THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Petitioner, - versus - JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO
LACABA, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 167710 Present:
PUNO,* C.J., Ynares-Santiago, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,** PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated: June 5, 2009 |
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions[1]
dated
The antecedents are as follows:
On
That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his death thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court shall determine.[3]
Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded “not guilty” to the crime as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution’s evidence was not strong.[4]
Meanwhile,
considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas
at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State Prosecutor Hernani T.
Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan,
Batangas to any RTC in
Before
transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27,
The
prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before this
Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a
Resolution dated
However,
upon respondents’ motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a Resolution dated
After
the presentation of the parties’ respective sets of evidence, the RTC rendered
a Decision[9] dated
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court
finds the accused JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and
ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying circumstance attendant,
hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and
Leonardo Genil is hereby sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as
soon as said accused are apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused
Leonardo Genil and Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and set aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of
conviction of all accused solely on the biased, uncorroborated and baseless
testimony of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory
weight to the evidence adduced by the defense, which was amply corroborated on
material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the
failure of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the position of
the defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or
preliminary finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated
July 12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic]
of conviction despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[10]
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao, were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for whatever relief from the court.[11]
Acting
on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order[12] dated
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its
decision and finds accused DOMINGO
LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA, “GUILTY” beyond reasonable doubt, as
principal of the crime of Homicide, and
in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate
prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said accused shall be credited with the full
period of their preventive imprisonment pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.
Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN
DE GRANO are hereby ACQUITTED on
the basis of reasonable doubt. They are
likewise declared free of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.[13]
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration of the Order arguing that:
1.
There was
absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance of the “Joint
Motion for Reconsideration” dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court.
2.
The testimony of
Teresita Duran deserves credence. The
delay in the taking of Ms. Duran’s written statement of the events she
witnessed is understandable considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of
the municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
3.
The crime
committed is murder.
4.
Accused Armando
de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the conspiracy.
On
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael E. David, filed a Petition[15] for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:
(a)
the private
respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after being denied bail and
deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of the Decision despite due
notice, lost the right to move for reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b)
the grounds relied
upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision are utterly erroneous.[16]
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy, considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.[17]
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,[18] arguing that the verification and certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the conformity of the Solicitor General.[19]
On
However,
in a Resolution[24] dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[25] In addition to the justifications it raised in its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner argued that the petition was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the certified true copies of the assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead of the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies of the assailed Orders.[26] This was opposed by the respondents in their Comment/Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[27]
Meanwhile,
in its 1st Indorsement[28]
dated
On
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal that was based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect, may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that the petition was not filed in the name of the offended party; and worse, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was signed not by the private offended party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the OSG and the endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of the OSG in the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO
THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.[30]
Petitioner,
through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none of the
respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did they surrender after promulgation
of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a motion for leave to avail themselves
of the judicial remedies against the decision, stating the reasons for their
absence. The trial court thus had no
authority to take cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration filed by
the respondents as stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. As such, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Having been issued without
jurisdiction, the Order dated
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of the OSG manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the CA given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would not have been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office.[32]
With
respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner
invokes a liberal application of the Rules for private complainant’s failure to
personally sign it. Petitioner
maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the unexpected acquittal of
Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the verification and certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-interest is the OSG itself as the representative of the State.[34]
On
their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning
the order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of
double jeopardy. Respondents argue that,
contrary to the OSG’s contention, respondents Joven and Domingo’s absence
during the promulgation of the Decision dated
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.[36]
Respondents
insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as it
was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should be dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a solicitor of the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will
first address the technical objections raised by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.[38] Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With
respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the
certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant
shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is detrimental to
an orderly judicial procedure.[39] However, this Court has relaxed, under
justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not
jurisdictional.[40] Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed
under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals[41]
and Wee v. Galvez,[42]
the Court noted that the petitioners were already in the
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals[45]
and similar rulings, the following has always been pointed out:
The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration, petitioners
here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show
that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign the certification
against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice.[46]
We
find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for
private complainant’s failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the petition, it was out of
extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally sign the
certification. It is to be noted that
when Armando and Joven were acquitted, Teresita was already out of the witness
protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not travel to
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,[47] when a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will not be given premium if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,[48] that the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.[49]
Also,
respondents’ contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the letter dated
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding that all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the fact that they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioner’s recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[53] An act of a court or tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.[54]
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.[55] In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his express consent.[56]
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[57]
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy.[58] Hence, any acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),[59] Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived.[60]
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Rules applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6.
Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by
reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in
which it was rendered. However, if
the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced
in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside
the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or
detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the
court which rendered the judgment. The
court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of
appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give
notice to the accused, personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because
he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his
last known address.
In case the
accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the
criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or
thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the
failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment
however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to
avail of these remedies. He shall state
the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that
his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.[61]
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within 15 days from notice.[62]
When
the Decision dated
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.[63]
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were
not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower
tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without
jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not
exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be
the source of an acquittal.[64]
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC’s ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding. We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.[65] The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC’s evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon.[66]
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard of the Rules, the finality of respondents’ acquittal and their co-accused’s conviction of homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accused’s treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and warrants this Court’s corrective action via a special writ of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge cannot hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was not based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It
is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence.
Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of
the law from which no one may be excused, not even a judge.[67] The Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that “a judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence.”[68] It bears stressing that competence is one of the marks of a
good judge. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in
the competence of our courts. Such is
gross ignorance of the law. Having
accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and the court
the duty to be proficient in the law.[69]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolutions dated
To
the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision
dated
The
Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge Teresa P. Soriaso for possible
violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial Conduct in issuing the Order
dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated to sit as an additional
member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
** Designated to sit as an additional
member, per Special Order No. 646 dated
*** Designated to sit as an additional
member, per Special Order No. 631 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurring, rollo, pp. 61-63; 65-71.
[2] People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Joven de Grano, Armando
de Grano and Estanislao Lacaba, G.R.
No. 129604, Resolution dated
[3] CA rollo, pp. 160-161.
[4] People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Joven de Grano, Armando
de Grano and Estanislao Lacaba, G.R.
No. 129604, Resolution dated
[5] CA rollo, p. 161.
[6] Supra note 4.
[7]
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 160- 214.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 366-371.
[26]
[27]
[28] Rollo, p. 115.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 463.
[39]
[40] Ateneo
de Naga University v. Manalo, G.R. No. 160455,
[41] G.R. No. 129638,
[42] G.R. No. 147394,
[43] G.R. No. 136233,
[44] Supra note 38.
[45] G.R. No. 127393, December 4, 1998, 299 SCRA 708, 712; See also Digital Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286, 290. (Italics supplied)
[46] Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, supra note 38, at 467.
[47] G.R. No. 146923,
[48] G.R. No. 141211,
[49] People
v. Court of Appeals (12th Division), G.R. No. 154557,
[50] CA rollo, pp. 437-439; 442-443; 447-448;
[51]
[52]
[53] Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
[54] Angeles
v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142612,
[55] Yuchengco
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139768,
[56] People
v. Tampal, G.R. No. 102485,
May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 202, 208 ; Paulin v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 103323,
January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 386, 389; Gorion
v. Regional Trial Court of
[57] People
v. Court of Appeals and Maquiling, G.R. No. 128986,
[58] 6 Crim. Proc. § 25.1(d) (3d ed.).
[59] Section
14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused: Provided,
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
[60] Lavides
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670,
[61] Italics supplied.
[62] Pascua
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140243,
[63] People
v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415,
[64] Supra note 57, at 690.
[65] Alicbusan v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 113905,
[66] Building Care Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 94237, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 666, 675; Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112948, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 546, 553-554; Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 518, 528-529.
[67] Tabao
v. Lilagan, A.M. No. 98-551-RTJ,
[68] Canon 3, Rule 3.01.
[69] Oporto, Jr.
v. Judge Monserate, A.M.
No. MTJ-96-1109,