G.R.
No. 179271 – BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (
ARTS
BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, AANGAT TAYO Party-List, and COALITION OF
ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS),
Intervenors.
G.R.
No. 179295 – BAYAN MUNA, A TEACHER, and ABONO, Petitioners, versus COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE OPINION
NACHURA, J.:
This
will clarify my position in these consolidated cases.
I
concurred in the April 24, 2009 ponencia of
the Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio subject to my submission that Section 11,[1] Republic
Act No. 7941[2] or the
Party-List System Act, insofar as it requires a two percent (2%) threshold vote
to entitle a party, sectoral organization or coalition to a seat in the House
of Representatives under the party-list system, is unconstitutional. As explained in my Separate Opinion, the 2% minimum vote requirement poses an
insurmountable barrier to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Philippine Constitution.
My advocacy, however, does not extend to
the complete disregard of a threshold vote.
I expressed full agreement with [now Chief] Justice Reynato S. Puno who,
in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Veterans
Federation Party v. Commission on Elections,[3] validated the need for a minimum vote
requirement, in order—
1. to avaoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system from opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard and earn their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elective representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.[4]
Thus, we proposed that, until
Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to Section 11, R.A. 7941,
we should abide by the sensible standard of “proportional representation” and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote
requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list
seats. Expressed differently, we do not propose that Section 11 or a
paragraph thereof be scrapped for being unconstitutional. It is only the ratio of 2% that we find as unconstitutional—the steady
increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of
additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list
groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement/ratio is no longer viable. It does
not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it
is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the
fundamental law from ever being fully operative.
Obviously, the ponencia did not fully accept our submission. It declared as unconstitutional the 2%
threshold vote only with respect to the second round of allocating party-list
seats (on the additional seats); it continued to apply the 2% minimum vote
requirement for entitlement to a seat under the first round of allocation (on
the guaranteed seats). This, clearly,
was not the intent of our modified concurrence to the ponencia, as expressed in our Separate Opinion.
As expressed in that opinion, the
formula which must be adopted—scrapping
only the 2% ratio but still adopting a threshold vote requirement, is as
follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast
for party-list)
--------------------------------------------------
= 1.8518%
54
party-list seats (as clarified)
Clearly, the
minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list
seats increases. Thus, in a scenario in which there are 100 party-list
seats, the threshold vote is computed as follows:
100%
(Total number of votes cast
for party-list)
--------------------------------------------------
= 1%
100 party-list seats
This is
the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to
the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of Representatives; it
would open opportunities for the broadest people’s representation in the House
of Representatives; and more importantly, it would not violate the
Constitution. Moreover, the threshold vote requirement, as enacted by Congress
and as validated by this Court in Veterans,
is maintained.
Additionally,
the formula will not be discriminatory as it will not only apply in the first
round of allocation of seats, but will also be applicable in the second round.
While I do not wish to belabor the point, the erroneous application by the ponencia of a threshold vote (2%) in the
first round of allocation of seats, and its disregard in the second round, might
cause an unintended transgression of the equal protection clause, which requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.[5]
Thus,
as I have expressed before, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% (only the ratio) in Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all
enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
[1] The provision reads in full:
Section 11. Number of
Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
For
purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the
In
determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a)
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b)
The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats. [Emphasis supplied]
[2]
Entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES
THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR”; approved on
March 3, 1995.
[3] G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000; 342 SCRA
244.
[4]
[5] Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra note 11, at 711-712.