Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
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ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II,
Petitioner, -versus- THE COURT OF APPEALS
and HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR., in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan,
Respondents. |
G.R. No.
152889 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* Corona,** NACHURA, and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: June
5, 2009 |
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PERALTA, J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari
under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction of the Decision[1]
of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 67115 dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by herein petitioner against Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan.
The factual
and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Honorato Galvez and his driver were
fatally shot on June 9, 2000 in Barangay
San Juan, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. On
June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged murder of the said victims was filed
by the 303rd Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
Division (PNP CID) Team with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor against the following: Cirilo de la Cruz,
Guilberto Chico, Edmund Fernando, two persons named Ronald and Gerry, three (3)
John Does, and Eulogio Villanueva. Likewise,
on July 14, 2000, a complaint for murder against petitioner Enrique Viudez II was
filed by Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor Honorato Galvez, for the killing of
the latter and his driver.[2]
On March 31, 2001, a Resolution was issued by the Investigating State Prosecutor finding
probable cause to indict the petitioner and others for the crime of
murder. On September 19, 2001, two (2) Informations[3]
for murder were filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued warrants of arrest on the
same day.[4]
On
September 21, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant
of Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of the Department of
Justice (DOJ)[5] arguing
that all the accused in the said criminal cases had filed a timely petition for
review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to Section 9[6]
of Department Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest
against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of
the said petition for review.
In an Order[7]
dated September 28, 2001, the RTC denied petitioner’s Motion stating that, insofar as the implementation of the warrant
of arrest against petitioner was concerned, said warrant had already been
issued for his apprehension. The court also added that there was no way for it
to recall the same in the absence of any compelling reason, and that
jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it; hence, petitioner
had no personality to file any pleading in court relative to the case until he
was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said Order, but was denied in an Order dated October 10, 2001.
Thereafter,
petitioner filed with the CA on October 11, 2001, a petition for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injuction[8] claiming the following:
x x x The
Order of September 28, 2001 and the Order of October 10, 2001 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. This is because of the following reasons:
(a) The fact that the petitioner has not
voluntarily surrendered nor arrested is not a legal impediment or obstacle to
the suspension of the implementation of the warrant of arrest issued against
the petitioner.
(b) Precisely, the petitioner has prayed
for the suspension of the implementation of the warrant of arrest because if he
is arrested or voluntarily surrenders to the Court, the issues on the
suspension of the implementation of the warrant of arrest would become moot and
academic. It is for this reason that the petitioner has prayed for the
suspension of the implementation of the warrant of arrest. The petitioner is
merely availing of his rights under the law. There would be a waiver on the
part of the petitioner if he surrenders to the lower court. Meantime, he would
be deprived of his provisional liberty pending the resolution of his petition
for review. The clear intention of Department Circular No. 70 is to suspend all
proceedings including the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending
resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for review.
(c) The
authority of the Secretary of Justice to entertain the petition for
review even after the filing of the informations is settled. In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Hon.
Rolando How, the High Court ruled, “the authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has
already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with
the 30-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act.”
(d) Moreover, the authority of the
Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of the Chief State Prosecutor,
Provincial or City Prosecutors is recognized by Sec. 4 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(e) Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly recognizes the authority and power of the
Department of Justice to prescribe the rules to be followed in cases of a
petition for review of a resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor, Provincial
or City Prosecutors. The rules provide “if upon petition by a proper party
under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe,” clearly
recognizing the power of the Secretary of Justice to promulgate rules to be
followed in petitions for review of appeals from resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor, Provincial or City Prosecutor.
(f) Pursuant to the rule-making power of
the Secretary of Justice, Department Circular No. 70 was promulgated by the
Secretary of Justice providing that “the appellant and the trial prosecutor
shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in
court are held in abeyance.
(g) The implementation of the warrant of
arrest issued against the petitioner is part of the proceedings in court. Since
the circular unequivocally provides that the “proceedings in court are held in
abeyance” pending resolution of the petition for review or appeal, it follows
that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it denied the motion to suspend the implementation of the
warrant of arrest. There is even no opposition by the trial prosecutor to the
motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner.[9]
In a
Resolution[10]
dated October 16, 2001, the CA found that the verified petition of petitioner
sufficiently showed that unless the implementation of the warrants of arrest
dated September 19, 2001 in Criminal Case Nos. 2492-M-2001 and 2693-M-2001 were
temporarily enjoined before the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction could be heard on notice, great or irreparable injury would be
visited upon the petitioner, as he could momentarily be arrested and detained
upon non-bailable charges. Thus, the CA
granted a TRO, commanding respondent RTC Judge Gabo to enjoin the
implementation of the said warrants of arrest.
Respondents
RTC Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch II of Malolos, Bulacan, and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued in their Comment (with motion to lift
temporary restraining order and
opposition to the application for
the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction)[11]
dated November 12, 2001, that the determination of whether to issue a warrant
of arrest after the filing of an information was a function that was exclusively
vested in respondent Judge. Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way
obligated to defer the implementation of the service of the warrant of arrest
simply because a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the
Secretary of Justice to question the filing of the information against the same
petitioner. As to their Opposition to the application for issuance of
preliminary injunction with motion to lift temporary restraining order, the
public respondents contended that the issue proposed by petitioner was the mere
suspension of the implementation of the warrant of arrest to await the resolution
of the Department of Justice; hence, respondent Judge was under no obligation
to suspend the proceedings, because the issuance of the warrant of arrest was
his exclusive function.
On December
19, 2001, the CA promulgated its Decision[12] dismissing
the petition for certiorari for lack
of merit and found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the
respondent Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged Orders. The court added that, since the premise of
petitioner's conclusion was erroneous – for said circular and the cases cited
did not make it obligatory for respondent Judge to grant petitioner's motion –
petitioner's cause was lost. It also
stated that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in any
circular of this Court, even in any of its decision was it ever pronounced that
when a petition for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor --
finding probable cause to indict a respondent -- is filed with the Office of
the Secretary of Justice, the court which earlier issued warrants of arrest, should
suspend their enforcement.
In an Order[13]
dated January 9, 2002, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest for the apprehension of petitioner by virtue of the expiration
of the effectivity of the TRO issued by the CA.
Petitioner
filed with the CA a Motion for Reconsideration[14]
dated January 3, 2002 of the Decision
dated December 19, 2001, which was eventually denied by the same court in its Resolution[15]
dated April 11, 2002, stating, among others, that it found nothing to justify a
modification, much less a reversal, of its judgment. The court further stated that the motion for reconsideration
had not presented any fresh argument or raised any new matter that would need
an extended discussion, and that the points stressed were the same as those
already discussed in the petition and other papers of the petitioner which were
fully considered in the decision.
Hence, the
instant petition.
Petitioner claimed,
among others, that the Decision of the CA was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that Department
Circular No. 70 of the Department of Justice promulgated on July 3, 2000 was
plainly a directive of the Secretary of Justice to the accused and the trial
prosecutor to ask the Court to suspend the proceedings thereon during the
pendency of the appeal. According to petitioner, the said department circular
had the force and effect of law. He cited
cases[16]
wherein this Court ruled that administrative regulations adopted pursuant to
law had the force and effect of law. Petitioner
also pointed out that the same department circular stated that its promulgation
was in line with recent jurisprudence. Anent
the prayer for the issuance of a TRO, petitioner argued that unless a TRO was
issued enjoining the implementation of the warrant of arrest dated September
19, 2001 and the alias warrant of arrest issued by virtue of the Order of
January 9, 2002, he stood to suffer great and irreparable injury, as he would
be deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
In a
Resolution[17]
dated May 6, 2002, this Court resolved to issue the TRO prayed for by petitioner
and to direct respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing the
warrant of arrest dated September 19, 2001 against petitioner and the alias
warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order of January 9, 2002 in Criminal
Case Nos. 2492-M-2001 and 2493-M-2001, entitled “People of the Philippines vs.
Enrique V. Viudez II, et al.,”
effective immediately until further orders from the same Court.
In its
Comment[18]
dated June 13, 2002, the OSG stated that the determination of whether to issue
a warrant of arrest after the filing of an information was a function that was
exclusively vested in respondent Judge. Respondent Judge, therefore, was in no way
obliged to defer the implementation of the service of the warrant simply
because a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the Secretary of
Justice to question the filing of the information against him. The OSG further argued that the respondent Judge
did not need to wait for the completion of the preliminary investigation before
issuing a warrant of arrest, for Section 4, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that the head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest
has been delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof. As an opposition to the application for
issuance of preliminary injunction and as a motion to lift the temporary
restraining order, the OSG stated that the petitioner did not challenge the
finding of probable cause of respondent Judge in the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against him. Petitioner simply wanted a deferment of its
implementation by virtue of Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70; hence,
according to the OSG, the issuance of the TRO was tantamount to an abatement of
the criminal proceedings.
Petitioner,
in its Opposition[19]
to the motion to lift temporary restraining order dated September 5, 2002
stated that the discussion of the evidence of the prosecution by the OSG was
way off the mark, because the only issue to be resolved in the present petition
was whether the implementation of the warrant of arrest issued by the RTC
should be suspended pending resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the
petition for review filed by petitioner. He also reiterated that the lifting of the
TRO would cause grave and irreparable injury to his rights because no bail had
been recommended for his provisional liberty.
On September
19, 2002, petitioner filed a Manifestation[20]
informing this Court that the Secretary of Justice had already sustained his
petition for review. A photocopy of the Resolution[21] of the Secretary of Justice,
promulgated on September 13, 2002, was attached to the said manifestation, the
dispositive portion of which reads, among others:
[t]he Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave of court,
for the withdrawal of the information for murder (2 counts) against Mayor
Enrique V. Viudez II and Eulogio Villanueva immediately. In view of the same
resolution, according to petitioner, the motion of the OSG for the lifting of
the TRO issued by this Court has no more legal basis and should be denied for
lack of merit.
In his Reply[22] to the Comment of the OSG, dated November 6,
2002, petitioner reiterated that the Secretary of Justice had already issued a
resolution on the petition for review that he filed with the said office, and
that the State Prosecutor had already filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw
the information against him and his co-accused; hence, the instant petition may
already be moot and academic because of the said developments.
On December
2, 2002, this Court resolved to give due course to the present petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[23] Petitioner eventually filed his Memorandum[24] dated
February 4, 2003, while the OSG filed its Memorandum on March 24, 2003.
Before this
Court shall delve into its disquisition on the issue propounded by petitioner, it
is worth noting that in his Memorandum[25] dated February 4, 2003, petitioner reiterated
that the Secretary of Justice had already resolved the petition for review and
ordered the withdrawal of the informations for murder filed against the same
petitioner with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, ruling that there was no probable
cause for the filing of the said informations. Accordingly,
as contained in the same Memorandum, the Office of the State Prosecutor filed a
Motion[26] to Withdraw the Informations, which the RTC
granted on October 23, 2002. [27]
Furthermore, in a Resolution dated May 6, 2002, this Court already resolved to
issue a TRO as prayed for by petitioner. These developments would necessarily render the
instant petition moot and academic; however, as implored by petitioner, this
Court will render its decision on the merits of the case in the interest of
justice.
The basic
issue propounded by petitioner is whether a pending resolution of a petition
for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable
cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the
implementation of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioner
cites DOJ Department Circular No. 70, specifically paragraph 2 of Section 9
thereof, which provides that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see
to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held
in abeyance. Somehow, petitioner is of
the opinion that the suspension of proceedings in court, as provided in the
said circular, includes the suspension of the implementation of warrants of
arrest issued by the court.
Petitioner's
contention is wrong.
It is well to
remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry, which
determines probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest;
and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable
cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper –
whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor. [28]
As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[29] the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the
rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion;
it requires less than evidence that would justify conviction. [30]
The purpose of the mandate of the
judge to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to
insulate from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. [31]
The function of the judge to issue a
warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus,
the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending
the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of
arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge. It must be emphasized that petitioner filed
with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the
implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not
a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to the validity
or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to
defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the
Secretary of Justice of the petition for review that he filed citing the following
directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular:
x x
x x
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall
see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are
held in abeyance. [32]
The
above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the
appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy
to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state
that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court
whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant
of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains
unhindered. This is in consonance with
the earlier ruling[33] of
this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best
and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial
court merely exercised his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's
motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA was correct when it
found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion in issuing the challenged orders.
Neither
does this Court find any applicability of the cases cited by the petitioner to
the instant case.
Petitioner
has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in
court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest
pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance
with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac
v. Villon,[37]
and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38]
A
close reading of the factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a common issue
among them is whether the arraignment of an accused may be deferred pending
resolution by the Secretary of Justice of a petition for review on the finding
of probable cause, to which this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere in the said decisions did it state
that the implementation or enforcement of the warrant of arrest was also
deferred or suspended, as herein petitioner prays for. Thus, as ruled in Ledesma:[39]
Where the secretary of justice exercises his
power of review only after an information has been filed, trial courts should
defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is
resolved. Such deferment or suspension,
however, does not signify that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of
justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by
the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution by the secretary of justice
to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
It was also decided in Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc.[40]
that:
Procedurally speaking, after the filing of
the information, the court is in complete control of the case and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision to suspend
arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice is an exercise of such discretion.
The
ruling in Dimatulac,[41]as well, reads:
We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge
Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of
the Yabuts on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the offended parties
were deprived of due process.
And
in Marcelo,[42]
this Court enunciated that:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in
a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers
the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the
resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to
dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in
that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.
Finally,
in Roberts, petitioner claimed that this Court, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, clearly directed the deferment of the issuance of the
warrant of arrest pending resolution of the petition for review by the
Secretary of Justice when it ruled that, in the meantime, respondent Judge
Asuncion was directed to cease and desist from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. Q-93-43198 and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioner. According to petitioner, the said dispositive portion is borne out
by the finding of this Court that:
x x x
[I]t was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to
suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:
“This case is already
in this Court for trial. To follow whatever the opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity
of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.” The real
and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of his court is not the
filing of the aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the
filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on a basis of a
resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the
investigating prosecutor. Once a motion
to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or
deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful
exercise of judicial prerogative.[43]
However,
the above observation of petitioner is inaccurate, if not erroneous.
What
this Court adjudged as premature in Roberts was the respondent judge's
denial of the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the
ground that the case was already in his court for trial and to follow whatever opinion
the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity of his court, which was still capable of
administering justice. In dispelling the ground relied upon by the respondent
judge, this Court ruled that the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw
the information, on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review
reversing the finding of the investigating prosecutor, was the real and
ultimate test of the independence and integrity of his court. Therefore, what was disapproved by this Court
was not the denial per se of the motions, but the reasoning behind
it. It was from that premise that this Court
ordered in the dispositive portion of its decision to defer the issuance of the
warrants of arrest. Of more importance still was the fact that, whereas the
questioned motions in Roberts were for the suspension of proceedings and
deferment of arraignment, the issue in the instant case is the suspension of
the implementation of a warrant of arrest, which this Court did not rule upon
in the former case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction dated April 25, 2002 is DENIED -- the petition for review, for lack
of merit; and the issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction, for
being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 638 dated May 8, 2009.
** Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 631 dated April 29, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion L. Aquino, with Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now retired Justice of the Supreme Court) and Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-41.
[2] CA Decision dated December 19, 2001, id.
[3] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2492-M-2001 and 2493-M-2001; rollo, pp. 59-62; 63-65.
[4]
CA decision, supra.
[5] Rollo, pp. 67-92.
[6] Section 9. Effect of the Appeal. Unless the Secretary of Justice directs otherwise, the appeal shall
not hold the filing of the corresponding information in court on the basis of the finding of probable
cause in the appealed resolution.
The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance.
[7] Rollo, p. 72.
[8] Id. at 74-92.
[9] Id. at 86-88.
[10] Id. at 93-94.
[11] Id. at 96-140.
[12] Supra note 1.
[13] Rollo, p. 95.
[14] Id. at 42-55.
[15] Id at 57-58.
[16] Valerio v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, SCRA 719; Antique Sawmills, Inc. v. Zayco, G.R. No. L-20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316; Macailing v. Andrada, G.R. No. L-21607, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 126.
[17] Rollo, p. 141.
[18] Id. at 160-207.
[19] Id. at 271-277.
[20] Id. at 281-282.
[21] Id. at 285-294.
[22] Id. at 303-309.
[23] Id. at 315-316.
[24] Id. at 320-327.
[25]
Id.
[26] Id. at 310-312.
[27] Id. at 313.
[28] AAA v. Antonio Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 496, 509, citing People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788, 792-793 (1990).
[29] G.R. No. 174016, July 28, 2008, 560
SCRA 278, 293-294.
[30] People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998).
[31] Id. at 294. citing Okabe v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 685, 706.
[32] See Note 6.
[33] Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106695, 1994, 235 SCRA 39, 48, citing Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
[34] G.R. No. 106695, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 39.
[35] G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254 SCRA 307.
[36] G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 656.
[37] G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679.
[38] G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 511.
[39] Supra note 36, at 680.
[40] Supra note 38, at 517.
[41] Supra note 37, at 712.
[42] Supra note 34, at 50.
[43] Supra note 35, at 333.