THIRD DIVISION
|
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner, - versus - BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and
JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 164584
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR. NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: June 22,
2009 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed
in this petition for review on certiorari
are the Court of Appeals (CA)
On
P129,000.00.[5] The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.[6] Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s
funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property
to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.[7]
All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.[8]
However,
Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On
On
P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as
Music Garden Resort.
Claiming
that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages[11]
against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin
claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the
Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
No
Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in
defeault. On
In
his Answer,[14]
petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the
Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of
Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the
Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge
of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the agreement entered into
by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped
from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There
being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages (Exhibits “T”, “T-1”, “T-2”, “T-3”, “T-4”, “T-5”, “T-6” and “T-7”) entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2.
Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as
damages representing unrealized income for the residential building and
cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in
question is restored to plaintiff; and
3.
Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, for attorney’s fees and other incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The
RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and
Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any
contract involving the property.
Benjamin’s right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s
findings that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by
Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial
court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the
questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on the
last page of the document and not on every page thereof.
On
appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its
Aggrieved,
petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on the following
grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF
RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF
THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO. 74833,
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.[17]
The
petition is impressed with merit.
In
fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of
a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her
British husband. In addressing the
matter before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law
issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question.
It
is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of
Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property
was also declared for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to
petitioner, Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual owner of
the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter
into a valid contract involving the subject property without his consent.
The
trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner
and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to observe the
applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states:[18]
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, by
virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified
from acquiring private lands.[19] The
primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony.[20] Our fundamental law cannot be any
clearer. The right to acquire lands of the
public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.[21]
In
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[22]
cited in Muller v. Muller,[23]
we had the occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, “natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,” and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
“Section
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into alien’s hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
x x x x
If the term “private agricultural lands” is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that “aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,” and that “they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural.” (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.[24]
The
rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the
In
Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,[30]
Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a parcel of land, together with the improvements
thereon. Upon his death, his heirs (the
petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the estate of their
deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties among
themselves. We, however, excluded the land
and improvements thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he
never became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional
prohibition.
In
Muller v. Muller,[31]
petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married
in
In
Frenzel v. Catito,[32] petitioner,
an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos; while respondent, a
Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller.
Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law
relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since he
was disqualified from owning lands in the
Finally,
in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[33]
petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of
land that was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a
third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification
of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner’s)
intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him
was null and void.
In light of the foregoing
jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the
Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the
In
fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot
be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we
find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño, with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 54-61.
[2]
[3] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Pepito T. Ta-ay; CA rollo, pp. 102-115.
[4] Evidenced by a Marriage Contract; Exh “A,” Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.
[5] The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly executed by the parties and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan; Exh. “D,” Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.
[6] Rollo, p. 55.
[7]
[8] The licenses and permits were under the name of Joselyn’s sister because at the time of the application, Joselyn was still a minor.
[9] Exh. “V”; Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.
[10] Exh. “T”; Folder of Exhibits of the Plaintiff.
[11] Records, pp. 1-3.
[12]
[13] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes, with Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, concurring;
[14]
[15]
[16] Supra note 1.
[17] Rollo, pp. 554-556.
[18] A similar provision was set forth in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, viz:
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states:
“Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution also states:
“Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public domain.”
[19] Muller
v. Muller, G.R. No. 149615,
[20] Muller
v. Muller,
[21] Ting
Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, G.R. No. 130115,
[22] 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
[23] Supra.
[24]
[25] The instances when aliens may be
allowed to acquire private lands in the
(a)
By hereditary succession (Section 7, Article XII, Philippine Constitution).
(b)
A natural-born citizen of the
(c) Americans who may have acquired tile to private lands during the effectivity of the Parity Agreement shall hold valid title thereto as against private persons (Section 11, Article XVII, 1973 Constitution).
[26] Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, supra. note 21.
[27] Muller
v. Muller, supra. note 19; Frenzel v.
Catito, supra. note 19.
[28] Muller
v. Muller,
[29] Cheesman
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833,
[30] Supra.
[31] Supra.
[32] Supra.
[33] Supra.
[34] Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra. at 103-104.