GRACE GOSIENGFIAO GUILLEN, deceased
EMMA GOSIENGFIAO GALAOS,
represented by her
daughter EMELYN GALAOS-MELARION, deceased FRANCISCO GOSIENGFIAO, JR., represented
by his widow EDELWISA GOSIENGFIAO, JACINTO
GOSIENGFIAO, and absentees ESTER GOSIENGFIAO BITONIO, NORMA GOSIENGFIAO, and PINKY
BUENO PEDROSO, represented by
their attorney-in-fact JACINTO
GOSIENGFIAO,
Petitioners, - versus - THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JIMMY HENRY F. LUCZON, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, LEONARDO MARIANO, AVELINA TIGUE, LAZARO MARIANO, MERCEDES SAN PEDRO,
DIONISIA M. AQUINO, and JOSE N.T. AQUINO, Respondents. |
G.
R. No. 159755 Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, *YNARES-SANTIAGO, **CHICO-NAZARIO, ***LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: June 18, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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At issue in this
petition is the timeliness of the exercise of the right of legal redemption that
this Court has recognized in a final and executory decision.
The petitioners, heirs
of Francisco Gosiengfiao (petitioner-heirs), assail in this Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari the
BACKGROUND
FACTS
I. G.R.
No. 101522 - Mariano v. Court of Appeals
The previous case where
we recognized the petitioner-heirs’ right of legal redemption is Mariano v. CA.[2]
To quote, by way of background, the
factual antecedents that Mariano recognized:
It
appears on record that the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao is the registered
owner of a residential lot located at Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan,
particularly described as follows, to wit:
The eastern portion
of
and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2416 recorded in
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan.
The
lot in question was mortgaged by the decedent to the Rural Bank of Tuguegarao
(designated as mortgagee bank, for brevity) on several occasions before the
last, being on
On
The
loan being unpaid, the lot in dispute was foreclosed by the mortgagee bank, and
in the foreclosure sale held on December 27, 1963, the same was awarded to the
mortgagee bank as the highest bidder.
On
P1,347.89 and the balance of P423.35 was paid on
On
On
Sometime
in 1982, plaintiff-appellant Grace Gosiengfiao learned of the sale of said
property by the third-party defendants. She went to the Barangay Captain and
asked for a confrontation with defendants Leonardo and Avelina Mariano to
present her claim to the said property.
On
On
On
Defendants
in their answer alleged that the plaintiffs has [sic] no cause of action
against them as the money used to redeem the lot in question was solely from
the personal funds of third-party defendant Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, who
consequently became the sole owner of the said property and thus validly sold
the entire property to the defendants, and the fact that defendants had already
sold the said property to their children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M.
Aquino. Defendants further contend that even granting that the plaintiffs are
co-owners with the third-party defendants, their right of redemption had
already been barred by the Statute of Limitations under Article 1144 of the
Civil Code, if not by laches.
On
On
Our Decision, promulgated on
Premises
considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence
of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not
begun to run.
WHEREFORE,
the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Aside from this express declaration, the
Court explained that, as the property was mortgaged by the decedent,
co-ownership existed among his heirs during the period given by law to redeem
the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole property by co-owner Amparo
did not vest in her the sole ownership over the property, as the redemption
inured to the benefit of all co-owners; redemption will not put an end to
co-ownership, as it is not a mode of terminating a co-ownership. The Court also distinguished[6] between Articles 1088[7]
and 1620[8]
of the Civil Code and ruled as inapplicable the doctrine that “the giving of a
copy of the deed of sale to the co-heirs as equivalent to a notice.”[9] On
II.
Execution of the
Mariano Decision
(G.R.
No. 101522) By the
a. The Incidents
On
On P53,760.[13] On
From 1994 to 1995, the respondent-buyers
filed four motions: a motion for reconsideration of the May 11, 1994 order
granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution;[16]
a motion to ascertain the redemptive shares of third-party defendants;[17]
a motion to declare the petitioner-heirs to have lost their right of legal
redemption;[18]
and a motion to expunge from the records the petitioner-heirs’ notice of
redemption.[19]
b.
The Judge Beltran Rulings
On December
4, 1995, the
trial court, through
Judge Orlando Beltran,[20]
issued an order (1) recalling the writ of execution for “incorrectly” quoting
the dispositive portion of the CA decision and nullifying the notice to vacate;
(2) denying the motion to ascertain third-party defendants’ shares, as Amparo’s
redemption inured to the benefit of her co-heirs, thus, each of the 10 heirs
has 1/10 equal share of the lot; (3) denying the third motion as no written
notice of the sale has been served on the petitioner-heirs by the vendor or by
the vendee; and (4) denying the last motion for lack of legal and factual
basis.[21] The
trial court thereafter denied the respondent-buyers’ motion for reconsideration
that followed.[22]
On
On
On
c.
The Judge Luczon Rulings
On September 26, 1997,
the trial court, through Judge Jimmy Henry F. Luczon, Jr.,[25]
issued an order granting the respondent-buyers’
omnibus motion for reconsideration of the
The trial court denied
the petitioner-heirs’ motion for reconsideration of the September 26, 1997
order, ruling that the introduction of the deed of sale as the parties’
evidence in the trial and higher courts was sufficient to give the petitioner-heirs
written notice of the sale; and that the Civil Code does not require any
particular form of written notice or distinctive method for written
notification of redemption.
III.
The Assailed Court of Appeals Decision
The petitioner-heirs
thereupon went to the CA on a petition for certiorari
to question the lower court’s orders.
(They had earlier filed an Appeal Ad Cautelam which the CA
consolidated with the petition for certiorari.)[27] As grounds, they cited the lower court’s lack
of jurisdiction since the motions ruled upon were really initiatory pleadings
based on causes of action independent of, although related to, Civil Case No.
3129, and that no certificate of non-forum shopping was attached, nor any
docket fees paid. They also claimed that
the respondent-buyers’ motion was a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration that the lower court could not rule upon, and one that was
filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal.[28]
Finally, they faulted the lower court for ignoring the law of the case, as established in Mariano.
The respondent-buyers questioned
the petition on technicalities, but focused on the issue of whether the final
and executory decision of this Court in Mariano
was effectively a written notice of sale to the heirs; they continued to
maintain that the redemption period should run from the finality of our
Decision, and, thus, had already lapsed.
The CA followed the respondent-buyers’
lead and likewise focused on the effect of our Decision on the petitioner-heirs’
redemption of the disputed co-owned property.
To quote the appellate court:
The
pivot of inquiry here is: whether or not the final and executory Decision of
the Supreme Court constitutes written notice to plaintiffs-appellants [herein
petitioner-heirs].
x
x x
It is undisputed that the Highest
Magistrate’s Decision in G.R. 101522 had
become final and executory on
The Entry of Judgment of G.R. 101522
states as follows, thus:
This is to certify that on
Premises
considered, respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence
of a written certification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has
not even begun to run.
WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
and
that the same has, on
As
it is an established procedure in court that when an entry of judgment was
issued, it means that the contending parties were already properly notified of
the same either through the parties themselves or through their respective
counsels.
Thus,
the very existence of the Supreme Court’s Entry of Judgment negates plaintiffs-appellants’
claim that no notice of what [sic]
nature was received by them insofar as G.R. 101522 was concerned.
Concomitantly,
the Court concurs with the argument of respondents-appellees [herein
respondent-buyers] that the thirty (30) days grace period within which to
redeem the contested property should be counted from
As
they failed to redeem the same in accordance with the instruction of the High
Court, plaintiffs-appellants lost all the rights and privileges granted to them
by the Supreme Court in G.R. 101522.
From
the foregoing facts, it is clear that plaintiffs-appellants had slept from
their rights and their failure to exercise the same within the period allowed
by the High Court is deemed a waiver on their part.
All
told, the Court holds and so rules that the court a quo erred not in reversing itself.
To
summarize, the appellate court ruled that (1) because an entry of judgment had
been made, the Mariano Decision is
deemed to have been served on the petitioner-heirs; (2) based on this premise,
the appellate court held that the 30-day redemption period should run from
August 2, 1993 (the date of the entry of judgment); and (3) for the petitioner-heirs’
failure to redeem within that period, they “lost all the rights and privileges
granted to them by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 101522.”
THE
PETITION
Faced with the CA’s
ruling and the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioner-heirs
filed the present petition with this Court.
They argue in this petition and in their memorandum that the
First. They clarify that their theory that the Decision
of this Court is not the written notice required by law was not anchored on
lack of notice of that decision, but on Article 1623 of the Civil Code: the
written notice should be given by the vendor, not by this Court by virtue of a
final decision. The CA erred and abused
its discretion in concluding that they lost their right of redemption under this
Court’s Decision because the start of the redemption period is not reckoned
from the date of the finality of that decision; the Decision is not the source
of their right to redeem.
Second. They posit a redemption period is not a
prescriptive period, and the lower courts erred in considering the 30-day
period as an extinctive prescriptive period because legal redemption under
Article 1623 does not prescribe. The
period has not even begun to run. Their use
of the services of the sheriff to exercise their right of redemption through a
motion for execution was approved by this Court as a method of redemption.
In their Comment, the respondent-buyers stress that
the main issue in this petition is whether the petitioner-heirs’ right of legal
redemption, as recognized in G.R. No. 101522, had been lost. The “non-reviewable” findings of facts of the
trial and appellate courts that plaintiffs exercised their right of redemption
late, and that the decision in G.R. No. 101522 had already become final, bind
this Court.
In their Reply to Comment, the
petitioner-heirs argue that the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623
cannot be reckoned from the date of finality of this Court’s Decision in G.R.
No. 101522 because it is not and cannot be a “notice” in writing by the vendor;
this Court is not the vendor and a written notice by the vendor is mandatory for
the 30-day redemption period to run. The
Decision negates the notion that it serves as a “notice,” because it clearly
states that the period of redemption had not begun to run. Having previously exercised the right of
redemption, the execution was nothing more than the implementation of what had
been the final ruling of this Court.
In their memorandum, the
respondent-buyers maintain that the petitioner-heirs’ “time-barred” right to
redeem the property was not cured by the notice of redemption and by their
“late” tender of the redemption money; since the petitioner-heirs were exercising
their right of legal redemption by virtue of the Decisions of this Court and
the CA, it was incumbent upon them to effectuate the steps of redemption
seasonably. The “belated” notice of
redemption and tender of payment of redemption price were not bona fide, as they were not made within
the required period.
THE
COURT’S RULING
The parties’ positions all
focus, and rightly so, on the main issue: when
did the 30-day period to redeem the subject property start? This is a
question of law, not of fact, as the respondent-buyers erroneously claim; thus,
the lower courts’ findings cannot bind this Court.
The appellate court unfortunately
failed to appreciate the breadth and significance of this issue, simply
ruling on the case based on the implications of an entry of judgment. Because
of this myopic view, it completely missed the thrust and substance of
the Mariano Decision.
We
grant the petition and hold – pursuant to the Mariano Decision and based on the subsequent pleaded developments –
that the petitioner-heirs have effectively exercised their right of redemption
and are now the owners of the redeemed property pursuant to the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Redemption.
A significant aspect of
Mariano that the CA failed to
appreciate is our confirmation of the ruling that a written notice must be
served by the vendor.[29] We ruled as follows:
The
requirement of a written notice has long been settled as early as in the case
of Castillo v. Samonte (106 Phil.
1023 [1960]) where this
Court quoted the ruling in Hernaez v. Hernaez
(32 Phil. 214), thus:
Both
the letter and spirit of the New Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen
the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any
other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of
the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as
sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no
necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the
said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or
information was sufficient.
x x x
The
ruling in Castillo v. Samonte, supra,
was reiterated in the case of Garcia v.
Calaliman (G.R. No. 26855, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 201) where We also discussed
the reason for the requirement of the written notice. We said:
Consistent
with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision (Article
1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written notice is
indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manners by
the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written
notice, as exacted by the code to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its
terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not
definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of
notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any
particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written
notification of redemption (Conejero et
al. v. Court of Appeals et al., 16 SCRA 775 [1966]; Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]; Cabrera v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 75069,
April 15, 1988).
We also made the factual finding that:
The
records of the present petition, however, show no written notice of the sale
being given whatsoever to private respondents [petitioner-heirs]. Although,
petitioners allege that sometime on
From these premises, we
ruled that “[P]etitioner-heirs have not
lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the
sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.” These premises and conclusion leave no doubt
about the thrust of Mariano: The right of the petitioner-heirs to
exercise their right of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period
for its exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been
notified in writing of the fact of sale.
This is what our Decision held, as the penultimate paragraph and the
dispositive portion clearly state. This
is the law of the case that should
guide all other proceedings on the case, particularly its execution.[30]
For the Luczon ruling and the CA to miss
or misinterpret the clear ruling in Mariano
– the Decision subject of the execution – is a gross and patent legal error
that cannot but lead to the reversal of their decisions.
In light of this
conclusion, we see no need to discuss the other presented issues. We hold that the computation of the 30-day
period to exercise the legal right of redemption did not start to run from the
finality of the Mariano Decision, and
that the petitioner-heirs seasonably filed, via
a writ of execution, their notice of redemption, although they applied for the
issuance of the writ some eight (8) months after the finality of the
Decision. In seeking the execution of a
final and executory decision of this Court, what controls is Section 11, Rule
51,[31]
in relation to Section 2, Rule 56,[32]
of the Rules of Court. Before the trial
court executing the decision, Section 6, Rule 39,[33]
on the question of timeliness of the execution, governs. Eight (8) months after the finality of the
judgment to be executed is still a seasonable time for execution by motion
pursuant to this provision. The writ,
notice of redemption, and the tender of payment were all duly served, so that
it was legally in order for the Sheriff to issue a Certificate of Redemption
when the respondent-buyers failed to comply with the writ and to accept the
notice and the tender of payment.
WHEREFORE,
in light of the foregoing, we hereby GRANT
the petition and, accordingly, REVERSE and SET ASIDE the January
17, 2003 decision and September 9, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 63093. The petitioner-heirs’ exercise of their right
of redemption of co-heirs Amparo G. Ibarra, Antonio C. Gosiengfiao, Carlos Gosiengfiao,
and Severino Gosiengfiao’s shares over Lot
1351-A, Plan Psd-67391, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2416, and
located in Ugac Sur, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in view of their March 31, 1995 Notice
of Redemption and the April 18, 1995 Certificate of Redemption issued by the Sheriff
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, is hereby declared
VALID and LEGAL.
Costs against the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional Member of the
Second Division per Special Order No. 645 dated
**
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
***Designated
additional Member of the Second Division effective
[1] CA Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., ponente; Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
[2]
G.R. No. 101522,
[3] The decision was penned by Judge Juan P.
Jimenez, RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
[4]
Supra note 1.
[5]
Supra note 2.
[6]
The Court held: “According to Tolentino, the fine distinction between
Article 1088 and Article 1620 is that when the sale consists of an interest in
some particular property or properties of the inheritance, the right of
redemption that arises in favor of the other co-heirs is that recognized in
Article 1620. On the other hand, if the
sale is the hereditary right itself, fully or in part, in the abstract sense,
without specifying any particular object, the right recognized in Article 1088
exists.”
[7] Art.
1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before
the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of
the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
[8] Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise
the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly
excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
[9] The Court further held: “Petitioners allege that upon the facts and circumstances of the present case, respondents failed to exercise their right of legal redemption during the period provided by law, citing as authority the case of Conejero, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (16 SCRA 775) wherein the Court adopted the principle that the giving of a copy of a deed is equivalent to the notice as required by law in legal redemption. We do not dispute the principle laid down in the Conejero case. However, the facts in the said case are not four square with the facts of the present case. In Conejero, redemptioner Enrique Conejero was shown and given a copy of the deed of sale of the subject property. The Court in that case stated that the furnishing of a copy of the deed was equivalent to the giving of a written notice required by law.”
[10]
Records,
Vol. II, p. 164.
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 429.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] RTC, Branch IV, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan.
[21] Rollo, pp. 120-123.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] RTC, Branch 1, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 152-155.
[27]
Per Resolution dated February 9, 2000 of the Former Fifteenth Division
of the CA (see CA-G.R. SP No. 51857 rollo, pp. 245-247), CA-G.R. SP No.
51857 was ordered consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 63093, which involved the
same issues and parties, provided that the ponencia
of the civil case conformed to the consolidation pursuant to Rule 3, Section 7
(b) (3) of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals directing that
the consolidated cases shall pertain to the justice to whom the civil case is
assigned. On
[28] Rollo, pp. 71 – 73, supported by
Annexes A to A-20.
[29] Parenthetically, Mariano is not the latest ruling on the
requirement of notice from the vendor.
In Perpetua vda. De Ape v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133638,
Despite the plain
language of the law, this Court has, over the years, been tasked to interpret
the "written notice requirement" of the above-quoted provision. In
the case Butte v. Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc., we declared that —
In considering
whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by
the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623
clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption
are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ.
Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the
redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the stranger, the
redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine
legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving
notice, and that method must be deemed exclusive. (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne
v. State, 12 S.W. 2(d) 528). As ruled in Wampler v. Lecompte, 150
Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [
why these provisions were
inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume until the
contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which
warranted the legislature in so legislating.
The reasons for
requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer,
are easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position
to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale.
Also, the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to fact of the sale, its
perfection; and its validity, the notice being a reaffirmation thereof, so that
the party notified need not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest
the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by
the buyer.
The interpretation
was somehow modified in the case of De Conejero, et al. v. Court of Appeals,
et al., wherein it was pointed out that Article 1623 "does not
prescribe a particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying
the redemptioner" thus, as long as the redemptioner was notified in
writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the redemption period starts
to run. This view was reiterated in Etcuban v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al., Cabrera v. Villanueva, Garcia, et al. v.
Calaliman, et al., Distrito, et al. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al., and Mariano, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
However, in the
case of Salatandol v. Retes, wherein the plaintiffs were not furnished
any written notice of sale or a copy thereof by the vendor, this Court again
referred to the principle enunciated in the case of
Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is
clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the vendor or
prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for
construction. Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former
Civil Code and Art. 1623 of the present one is that the former did not specify
who must give the notice, whereas the present one expressly says the notice
must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory
language.
In this case, the
records are bereft of any indication that Fortunato was given any written
notice of prospective or consummated sale of the portions of Lot No. 2319 by
the vendors or would-be vendors. The thirty (30)-day redemption period under
the law, therefore, has not commenced to run.
[30] In Vios
v. Pantangco, Jr., G.R. 163103,
[T]he opinion delivered on a
former appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an
appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court
for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case
upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
[31] Rule 51, Sec. 11. Execution of judgment.
Except where the judgment or
final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately
executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court
after its entry.
x x x
[32]
Rule 56, Sec. 2. Rules applicable.
The procedure in original cases
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus
shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution,
laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this Rule, subject to the following
provisions:
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of
Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the Supreme Court;
x x x
[33] Rule 39, Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by
independent action.
A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.