SECOND
DIVISION
|
EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
- versus - BONIFACIO L. MIRANDO,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 179512
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and PERALTA,*
JJ. Promulgated: July
30, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Bonifacio Mirando (respondent), who was
hired by Eagle Star Security Services, Inc. (petitioner) as a security guard on
P250.00.[1]
On
Responding to the complaint, petitioner
alleged that respondent went on absence without official leave (AWOL) on December
16, 2001 and had not since reported for work, drawing it to send him a notice on
December 26, 2001 to explain his absence, but he failed to respond thereto. [5]
Petitioner further alleged that in a Memorandum[6] dated
December 26, 2001 sent to Agodilla, Endencio reported that respondent pulled
out his uniform on December 15, 2001 and that according to him (respondent), he
“w[ould] render (sic) voluntary resignation by December 17, 2001[,] Monday.”
By Decision[7] of
WHEREFORE,
a Decision is hereby rendered declaring complainant to have been illegally
dismissed. Concomitantly, respondents
are ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and with payment of full backwages from the time of his
illegal dismissal on
Further, respondents are ordered to pay complainant [service incentive leave pay] for 2001, balance of 13th month pay for the year 2001, P1,500.00 representing difference in uniform allowance and 10% of the aggregate amount as attorney’s fees.
Computation of the award prepared by the NLRC Computation Unit is hereto attached and made integral part of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the NLRC, by Decision[8] of
On petitioner’s and respondent’s
respective motions for reconsideration, the NLRC amended its Decision, by Resolution[9] of
April 28, 2006, by reducing the “monetary awards to [herein respondent]
representing [the] cash bond [equivalent], 13th month pay and
service incentive leave pay” to P1,100.00, P2,403.08 and P107.17,
respectively.
Petitioner, via certiorari, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, by Decision[10] of
In affirming the NLRC ruling, the CA observed:
. .
. [I]f indeed it were true that the private respondent manifested his intention to resign on December 15,
2001 to Juanito Endencio[,] then the petitioner agency would have no reason to declare the former as AWOL as
their first reaction would have been to allow the private respondent to execute
a resignation letter. Moreover, the
Court finds it very peculiar that Juanito Endencio, whom the private respondent
allegedly told of his intention to resign on December 15, 2001, did not report
the incident immediately to the petitioner agency but instead waited until
December 26, 2001, or 11 days after, to submit a memorandum reporting the said
incident. This boggles the mind as
logic dictates that such an important incident, if it were true, should have
elicited a much more immediate reaction from Juanito Endencio, being the
Detachment Commander or Officer in Charge of the petitioner agency. After all, a security guard threatening to
quit, thereby abandoning his post, is not an incident that should be taken
lightly, much less ignored by a supervisor, especially considering that
the private respondent’s post was at a bank. In addition, it is significant to note that
the said memorandum came several days after the private respondent filed his case
against the petitioner for illegal dismissal on
Hence, the present petition for
review which faults the appellate court
I
. . . WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER WHICH RELIED ON MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND INFERENCES.
II
… IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED AND IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED ON RECORD WHICH SHOWS BEYOND PERADVENTURE OF DOUBT THAT RESPONDENT WAS NEVER DISMISSED BUT RATHER WENT ON AWOL.
III
… IN FINDING RESPONDENT TO BE ENTITLED TO FULL BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION [PAY], INCLUDING ATTORNEY’S FEES DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE [WAS PRESENTED] TO SATISFY THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE MONEY CLAIMS.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner reiterates that it did not
dismiss respondent who, so it claims, voluntarily separated himself from the
service by refusing to report for work.[12] And it contends that respondent’s amendment
of his complaint after forty nine days to include a prayer for reinstatement,
among other things, exposed his scheme that he did not actually want to be
reinstated but merely wanted a “windfall” in the form of backwages and separation
pay.[13]
Petitioner goes on to argue that even
assuming that respondent was not given any duty assignment, his filing of the complaint
for illegal dismissal was “premature” as he should be considered to have been
in floating status or off-detail under Article 286[14]
of the Labor Code.[15]
Respondent, in his Comment,[16]
maintains that the present petition was filed manifestly for delay as the grounds
cited therein are mere rehash of those already sufficiently passed upon by the
administrative bodies and the appellate court.
Additionally, respondent argues that
the present petition must be treated as a “mere scrap of paper” since the one
who signed it was “not properly authorized by the [p]etitioner to file [it] before
this [Court].”
The petition must be denied.
There is no proof that petitioner’s
representative Reynaldo G. Tauro (Tauro) was authorized to file the petition on
its behalf.[17] The Board Resolution (Annex “R” to the
petition), which was adopted during petitioner’s Special Board Meeting of
RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved that the corporation shall elevate on Certiorari before the Court of Appeals NLRC NCR Case No. 039872-04 entitled “Bonifacio L. Mirando, complainant, versus Eagle Star Security Services, Inc., respondent.”
RESOLVED further as it is hereby resolved that Mr. REYNALDO G. TAURO, shall be appointed as authorized representative of the Corporation, to represent and sign in behalf of the corporation the Verification and Certification of the petition for afore-mentioned case. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, Annex “R was adopted for
the purpose of authorizing Tauro to file petitioner’s petition for “Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.” [18] Despite petitioner’s awareness in its Reply to
respondents’ Comment filed before this Court of the defect in Tauro’ authority
to sign for and in its behalf the Verification and Certification against
Non-Forum Shopping,[19]
it failed even to belatedly file the requisite authority.
Fuentebella and Rolling Hills Memorial Park v. Castro,[20] on the requirement of a certification against
forum shopping, explains:
The reason for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
. . . Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative …[I]f the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum shopping as long as he is authorized by a resolution of its board of directors.
x x x x
A certification without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. (Citations omitted; emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s discourse on relaxation
of technical rules of procedure in the interest of substantial justice does not
impress. While there have been instances when the Court
dispensed with technicalities on the basis of special circumstances or
compelling reasons,[21] there
is no such circumstance or reason in the present case which warrants the
liberal application of technical rules.
AT ALL EVENTS, on the merits, the appellate court did not commit any reversible
error in affirming the congruent findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
that respondent was illegally dismissed.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC gave
weight to the
3. That I am [respondent’s] co-worker as [s]ecurity [g]uard at the said bank from the period of April 30, 2000 up to December 15, 2001 and [respondent] was terminated on the dated [sic] stated above without any violation, (Underscoring supplied),
as well as to Villasis’ handwritten “Pagpapatunay”[23] dated
The persistence of respondent to
resume his duties, not to mention his immediate filing of the illegal dismissal
complaint, should dissipate any doubt that he did not abandon his job.
Clutching at straws, petitioner argues
that respondent was on temporary “off-detail,” the period of time a security
guard is made to wait until he is transferred or assigned to a new post or
client;[24] and
since petitioner’s business is primarily dependent on contracts entered into
with third parties, the temporary “off-detail” of respondent does not amount to
dismissal as long as the period does not exceed 6 months, following Art. 286 of
the Labor Code.[25]
Petitioner’s citation of Article 286
of the Labor Code reading:
ART. 286. When
employment not deemed terminated. ─ The bona fide suspension of the operation of
a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the
fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate
employment. In all such cases, the
employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of
seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than
one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his
relief from the military or civic duty.
(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
is misplaced. Philippine Industrial Security Agency v. Dapiton teaches:
We stress that Article 286 applies
only when there is a bonafide suspension
of the employer’s operation of a business or undertaking for a period not
exceeding six (6) months. In such a
case, there is no termination of employment but only a temporary displacement
of employees, albeit the displacement should not exceed six (6) months. The paramount consideration should be the
dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of
its employees temporarily out of work. In
security services, the temporary “off-detail” of guards takes place when the
security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the security
agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts under its
existing contracts are less than the number of guards in its roster.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
In the
present case, there is no showing that there was lack of available posts at petitioner’s
clients or that there was a request from the client-bank, where respondent was
last posted and which continued to hire petitioner’s services, to replace
respondent with another. Petitioner suddenly
prevented him from reporting on his tour of duty at the bank on
In fine,
the appellate court’s affirmance of the NLRC decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special
Order No. 664 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 50-51, 70-71, 86-87.
[2] Ibid.
[3] NLRC records I, p. 2; Docketed as NLRC NCR North Sector Case No. 12-06545-2001.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 85-98.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Art. 286. When employment not deemed terminated.—The bona fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.
[15] Rollo at pp. 42-43.
[16]
[17]
[18] CA rollo, p. 159.
[19]
[20] G.R. No. 15086, 494 SCRA 183 (2006).
[21] Vide:
General Milling Corp. v. NLRC, 442 Phil. 425
(2002); Shipside Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 143377,
352 SCRA 334 (2001); Uy v. Land Bank of
the Phils., 391 Phil. 303 (2000), citing Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, 318 SCRA 94 (1999) De Guia v. De Guia, G.R. No. 135384, 356
SCRA 287 (2001); and Damasco v. NLRC,
G.R. Nos. 115755 & 116101, 346 SCRA 714 (2000) citing Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125671, 323 SCRA
679 (2000); Philippine Scout Veterans
Security and Investigation Agency Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124500, 299 SCRA
690 (1998); Judy Phils., Inc. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 111934, 289 SCRA 755 (1998).
[22] NLRC records I, p. 14.
[23]
[24] Superstar Security Agency v. NLRC, 184 SCRA 74 (1990).
[25] Rollo, p. 42.
[26] Philippine
Industrial Security Agency v. Dapiton, G.R. No. 127421,