Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
JESSE
Y. YAP, Petitioner, - versus - HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 159186 Present:
Ynares-Santiago,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: June
5, 2009
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- - - - - - x DECISION PERALTA, J.: |
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This
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolution[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the Decision[2] dated
April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner
Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business
through their company Primetown Property Group.
Sometime
in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te
(Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks
from Evelyn.
In
the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early
part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank,
they were dishonored for the reason that the “Account is Closed.” Demands
were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make
good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
On
Subsequently,
on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City
filed several informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to
suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a prejudicial question
and motion to exclude the private
prosecutor from participating in the proceedings.[6] Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the
criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were
finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders[7]
dated
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[11] before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil
Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge.
On
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which
was denied in an Order dated
Thereafter,
petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus
with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[15]
docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
On
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful
perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved
therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the
petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to
collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have
rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and
the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from
each other. It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale
that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks. Therefore,
petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the
validity of the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We
cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such sale by filing an action
for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the
sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and
6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.[17]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[18]
which was denied in the Order[19]
dated
Hence,
the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.[20]
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial
question, as defined by law and jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It
is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection
of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil
cases, the issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from
the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical
antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid
consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it
necessarily follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically
requires, among other elements, that the check should have been issued for account
or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no violation of
the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for
the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and
to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made
this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the
purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231
and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue
in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and
Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising
from the checks. These checks were
issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the
same checks to private complainants. The
checks were subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG
maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no bearing on the
issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[21]
The present case hinges on the determination of whether
there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny
the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists
in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale
behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.[22]
If both civil
and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately
related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would
likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.
It must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question.[23]
Neither is there a prejudicial
question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.[24]
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is
guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether the
private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the
value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions,
even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the value of the
checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge
of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.[25]
In Jose v. Suarez,[26]
the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest
rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said
interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the
cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled
that “whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually
declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome
of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere
issuance of bouncing checks. In fact,
the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a
bouncing check has been issued.”
Further,
We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,[27]
that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x x
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[28]
Moreover,
petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul[29] is misplaced. The case of Ras involves
a complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged
double sale. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the
defendant in the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject
matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial
question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very
same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of
whether the petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of
the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or innocence of the
petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether
petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its
issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts,
it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In
addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a
defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and
merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and
weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better
ventilated during trial proper.
Precisely,
the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights
of the parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations
and evidence through a well designed machinery termed “trial.” Thus, all the defenses available to the
accused should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not
the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the case for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming
the decision of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 646 dated May158, 2009.
** Designated to sit as an additional
member, per Special Order No. 631 dated
[1] Penned by
Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate
Justices
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 773, 781-782, citing Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 490, 499 (1997) and Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).
[23] People
v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193,
January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 370,
citing Sabandal v. Tongco, 366 SCRA
567 (2001), Alano v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 549 (1997), Benitez
v. Concepcion, Jr., 112 Phil. 105 (1961), Te v. Court of Appeals,
346 SCRA 327 (2000), Beltran v. People, 334 SCRA 106 (2000), and Isip
v. Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 (1971).
[24]
Sabandal v. Tongco, supra note
23, citing Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 (1974).
[25] Lozano
v.
[26] Supra note 22.
[27] G.R. No. 154438,
[28] Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 100, citing Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).
[29]
G.R. Nos. L-50441-42,