SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE
OF THE Appellee, - versus - ROGER PEREZ
and DANILO PEREZ, Appellants. |
G.R. No. 179154
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio Morales, CHICO-NAZARIO,* LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and PERALTA,***
JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated
On
That on or about the 29th day of
January 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating
[with] another person whose true name, identity and whereabouts [have] not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, qualified by evident
premeditation and treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one FULGENCIO MAGLENTE
CUYSONA by then and there stabbing him with the use of a bladed weapon, hitting
him on his trunk, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of Fulgencio Maglente y Cuysona.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented Ariel Baque and
Rolando Gangca, two eyewitnesses who allegedly saw the stabbing incident on
Ariel Baque testified that he was in his house
located at
On cross-examination, Baque testified that he is a tricycle driver but
on
Rolando Gangca, also a resident of
Araceli Cuysona, Fulgencio’s widow, testified
that her husband died on P877.00 for hospitalization expenses and P30,000.00
for funeral expenses of her husband.[8]
The defense, for its part, presented SPO1 Resty San Pedro of PNP CPD,
Station 5 Police Station,
SPO1 Resty San Pedro’s testimony on direct
examination was dispensed with when the prosecution and the defense stipulated
that: (1) at about 10:30 in the evening of November 4, 2000, appellants Roger
Perez and Danilo Perez voluntarily surrendered at Fairview Police Station 5 accompanied by their lawyer, Atty. Gaspar Tagalo;
(2) both appellants were interviewed by SPO1 San Pedro who was on duty at the
time; (3) appellant Danilo Perez admitted to SPO1 San Pedro during the
interview that he stabbed to death Fulgencio Cuysona and SPO1 San Pedro reduced
the oral admission of Danilo Perez in typewritten (question and answer) form; and
(4) SPO1 San Pedro gave the typewritten confession to appellant Danilo Perez
who read the same and voluntarily
signed the written admission in the presence of his counsel. The defense
marked in evidence the following exhibits: Exhibit 8-a, signature of appellant
Danilo Perez; Exhibit 8-b, signature of Atty. Gaspar Tagalo; Exhibit 8-c, signature
of the Administering Officer; and Exhibit 8-d, Tanong at Sagot No. 8 where he
admitted and claimed sole responsibility for killing Fulgencio.[9]
Likewise, during the hearing on
On cross-examination, appellant Danilo Perez
testified that he stabbed the victim on January 29, 2000 and that he
surrendered and gave a statement to the police only on November 4, 2000 or ten
months after the stabbing incident and when there was already a warrant of
arrest issued for his apprehension. He
likewise identified his written admission marked as Exhibit 8.[11]
Francisco Dayola testified that at about
On cross-examination, Dayola testified that he is employed by appellant
Roger Perez and that he is in court by virtue of a subpoena. He confirmed that on
Appellant Roger Perez testified that he was a jeepney operator and
owned a variety store. On
On
On cross-examination, appellant Roger Perez confirmed that he had a
drink with his friends at about 8:30 in the evening of January 29, 2000; that
he consumed only a few bottles of beer; that while they were drinking, his
brother, appellant Danilo Perez, went home to eat; that at about 10:00 in the
evening of the same day, he came to know that Fulgencio had been stabbed; that
he did not attend the wake of Fulgencio although he knew the deceased during
his lifetime; and that he also knew Ariel Baque and Rolando Gangca with whom he
has no quarrel or dispute such that there is no reason for them to testify
against him. He added that he learned
that he was a suspect in the stabbing of Fulgencio only on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds both accused ROGER PEREZ y
CAROLINO and DANILO PEREZ y CAROLINO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and applying the provisions of the
said Code, hereby sentences each of them to Reclusion Perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of the late FULGENCIO CUYSONA the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as indemnity for the death of the victim, P39,877.00 as
actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
The period during which
the accused was under detention should be deducted from the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellants seasonably filed their appeal. However, in a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is awarded to the heirs of the victim Fulgencio Cuysona.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Hence, this appeal.
On
Appellants assign the following errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
NOT HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE IS SO WEAK TO THE EFFECT THAT BOTH
THE TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY
FAILED TO OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGER PEREZ, HENCE, ROGER PEREZ SHOULD BE EXONERATED AND
ACQUITTED HIS GUILT NOT BEING ESTABLISHED BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
POINTED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT ERRORS HEREUNDER ASSIGNED;
II.
THE COURT BELOW ALSO
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE “FACT OF DEATH” OR CORPUS DELICTI WAS
NOT PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT (SIC) AS AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGER PEREZ;
III.
THE COURT BELOW LIKEWISE
ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT CONSPIRACY AND MOTIVE ARE NOT
ESTABLISHED BY PROSECUTION EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AGAINST APPELLANT
ROGER PEREZ;
IV.
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRED
IN ADMITTING AS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE THE HEARSAY PROSECUTION EXHIBITS “C”; “E”;
AND “F” AS AGAINST ROGER PEREZ;
V.
THE COURT A QUO
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DANILO PEREZ Y CAROLINO REPEATED BY HIS TESTIMONY IN COURT IS
CONVERTED INTO A JUDICIAL CONFESSION; AND
VI.
FINALLY, THE TRIAL COURT
OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING SAID APPELLANT DANILO PEREZ GUILTY OF HOMICIDE
ONLY AND THE SENTENCING OF SAID APPELLANT UNDER THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.[19]
In
essence, appellants ask us to resolve the following two issues: (1) Did the prosecution
prove the guilt of appellant Roger Perez beyond reasonable doubt? and (2) Did
the trial court err in holding appellant Danilo Perez guilty of murder instead
of homicide?
In their brief, appellants claim that
the trial court gravely erred in giving full probative value and credence to
the testimonies, of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which, appellants argue, were
allegedly fabricated, manufactured and perjured. They insist that it was only appellant Danilo Perez
who stabbed Fulgencio considering that appellant Roger Perez was already
sleeping in their house at that time. Moreover,
they aver that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti or
fact of death because it failed to present the medico-legal officer who
autopsied the body of Fulgencio and prepared the Medico-Legal Report[20] showing the
wounds sustained by the victim. Appellants
likewise assert that conspiracy
and motive were not established, and that Danilo should be convicted of the
crime of homicide only.
For its part, the OSG
counters that the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are clear,
straightforward, consistent and categorical. It asserts that appellants failed to show any
ill motive on the part of the prosecution eyewitnesses to testify falsely
against them. The OSG further claims
that even without the testimony of the doctor who prepared the Medico-Legal
Report, the prosecution was still able to prove the corpus delicti by establishing the fact that the victim died
and that such death occurred after he was stabbed by the appellants. Moreover, it argues that proof of motive is
not indispensable for a conviction and that conspiracy may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Finally, it claims
that Danilo should be convicted of the crime of murder since treachery and
abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
After a meticulous review of the
records, we affirm appellants’ conviction. We shall now discuss the parties’ arguments in
seriatim.
First, the trial court did not err in
appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses. The legal aphorism is that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions anchored
on the said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect by the
appellate courts. The raison d’ être for this principle is
that the trial court is able to observe and monitor, at close range, the
conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they testify.[21]
In fact, the rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals.[22]
Applying these
guidelines, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s assessment of the
prosecution eyewitnesses’ credibility. Close
review of the records reveal that Baque and Gangca’s testimonies are positive,
clear and straightforward, without any tinge of falsehood or sign of
fabrication. They were subjected to
lengthy and rigorous cross-examinations, yet they stuck to their testimonies. Also, not only were the appellants identified by the prosecution
eyewitnesses, the latter also testified as to appellants’ roles and their
specific deeds in the killing. Further, no
evidence on record was presented to prove that the prosecution eyewitnesses had
any ill motive to prevaricate and falsely pinpoint appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime.
Second, appellants’ defense of denial and
alibi must fail. It is jurisprudentially
held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. In this case, Roger failed
to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. In fact, Roger’s house was only a few meters
away from where the crime happened. As
correctly pointed out by the appellate court, Roger’s defense that he was asleep
with his wife in his house when the incident took place must be rejected since his
testimony was not even corroborated by his wife whom he claimed to be with him
when the victim was stabbed.
Moreover, it is well-settled that a bare alibi
and denial, being merely self-serving, is itself hardly given credence. Alibi and denial cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification by an eyewitness. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevail over the twin defenses of denial and alibi.[23] Here, prosecution
eyewitness Baque positively identified that Roger was present when the stabbing
incident occurred. In fact, he was only
four arms length away from the crime scene when he saw Roger stabbing the
victim.
Third, appellants’ contention that Danilo’s
admission that he alone committed the crime, hence, Roger should be exonerated,
must necessarily fail. To uphold this
argumentation would leave in the hands of the one accused who elects to plead
guilty, the automatic exemption of his co-accused from all criminal
responsibility.[24] Plainly,
this should not be automatically allowed since the culpability or innocence of
Roger should be determined based on the evidence of their individual
participation in the offense charged. The
prosecution clearly proved that Roger participated in the stabbing of
Fulgencio.
Fourth, we sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy
may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner
in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest.[25]
In this case, conspiracy between the
appellants was clearly established. Danilo initially stabbed Fulgencio at the back
followed by Roger who stabbed the latter at the chest. When the victim tried to run for his life, a
man with blonde hair blocked his path and the three continued to stab the
victim. These acts undoubtedly showed
appellants’ unanimity in design, intent and execution. The appellants performed specific acts with
closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and
design[26] to bring about the death of Fulgencio.
Also, the claim that Roger lacked the motive to
commit the crime will not preclude his conviction. Motive is not an element of the crime of
murder. Motive is totally irrelevant when
ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Where a reliable eyewitness had
fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the
felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal
case.[27]
Fifth, we are not persuaded by the appellants’
claim that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti. Corpus delicti refers to the fact that a crime has been
actually committed. It does not refer to
the autopsy report evidencing the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim
nor the testimony of the physician who conducted the autopsy or medical
examination. It is made up of two
elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act. While the autopsy report of a medico legal
expert in cases of murder is preferably accepted to show the extent of injuries
suffered by the victim, it is not the only competent evidence to prove the
injuries and the fact of death. It may
be proved by the testimonies of credible witnesses.[28]
The testimony of the doctor who prepared the
Medico-Legal Report, therefore, is not crucial in proving corpus delicti. The fact
that Fulgencio died and that such death occurred after he was stabbed by
appellants was clearly established by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses
and the evidence adduced by the prosecution during the trial. In fact, Danilo himself admitted in his
extrajudicial confession that he killed Fulgencio.
Finally, we are not convinced by appellants’
asseverations that Danilo should be convicted only of homicide. We agree with the conclusion of the court a
quo that the appellants should be convicted of murder. The killing of Fulgencio was attended by
treachery and abuse of superior strength, and any one of these two aggravating
circumstances may qualify a killing into murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[29] The
events narrated by the prosecution eyewitnesses point to the fact that Fulgencio
could not have been aware that he would be attacked by the appellants. There was no opportunity for him to defend
himself, as appellants, suddenly and without provocation, stabbed him at the
back and on the chest.
Furthermore, abuse of superior strength
attended the killing when the appellants, together with an unidentified person
who held the victim’s hands, took advantage of their combined strength in order
to consummate the offense. However, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated
separately, it being necessarily absorbed in treachery.[30]
All told, we hold that appellants Roger Perez
and Danilo Perez are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
WE CONCUR: CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
||
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
|
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
||
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 658.
** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 635.
*** Designated member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 664.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-25. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 44-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Theresa L. De la Torre-Yadao.
[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
[4]
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] Records, pp. 396-397. RTC Order dated
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] TSN,
[14] TSN,
[15]
[16] TSN,
[17] CA rollo, p. 54.
[18] Rollo, p. 24.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 67-68.
[20] Records, pp. 108-109.
[21] People v. Aquinde, G.R. No. 133733,
[22] People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019,
[23] People v. Borbon, G.R. No. 143085,
[24] People v. Abordo, G.R. No. 107245,
[25] Mangangey v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 147773-74,
[26] People v. Quirol, G.R. No. 149259,
[27] People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594,
[28] People v. Quimzon, G.R. No. 133541,
[29] Revised Penal Code,
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. − The following are aggravating circumstances:
x x x x
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
x x x x
[30] People v. Loreto, G.R. Nos. 137411-13,