THIRD DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - LEO QUEMEGGEN and JANITO
DE LUNA, Accused-Appellants. |
G.R.
No. 178205
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR. NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: July 27,
2009 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For
review is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
As
established by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
On October 31, 1996, at around 11:00 in the
evening, Noel Tabernilla (Tabernilla) was driving his passenger jeep to
Navotas, Metro Manila. Along Road 10 in
Navotas, four of the passengers announced a hold-up. One of the robbers poked a balisong on Tabernilla’s nape,[3]
while the other three divested the passengers of their valuables.[4] Then, the hold-uppers alighted from the jeep
in a place called “Puting Bato.”[5]
From
there, Tabernilla and six or seven of his passengers went to the nearest police
detachment to report the incident. Three policemen accompanied them to the
scene of the crime. While there, the policemen chanced upon the robbers riding
a pedicab. Socrates Kagalingan
(Kagalingan), one of the passengers-victims, recognized the perpetrators, since
one of them was still wearing the belt bag that was taken from him.[6]
The policemen were able to arrest three suspects,
including Janito de Luna (de Luna), but Leo Quemeggen (Quemeggen) was able to
escape. The three suspects were left
under the care of a police officer, Emelito Suing (Suing), while the other
police officers pursued Quemeggen.
Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects ganged up on
Suing; de Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as “Weng-Weng” shot
him on the head.[7] The suspects thereafter escaped.
Upon
the return of the two policemen who unsuccessfully pursued Quemeggen, Suing was
brought to the hospital where he eventually died.[8]
Dr. Rosalyn Cosidon (Dr. Cosidon) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Suing.[9]
She concluded that the cause of the death of Suing was hemorrhage as a result
of a gunshot wound in the head. The
results of her examination were reflected in Medico-Legal Report No. M-1614-96.[10]
Appellants
Quemeggen and de Luna were eventually arrested through follow-up operations
undertaken by the Navotas Police.[11] On
November 5, 1996, appellants were charged in an Information for Robbery with Homicide, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of
October 1996, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of one SOCRATES KAGALINGAN Y ROXAS, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away
the following articles to wit:
One
(1) gold necklace worth ----------- P1,800.00
One
(1) men’s wrist watch ----------- 2,000.00
Cash
money amounting to ----------- 500.00_
Total ------------ P4,300.00
belonging to said complainant, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the total amount of P4,300.00;
that on the occasion of the said Robbery one of the arrested suspect[s] dr[e]w
a handgun and shot one PO2 SUING, thereby inflicting upon the said PO2 Suing, serious
physical injuries, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY
TO LAW.[12]
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded “Not Guilty.”[13]
As the appellants manifested[14]
that they were not availing of the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued.
During the trial, Tabernilla and Kagalingan testified for
the prosecution. Dr. Cosidon’s testimony
as an expert witness was dispensed with in view of the appellants’ admission of
her qualification and competence; the fact that she conducted the autopsy on
the cadaver of the victim; that she prepared the sketches of a human body; that
a slug was recovered from the head of the victim; and that the body of the
victim was identified prior to the autopsy.[15]
Appellants, on the other hand, interposed the defense of
alibi. They maintained that they were
elsewhere when the robbery and shooting incident took place. They claimed that they were in their
respective houses: Quemeggen was helping his grandmother cut pieces of cloth used
in making rugs, while de Luna was sleeping with his wife.[16]
On August 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[17]
convicting the appellants of Robbery with Homicide, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Leo Quemeggen
y Larawan and Janito de Luna y Rayo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with homicide defined and penalized under Art. 294, par. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, for which they are both hereby
sentenced to the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Accused
Quemeggen and accused de Luna are also ordered to pay (1) the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnification for the loss of the
victim’s life, and (2) P4,000.00 to Socrates Kagalingan by way of
indemnification of the total value of the valuables taken from him during the
hold-up.
Costs
against the two (2) accused.
SO
ORDERED.[18]
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review, but on February 9, 2005, pursuant to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo,[19] we transferred the case to the CA. [20]
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case
No. 17287-MN dated
1. As to accused-appellant Leo Quemeggen: he is
found guilty of the crime of Robbery and is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years of prision
correc[c]ional as minimum to eight
(8) years of prision mayor as maximum
with the accessories of said penalty; and
2. As to accused-appellant Janito de Luna: he is
found guilty of the crime of Robbery and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment
ranging from four (4) years of prision
correc[c]ional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum with the accessories of said penalty. He is likewise found guilty of the crime of
Homicide and is sentence[d] to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum with the accessories of said penalty.
3. Both accused-appellants area (sic) also
ordered to indemnify Socrates Kagalingan the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00)
for the valuables taken from him during the robbery.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The CA concluded that
appellants could not be convicted of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide. It noted that Suing was not
killed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, two separate crimes of robbery and
homicide were committed. As the
appellants were in conspiracy to commit robbery, both were convicted of such
offense. However, as to the death of Suing,
considering that at the time of the killing, Quemeggen was being chased by the
police officers and there was no evidence showing that there was conspiracy,
only de Luna was convicted of homicide.[22]
Hence, this appeal, based on the following arguments:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[23]
In assailing their
conviction, appellants argue that: 1) the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are incredible, because it was unnatural for the robbers not to leave the crime
scene immediately after the incident; 2) the prosecution failed to present a
policeman to prove that appellants were arrested on board a pedicab, and that
the loot from the robbery was confiscated from them; and 3) no expert testimony
was presented to prove the fact of death of the victim.[24]
We find no merit in the
appeal.
Appellants fault the CA
for relying on the improbable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who
testified that they saw the former at the crime scene riding a pedicab. Appellants add that it was improbable for
them not to leave the crime scene immediately after the robbery. It is well-settled that different people
react differently to a given situation, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange event.[25]
Moreover, when it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves
great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe
directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is
in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence
properly.[26]
Appellants’ conviction is not negated by the failure of the
prosecution to present any police officer to testify that appellants were
arrested on board a pedicab, and that the loot from the robbery was confiscated
from them; and an expert witness to testify on the cause of death of the
victim. Kagalingan and Tabernilla’s
testimonies as to the circumstances surrounding the robbery and the killing were
sufficient. It must be recalled that they
were eyewitnesses to the commission of the crimes. These witnesses adequately narrated the
events that transpired from the time the appellants declared a hold-up up to
the time they alighted from the passenger jeep.
They also witnessed how de Luna and the other malefactors strangled and
eventually shot Suing.
As to the non-presentation of Dr. Cosidon as an expert
witness, records show that appellants, through their counsel de oficio, admitted in open court her
qualifications and competence, the conduct of autopsy and the results thereof as
appearing in Dr. Cosidon’s report, including the cause of death.[27] Hence, the presentation of an expert witness was
no longer necessary.
Now, on the nature of the
crime or crimes committed. The
Information shows that appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides in part:
“Art.
294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, when by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.”
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the
prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
1. The taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to
another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on
the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.[28]
We reiterate, at this
point, the relevant factual circumstances.
Appellants, together with the other suspects, boarded Tabernilla’s
passenger jeep. Suddenly, they announced
a hold-up. One of them poked a balisong at
the neck of Tabernilla, while the others divested the passengers of their
valuables. Obviously, in boarding the
passenger jeep, announcing a hold-up, and eventually taking the personal
belongings of the passengers, appellants had the intent to gain. Thus, the
first three elements of the crime were adequately proven.
The only question is
whether the fourth element was present, i.e., that by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery, homicide was committed.
Homicide is said to have
been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; c) to prevent discovery of the
commission of the robbery; or d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of
the crime.[29]
Given the circumstances surrounding the
instant case, we agree with the CA that appellants cannot be convicted of
Robbery with Homicide. Indeed, the killing may occur before, during, or after
the robbery. And it is immaterial that
death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed.[30] However, essential for conviction of robbery
with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the
former or whether both crimes are committed at the same time.[31]
From the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, we cannot see the connection between the robbery and
the homicide. It must be recalled that
after taking the passengers’ personal belongings, appellants (and two other
suspects) alighted from the jeepney. At that moment, robbery was consummated. Some of the passengers, however, decided to
report the incident to the proper authorities; hence, they went to the nearest
police station. There, they narrated
what happened. The police eventually
decided to go back to the place where the robbery took place. Initially, they saw no one; then finally,
Kagalingan saw the suspects on board a pedicab.
De Luna and two other suspects were caught and left under the care of
Suing. It was then that Suing was
killed. Clearly, the killing was
distinct from the robbery. There may be
a connection between the two crimes, but surely, there was no “direct
connection.”
Though appellants were
charged with Robbery with Homicide, we find Quemeggen guilty of robbery, and de
Luna of two separate crimes of robbery and homicide. It is axiomatic that the nature and character
of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific
crime, but by the facts alleged in the information.[32] Controlling in an information should not be
the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large,
mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[33] There should also be no problem in convicting
an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged in one information or
complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they were made the
subject of separate complaints or informations.[34]
As worded, the Information
sufficiently alleged all the elements of both felonies.
Needless to state,
appellants failed, before their arraignment, to move for the quashal of the
Information, which appeared to charge more than one offense. They have thereby waived any objection thereto,
and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those charged in the
Information and proven during the trial.[35]
As to the proper
penalty, we sustain the appellate court. The penalty for simple robbery is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium
period, ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 10 years.[36] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum term thereof shall be 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20
days; while the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree or 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. The CA thus correctly imposed the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years of prision correccional
as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor
as maximum.
On the other hand, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years.[37] The maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months; while
the minimum term shall be within the range of prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Therefore, the CA was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court notes that the
CA failed to award civil indemnity ex
delicto to the heirs of Suing. Civil
indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof other
than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.[38]
Thus, de Luna shall be liable to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the death of Suing.
Records show that appellants were committed to prison on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Considering
that Quemeggen has been incarcerated for more than the maximum penalty for the
crime of robbery he committed, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE LEO QUEMEGGEN from confinement,
unless further detention is justified by some other lawful cause, and inform
this Court of the action taken within
five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-17.
[2] Penned by Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 15-20.
[3]
[4] Rollo, p. 5.
[5] CA rollo, p. 16.
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 6.
[8] CA rollo, p. 17.
[9] Records, p. 63.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, p. 9.
[17] Supra note 2.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 19-20.
[19] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[20] CA rollo, p. 104.
[21] Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[22]
[23] CA rollo, p. 51.
[24]
[25] People v. Reyes, 447 Phil. 668, 676 (2003).
[26] People
v. Lara, G.R. No. 171449,
[27] Records, p. 64.
[28] People v. Lara, supra at 154; People v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 401-402; People v. Sanchez, 358 Phil. 527, 535 (1998).
[29] People
v. Jabiniao, Jr., G.R. No. 179499,
[30] People
v. Jabiniao, Jr., supra at 783; People
v. De Jesus, supra at 402.
[31] People
v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599,
[32] People v. Lara, supra note 26, at 156.
[33] People v. Taño, 387 Phil. 465, 487 (2000).
[34]
[35] People
of the
[36] Article 294 (5), Revised Penal Code.
[37] Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
[38] Razon
v. People, G.R. No. 158053,
[39] Records, p. 14.