Republic
of the SUPREME
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
|
SPS.
LITA DE FELIX
Petitioners, -
versus - ANITA
B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE
LEON, and VILMA B. DE Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 185063 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: July
23, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before
us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking
to set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] dated
August 27, 2008 and October 20, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571. The CA
affirmed with modification the October 4, 2006 Decision[3] in
Civil Case No. Q04-51595 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22 in
The Facts
On
July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the
purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in
Following
the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed,
on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio,
“single.”
Subsequently,
Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12,
1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
Thereafter,
or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their vows in a church wedding
at
On
February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three
months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No. 173677
canceled. They secured the issuance in
their names of TCT No. N-173911 from the
Getting
wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance of TCT No.
N-173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice of Adverse Claim
before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to protect their rights over the
subject property. Very much later,
Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in
a. A Real
Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of spouses Cesar Diankinay and
Filomena Almero on July 22, 1977.
b. A
Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena
Almero on November 27, 1979 for nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage.
c. The
Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
The Tarrosas, in their Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his
exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from
PHHC. As further alleged, they were not
aware of the supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Sale.
After several scheduled hearings,
both parties, assisted by their respective counsels, submitted a Joint
Stipulation of Facts with Motion, to wit:
1.
The parties have
agreed to admit the following facts:
a. Bonifacio
O. De Leon, while still single x x x, purchased from the [PHHC] through a Conditional Contract to Sell on July 20,
1965 a parcel of land with an area of 191.30 square meters situated in
Fairview, Quezon City for P841.72;
b. On
April 24, 1968, Bonifacio O. De Leon married plaintiff Anita B. De Leon before
the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija.
Both parties stipulate that said marriage is valid and binding under the
laws of the
c. On
June 22, 1970, Bonifacio O. De Leon paid [PHHC] the total amount of P1,023.74 x
x x. The right of ownership over the
subject parcel of land was transferred to the late Bonifacio O. De Leon on June
22, 1970, upon the full payment of the total [price] of P1,023.74 and upon
execution of the Final Deed of Sale;
d. After
full payment, Bonifacio O. De Leon was issued [TCT] No. 173677 on February 24,
1972;
e. On
January 12, 1974, Bonifacio O. De Leon executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendants-spouses Felix Rio Tarrosa and
Lita O. De Leon disposing the parcel of land under TCT No. 173677 for valuable
consideration amount of P19,000.00 and subscribed before Atty. Salvador R.
Aguinaldo who was commissioned to [notarize] documents on said date. The parties stipulate that the Deed of Sale is valid and genuine. However, plaintiff Anita De Leon was not a
signatory to the Deed of Sale
executed on January 12, 1974;
f. That
plaintiff Anita B. De Leon and the late Bonifacio O. De Leon were married in
church rites on May 23, 1977 x x x;
g. The
late Bonifacio O. De Leon died on February 29, 1996 at the
h. The
said “Deed of Sale” executed on January 12, 1974 was registered on May 8, 1996
before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and [TCT] No.
N-173911 was issued to Lita O. De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa.[5]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On
October 4, 2006, the RTC, on the finding that the lot in question was the
conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in favor of Anita
and her children. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in the following manner:
(1) Declaring
the Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 executed by the late Bonifacio O. De
Leon in favor of defendants-spouses Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa void ab
initio;
(2) Directing
the Register of Deed of Quezon City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
N-173911 in the name of “Lita O. De Leon, married to Felix Rio Tarrosa” and
restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 173667 in the name of “Bonifacio O.
De Leon”;
(3) Ordering
the defendants-spouses to pay plaintiffs the following sums:
(a) P25,000.00
as moral damages;
(b) P20,000.00
as exemplary damages;
(c) P50,000.00
as attorney’s fees plus appearance fee of P2,500.00 per court appearance;
(d) Costs
of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved,
the Tarrosas appealed to the CA. As they
would submit, the RTC erred:
(1)
in finding for
the plaintiffs-appellees by declaring that the land subject matter of the case
is conjugal property;
(2)
in not declaring
the land as the exclusive property of Bonifacio O. De Leon when sold to
defendant-appellants;
(3)
in ruling that
defendant-appellants did not adduce any proof that the property was acquired
solely by the efforts of Bonifacio O. De Leon;
(4)
in declaring that
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest to Bonifacio O. De Leon because
of the absence of liquidation;
(5)
in cancelling TCT
No. N-173911 and restored TCT No. [173677] in the name of Bonifacio O. De Leon;
(6)
in awarding moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs-appellees.[6]
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On
August 27, 2008, the CA rendered a decision affirmatory of that of the RTC,
save for the award of damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit which the
appellate court ordered deleted. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
decision dated October 4, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
SO
ORDERED.
Just
like the RTC, the CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal
presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. The appellate court held further that the
cases they cited were inapplicable.
As
to the deletion of the grant of moral and exemplary damages, the CA, in gist,
held that no evidence was adduced to justify the award. Based on the same reason, it also deleted the
award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
The
Tarrosas moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA in its equally assailed
resolution of October 20, 2008.
Hence,
they filed this petition.
The Issues
I
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the
land purchased on installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon before marriage although
some installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his
exclusive property.
II
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in ruling that the Lorenzo, et al. vs. Nicolas, et al., and
Alvarez vs. Espiritu cases do not
apply in the case at bar because in the latter the land involved is not a friar
land unlike in the former.
III
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court a quo which ruled that petitioners did not adduce
any proof that the land was acquired solely by the efforts of Bonifacio O. De
Leon.
IV
Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in
affirming the decision of the trial court which ruled that one-half (1/2) of
the conjugal assets do not vest to Bonifacio O. De Leon because of the absence
of liquidation.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Subject Property is the
Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita
The
first three issues thus raised can be summed up to the question of whether or
not the subject property is conjugal.
Petitioners
assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before
he married Anita, the land was Bonifacio’s exclusive property and not conjugal,
even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio
during the marriage. In support of their
position, petitioners cite Lorenzo v.
Nicolas[7] and Alvarez v. Espiritu.[8]
We
disagree.
Article
160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals[9]
teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of
the partnership. Only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. In fact, even when
the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the
presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered
conjugal.[10]
In
the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the
PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is
well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract
to sell. In both types of contract, the
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full
payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not
take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed.[11] In other words, in a contract to sell
ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full
payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon
delivery of the thing sold.[12]
Such
is the situation obtaining in the instant case.
The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and
PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property
will vest on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in
turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price, to wit:
14. Titles
to the property subject of this contract remains with the CORPORATION and shall
pass to, and be transferred in the name of the APPLICANT only upon the
execution of the final Deed of Sale provided for in the next succeeding
paragraph.
15. Upon
the full payment by the APPLICANT of the price of the lot above referred to
together with all the interest due thereon, taxes and other charges, and upon
his faithful compliance with all the conditions of this contract the
CORPORATION agrees to execute in favor of the APPLICANT a final deed of sale of
the aforesaid land, and the APPLICANT agrees to accept said deed, as full
performance by the CORPORATION of its covenants and undertakings hereunder.[13] x x x
Evidently, title to the property in
question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to
stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on April
24, 1968. In net effect, the property
was acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to the
property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only
with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.[14] There must be clear evidence of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses,[15]
and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.[16]
Petitioners’ argument that the
disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive property, since it was registered solely
in his name, is untenable. The mere
registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature.[17] What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
Thus, the question of whether
petitioners were able to adduce proof to overthrow the presumption is a factual
issue best addressed by the trial court.
As a matter of long and sound practice, factual determinations of the
trial courts,[18]
especially when confirmed by the appellate court, are accorded great weight by
the Court and, as rule, will not be disturbed on appeal, except for the most
compelling reasons.[19] Petitioners have not, as they really cannot,
rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot in question. In this regard, the Court notes and quotes
with approval the following excerpts from the trial court’s disposition:
The defendants, however, did not adduce any proof that
the property in question was acquired solely by the efforts of
[Bonifacio]. The established
jurisprudence on the matter leads this Court to the conclusion that the
property involved in this dispute is indeed the conjugal property of the deceased
[Bonifacio] De
In fact, defendant even admitted that [Bonifacio]
brought into his marriage with plaintiff Anita the said land, albeit in the
concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. The property was registered only in 1972
during the existence of the marriage.
However, the absence of evidence on the source of funding has called for
the application of the presumption under Article 160 in favor of the
plaintiffs.[20]
The
cases petitioners cited are without governing applicability to this case simply
because they involved a law specifically enacted to govern the disposition of
and ownership of friar lands. In Lorenzo, the Court held that the
pervading legislative intent of Act No. 1120 is “to sell the friar lands
acquired by the Government to actual settlers and occupants of the same.”[21] The Court went on further to say in Alvarez that “under the Friar Lands Act
of 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the purchaser
the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued.”[22] Plainly, the said cases are not applicable
here considering that the disputed property is not friar land.
There
can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the sale of the disputed lot to
petitioners was never obtained or at least not formally expressed in the
conveying deed. The parties admitted as
much in their Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion earlier reproduced. Not lost on the Court of course is the fact
that petitioners went to the process of registering the deed after Bonifacio’s
death in 1996, some 22 years after its execution. In the interim, petitioners could have had
work—but did not—towards securing Anita’s marital consent to the sale.
It
cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.[23] To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal
piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the
wife’s consent. Else, the sale is not
valid. So it is that in several cases we
ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated,
under civil interdiction, or like causes.
The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is
in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.[24] Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself
authorized their validity.[25]
Accordingly,
the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between Bonifacio and the
Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is
Merely Inchoate until Liquidation
As
a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half
of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a
title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of
the liquidation and settlement.[26] The interest of each spouse is limited to the
net remainder or “remanente liquido”
(haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.[27] Thus, the right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage,
when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.[28]
Therefore,
even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal
partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated,
the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does
not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Nevertheless,
this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a valuable
consideration in the amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the
share of Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to
reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas.
It is a well-settled principle that no person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Pursuant to Section 13,
Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 191-209. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] 91 Phil. 686 (1952).
[8] No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892.
[9] G.R. No. 120594, June 10, 1997, 273 SCRA 229, 236.
[10] Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124642, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 356, 370; Tan, supra note 9; Viloria v.
Aquino, 28 Phil. 258 (1914).
[11] Serrano v. Caguiat, G.R. No. 139173, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 57, 64; Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119580, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 464, citing Rose Packing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-33084, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 309, 318 and Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85733, February 23, 1990, 182 SCRA 564, 670.
[12] Serrano, supra at 65.
[13] Rollo, p. 45.
[14] Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107, 117; citing Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991, 200 SCRA 792.
[15] Ching, supra note 10; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, November 25, 1988, 229 SCRA 188.
[16] Tan, supra note 9.
[17] Go, supra note 14, at 119; Acabal v. Acabal, G.R. No. 148376, March
31, 2005, 454 SCRA 555, 580, citing
[18] Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439, 451; citing People v. Cordero, G.R. Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 383.
[19] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116372, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 451, 460.
[20] Rollo, p. 101.
[21] Supra note 7.
[22] Supra note 8, at 897; citing Director of Lands v. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806 (1950).
[23] Art. 166.
[24] Nicolas v. Court of Appeals, No. L-37631, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 635, 643; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 215 Phil. 380 (1984); Tolentino v. Cardenas, 123 Phil. 517 (1966).
[25] Civil Code, Art. 5.
[26] Abalos v. Macatangay, Jr., G.R. No. 155043, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 649, 663; Wong, supra note 14, at 803.
[27] Manuel v. Losano, 41 Phil. 855 (1918); Nable Jose v. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713 (1916).
[28] Abalos, supra note 26; citing Quintos de Ansaldo v. Sheriff of Manila, 64 Phil. 115 (1937).
[29] Civil Code, Art. 22; Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74, 96; Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation v. New World Properties and Ventures, Inc., G.R. No. 143154, June 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 557, 578; Reyes v. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003.