Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
WILMA TABANIAG, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 165411
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR.,
Nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: June 18, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
For
review before this Court is the February 27, 2004 Decision[1]
and September 22, 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24906, which affirmed the October
16, 2000 Decision[3]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
268, Pasig City, finding Wilma Tabaniag (petitioner) guilty of the Crime of Estafa
as defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, with
modification as to the penalty.
The
Information[4]
dated
That
on or about and during the month of January 1992, in the Municipality of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding each other, received in trust from one Dennis Espiritu
assorted jewelries (sic) amounting to P509,940.00
under the express obligation on the part of the accused to sell the same and
thereafter to remit the proceeds of the sale and/or return said jewelries (sic)
if not sold to said complainant, but the accused once in possession of said
jewelries (sic), far from complying with their aforesaid obligation, with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate, and convert to their own
personal use and benefit and despite demands to pay the proceeds of the sale
and/or to return the said jewelries (sic) in the amount of P509,940.00, they failed and
refused, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned
amount of P509,940.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
When
arraigned, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.”
Co-accused Melandia Olandia (Olandia) was dropped from the Information
upon the request[6]
of complainant Dennis Espiritu (Dennis).[7]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution presented two
witnesses, namely: Dennis and his wife Ma. Victoria (Victoria) [complainants].
On
On
The Amended Information[11]
reads as follows:
On or about and during the month of February
1992, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together, and mutually helping and aiding each other, received in
trust from one Victoria Espiritu assorted jewelries (sic) amounting to P155,252.50 under the
express obligation on the part of the accused to sell the same and thereafter
to remit the proceeds of the sale and/or return said jewelries (sic) if not
sold to said complainant, but the accused once in possession of said jewelries
(sic), far from complying with their aforesaid obligation, with unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate, and convert to their own personal use and
benefit and despite demands to pay the proceeds of the sale and/or to return
the said jewelries (sic) in the amount of P155,252.50, they failed and refused, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P155,252.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
The defense presented two witnesses,
namely: petitioner Tabaniag and Juan Tapang III (Tapang).
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused WILMA TABANIAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa as
defined and penalized under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor in its maximum period to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period and to indemnify the
offended party in the amount of Sixty-Two Thousand Nine Hundred (P62,900.00). With costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
The facts of the case as gleaned from the
records are as follows:
Complainants, both doctors by
profession, are engaged in part-time jewelry business.[14] Petitioner,
on the other hand, is an agent who sells the pieces of jewelry of complainants
on commission basis. On
After weeks passed,
Petitioner, in her defense, alleged
that she entrusted the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera who issued Security Bank
Checks[19] as
payment. Petitioner claimed that
On cross-examination, however, petitioner admitted that the
cases she filed against Bisquera did not involve the same checks which are the
subject matter of the case at bar.[22]
On
WHEREFORE, the Decision finding accused-appellant Wilma Tabaniag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa is AFFIRMED with the indeterminate penalty modified to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as the maximum, and with the award of indemnity in the amount of Php62,900.00, deleted.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The pertinent portions of the CA
decision are hereunder reproduced, to wit:
Tabaniag entered into an agreement with Victoria Espiritu for the sale of jewelry. She obligated herself, among others, to deliver and account for the proceeds of all jewelry sold and to return all other items she could not sell. The jewelry could not be sold on installment. She abused the confidence reposed upon her by misrepresenting herself to have sold the jewelry to a certain Bisquera and failing to remit the profit after demand to do so by Espiritu. Due to her failure to forward the returns from the sale of the jewelry, Espiritu suffered loss of income and profit.
The receipts issued to and signed by Tabaniag
corroborate the prosecution's testimonial proof that she personally received
the jewelry. Tabaniag's uncorroborated claim that Victoria Espiritu directly
transferred the jewelry to a certain Jane Bisquera cannot stand along against
this factual finding. The checks issued by Bisquera do not conclusively prove a
direct transaction between her and Espiritu. x x x[24]
On
On August 2, 2004, Dennis filed a
Motion to Dismiss,[26]
attaching thereto an Affidavit of Desistance,[27]
to the effect that he was withdrawing the criminal complaint because he and petitioner
had already reached an amicable settlement, the latter obligating herself to
pay the civil aspect of the case.
On
Hence, herein appeal with the
following assignment of errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE ON THE PART OF ACCUSED/PETITIONER TABANIAG IN
ENTRUSTING THE SUBJECT JEWELRIES (SIC) TO BISQUERA FOR
Second Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION DESPITE ITS VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHT OF ACCUSED TABANIAG.
Third Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT THE LETTER COMPLAINT SENT TO THE BGY. CAPTAIN OF BGY. KAPITOLYO
WHICH WAS NEVER RECEIVED BY ACCUSED A DEMAND IN CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 1(b)
OF ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
Fourth Assignment of Error
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE MOTION TO DISMISS/AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE OF ESPIRITU WILL NOT EXONERATE ACCUSED TABANIAG DESPITE
IT BEING THE SAME PERSON WHO EXECUTED THE SAME AFFIDAVIT TO DISMISS CASE VERSUS
ACCUSED MELANIA OLANDIA.
Fifth Assignment of Error
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RENDER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]
The petition is impressed with merit.
The
elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand
by the offended party to the offender.[30]
Anent the first error raised by petitioner,
this Court finds that, given the facts of the case and the evidence on record, the
evidence is wanting to prove that petitioner had misappropriated or converted the pieces of jewelry
entrusted to her by Victoria.
In
his Complaint-Affidavit,[31]
Dennis alleged that petitioner gave the pieces of jewelry to her sub-agent
Bisquera for the latter to sell the same. Furthermore, Dennis alleged that the
checks issued as payment were dishonored, the reason being that the accounts
were closed.
Petitioner
does not deny entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera. The
records of the case reveal that petitioner
had in fact entrusted the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera as evidenced by two
receipts[32]
dated
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.[34]
The
factual milieu of the case at bar is similar to Serona v. Court of Appeals[35](Serona)
where pieces of jewelry were also transferred to a sub-agent. The Solicitor General, however, contends that
the doctrine laid down in Serona is inapplicable as the agreement
between complainants and petitioner provide a clear prohibition against
sub-agency.[36]
The
conditions set forth in the two trust receipts signed by petitioner read:
x x x in good condition, to be sold in CASH ONLY within _____, days from date of signing this receipt. If I could not sell, I shall return all the jewelry within the period mentioned above. If I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account the whole proceeds of the sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries (sic) at his/her residence: my compensation or commission shall be the over-price on the value of each jewelry quoted above. I am prohibited to sell any jewelry on credits or by installment, deposit, give for safekeeping, lend pledge or give as security or guarantee under any circumstances or manner, any jewelry to other person or persons, and that I received the above jewelry in the capacity of agent.[37]
Contrary to the claim of the Solicitor
General, the aforementioned conditions do not, in any way, categorically state
that petitioner cannot employ a sub-agent. A
plain reading of the conditions clearly shows that the restrictions only
pertain to the manner in which petitioner may dispose of the property: (1) to
sell the jewelry on credit; (2) to sell the jewelry by installment; (3) to give
the jewelry for safekeeping; (4) to lend the jewelry; (5) to pledge the
jewelry; (6) to give the jewelry as security; and (7) to give the jewelry as guarantee. To this Court's mind, to maintain the
position that the said conditions also prohibit the employment of a sub-agent
would be stretching the plain meaning of the words too thinly.
Petitioner is thus correct in citing Serona, which is
instructive and may be applied by analogy, to wit:
Petitioner did not ipso facto commit the crime of estafa through conversion or misappropriation by delivering the jewelry to a sub-agent for sale on commission basis. x x x
It must be pointed out that the law
on agency in our jurisdiction allows the appointment by an agent of a
substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary
between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of
x x x x
In the case at bar, it was
established that the inability of petitioner as agent to comply with her duty
to return either the pieces of jewelry or the proceeds of its
sale to her principal Quilatan was due, in turn, to the failure of Labrador to
abide by her agreement with petitioner. Notably,
Similarly, it cannot be said that
petitioner misappropriated the jewelry or delivered them to
In People v. Nepomuceno, the accused-appellant was acquitted of estafa on facts similar to the instant case. Accused-appellant therein undertook to sell two diamond rings in behalf of the complainant on commission basis, with the obligation to return the same in a few days if not sold. However, by reason of the fact that the rings were delivered also for sale on commission to sub-agents who failed to account for the rings or the proceeds of its sale, accused-appellant likewise failed to make good his obligation to the complainant thereby giving rise to the charge of estafa. In absolving the accused-appellant of the crime charged, we held:
Where, as in the present case, the
agents to whom personal property was entrusted for sale, conclusively proves
the inability to return the same is solely due to malfeasance of a sub-agent to
whom the first agent had actually entrusted the property in good faith, and for
the same purpose for which it was received; there being no prohibition to
do so
and the chattel
being delivered to the
sub-agent before the owner demands its return or before such
return becomes due, we hold that the first agent cannot be held guilty of estafa by either misappropriation or conversion. The abuse of
confidence that is characteristic of this offense is missing under the
circumstances.
Furthermore, in Lim v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing Nepomuceno and the case of People v. Trinidad, held that:
In cases of estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the accused personally, through his own acts, and his mere negligence in permitting another to take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1-b, of the Revised Penal Code; unless of course the evidence should disclose that the agent acted in conspiracy or connivance with the one who carried out the actual misappropriation, then the accused would be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. If there is no such evidence, direct or circumstantial, and if the proof is clear that the accused herself was the innocent victim of her sub-agent’s faithlessness, her acquittal is in order.[38]
Petitioner thus cannot be criminally
held liable for estafa. Although it cannot be denied that she
received the pieces of jewelry from complainants, evidence is wanting in proving that she
misappropriated or converted the amount of the pieces of jewelry for her own
personal use. Likewise, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show that
petitioner had conspired or connived with Bisquera. The mere
fact that petitioner failed to return the pieces of jewelry upon demand is not
proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of misappropriation or conversion.
In
addition, this Court takes notice of the findings of fact by the RTC in the
separate civil action instituted by complainants, the same docketed as Civil
Case No. 63131, dealing with the civil aspect of the case at bar:
x x x x
Jane Bisquera cannot interpose the defense that she is not privy to the transaction. Her admission that she has indeed received the pieces of jewelry which is the subject matter of the controversy and her offer to extinguish the obligation by payment or dacion en pago is contradictory to her defense. Therefore, she is estopped from interposing such a defense.
Furthermore, earlier in her transaction with Wilma Tabaniag, the principals, Sps. Espiritu, were not alien to her but were in fact disclosed to her, hence, she has knowledge that the spouses are the principals of Tabaniag.
Bisquera, being a sub-agent to Tabaniag, is in fact privy to the agreement. x x x[39]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner had in
fact transferred the pieces of jewelry
to Bisquera. Thus, contrary to the finding of the CA,
petitioner could not have converted the same for her own benefit, especially
since the pieces of jewelry were not with her, and there was no evidence of
conspiracy or connivance between petitioner and Bisquera.
Moreover,
even
Q. Now, madam witness, there is a (sic) mentioned here an amount of P300,000.00 regarding the violation
of bouncing check, am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And according to you, these were payments made by Wilma Tabaniag, am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is the drawer of these checks with a P300,000.00 that you mentioned in this particular document,
not less than P300,000.00?
A. The total
check P300,000.00 was under
my name.
Q. No, I mean, who is the drawer?
A. Mrs. Tabaniag issued and the other pieces of jewelry were issued by a certain Jane Bisquera.
Q. No, not jewelries, checks.
A. I'm sorry, checks.
Q. How much
was issued by Jane Bisquera?
A. The total
is P320,872.00
Q. That was
by Jane Bisquera alone?
A. Yes, sir.[40]
Lastly, although petitioner may have admitted that the cases she filed
against Bisquera do not involve the same checks, which are the subject matter
of the case at bar, the same does not necessarily manifest a criminal intent on
her part. On the contrary, what it shows
is that petitioner too may be an unwilling victim of this day-to-day malady of
bouncing checks, common in our business field. Certainly,
petitioner may have been negligent in entrusting the pieces of jewelry to Bisquera, but in no way can such
constitute estafa as defined in the RPC.
As a final note, a reading
of the records and transcript of the case seemingly shows an unintentional
reference by the parties in describing the transaction as one of sale.[41] The foregoing notwithstanding, if this Court
were to consider the transaction as one of sale and not one of sub-agency, the
same conclusion would nevertheless be reached, as the critical elements of
misappropriation or conversion, as previously discussed, are absent in the case
at bar.
It is the primordial duty
of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.[42] What is required of it is to justify the
conviction of the accused with moral certainty.[43] In the
case at bar, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Based on the foregoing, it would then
be unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.
Notwithstanding the
above, however, petitioner is not entirely free from any liability towards
complainants. The rule is that an
accused acquitted of estafa
may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the
evidence so warrant.[44] However,
since there is a separate civil action instituted by complainants, this Court
deems it proper for the civil aspect of the case at bar to be resolved therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24906, dated February 27, 2004, and its Resolution
dated September 22, 2004 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Wilma
Tabaniag is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, without prejudice, however, to the recovery of civil liability in Civil
Case No. 63131, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 268,
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Vicente Q. Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-46.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 22-28.
[4]
[5]
[6] Affidavit dated
[7] TSN,
[8] Records, pp. 186-188.
[9]
[10]
[11] CA rollo, pp. 10-11.
[12]
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] Exhibit “B,” folder of exhibits, p. 2.
[16] Exhibit “C,” folder of exhibits, p. 3.
[17] TSN,
[18] Exhibit “D,” folder of exhibits, p. 4.
[19] Exhibit “4,” folder of exhibits, pp. 2-4.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 51-53.
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23] CA rollo, p. 154.
[24] Rollo, p. 43.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 160-172.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Rollo, p. 16.
[30] Salazar v. People of the
[31] Records, p. 6.
[32] Exhibits “11” and “12” for the defense, folder of exhibits, pp. 19-20.
[33] TSN,
[34] Amorsolo v. People, G.R. No. L-76647,
[35] G.R. No. 130423,
[36] Rollo, p. 131.
[37] Exhibit “B” and “C,” folder of exhibits, pp. 2-3. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[38] Serona v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 35,
at 41-44. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[39] Rollo, pp. 105-106. (Emphasis supplied.)
[40] TSN,
[41] See TSN,
[42] People
v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 139341-45,
[43] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.
[44] Serona v. Court of Appeals, supra note 35.