of this case. It is not disputed that the
trial court, rightly or wrongly, considered them to have voluntarily submitted
to its jurisdiction by virtue of their motion for inhibition. Thus,
respondents’ apprehension that the motion for reconsideration might be construed
as further manifesting their voluntary appearance is certainly well-grounded.
They may not, therefore, be faulted for having resorted immediately to a
special civil action for certiorari.
Second
Issue: Voluntary Appearance
Preliminarily,
jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court.[47]
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.[48]
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction.[49]
This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that
a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction
over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.[50]
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1)
Special appearance
operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2)
Accordingly, objections
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly
made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3)
Failure to do so constitutes
voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances
where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to
the court for resolution.
Measured against these standards, it is readily apparent that respondents
have acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the trial court as early as June 17,
2003, when they filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Significantly,
the motion did not categorically and expressly raise the jurisdiction of the
court over their persons as an issue. It merely (i) “reminded” the court of its
purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of summons by publication, (ii) alleged
that because petitioner “has not lifted a finger to pursue this case against
movants-defendants,” the case may be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and (iii)
prayed additionally for the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens indicated at the back of the transfer certificates of
title covering the subject properties. We note, furthermore, that the motion
failed to qualify the capacity in which respondents were appearing and seeking
recourse.[51]
It is in this light that the Court’s pronouncement in Busuego v. Court of
Appeals[52]
finds cogent application:
A voluntary
appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance in whatever form, without
explicitly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a
submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the
formal method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to
deliver to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance
of the person who subscribes it, an
appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer.
This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such
formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for
example, and unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the
jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person.[53]
(emphasis supplied)
Besides, any lingering
doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the respondents’ motion
for inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of
Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking
affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested
their voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. It is well-settled that
the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the
court’s jurisdiction.[54]
To be sure, the convenient caveat in the title of the motion for
inhibition (i.e., “without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court”) does not detract from
this conclusion. It would suffice to say that the allegations in a pleading or motion
are determinative of its nature; the designation or caption thereof is not
controlling.[55]
Furthermore, no amount of caveat can change the fact that respondents tellingly
signed the motion to inhibit in their own behalf and not through counsel, let
alone through a counsel making a special appearance.
Third
Issue: Inhibition
Respondents argue that the
trial court’s so-called “continuous delay in the proceedings” is indicative of
the fact that it is incompetent to continue hearing the case. Respondents therefore
assert that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied their motion to inhibit and
required them to file their Answer.
We are not convinced.
Under the first paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a judge or judicial officer shall
be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in which:
(a)
he, or his wife or child,
is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise; or
(b)
he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; or
(c)
he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel; or
(d)
he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.[56]
Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule on voluntary
inhibition and states: “[a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.” That discretion is a matter of
conscience and is addressed primarily to the judge’s sense of fairness and
justice.[57]
We have elucidated on this point in Pimentel v. Salanga,[58]
as follows:
A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of
record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of
inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the
judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He
is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise
great care and caution before making up his mind to act in or withdraw from a
suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit
himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the
result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the
all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where
his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substances to the second paragraph of Section
1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of
justice.
The present case not
being covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the issue thus turns on
whether Judge Napoleon Inoturan should have voluntarily inhibited himself.
At the outset, we underscore that while a party has the right to seek the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case, this right
must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of
repression.[59]
Respondents consequently have no vested right to the issuance of an Order
granting the motion to inhibit, given its discretionary nature.[60]
However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case.[61]
The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we have
noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis.[62]
This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.[63]
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from
the decision or order itself.[64]
The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to
produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.[65]
We do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying respondents’
motion to inhibit. Our pronouncement in Webb, et al. v. People of the
A perusal of the
records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to
prove that respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the
assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean
on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they
characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We note that
respondent judge's rulings resolving the various motions filed by petitioners
were all made after considering the arguments raised by all the parties. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We hasten to
stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course
of a trial is not without remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our Rules
of Court and we need not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly, the remedy for erroneous
rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, is not the
outright disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to come a judge
with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts
will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all err. (emphasis
supplied)
Truth
be told, respondents are not entirely blameless for any perceived delay in the
resolution of the various incidents of the case. For instance, they make much
of the fact that close to three years passed before their “Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss and to Annul All the Proceedings Taken Against the Defendants,” filed
on December 11, 1998, was noted by the trial court. But the fact remains that
the said “motion,” not having a notice of hearing addressed to the adverse
party, is legally a mere scrap of paper.[67]
It presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the
court, and is not entitled to judicial cognizance.[68]
Considering the foregoing,
we rule that respondents’ accusations of delay, incompetence, and bias on the
part of the trial court are unfounded. Hence, they are not entitled to the
inhibition of Judge Inoturan as a relief.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,
the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another in their stead is hereby rendered ORDERING respondent
Spouses Dy and Chuyaco to answer the Complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1585 within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Decision.
The trial court is directed to proceed hearing the case, and to resolve
the same with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
[1] Rollo, pp. 52-63.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] The Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was filed on December 1, 1994.
[7] Rollo, pp. 113-118.
[8] The Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss was filed on January 30, 1995.
[9] Rollo, p. 120.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Order dated May 8, 1997; id., p. 367.
[17]
[18]
[19] Order dated September 14, 1998; id., p. 374.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] The Compliance and Manifestation was in fact filed by registered mail on December 28, 2001, or almost two months before the “Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction)” was filed. It appears that respondents’ counsel did not receive her copy thereof because she moved to a new office without notifying petitioner’s counsel.
[29] Rollo, p. 224.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] This should be June 17, 2003.
[35] Rollo, pp. 191-192.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Court.
[43] Pure Foods Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 415, 424; Tan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128764, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 452, 457; Bernardo, et al. v. Abalos, et al., G.R. No. 137266, December 5, 2001, 371 SCRA 459, 464; Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga, et al., G.R. No. 159022, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 278, 282; Audi AG v. Mejia, et al., G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 378, 383.
[44] Pure Foods Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., id.; Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 115497, September 15, 1996, 261 SCRA 757, 765; Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108634, July 17, 1997, 275 SCRA 568, 574; Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999, 301 SCRA 637, 647; Yau v. The Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 126731, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 340, 348; New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, et al., G.R. No. 165001, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 601, 610.
[45] Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141008, January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 321, 333, citing Tan v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 43; Abraham v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 143823, March 6, 2001, 353 SCRA 739, 744-745; Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142133, November 19, 2002, 392 SCRA 229, 236; Diamond Builders Conglomeration, et al. v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 171820, December 13, 2007, 540 SCRA 194, 210.
[46] Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga, et al., supra note 43, citing Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., id.
[47] Platinum
[48] Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, 21 March 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471.
[49] Galicia, et al. v. Manliquez, et al., G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 85, 94; Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498, 515; Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143736, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 87, 93.
[50] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, id., 516; Casimina v. Legaspi, et al., G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 171, 180.
[51] The opening paragraph of the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute stated: “COME NOW, defendants (sic) Sps. DY and Sps. CHUYACO, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully state: xxx. ”
[52] G.R. No. L-48955, June 30, 1987 151 SCRA 376, 385.
[53]
Citing
[54] Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 103068, June 22, 2001, 359 SCRA 409, 425.
[55] See Tan, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 148575-76, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 532, 546-547; Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372, 385-386.
[56] Section 1, Rule 137 provides as follows:
Section 1.Disqualification of Judges — No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court
when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
[57] Gochan, et al. v. Gochan, et al., G.R. No.
143089, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 323, 332.
[58] G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160, 167-168.
[59] Webb, et al. v. People of the
[60] Gutang, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124760, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 76, 85.
[61] Gochan, et al. v. Gochan, et al., supra note 57, 333.
[62]
[63] Id
[64] Aleria, Jr. v. Velez, et al., G.R. No.
127400, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 611, 620; Webb, et al. v. People of the
[65] Webb, et al. v. People of the
[66] Id.
[67] Neri v. de la Peña, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 539, 545-546.
[68] Spouses Cui, et al. v. Judge Madayag, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-94-1150, June 5, 1995, 245 SCRA 1, 10.