EN BANC
|
VENANCIO
INONOG, Complainant, - versus
- JUDGE
FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175
Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR.,* NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,** PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ Promulgated: July 28, 2009 |
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present administrative case
stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay[1] of
Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on April
26, 2005, charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 135,
Respondent judge initiated the
proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an order dated March 18, 2005 in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393, entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al.,
directing the complainant to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. The said order read:
ORDER
For intentionally parking car with plate no. WDH 804 at the parking space reserved for the undersigned Presiding Judge, thereby causing the delay in the promulgation of the Decisions in the above-entitled cases driver Butch Inonog, c/o Permit Division, this City, is hereby ordered to appear before this Court at 10:30 A.M., March 18, 2005 and show cause why he should not be cited for Contempt for delaying the administration of justice.
SO ORDERED.
That same day, respondent judge
issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt. To quote from the second order:
ORDER
For failure to appear of respondent Venancio Inonog alias Butch Inonog at today’s hearing and show cause why he should not be cited for contempt, the Court finds him GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT, and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment for a period of five (5) days and to pay a fined [sic] of P1,000.00.
Let a warrant issue for his arrest furnishing copies thereof to the Director General Philippine National Police, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and the Station Commander of Makati Police Station.
SO ORDERED.
The
relevant facts, culled from the records, follow:
Complainant alleged that he is the
security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit Division of Makati
City. According to complainant, at around
1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss
in a vacant parking space at the basement of the
Later that morning, complainant
received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City Government of
Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala of respondent judge
at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of
court for parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. He was informed that the respondent judge
blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the
promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046,
02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the
latter had a hard time looking for another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he
failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued.
Complainant immediately left his home
in Tanay to go to P1,000.00). A warrant for his arrest was also issued.[2]
On March 21, 2005, complainant
through counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Order
of Arrest, but said motion was denied.
Subsequently, complainant filed an Amended Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest, attaching proof of payment
of the fine in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). In his motions, complainant explained that he
did not know that the parking space was reserved for the respondent judge. He also begged for forgiveness and promised not
to repeat the incident. Acting on the said amended motion, respondent judge
issued an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainant’s explanation to be
unsatisfactory. However, respondent
judge modified his previous order by deleting the sentence for imprisonment for
five (5) days but the fine of P1,000.00 was increased to P2,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely. In compliance,
complainant paid the additional amount of P1,000.00 as fine.
Aggrieved by the said orders of
respondent judge, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.
In his Comment dated June 10, 2005,
respondent judge explained that on March 18, 2005, he proceeded to the court at
around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320,
02-3046, 02-3168-69 and 03-392-393, all entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al., which were to be promulgated on
the first hour of the same day. Upon
reaching his parking slot, he found complainant’s vehicle parked there. As a result, he had a hard time looking for
his own parking space. Hence, the
promulgation of the decision was delayed.
According to respondent judge,
complainant knew that the parking slot was reserved for him because it bore his
name. He emphasized that prior to the
incident, he already had his name indicated at the said slot precisely because
there had been previous occasions when other vehicles would occupy his parking
space and he had been forced to park at the public parking area.
Respondent judge added that he
ordered the complainant to appear before him for the hearing at 10:30 a.m. of
March 18, 2005, but, complainant refused, thus, he declared him in contempt of
court.
Respondent judge also averred that he
neither took advantage nor exercised arbitrarily the power of the court as in
fact, complainant was given a chance to be represented by a counsel of his own
choice and was given an opportunity to explain his position which the latter
seriously considered.
Respondent judge explained that his
acts were brought about by his deep concern with the disposition of the cases
assigned to him within the prescribed period.
To accomplish this, he came to office at 7:00 a.m. and worked on his
cases not only in his office, but even at home.
Respondent judge mentioned that he was able to dispose 349 cases leaving
only 171 cases pending as of December 31, 2004.
He pointed out that he was able to further reduce his docket to 23 civil
cases and 29 criminal cases as of May 31, 2005.
Thus, he ranked 3rd among judges in the RTC,
Respondent judge added that petty
disturbances, like the incident involved in the instant administrative
complaint, were annoying to him since they interfered in the performance of his
judicial function. Nevertheless, he did not lose his objectivity, probity,
equanimity, integrity and impartiality and reacted to these incidents within
the limits and boundaries of the law and justice.
On November 15, 2005, the OCA made
the following evaluation and recommendation:
EVALUATION: This administrative complaint came about when Judge Francisco B. Ibay cited complainant in contempt of court simply because the latter parked his vehicle at the parking space served for him. In the exercise of his contempt power, not only did respondent deny the complainant his right to be heard but also convicted him in contempt of court based on a very loose and flimsy reason.
Contempt of court has been defined as a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 57).
Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and indirect. Direct contempt, which is summary, is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so (Section 1, Rule 71).
Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558). Undoubtedly, Judge Ibay cited the complainant for indirect contempt of court since the subject incident transpired not in the court’s presence.
In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court’s honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of court, he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in writing and given an opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically outlines the procedural requisites before a person may be punished for indirect contempt, thus: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543). Proceedings against persons charged with contempt of court are commonly treated as criminal in nature, thus this mode of procedure should be strictly followed.
Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay’s order directing the former to appear and explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after respondent judge found that his parking space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainant’s failure to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his defense.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court
our recommendations that this instant I.P.I. be REDOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter and Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Regional Trial Court, Branch
35, Makati City, be penalized to pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
The Court agrees with the findings of
the OCA but deems it proper to impose a penalty different from the OCA’s
recommendation.
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt. Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule read as
follows:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.—After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. xxx xxx xxx
The phrase “improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice” is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that
could constitute indirect contempt.
However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot allegedly
reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that he acted with
malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated to delay the
proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved
for respondent judge. We cannot also say
that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the
court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and inconsequential to be the basis
of an indirect contempt proceeding.
In Lu Ym v. Mahinay,[3]
we held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or
prohibited by the order of the Court. A
person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which
is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that
there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or
thing is forbidden or required. Here,
the act of complainant is not contrary or clearly prohibited by an order of the
court.
The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well
as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt
for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard
not for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been
enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost
restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[4] Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously
citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of
the authority vested upon him by law.
Besides possessing the requisite
learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable
qualities of every judge.[5] Respondent judge himself has characterized
this incident as a “petty disturbance” and he should not have allowed himself
to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste valuable court time and
resources on a trivial matter.
As for the
appropriate penalty to be imposed, we note that this is not the first time
respondent judge was charged with grave abuse of authority in connection with
his misuse of his contempt power. In
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972 entitled Panaligan v.
Ibay,[6]
the Court in its Decision dated June 21, 2006 resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00
on respondent judge for improperly citing therein complainant for contempt and
ordering his detention without sufficient legal basis. He was warned not to repeat the same or
similar offense, lest a more severe penalty shall be imposed. In Macrohon
v. Ibay,[7]
respondent judge was also found guilty of the same offense and ordered to pay a
fine of P25,000.00. In the recent
case of Nuñez v. Ibay,[8]
which involved a very similar incident regarding inadvertent usurpation of
respondent judge’s parking slot, the Court likewise found respondent judge
guilty of grave abuse of authority for citing complainant therein in contempt
of court without legal basis. In Nuñez, we ordered respondent judge to
pay a fine in the amount of P40,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits, since said respondent judge opted to avail of Optional
Retirement under R.A. No. 910 (as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No. 1438)
effective August 18, 2007.
Considering that this is not the
first time that respondent judge committed the same offense and in Nuñez, which had similar factual antecedents as the case at bar, the
Court already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of P40,000.00,
it is proper to impose on him the same penalty in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found guilty of grave abuse of
authority. He is ordered to pay a FINE
of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
|
(No part) PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
(On official leave) ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice
|
|
|
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
* No part. Participated as then Court Administrator.
** On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[2]
[3]
G.R.
No. 169476, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 253, 263-264.
[4] Torcende v. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1238, January 24, 2003, 396
SCRA 11, 21-22.
[5] Id. at 25.
[6] 491 SCRA 545.
[7] A.M. No. RTJ-06-1970, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 75.
[8] A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009.